THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 27 JULY 1966

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005968440
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: July 27, 1966

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004600230001-1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
27 JULY 1966
7015'-S-E-G2ZI_
23
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004600230001-1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004600230001-1, 11
DAILY BRIEF
27 JULY 1966
1. Congo The situation is deteriorating.
2. Soviet Union
President Mobutu, meanwhile, has
either been unable to control his army
or is deliberately acting against the
mercenaries. He earlier had told US
officials that he did not blame the mer-
cenaries for the events in Kisangani;
now, however, some of the mercenaries
in remote areas have been imprisoned
by government troops.
The Congolese Army is not capable
of operating effectively against a com-
bined mercenary-Katangese force in the
Kisangani area. Loss of control there
could create a situation favorable for
a coup attempt or for a secessionist
move.
50X1
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004600230001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004600230001-11
3. Cambodia
Sihanouk insists that the Vietnamese
Communists must formally accept his ver-
sion of Cambodia's border with South
Vietnam if he is to recognize the Viet
Cong as "representative of the South
Vietnamese people and nation." In a
speech last week, Sihanouk said he is
willing to exchange ambassadors with
Hanoi and accept a Viet Cong "diplomat"
in Phnom Penh if the Communists accept
his border ideas.
Without the border agreement, how-
ever, "the affair will be terminated,"
he declared. He expressed some doubt
that the Viet Cong will be willing to
sign on his terms. There has been no
hint from Hanoi or the Viet Cong as to
their attitude.
Sihanouk's recent comments suggest
that he is coming to have serious doubts
of an early Communist victory in South
Vietnam. He still thinks, however, that
they will ultimately prevail and prob-
ably thinks that a border agreement now
would establish "juridical" grounds for
warding off future Communist pressure
against Cambodia.
50X1
4. South .Vietnam
The Communist psychological apparatus
in South Vietnam has made a pitch to two
key generals who may, in fact, be caught
up in internal dissension within the
South Vietnamese military. The Libera-
tion Front radio was heard recently warn-
ing the II and IV Corps commanders that
they are the next targets of a govern-
ment purge.
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004600230001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004600230001-1
5. North Vietnam
6. Brazil
The propaganda treatment which
Hanoi has recently been giving to the
Demilitarized Zone contrasts signifi-
cantly with Peking's. The Chinese are
saying that the zone really no longer
exists. They imply that the North Viet-
namese have the right to strike south
in retaliation for US aggressive acts.
Hanoi, on the other hand, has been cau-
tious and has stressed its alleged com-
pliance with zone regulations.
The recent major North Vietnamese
infiltration across the zone clearly
gives reason for Hanoi's sensitivity
on the subject. Today Hanoi again for-
mally protested US acts which, it charged,
have "aggravated tension" in the area of
the zone.
Reaction in Brazil to the bombing
incidents in Recife on Monday has been
one of general revulsion accompanied by
some fear that Castello Branco may over-
react to the provocation. Leaders of
the opposition Brazilian Democratic Move-
ment immediately denounced the terrorist
acts; their main concern apparently was
that a wave of terrorism might lead the
government to cancel the congressional
elections set for November.
A number of Communists and other
extremists have been rounded up, but the
government seems disinclined at this
point to take more drastic action. If
bomb plantings continue, however, the
government's attitude could quickly
change.
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004600230001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004600230001-1
7. Cuba
8. Argentina
50X1
Castro's remarks about Latin Ameri-
can Communists who "preach electioneer-
ing" instead of fomenting revolution were
probably the most significant part of
his anniversary speech yesterday. Barbs
of this kind can only suggest that Castro
and the other established Communist par-
ties of Latin America are split again
over the question of revolutionary tac-
tics.
Castro in effect may be saying
that Cuba now feels itself less bound
by the accords of the Havana Conference
of Latin Communist parties in November
1964. At that time, Cuba agreed with
Moscow's position and stopped funding
extremist groups not endorsed by the
regular Communist parties.
The generals who brought the Ongania
government to power are beginning to worry
about the progress of their revolution.
These people hoped for moderation, but
now they feel that the influence of the
Catholic nationalists in the government
is growing and promoting a kind of con-
servatism that is bad for the country.
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004600230001-1
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004600230001-1
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004600230001-1