THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 20 FEBRUARY 1968

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005974287
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: February 20, 1968

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The President's Daily Brief
20 February 1968
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DAILY BRIEF
20 FEBRUARY 1968
1. South Vietnam
2. Soviet Union
Communist military activity in
South Vietnam declined in intensity yes-
terday and last night, though sporadic
new rocket and mortar attacks were made
against the Khe Sanh airfield and vari-
ous other points in the country.
Enemy troops are still holding
parts of two provincial capitals they
attacked on Sunday. Allied forces have
made only minor progress in the Hue
Citadel and there are more signs that
the Communists are trying to bring more
troops into the Hue area.
Kosygin's weekend speech revealed
new signs that the Soviets are worried
about how the US may respond to the Com-
munist offensive in Vietnam. The Pre-
mier's line was that now the time has
come for the US to take the road toward
peace, that Trinh's statements have
cleared the ground for such movement,
and that escalation can only end in
grief for the US.
For some time now, Moscow has shown
growing concern that the Tet offensive
may only make the war longer, costlier,
and more dangerous. The Soviets have
even doctored up some Liberation Front
statements before publishing them in
Moscow--evidently because the statements
were tougher than Moscow thought they
should be.
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3. Czechoslovakia
4. Singapore
5. Middle East
Ferment inside the Communist party
is growing. All over the country local
party units are demanding liberaliza-
tion. This pressure from below--most
of it based on genuine grievances with
the old system--will strengthen Dubcek's
hand at the top of the party structure.
Even the Old-time party war horses are
bending to the pressure and talking pub-
licly about the need for cutting back
drastically on the party's power and in-
fluence.
The next Central Committee meeting,
now expected in March, will probably be
the occasion for announcing some person-
nel and organization changes. But the
Czechs are a legalistic people and the
changes will be carefully studied before
being implemented.
Lee Kuan Yew is assured of an all-
out victory for his party in the April
elections. Opposition candidates will
contest only seven of the country's 58
constituencies--and these seven hardy
souls will most likely lose.
Unless there is some progress to-
ward an over-all settlement by 2 March
when the Arab foreign ministers meet,
Jordan may well be forced by internal
pressures to go to the Security Coun-
cil; this would mean that the Jarring
mission has failed. In the Security
Council, now more pro-Arab than last
year, the blame for the failure of the
mission will likely be placed on Israel.
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6. Panama
President Robles said
that he may have to post-
pone the 12 May presidential elections
unless the current political crisis
eases. The struggle between the op-
posing candidates for control of the
electoral machinery remains unresolved.
Tempers are high, and a rash move by
Robles could easily set off violence.
Arnulfo Arias has already warned
that he will move to impeach Robles if
there is any tampering with the elec-
tion schedule. Should Robles announce
a postponement, the indignation would
be great. Arias might then gain just
enough support in the Assembly to pull
off an impeachment.
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Top Secret
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
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20 February 1968
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Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
for the President's Eyes Only
20 February 1968
I? NOTES ON THE SITUATION
Communists Single Out Quang Tri Front: In a
propaganda statement designed to buttress Communist
preparations for large-scale offensive operations
in the northern part of South Vietnam, the Viet
Cong radio on 18 February described the "Quang Tri
Front" as "a giant noose that is tightening around
the necks of US troops." The commentary singles
out Khe Sanh as a place where the US is worried
about a "new Dien Bien Phu - type battle." It draws
the most direct parallels between Dien Bien Phu and
Khe Sanh yet noted in enemy propaganda, but it does
not limit the Communist threat to that area. The
commentary claims that Communist actions in Quang
Tri Province since the opening of the Tet offensive
have driven allied forces into "a state of complete
encirclement" from the coastal area to the mountains
around Khe Sanh.
The broadcast also takes note of one of the
principal elements of enemy strategy in saying that
main force units are being used to disperse and tie
down allied troops while local and guerrilla forces
intensify their activities throughout the provinces.
It claims that this action so far has created favor-
able conditions for dealing the US "new decisive
blows." It concludes by praising Communist forces
and says their activities will be the forerunner of
"a new Dien Bien Phu-type of heavy defeat for the
enemy."
* * *
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Peking Views: The Chinese have once again re-
iterated their opposition to third-party efforts to
obtain a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. A Peking
broadcast yesterday asserted that U Thant's recent
overseas trip and Prime Minister Wilson's trip to
the US and the Soviet Union were part of Washington's
effort to intensify the "peace talks fraud" in "col-
lusion" with the Soviets. The broadcast did not
mention the widely publicized North Vietnamese con-
tacts with Thant, but it predicted that the Viet-
namese would not be fooled by the "trick" and would
continue fighting until the US was defeated.
The broadcast is part of Peking's increased
propaganda commentary on Vietnam, which rose in
volume last week to the highest level in three years.
The bulk of the propaganda is devoted to hailing Com-
munist "victories" in Vietnam, and there has been no
significant departure from previous Peking pronounce-
ments.
* * *
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Comment on San Antonio Formula: The Hanoi
party daily issued one of the Communists' most
direct and lengthy rejections of the San Antonio
formula on 18 February. Calling the formula a
"double-dealing trick," the commentary promised
that Hanoi would reject any "other US moves for reci-
procity."
The article also went back to earlier tough
language that the US must stop the bombings "defini-
tively and unconditionally." North Vietnam has
omitted the word "definitively" in important policy
statements in recent months and has used it only
infrequently in more routine propaganda commentary.
Its reappearance in this article does not appear
to represent a stiffening of Hanoi's demands for a
cessation of bombings. On more authoritative levels
and through diplomatic channels Hanoi continues to
use the formulation "unconditionally."
* * *
NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL
ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
Nothing of significance to report.
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