THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 3 JANUARY 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976543
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: January 3, 1969

t."
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600370001-4
The President's Daily Brief
"/"OrSe.644e.t_ 3 January 1969
23
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600370001-4
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600370001-4 50X1
THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
3 JANUARY 1969
1. Israel -
Arab States
2. Soviet Union-.
Middle East
3. South Vietnam
Israeli aircraft are regularly
overflying southern Lebanon, ready to
retaliate if there are further guer-
rilla attacks. Yesterday the Israelis
once again called in aircraft to bomb
villages in northern Jordan following
a shelling incident on the border.
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600370001-4
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600370001-4
4. France
Political and economic uncertain-
ties last year further slowed develop-
ment of De Gaulle's nuclear force de
dissuasion. The US Intelligence Board
this week approved a national intelli-
gence estimate which re-evaluates the
program's prospects. The following are
the conclusions:
--Of the three weapons systems
which are to comprise the force--medium-
range bombers, IRBMs, and Polaris-type
submarines--only the bombers are opera-
tional. Their range and performance,
however, give them a very limited capa-
bility against the Soviet Union.
--The small IRBM force of 27 mis-
siles originally was to begin replacing
the bombers in 1966, but we now believe
the first missiles will not be opera-
tional until late 1970 at the very ear-
liest. The first Polaris-type submarine
will probably become operational in late
1971 or 1972, and additions to the fleet
of missile subs will probably be made at
about two-year intervals thereafter un-
til the French have four or five boats.
--The recently announced cancella-
tion of Pacific nuclear tests in 1969
means the French are unlikely to have
thermonuclear warheads before 1973,
and then only if testing is resumed in
1970.
--De Gaulle will be extremely re-
luctant to stretch out the development
of his nuclear force any further than
he already has, but he would probably
be forced to do so by new economic dif-
ficulties.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600370001-4
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600370001-4
ouX1
. Soviet Union
6. Peru-
Soviet Union
7. Sweden-
Middle East
Satellite photography
shows the Soviets' biggest space
booster back on its launch pad. The
booster, which has been photographed
on its pad several times
was returned to the nearby checkout
building Assuming the
checkout turned up no major difficul-
ties, the first flight test could occur
within the next few months.
Lima and Moscow have agreed to open
diplomatic relations. Since the mili-
tary government took over in October,
it has established diplomatic ties with
Rumania and Yugoslavia and has signed
trade agreements with Czechoslovakia,
Poland, and Hungary.
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600370001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600370001-4
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600370001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600370001-4
Top Secret
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
.) Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
2.) North Vietnamese Reflections of US
Political Attitudes
Top Secret 50X1
16
3 January 1969
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600370001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600370001-4 50X1
Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
for the President's Eyes Only
3 January 1969
I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION
Foreign Shipping During November: Seaborne im-
ports to North Vietnam decreased by 14 percent--from
164,000 tons in October to 141,000 tons in November--
despite an increase in foreign ship arrivals from 34
to 42. A drop in dry cargo deliveries by Soviet ships
from the Black Sea accounted for most of this decline.
Deliveries of foodstuffs (68,000 tons) were higher than
in October, while those of petroleum (24,000 tons),
fertilizer (4,000 tons), and general and miscellaneous
cargo dropped sharply from October rates. Timber de-
liveries (8,000 tons) were at a record level.
Seaborne exports climbed to 74,000 tons in Novem-
ber, 59 percent above the volume in October. Coal ex-
ports of 62,000 tons were the highest in six months,
and exports of general and miscellaneous cargo of
12,000 tons were the highest in 17 months. No seaborne
imports of arms or ammunition were detected during No-
vember. Projected seaborne imports for December show
an increase to about the monthly average in January-
November--160,000 tons.
Ship congestion at Haiphong continued to decrease
in November but was still far greater than the low of
May 1968. The average number of dry cargo ships in
port per day dropped from 33 in October to 29 in Novem-
ber, compared with 16 in May. The average layover
time for departing dry cargo ships fell from 35 days
in October to 30 days in November, compared with 14
days in May. The cargo discharge rate at Haiphong in
November remained well below the high rate achieved in
July, probably because of a reduction in berthing capa-
city stemming from silting alongside the transit and
fishing wharves.
Pham Van Dong Interview: The premier took a
tough stand on terms for a Vietnam settlement during
an interview with a TASS correspondent in Hanoi yes-
terday. He stuck routinely to Communist insistence
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600370001-4
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600370001-4
50X1
that a peaceful settlement meant US and allied troop
withdrawal leaving the South Vietnamese people free
to resolve their domestic questions in accordance
with the Front's political program.
According to an account of the conversation
broadcast by the TASS international service, Dong
pushed the demand for a "peace cabinet" in South
Vietnam. He said it would be formed following the
mass overthrow of the present Saigon government. It
would then start negotiations with the Front which
would result in a coalition government.
He indicated bitter fighting was ahead since
the US persists in its "aggressive designs" despite
having been "defeated." He claimed that the US had
threatened to resume full-scale bombing in the North
and daily violated the "security and sovereignty" of
North Vietnam.
* * *
Explosive Shipments: The Soviets are still send-
ing large quantities of explosives to North Vietnam.
Some 75 tons were sent during the first week of Decem-
ber alone. -
I Three rail cars loaded with
explosives destined for Vietnam were held at the Chi-
nese border because the necessary documentation had
not been given the Chinese.
-2-
50X1
50X1
;...AJA I
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600370001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600370001-4
Agricultural Situation: A 27 December Nhan Dan
article points out that "unsatisfactory carrYTHR" BUY"
of several interrelated tasks for the tenth month
crop "led to a careless and perfunctory fulfillment
..., a low crop output, and part of the acreage being
left uncultivated." ?The same difficulties are said
to be developing for the fifth month crop because of
weather problems and poor organization of farm labor.
Inefficient organization of farm labor has con-
tributed to agricultural production losses since
1965.
* * *
'II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL
ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
There is nothing of significance to report today.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600370001-4
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600370001-4
\
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600370001-4