THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 21 OCTOBER 1968

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
0005976419
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
10
Document Creation Date: 
September 16, 2015
Document Release Date: 
September 16, 2015
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 21, 1968
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006500070001-8 The President's Daily Brief October 1968 23 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006500070001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006500070001-8,1 THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 21 OCTOBER .1968 1. Soviet Union.- At least some of the Soviet divi- Czechoslovakia sions reported Saturday morning to be returning to the USSR now appear to have reached their home stations in the Baltic Military District. Some So- viet fighter planes also flew back to Poland Saturday. They had been in Czechoslovakia since late August. 2. Czechoslovakia The new status-of-forces treaty with Moscow is threatening the facade of unity the top leadership has tried to maintain. Although Dubcek is said to be re- signed to the agreement, President Svo- boda, among others, is described as violently opposed. Premier Cernik on the other hand appears to be using the treaty as a means of currying favor with the Soviets. We have it on good authority, that he has an eye on Dubcek's job as party first secretary. He may have some competition, however. Slo- vak party boss Husak, thought to be Moscow's fair-haired boy, gave a speech Saturday supporting the treaty. This polarization is also becoming more pronounced at lower party levels. The conservatives are becoming more open in their attacks on the post-Janu- ary leadership, while as yet unrecon- structed liberals are organizing a fac- tion in the central committee to counter them. 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006500070001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006500070001-8_0x1 3. Egypt tt Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006500070001-8 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006500070001-8 4. Cambodia 5. Communist Parties 50X1 Sihanouk's security forces are trying harder, but they still seem to be making little headway against Cam- bodia's various dissident groups. In the northeast especially. tribal rebels 50X1 appear to have gotten their sec- 50X1 ond wind. A number of new attacks have been reported recently, and the dissi- dents seem to be waging a fresh campaign to cut the main roads and intimidate progovernment villagers. The government has brought up army reinforcements, and Cambodian in- tercepts indicate some of the air force's T-28s may see some rare action against dissident positions along the main road into South Vietnam's western highlands. The Italian Communists, meanwhile, have an operative making the rounds in Latin America trying to persuade Com- ? munist parties there to come out against the Soviets on Czechoslovakia. All ex- cept the Mexican party have supported the Soviet intervention. 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006500070001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006500070001-8 6. Soviet Union One indirect cost to Moscow of its intervention in Czechoslovakia may be a smaller than expected grain crop this year. Poor weather is part of the answer, but another factor has been a shortage of trucks to haul the grain to elevators. The Soviets normally avoid transport bottlenecks during the harvest by requisitioning military trucks, but there were fewer available this year because of the partial mobi- lization of the armed forces. 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006500070001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006500070001-8 Top Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006500070001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006500070001-8 Top Secret FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY 1.) Special Daily Report on North Vietnam 2.) North Vietnamese Reflections of U S Political Attitudes Top Secret 16 21 October 1968 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006500070001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006500070001-8, :1 Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes Only 21 October 1968 I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION Peking Speaks Up: Peking's uneasiness about North Vietnam's current tactics and the possibility of progress in the Paris talks have finally prompted the Chinese Communists to acknowledge publicly that Hanoi is engaged in negotiations with the United States. A New China News Agency (NCNA) release on 19 October marks the first time Chinese Communist media have referred directly to the Paris talks. This belated response is underscored by the item's lead, which says that the talks started on 13 May and that 26 official meetings have been held so far. NCNA rounds up recent Western press reports con- cerning the talks and says that these indicate that President Johnson is preparing to "dish out a big plot and fraud of 'halting all bombings' of North Vietnam." NCNA includes a sprinkling from most re- cent press speculation, but leaves its readers dan- gling by saying that these reports "remain to be confirmed by the further development of the situa- tion." * * * Hanoi Propaganda: North Vietnamese propaganda during the weekend offered no clues to Hanoi's in- tentions. An article in the army paper on 19 Octo- ber went to great lengths to describe the US posi- tion in Vietnam as "hopeless" and to link US foreign and domestic problems to the Vietnam war. It argued that the next US administration will face the same "painful choice" as President Johnson in deciding whether to continue or to stop the war, but it failed to mention the bombing issue or the usual arguments against reciprocal restraint on the part of Hanoi. * * * 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006500070001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006500070001-8 :1 * * * II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR There is nothing of significance to report today. ?2? 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006500070001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006500070001-8 Top Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006500070001-8