THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 28 JUNE 1968

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976224
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: June 28, 1968

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006200180001-9
,
The President's Daily Brief
28 June 1968
23
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006200180001-9
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006200180001-9
THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
28 JUNE 1968
1. Soviet Union
2. South Vietnam
3. Malaysia-
Philippines
At Annex today we present our
analysis of Gromyko's offer to discuss
limitations on strategic weapons.
Belief that some accommodation
with the Liberation Front will have to
be accepted by the government eventu-
ally is being voiced in Saigon. Over
the past few weeks, student, labor, and
religious groups have called for an end
to the fighting and suggested negotia-
tions with the Front.
The Communists are trying to en-
courage and exploit these feelings.
One of the Front's leading political
cadre is reported to have said the
Front was highly interested in promot-
ing a peace campaign in Saigon.
Delegations of the two countries
have been talking in Bangkok about Phil-
ippine claims to part of Malaysian Borneo.
Both sides feel there has been no prog-
ress and are about ready to pack up.
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006200180001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006200180001-9
4. Czechoslovakia
5. France
Prague is announcing that the War-
saw Pact exercise will end this weekend
and foreign troops will go home. Pub-
lic statements about the nature of this
exercise have changed often enough, how-
ever, to give the Czechs some reason to
feel a bit uneasy about when their So-
viet guests might leave.
The Gaullists go down to the wire
expecting to get more than the 92 ad-
ditional seats they need to win in the
second round for a majority. They are
still worried about voter complacency,
however, and are working hard to get
their backers to the polls on Sunday.
50X1
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006200180001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006200180001-9
ANNEX
Soviet Offer to Discuss Strategic Weapons
Gromyko's offer to "exchange opinions" on the
limitation of offensive and defensive strategic weap-
ons comes after more than a year of hesitation in
Moscow.
The issue has obviously been a controversial one
within Soviet policymaking circles. Broad considera-
tions of military posture, economic allocations, and
foreign policy contributed to the long delay in mov-
ing toward a decision to talk.
Gromyko's statement does not by itself signify
that any of these problems has been definitively re-
solved. The offer to discuss the question may be only
another step--though a large one--by the Soviet lead-
ership in the process of weighing all the factors be-
fore coming to a final decision on the future of So-
viet weapons systems both offensive and defensive.
The movement in the Soviet position may have
flowed from President Johnson's speech to the nation
on 31 March. The prospect that an end of the Vietnam
war might free the US to devote huge sums to more and
better missile systems--which the USSR would be hard-
pressed to match--could have played a large part in
tilting the scales toward missile talks.
The negotiation of a strategic arms limitation
agreement would have a distinct advantage for the So-
viets at this time. Their current strategic attack
programs will provide them with the most powerful de-
terrent they have ever had. In the early 1970s, how-
ever, the currently programmed US strategic missile
systems will begin to erode this capability. Besides,
there is the question of costs. Soviet defense ex-
penditures are expected to increase some 10-15 per-
cent by 1970-72. Soviet-American talks could make
it possible for Moscow to hold expenditures to about
the present levels, allowing much needed allocations
to other areas of the economy.
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006200180001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006200180001-9
Nevertheless, Gromyko intimated that there were
lingering misgivings about the Soviet move within the
USSR when he denounced those who regard the arms race
as a "fatal inevitability." He charged that those,
presumably dogmatic Communists or military leaders,
who assert that disarmament is an illusion were "tak-
ing a stand close to the forces of the most dyed-in-
the-wool imperialist reaction."
On the other questions affecting the climate of
US-Soviet relations--the Vietnam war, the Paris peace
talks, Middle East tensions, Berlin and Germany--
Gromyko stood pat. The Soviet foreign minister noted
that Soviet-Ainerican relations were "still burdened"
by the war and US "aggressiveness." Throughout the
speech he steered clear of any suggestion that the
door to improved relations was about to be opened.
His statements on disarmament were in fact put in the
context of multilateral undertakings without mention-
ing the US by name.
A - 2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24: CIA-RDP79T00936A006200180001-9
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006200180001-9
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006200180001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006200180001-9
Top Secret
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
1.) Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
2.) North Vietnamese Reflections of U S
Political Attitudes
Top Secret 50X1
16
28 June 1968
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006200180001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006200180001-9
50X1
Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
for the President's Eyes Only
28 June 1968
I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION
* * *
Antiwar Phone Campaign: The "Women's Strike
for Peace" organization is urging all members and
sympathizers to telephone the White House and the
Pentagon with antiwar messages on 1 July. The ob-
jective is to tie up the telephone lines.
* * *
* * *
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006200180001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006200180001-9 -
* * *
Claims of Aircraft Shootdowns: Hanoi's domes-
tic service in Vietnamese yesterday broadcast the
highly inflated claim that the 3000th US aircraft had
been shot down on 25 June. Following this announce-
ment, a 20-minute communique of the armed forces' high
command acclaiming this feat was broadcast. The com-
munique asserted that the US had suffered one defeat
after another in its air war against the North and
that "since late March it has had to carry out so-
called limited bombing of North Vietnam." It added
that this limitation "is an admission of defeat by
the Americans."
The occasion also brought a message of congratu-
lations from Ho Chi Minh.
* * *
II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL
ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
-2-
50X1
'50X1
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006200180001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006200180001-9 -
? Hanoi on Humphrey: Hanoi has rejected Vice Presi-
dent Humphrey's proposal for a cease-fire. In .a domes-
tic commentary of 26 June, Radio Hanoi said that "an
immediate cease-fire is not a measure that leads to-
ward peace" and promised that the Vietnamese people
would continue to fight as long there were "US ag-
gressors" in Vietnam.
-3-
50X1
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006200180001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006200180001-9
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006200180001-9