THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 30 NOVEMBER 1966

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005968657
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: November 30, 1966

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004800370001-4
The President's Daily Brief
November 1966
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004800370001-4
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004800370001-4
?J?,.//? I
DAILY BRIEF
30 NOVEMBER 1966
1. North Vietnam
2. North Vietnam
3. Soviet Union
We see signs that Communist mili-
tary leaders, probably shaken by the
success of US search-and-destroy opera-
tions, are shifting from large-scale
operations to guerrilla tactics. A
discussion of this trend is ,today's
Annex.
50X1
The new Soviet spacecraft was
finally brought to earth today
This was
probably the first in a series of test
flights of a new vehicle for future
manned space missions.
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004800370001-4
50X1
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004800370001-4
4. West Germany
5. Indonesia
30 Nov 66
50X1
The new cabinet includes much of
the best political talent in Bonn.
Kiesinger's success will be measured
by the degree to which he can forge an
effective government out of this group
of ambitious individuals, whose past
feuds have been frequent and bitter.
In parliament, the new "grand co-
alition" will hold 447 seats to only
49 for the Free Democrats, the sole
opposition party. However, after 17
years of fighting each other, the co-
alition parties may have trouble co-
operating. Sensitive issues include
the Socialists' desire to improve re-
lations with East Europe, including
East Germany, and the questions of off-
set and the impending budget deficit.
Moscow has agreed to permit Indo-
nesia to reschedule its debts on terms
at least as favorable as those offered
by Western creditors. During there-
adjustment period, Moscow will provide
spare parts and technical assistance on
a cash basis.
Soviet military aid deliveries ac-
count for the largest single slice of
the Indonesian debt and the Soviets ob-
viously want to protect their invest-
ment. They are also urging Djakarta to
move ahead with some economic aid proj-
ects already under way. These include
a steel mill and a nuclear research re-
actor.
50X6
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004800370001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004800370001-4
6. Jordan Jordan was quiet today for the
first time in over ten days.
7. Rhodesia
30 Nov 66
50X1
The Rhodesian affair has staggered
into yet another final round. Neither
opponent wants to allow the other to
be last in the ring. Thus both continue
to shadow-box long after the real issues
have been settled.
Smith's latest maneuver is to make
a "final" series of counterproposals to
the British. These are clearly designed
for public effect as a demonstration of
willingness to compromise, but make no
concessions on his basic position.
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004800370001-4
50X1
DeClassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004800370001-4
?AJX1
ANNEX
Return to Guerrilla Warfare?
The "great debate" among North Vietnamese mili-
tary leaders over whether to emphasize guerrilla
operations over large-scale mobile warfare seems to
have ended for the moment--in favor of the guerrillas.
Such is the message of an article written by one
"Cuu Long" (Vietnamese for "Mekong") and widely publi-
cized by the North Vietnamese. "Cuu Long' is probably
the pseudonym of a senior member of the Communist hier-
archy in South Vietnam. He specifically warns against
"the erroneous concept" of,"depending on concentrated
troops" to challenge US forces to large unit combat on
-a regular basis. All this contrasts markedly with the
weight placed on conventional warfare tactics by the
Communist leadership within South Vietnam as late as
last July.
The appearance of this article suggests that the
leadership has made its decision. Actually such tac-
tics have been forced on the Communists in recent
months by the success of US search-and-destroy/spoil-
ing operations, which have made it more difficult for
them to mount their own large-scale operations.
None of this means, however, that the Communists
are going to pack up their gear and go home. "Cuu
Long" stresses, on the contrary, that guerrilla war
is admirably suited to a "protracted resistance"
which will tie down enemy forces by making them spread
themselves thin. Nor does he mean that the Communists
will lapse into purely defensive tactics. Specifi-
cally warning against such a move, he points out that
even in guerrilla warfare the object is continually
to attack and harass the enemy. "To pause at the de-
fensive is to invite the danger of being annihilated"
is the way "Cuu Long" puts it. He does not rule out
occasional large-scale operations, but implies that
30 Nov 66
50X1
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004800370001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004800370001:4,1
there must be closer coordination between the political
and military actions of the guerrillas and the regular
forces.
The author admits that the Communists face diffi-
culties even if they go all out to develop the "un-
limited" potential of guerrilla warfare. For instance,
he notes the need for quickly expanding the number of
guerrillas in the south, and implicitly criticizes the
Viet Cong high command for weakening the guerrillas
in 1965 by transferring cadres and men into the regular
forces. Elsewhere in the article he hints that this
process is already being reversed. We indeed see signs
that some of the larger units are being broken down into
guerrilla groups.
The Communists clearly remain confident that with
these revised tactics they can chew up US forces piece-
meal and ultimately inflict a politically unacceptable
level of casualties.
- 2 -
30 Nov 66'
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004800370001-4
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004800370001-4
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004800370001-4