THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 20 NOVEMBER 1968

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
0005976472
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
12
Document Creation Date: 
September 16, 2015
Document Release Date: 
September 16, 2015
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Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
November 20, 1968
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600010001-3 The President's Daily Brief November 1968 23 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600010001-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600010001-3 THE PRESIDENT'S 'DAILY BRIEF . 20 NOVEMBER .196$ . France 2. France 3. Czechoslovakia The speculators were not impressedi either by Couve's interviewHon Monday or by the German measures announced yesterday. We estimate that by closing time yesterday, French reserves had fallen to about $3.2 billion. Another ten days of heavy losses would practi- cally eliminate the reserves; further decisive action would have to be taken well before such .a point was reached. Lubomir Strougal looks like.Mos- cow's future candidate for a successor to Dubcek. Over the weekend, Strougal gained four important party posts from which he can maneuver against the party first secretary. Moscow's man inside the Czechoslovak leadership is discussed at Annex. 50X1 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600010001-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600010001-3 4. Hungary - Soviet Union 5.? Italy Gromyko worked out a unique cultur- al agreement with the Hungarians during his recent visit to Budapest. The agree- ment, although it broadens the ties be- tween the two countries, seems to be legs rigid than previous pacts. It also gives the Hungarians more of a voice in the ex- change process. They are to be permitted to scrutinize Soviet textbooks on Hungarly, for instance,.and the Soviets have agreod to loosen their controls over exchange visits. After years of literary pirating, Moscow has also agreed to copyright ar- rangements. The Soviets extracted a price, of course--the two countries ,will be co- ordinating their positions even more closely in international cultural forums Even so, if Moscow lives up.to its com- mitments, the accord should lessen the Hungarians' resentment over their client status. The Christian120eMocrats.and.the So- cialists still,seem far.from agreement ' on,a new. government, and the Christian Democratic interim_cabinet.which.re-6 -signed yesterday'may:be'succeeded.by,an- other one of.similar.Stripe. 6. Egypt-Israel We are not the only ones looking for Soviet missiles in Egypt. Israeli planes have conduct- ed an intensive reconnaissance of the canal area. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600010001-3 50X1 50X1 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600010001-3 7. Japan 8. Mali Yesterday's B-52 crash in Okinawa is being exploited to the hilt by the Japanese press. From now on the gov- ernment will be under even greater pres- sure to seek removal of the bombers and to stiffen Japan's position on the status of the bases after Okinawa re- verts to Japan. The crash may produce some politi- cal fallout for Sato, even though he still seems a shoo-in in next week's elections for the presidency of his party. He has been trying to duck the whole reversion issue, but his two challengers have been pushing for tight- er controls on US military activity in Okinawa. The newly elected Okinawan chief executive has reiterated that he will demand removal of the bombers. Yesterday's army coup seems to ? have been triggered by friction betweenf the army and the governing party's para- military arm 50X1 50X1 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600010001-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600010001-3 - TOP SECRET - CONTAINS SIGINT AND KEYHOLE MATERIAL ( ANNEX Lubomir Strougal: Czechoslovakia's New Eminence Grise ? -Lubomir Strougal, elevated over the weekend to; _four top party posts, is not a fanatical Stalinist, but he is a heavy-handed conservative . A personal friend of former party boss Novotny, Strougal nevertheless turned on him last winter and helped remove Novotny from power. He I was paid off with-a deputy premiership, a position he still holds. Strougal was arrested by the Soviets on 21 Au- gust. Perhaps because of this, he initially (and um- characteristically) condemned the invasion as illegal. Strougal, however, quickly saw the error of his wayis and subsequently stated the intervention was necessi- tated by "serious mistakes" on the part of the Dubcek regime. Such agility has earned the 44-year- old Strougal a reputation for being a consistent winner in the internecine struggles that pass for politics in Czechoslovakia. The son of a cement worker from Bohemia, Strougal holds a law degree. He seldom travels and he has been outside the Communist bloc only once, r on a trip to Finland. Along with Machiavellian pragmatism, Strougal has ability and energy; he is not a flamboyant polik- ical figure. All these are characteristics which " would serve him well as Moscow's man inside the Czechoslovak leadership--and there is little doubt Strougal is exactly that. He now holds four key jobs: membership on the new (potentially all-power- -ful) Executive Committee of the party presidium, membership in the policy-making presidium itself, membership in the secretariat (which implements poliL- cy), and the chairmanship of the party's new bureau for the Czech lands (a counterpart of the Slovak ' party organization). .Strougal has been in touch since the invasion with Deputy Foreign Minister. Vasily Kuznetsov, Moscow's on-the-scene architect of "normalization." A-1 TOP SECRET - CONTAINS SIGINT AND KEYHOLE MATERIAL Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600010001-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600010001-3 If the Soviets keep heavy pressure on the Czecho- slovak regime, Strougal is in .a good position to challenge Dubcek for the party leadership, perhaps as early as the next party congress in 1969. He is clearly the type of Communist about whom Moscow would feel confident. In the meantime, he presumably will continue to enjoy Soviet support and be in a posi- tion to bring other conservatives into positions of power and influence. A-2 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600010001-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600010001-3 () Top Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600010001-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600010001-3 Top Secret FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY 1.) Special Daily Report on North Vietnam 2.) North Vietnamese Reflections of U S Political Attitudes Top Secret 16 20 November 1968 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600010001-3 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600010001-3,1 Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes Only 20 November 1968 I. NOTES .ON THE SITUATION 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600010001-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600010001-3,1 Xuan Thuy Interview: Xuan Thuy's remarks to UPI yesterday, in which he demanded an "independent" role for the Front and rejected a "two-party conference," contained nothing new and do not, in themselves, fore- shadow a procedural stalemate in Paris. These points were also made in the North Vietnam- ese Foreign Ministry? statement on 16 November. They may well be intended to aggravate differences between Saigon and Washington and to make it more difficult for the South Vietnamese to move to Paris. On this and other issues raised by the bombing cessation, Hanoi feels free to adopt the toughest possible public stance, but it still avoids raising any new conditions for moving on in the talks. * * * Rail Progress: Dual gauging of the main China- North Vietnam rail line is probably completed to Hanoi. 50X1 The North 50X1 Vietnamese, however, have had ample time to finish the 15 or so miles of dual gauge construction remaining between Dong Dang and Hanoi as of June 1968. There has been no indication, however, of dual gauge construction south of Hanoi or on the line from Lao Cai. The Communists have constantly repaired and im- proved the Dong Dang - Hanoi line since bombing be- gan in 1965. The many improvements have included dual tracking, building of multiple crossings at main water obstacles, and opening of an alternate to the main rail line from China via Kep, Thai. Nguyen, and Dong Anh. 50X1 -2 - 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600010001-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600010001-3 :II, NORTH .VIETNAMESE?REFLECTIONS. OF. US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR . :There is nothing of significance to report to- day. 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600010001-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A00660001000-1-3 Top Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600010001-3