THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 13 JANUARY 1966

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005968096
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: January 13, 1966

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004200280001-0
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
13 JANUARY 1966
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DAILY BRIEF
13 JANUARY 1966
1. Vietnam
Shelepin has left Hanoi, but no
communiqu?n the visit has yet been
released.
The anti-Chinese thrust of the
Shelepin mission became increasingly
apparent as the visit progressed. This
was particularly noticeable in Shelepin's
stress on the overriding need for bloc
unity and "joint practical steps" to
support Hanoi. The North Vietnamese
leaders, however, remained extremely
cautious in offering any support for
Moscow's efforts to discredit Peking.
Speeches out of Hanoi during the
?past week also betrayed a marked diver-
gence between the Soviets and the North
Vietnamese in their treatment of the US
peace initiative. The North Vietnamese
repeatedly denounced US diplomatic ef-
forts as "deceitful and perfidious
trickery," but Shelepin pointedly avoided
this theme.
In addition, reports from the So-
viet news agency, TASS, have toned down
the more abrasive comments from Hanoi
on recent US moves, And Moscow has not
yet replayed the vituperative speech
which Pham Van Dong made last Saturday.
The subject of increased Soviet
military assistance was given only cur-
sory public attention during the visit.
Shelepin merely noted that Soiet - North
Vietnamese cooperation in strengthening
the defense potential of North Vietnam
"continues to develop."
Peking has still not commented di-
rectly on the Soviet mission.
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2. North Vietnam
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3. Sino-Soviet Reaction Communist reaction to President
Johnson's State of the Union address
has been limited so far to preliminary
press comments. Normally it takes two
or three days before the more authori-
tative responses come in.
The Soviet, newspaper, Izvestia,
said the world has been looking for evi-
dence that the US is ready to take real
steps to stop its "armed aggression,"
but the "decisive thing in the message
turned out to be an assertion that Ameri-
cans do not intend to leave Vietnam."
Izvestia added that it is obvious that
the US intends to continue the war in
order to impose its will on the Viet-
namese people,
In the initial reaction from Peking,
the Chinese radio asserted that the speech
"exposed" the US peace campaign "as a
smokescreen to cover its war escalation."
The broadcast also said that President
Johnson"blatantly flung war threats" at
the Vietnamese and Chinese peoples.
There has been no response yet from
Hanoi.
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4. Communist China
5. India
6. Indonesia
The two top party leaders, Mao Tse-
tung and Liu Shao-chi, have not shown
up in public since late November. This
is particularly unusual in Liu's case.
As chief of state, he normally makes
many ceremonial appearances. Both leaders
may be on extended vacations, but what-
ever the explanation, it does appear that
their burden of years is slowing them
down.
Congress Party leaders are to be-
gin meeting tomorrow in an effort to
agree on a new prime minister. Most
leaders want an early decision without
an open contest. But the lack of an
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Defense Minister Chavan and former
Finance Minister Morarji Desai seem both
to be actively seeking the job.
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Tensions produced by the continuing
power struggle seem to have been stepped
up a notch or two since the weekend.
Army-inspired student demonstrations,
protesting Sukarno's economic policies,
have come increasingly close to attack-
ing Sukarno directly. Reacting to his
expulsion of US newsmen on Tuesday, they
demanded yesterday that Peking's news
agency also be expelled.
Sukarno, who has recently shown some
signs of increased confidence, is reported
to be deeply angered by the demonstra-
tions and has ordered the army to end
them. Army leaders are said to be con-
sidering "postponing" them.
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7. Rhodesia
Common Market
Prime Minister Wilson seems to have
come out of the Commonwealth Conference
on Rhodesia in a better position than
his .advisers had expected. He was sub-
jected to the inevitable African pressure
for quicker and more decisive action '
against the Smith regime. But he appar-
ently avoided major concessions and did
emerge with at least tacit backing for
his policies by most of the African par-
ticipants.
The final communiqu?tates that an-
other conference will be held no later
than July if Smith is still in power by
that time. Although some members re-
served the right to call for further
United Nations action sooner, even ten-
tative agreement on a July deadline is
a considerable concession by the Afri-
can nationalists.
The British cabinet 'officer in charge
of Commonwealth affairs revealed today
that he will go to Salisbury tomorrow
for talks with the beleaguered British
governor in Rhodesia. He may also see
Smith.
Next week's council meeting in Luxem-
bourg will be the first since last June
with the French participating. The
five .other members have no clear idea of
what Paris intends to propose, but all
are prepared to resist a French effort
to change the basic principles of the
organization.
Any formula fuzzing over the differ-
ences with the French would be exceed-
ingly difficult to negotiate. It might
be attempted, however, if the French ap-
pear conciliatory. Otherwise, the five
are likely to consider how they can pro-
ceed without France.
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9. Dominican Republic There is a cautious feeling today
in Santo Domingo that the latest crisis
? may be on the way toward a settlement.
Garcia Godoy seems to have made some
progress in the last two days in moving
? the two top former rebel leaders toward
a graceful departure from the country.
The main problem has been to give Caa-
mano some kind of "guarantee" that the
remaining ex-rebels will not suffer after
their leaders' departure.
10. Turkey
Once the two are out, the chances
of voluntary departure by the three regu-
lar military chiefs will be fairly good.
It will not be easy to accomplish
all this,however. Any rash move on either
side--or by Garcia Godoy himself--could
get the situation off the track again.
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