THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 5 MAY 1967

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005973786
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: May 5, 1967

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? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24: CIA-RDP79T00936A005100390001-8
The President's Daily Brief
?Thp?Stc-ret--- 5 May 1967
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24: CIA-RDP79T00936A005100390001-8
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DAILY BRIEF
5 MAY 1967
1. Soviet Union
The principal conclusions of the
National Intelligence Estimate "Soviet
Attitudes and Intentions toward the War
in Vietnam" just approved by the US In-
telligence Board are:
--The Soviet leaders probably believe
there is no prospect of movement to-
ward a political solution for several
months, and that they have no alterna-
tive but to help North Vietnam carry
on the war, hoping that changes in at-
titude in either Hanoi or Washington
will permit a political solution later.
--The Russians fear that the US, in its
impatience to get the war over, will
escalate the conflict in a way which
will increase the risks and costs for
Moscow; in an effort to forestall this
they are stressing their intention to
move to more vigorous support of North
Vietnam.
--Peking will probably not pose serious
obstacles to the continued transit of
military supplies across China.
--Hanoi at some point will probably press
Moscow for more sophisticated equipment
than those types now on the scene.
There is a good chance that under pres-
sure the Soviets would provide such
weapons as cruise missiles and tactical
rockets.
--If the conflict were to be intensified
by the US the Soviets at some point
would probably create an atmosphere of
heightened tension. They might provide
limited numbers of volunteers or crews
for defense equipment or aircraft. The
mining or blockade of the North Vietnam-
ese coast would be most likely to pro-
voke these responses. Moscow is prob-
ably not prepared to resort to direct
threats of general war as a means to
protect North Vietnam.
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2. South Vietnam
3. South Korea
assessment of Buddhism as a
political force between now and the Sep-
tember elections:
--The Buddhist movement, largely be-
cause of government surveillance
of the militant leaders and the
adoption of tough control measures,
is less a threat to political sta-
bility than at any time since 1963.
--Tri Quang is the sole leader of the
militants, and the only Buddhist
capable of directing antigovernment
activities. Tam Chau, the moderate
Buddhist leader, is no organizer
and has no devoted activist follow-
ing.
--Tri Quang can probably control only
180,000 votes, but he can inspire
others to action.
--There is no hard evidence that the
Buddhists are controlled by the Viet
Cong, although their antics fre-
quently serve the Viet Cong cause.
--Come September, the Buddhists will
flock to the polls rather than the
barricades.
President Pak's victory in the presi-
dential election assures a continuation of
moderate leadership stressing economic im-
provement. Pak's large margin--won over
the same opponent he narrowly defeated
four years ago--will give him some new
muscle to help control the factional fight-
ing in his Democratic Republican Party.
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4, Yemen
5. Cuba
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We have re-examined the evidence--
including recent reports and rumors in the
press--,and find nothing to change our con-
clusion that no strategic weapons, nuclear
warheads, or Soviet combat troops have been
reintroduced into Cuba.
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Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005100390001-8