THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 19 DECEMBER 1968

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976521
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: December 19, 1968

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The President's Daily Brief
19 December 1968
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THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
19 DECEMBER 1968
1, Cambodia
2. Communist China
3. Soviet Union
4. Soviet Union
Press reports from Phnom Penh this
morning state Sihanouk is "immediately"
releasing the detained Americans. ?
Sihanouk apparently made? the announce-
ment at a press conference.
Yesterday the Soviets made their
fourth test of an ICBM with multiple
re-entry vehicles.
This system could be operational by late
next year.
For several years we have been
watching a debate within the Soviet
military over what sort of war would be
fought in the 1970's and what weapons
should be procured to fight it. This
debate is reflected in articles written
for military publications and it seems .
to be sharpening. We discuss the argu-
ments today at Annex.
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5. South Korea
6. Pakistan
The army and militia are still
hunting down surviving North Korean in-
filtrators who landed on the east coast
in early November. Of the 90-120 North
Koreans who landed, 76 have been killed
and seven captured. The rest have
broken into small bands or are movig.
individuall
Right now the displeasure with Ayub's
leadership does not seem to have reached
dangerous proportions. We see, however,
that Ayub has canceled his plans to at-
tend the Commonwealth Conference in Lon-
don.
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. South Vietnam
8. Brazil
The Viet Cong 9th Division is now
moving toward Saigon from its base
area on the Cambodian border. The 9th
has played a key role in major offen-
sive actions this year. Three prison-
ers from this division, captured near
Saigon on Tuesday, claim the division
will attack Tan Son Nhut air base.
Communist terrorists seem un-
daunted by the government's harsh re-
pression of recent days. The princi-
pal victims, in fact, have been non-
Communist politicians and student
leaders. Two terrorist bombings took
place in Sao Paulo on Tuesday. If
they continue, there is likely to be
a violent reaction from security forces
and right-wing militants.
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ANNEX
Soviet Military Debates Forces for the 1970's
Soviet military leaders have been engaged for
several years in a debate over strategy and force
structure. The controversy has become more polemic
during the past year. It focuses on questions of
strategic offensive force levels, the antiballistic
missile issue, and the need for more flexible con-
ventional forces.
The debate, which is carried on in the military
-press, reflects the-scramble between the servi-ce
for resource priorities as planning for the 1970's
goes forward. To a degree it may also reflect dif-
ferences of views within the Ministry of Defense on
the potential risks and advantages of pursuing:armS
limitation talks.
Except for those military leaders with clear
vested interests, such as the commander of the Stra-
tegic Rocket Forces and the commander of Warsaw Pact
forces, the statements of the majority of key offi-
cers in the high command have not demonstrated an
clear-cut alignment of sides in the debate.r
The current round of the debate centers on the
nature of modern war and its costs. Proponents of
increased levels of offensive and defensive strategic
forces argue from the theory that a future war would
begin with a massive surprise attack by the US. They
are pessimistic about the chances for advance warn-
ing and insist that the Soviet Union must strive for
strategic superiority, both offensive and defensive,
if it is to maintain an effective retaliatory capa-
bility.
Those advocating expansion of conventional capa-
bilities contend that the Soviet force ought to be
more flexibly geared to meet a broader spectrum of
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military contingencies. This school of thought re-
jects the thesis that an East-West conflict would
quickly escalate into an all-out nuclear exchange.
Their argument currently seems to have gained ground
within the Soviet military establishment.
The question of resource allocation, the sec-
ond theme, has been raised beyond the perennial one
of defense versus the rest of the economy. Within
the military establishment it is now debated in
terms of strategic versus conventional weaponry. The
allocation discussion also implies that cost effec-
tiveness considerations may now have some weight in
selecting weapon systems.
The outcome of the debate remains uncertain.
Both the General, Staff publicationAfilitary-'Thought
and the press organ of the militaryYs.Main,Politi-
cal Administration,,.Communist of the Armed Forces,
carry articles reflecting many sides of these issues.
It is clear the debate is going on at the highest
levels of the Ministry of Defense..
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Top Secret
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
1.) Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
2.) North Vietnamese Reflections of U S
Political Attitudes
Top Secret
16
19 December 1968
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Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
for the President's Eyes Only
19 December 1968
I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION
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* * *
Hanoi on Delays in Paris: Communist propaganda
over allied "delaying tactics" in Paris is being
stepped up. A "Commentator" article in the party
daily .Nhan Dan on 18 December pins full blame for
the currentiTripasse on Washington?and warns that if
the US wants to move "toward an honorable peace"
it must stop delaying the talks and end its "war of
aggression." The article is a straightforward pre-
sentation of the standard Communist line on develop-
ments of the past six weeks and contains no new em-
phasis or new language. It may signal, however, a
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greater effort by the Communists to exploit coordi-
nation problems and procedural differences on the
allied side. Up until now, Hanoi's approach, while
always couched in usual propaganda terms, has sug-
gested that the Communists did not want the proced-
ural hassle to be prolonged.
* * *
Hanoi Comments on Nixon Cabinet: North Viet-
nam's first public reaction to the Nixon administra-
tion's cabinet is bland and noncommittal. In a
brief domestic service broadcast on the 16th, Radio
Hanoi reported the names of the three top cabinet
officers and then claimed that the composition of
the cabinet was contrary to the president-elect's
campaign promise that he would form a "coalition
government" which included Democrats, women, and
Negroes.
II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL
ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
day.
There is nothing of significance to report to-
-3-
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