THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST 29 OCTOBER 1963

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005996635
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: October 29, 1963

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THE PRESIDENT'S
INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST
ISSUED BYTHE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
29 OCTOBER 1963
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1. Morocco-
Algeria
a. Ben Bella has arrived in
Bamako, and Hassan will follow later
today, Mali officials anticipate a
two-day round of talks.
b. All, including Nasir, place
great hope on this mediation effort.
c. Talking to Ambassador Ba-
deau yesterday, Nasir justified his
assistance to Ben Bella on the grounds
that it would keep Ben Bella from an
irrevocable commitment to the Soviet=
Castro camp. In fact, he says, he
made it plain to Ben Bella that if
"significant amounts" of Cuban assis-
tance were brought in, UAR aid would
be withdrawn. Ben Bella could not
have both, as Egyptians would not be
caught in the same boat with Cubans.
e. King Hassan has told Ambas-
sador Ferguson that he is not looking
to us for military aid this he can
get elsewhere so long as we do not
prevent it. What he wants is economic
aid.
(Cont'd)
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2. Dahomey
f. Hassan also said that at
today's talks we will be seeking only
a cease-fire and establishment of a
date for opening border negotiations.
g. The front, meanwhile, seems
relatively quiet, despite some skirm-
ishing in the Tindouf area.
a. ?The military in the person
of Army Chief of Staff Soglo stepped
in late yesterday, turning the three-
man provisional government into a
four-man one which still includes
Maga although he resigned as Presi-
dent yesterday.
b. Maga's retention reflects
Army concern lest the northern tribes,
which he represents and which are,
in turn, well represented in the
army, touch off a civil war against
the south.
c. Ex-vice president Apithy
and former National Assembly presi-
dent Ahomadegbe, the other two mem-
bers of the unstable, new governing
group, seem also to favor Maga's re-
tention. They lead the two rival
southern factions in Dahomey's long-
standing three-cornered power struggle.
(Cont d)
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3. Brazil
d. Cotonou is superficially
quiet? and workers are returning to
their jobs, but labor unionists will
not like the retention of Maga.
The possibility of civil disorders
still looms large, particularly as
there are now signs that military
leaders are beginning to split along
regional lines.
e. Equally large looms the
possibility of outside involvement
between rivals Nigeria and Ghana,
with Ivory Coast, Niger, and Upper ,
Volta, (the latter three Vcommitted" to
support Maga) watchfully in the wings.
a. An association of some
eighty Communist-oriented unions in
Sao Paulo has threatened to call a
strike (mostly for higher wages) this
week, and Brazil's largest labor con-
federation, the Communist-controlled
National Confederation of Industrial
Workers, is talking of a nationwide
sympathy strike.
b. The Second Army in Sao
Paulo has been alerted against pos-
sible disorders and can probably con-
trol the situation.
c. Even so, the possibility of
federal intervention remains.
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4. Communist
China
b.
we
have indicated early 1964 as the
earliest probable date with later
dates more likely if the Chinese
encounter even normal difficulties.
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NOTES
A. Syria-Iraq Recent actions by Syrian and Iraqi
leaders have caused Ambassador Knight in Damascus
to conclude that they intend to arrive at full po--
litical unity within two or three months "at the
most." The Ambassador feels that the cautious
"sector by sector" approach to unity has been aban-
doned and that the present "all or nothing" pace is
not necessarily a sign of strength and confidence.
B. Japan-Pakistan To make their air agreement with
China mean something, the Pakistanis have been work-
ing hard on the Japanese for onward rights to Tokyo.
The Japanese have told us in confidence, however,
that they will grant Pakistan no such privilege
until the Chinese give Japan rights for a route
through China from Tokyo to South and Southeast
Asia.
t?-?t_ I. - -
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