THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST 22 SEPTEMBER 1961

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005959046
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: September 22, 1961

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THE PRESIDENT'S
INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST
22 SEPT 1961
TUTS-EC-kgT-
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1. Katanga situation
a) The provisional cease-fire was
still in effect this? morning, but
both sides were regarding the present
state as tentative. The UN is going
ahead with plans to bring jets into
the Congo, and Tshombe has reportedly
demanded complete Withdrawal of UN
troops from Katanga;
b) Adoula appears so far, to be
holding out against heavy pressure
from elements of his government who
want Strong action against Katanga.
Army chief Mobutu
xorces lack suffiCient transport
or supplies for major operations;
c) On the outskirts of Elisabeth-
ville, the 30,000 anti-Tshombe
Baluba refugees, short of food, were
reported in a dangerous mood and
possibly on the verge of spilling
9Y_qtC1W_r_camus into the city.
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2.
Mexican disturbances
linked to broad anti-
There is strong evidence that there
was an attempt to assassinate or
government plot
c pture Lopez Mateos on the night
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of 14 September.
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Our mission in Mexico City believes
that the attempt on the President
and the 14-16 September terrorist
outbreaks may have been links in a
conspiracy to overthrow the govern-
ment directed by politically
important elements. The government
is now trying
identity of
Mateos is described
determined
to establish
the ringleaders.
as shaken
to get to the
the
Lopez
and
bottom of
the plot.
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3.
Harriman's Laos The Rangoon
talks with Souvanna
talks
were more satisfactory on the
whole than Ambassador Harriman 50X1
had expected with one important
exception: SouVanna is still
insisting on drawing entirely from
his own followers, rather than in,-
cluding:seVeral Outside- moderates,
in making up the center group in
a coalitiOn. He indicated, however,
that he is determined' tobeat the
Pathet Lao "at all costs" in elec-
tions. If the elections are lost,
he said, he would 'fightrather than
let Laos go Communist.'
Harriman's later discussions with
Phoumi in Vientiane found the litter
still deeply suspicious of Souvanna's
independence and showing little
inclination for serious negotiations
with the opposition. 50X1
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4. Khrushchev condemnation
of Mongi Slim
5. Soviet nuclear and
missile tests
He issued a long diatribe against Slim
before a group of African ambassadors,
including the Tunisian envoy, during 50X1
the Bizerte crisis. His charge that
Slim has not served the best interests 50X1
Of Africa in the UN will probably re-
appear in Soviet argumentation against
him. 50X1
a) There may have been two more
nuclear tests since yesterday, one
in the Arctic and the other at
Se ipalatinsk. There had been four
nuclear tests earlier -this week,
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b) there was an extended range missile
firing into the Central Pacific,
approximately 6500 nautical miles. on
thp 171-h and gamin ugmateaTodow
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6. Prospects for French-
Algerian negotiations
7. Communist activity
in South Viet-Nam
8. Conservatives in
Ghanaian cabinet
want showdown with
Nkrumah
Both sides have signalled their
readiness to resume negotiations.
The Algerians, however, are not -- 50X1
fully convinced of De Gaullee good
intentions regarding the Sahara'. -
They say that, though firm on Sahara
sovereignty, they are flexible on
transitional arrangements, but they
would like to pdn down the-meaning of
De Gaulle's "mystical la7guage" on the
subject. 50X1
There are press reports of another
major Viet Cong attack on a government
outpost north of Saigon, the second 50X1
this week.
Communist guerrilla forces in South
Vietnam constitute an increasing
military threat and appear to intend
to develop a major b se of oper tions
in the plateau area of central South
Vietnam bordering Laos. 50X1
They are worried by his leftward
bend in both foreign and domestic
policy, and want him to modify
the new economic measures which have
caused the present wave of stikes.
Nkrumah has been taking a tough
line internally.
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NOTES
A. There are no signs of a break in the Afghan-Pakist n impasse.
Both sides are continuing military prepartions--apparently
defensive--alone the border.
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OUA I
B. The latest assessment of the situation inthe Dominican Bepublicis
that those favoring violent action are in the ascendancy among the opposition50X1
D. It is now known that the Soviet-Ir
cii arms ereement
provided for
the supply of surface-to-air guided missiles to Iraq. A similar
agreement was reached e rlier with Indonesia and possibly
also with the UAR.
E. Sukarno has begun to display some optimism over the chances for
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?J?,J/V I
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a negotiated settlement of the West New Guine issue. His
attitude probably arises from a number of semi-offici 1 contacts
which he and other Indonesian
representatives
h ve been having
with the Dutch.
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F.
Algerian security forces
are braced
for possible disorders
following yesterday's broadcast appe 1 for demonstrations by
General Salan, De Gaulle is on a speaking tour of southern
France;
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CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB SUBCOMMITTEE ON
BERLIN SITUATION--15 August-19 September
1. Soviet statements over the past two weeks and the agree-
ment to talk with the US in New York suggest that Khrushchev
has not foreclosed the possibility of a negotiated settlement as
an alternative to proceeding with a separate treaty by the end
of the year. The Soviets, however, have rigidly adhered to
their stated terms--a German peace tre ty and a "free city"--
as the framework for negotiations. Repeated Soviet and satel-
lite statements reaffirming the year-end deadline for a peace
treaty indicate that the Soviets hope to step up the pace of dip-
lomatic exchanges. The Soviets apparently would prefer a
Western initiative to convene formal negotiations at an e rly
date, but failing this they will probably try to exploit the UN
session to put pressure on the West to negotiate.
2. As part of their general tactics of intimidation'and pres-
sure against the West, the Soviets have made diplomatic threats
against civil air traffic to Berlin. Some limited harassments,
similar to those in the past, appear likely, but will probably
stop short of forcible action against air access prior to the con-
clusion of a peace treaty.
3. Within East Germany popular dissatisfaction--particu-
larly among the youth--remains widespread and continues to be
exhibited in a variety of minor antiregime-incidents which be-
came more frequent as the 17 September election approached.
Refugee escapes to West Berlin and West Germany are at a total
rate of 20 to 30 a day. The regime Shows concern about the
latent discontent and continues to move vigorously and ruthless-
ly to maintain control over the population. While self-confidence
is displayed at the top level Of the party, lower echelon party
workers seem nervous, Overworked, and edgy. Strikes, pas-.
sive resistance, and even severe local demonstrations remain
possible, but the regime presently is prepared to take whatever
actions are necessary to prevent serious popul r outbursts.
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