THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 16 AUGUST 1965

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005967839
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: August 16, 1965

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
16 AUGUST 1965
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DAILY BRIEF
16 AUGUST 1965
1. North Vietnam
There is additional evidence that
Hanoi is not insisting on withdrawal
of US troops as a precondition for
starting talks.
In an interview published yesterday
in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh said that the US
must give "tangible proofs" that it ac-
cepts the North Vietnamese four points.
These "proofs" include "immediate" ces-
sation of US attacks on the north and
stoppage "forthwith" of the war against
the Viet Cong in the south. Ho also
called for withdrawal of US forces, but
this was not labelled an "immediate" neces-
sity.
Last week, Hanoi's ambassador to
Havana took a similar line. He told a
Western diplomat that North Vietnam does
"not wish to say that negotiations could
start only after" the withdrawal of US
forces. However, Hanoi insists on a
"sincere declaration" showing that the
US respects the Geneva agreements. The
ambassador implied that this would involve
a unilateral cease-fire by the US.
Soviet officials continue to reflect
Moscow's desire for limiting and even-
tually resolving the war. On 7 August
a Soviet Embassy officer in Hanoi urged
direct communication between President
Johnson and Ho Chi Minh in order to break
the impasse. He told a Western official
that North Vietnamese leaders were begin-
ning to understand that the US would not
be pushed out, but they "may well" not
have understood completely US policy re-
garding talks.
The Soviet offered no assurances
that a US initiative would be favorably
?received in Hanoi.
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2. South Vietnam
The Ky government may find itself
embroiled in a major corruption scandal.
The US Embassy has information that
both local Vietnamese officials and some
government figures in Saigon are impli-
cated in land speculation around Cam
Ranh Bay. The speculators--including
the wife of War Minister Co--apparently
acquired government land at no cost and
plan to turn it back with large profits
after construction of the US base and
port facilities is completed.
3. Dominican Republic Although the OAS negotiating team
has made little further headway against
rebel intransigence, prospective provi-
sional president Gracia Godoy has not
given up hope that his private negotia-
tions with rebel leaders will bear fruit.
Factionalism among the rebels re-
mains a major factor in their stalling.
Extremists apparently still hope to gain
from a continuation of the present situa-
tion.
The Annex today summarizes the at-
titude of the principal Communist fac-
tions toward undertaking guerrilla war-
fare oncea provisional government takes
over.
4. Greece
5. Kashmir
The maneuvering to line up support
for an alternate to Papandreou continues,
with Deputy Prime-Minister Stephanopoulos
and ex-Interior Minister Tsirimokos still
the leading prospects,
if either is named by the
King, the COmmunists will take to the
streets of central Athens in protest.
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Skirmishing continues but there is
no evidence that infiltrators from Paki-
stan have been able to muster significant
local support.
So far, there is no information 50X1
to confirm press reports 50X1
regular Pakistani units as such have
major attacks along the cease-fire
to support the "guerrilla" activity.
that
made
line
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6. Yemen
7. East Germany
8. Turkey
There are further signs that per 50X1
sonal talks between Nasir and King Faysal
may be forthcoming. The King, at least,
says he "will continue to talk despite
everything."
The major exercise of Soviet forces
appears to have ended today. west of Ber-
lin.
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Prime Minister
Urguplu's current visit to the USSR--
the usual communiqu?s due tomorrow.
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ANNEX
The Outlook for Insurgency in the
Dominican Republic
The various Communist factions have considerably
expanded their capabilities for guerrilla warfare since
the insurrection broke out. At the outset, they ac-
quired a large amount of weapons, ammunition, and ex-
plosives, and since that time have made a concerted
effort to cache this equipment. When the provisional
government takes over, the amount of weapons and am-
munition available to the extremists probably exceeds
the number of trained personnel available for terror-
ist activity.
The biggest problem facing the Communists is
their lack of mass support. The bulk of the populace
is conservative and anti-Communist. Most of the peo-
ple are ready to accept almost any political solution
which will bring the country some semblance of order
and stability.
The extremists, nevertheless, have made progress
in broadening their political base. By hammering
at the issue of a "foreign invader" and thus appeal-
ing to the inherent nationalism of the people, they
have won adherents and sympathizers who would not be
attracted by the Marxist call alone. In sum, Commu-
nists are still very much in the minority, but they
probably feel that they are in a better position now
to resort to violence than any time in recent years.
The three Communist parties, however, are not
united on the question of guerrilla warfare. The
apparent intentions of each of these parties is sum-
marized below:
The Dominican Popular Movement
This hard-line, pro-Chinese party is committed
to armed revolution and probably cannot delay much
longer some concrete indication that it will follow
through. The party probably has about 700 to 900
members drawn largely from poorer urban groups. Al-
most all its strength is in Santo Domingo.
(Cont' d)
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ANNEX (Cont'd)
By itself, it probably cannot seriously endanger
the stability of the country; operations in the in-
terior will likely be unsuccessful and those in Santo
Domingo will probably be only of a terrorist and
harassing nature, targeted largely against the US
presence.
The 14th of June Political Group
The pro-Castro party is believed to have about
2,500 members and a much larger number of sympathizers.
Many of its leaders have had guerrilla warfare train-
ing in Cuba.
This group is divided whether to undertake large-
scale insurgency operations. It has the best capability
to do so in terms of membership, training, and experi-
ence. If its hard-line faction gets control, the party
will represent a much greater threat than would the
Dominican Popular Movement. If the two groups should
combine forces, they could cause disruptions which
would seriously impair the effectiveness of the pro-
visional government, although they probably could not
bring the government down.
The Dominican Communist Party
This is the Moscow-oriented party; it has between
700 and 1,000 members. For tactical reasons it advo-
cates a moderate approach to an ultimate Communist
victory. It is unlikely at this point that this
group would undertake a serious insurgency campaign.
However, if the other two parties should have success
with guerrilla operations, the Dominican Communists
might reconsider.
Taking the interplay among and within the three
groups into account, it appears that Dominican mili-
tary and police forces will probably be able to pre-
vent insurgent activity from posing a serious threat.
However, if the new regime resorts to harsh repres-
sive measures and the economic situation does not im-
prove, the extremists might gain enough outside sup-
port to threaten the provisional government.
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