THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 16 AUGUST 1966

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005968474
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: August 16, 1966

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
16 AUGUST 1966
23
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DAILY BRIEF
16 AUGUST 1966
1. Congo
2. Pakistan
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The situation continues to deteri-
orate, amid increasing indications that
Tshombe and his followers are exploit-
ing the chaos in order to return him to
power. This possibility and some of its
consequences are discussed at Annex.
Outgoing Pakistani Finance Minister
Shoaib has floated the idea that the US
should offer to resume the supply of
military spare parts to Pakistan on the
condition that Pakistan forego further
military aid from China.
It was not clear, however, that he
was speaking for anyone except himself.
Clearly, strong elements in Pakistan
would resist such a deal., In fact,
Shoaib himself noted that the Pakistani
military were free of budgetary restraints
in making deals with Peking since all
Chinese aid was on a grant basis.
Nevertheless, foreign ministry of-
ficials have indicated to Ambassador
Locke that Pakistan would be forthcom-
ing in seeking to avoid an arms race
with India if the United States were to
resume the supply of military spare parts.
3. Dominican Republic The newly appointed Dominican po-
lice chief has ordered harsh reprisals
against suspected terrorists. Overreac-
tion by national police to continued agi-
tation and disorders could alienate pub-
lic support from the Balaguer regime.
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4. Syria-Israel
Both countries have made belliger-
ent statements in the wake of Monday's
clash on the Sea of Galilee. The inci-
dent began with an exchange of fire be-
tween an Israeli patrol boat and a Syrian
shore position. In subsequent air ac-
tion at least one Syrian MIG was shot
down.
Each side has since issued a state-
ment that it will retaliate immediately
if the other makes a move. In this
hair-trigger situation the stage is set
for increasingly serious incidents.
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DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
?
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC ??%?????? SUDAN
1. N.
vil-17/4
EQUATEUR
?Mbandaka
CONGO i
?Bandundu
BRAZZAVILLE KINSHASA41,*.
.AlardHASA
fkONGO-CiNTR(ALE?P?LDVILLE)
Th.BANDUNDU
UELE
Isiro?
Kisangani
(Stanleyville)?
HA UT-CONGO
KASAI-
OCCIDENTAL
Luluabourg
ANGOLA
(Port.)
C) National capital
Consolidated province boundary
C) Province capital
ME Administration unresolved
290
Statute Miles
63151
?
?"
KIBALI-
Bunia
ITURI ?
Albert
ORD-?
e Edward 'UGANDA
KIVU ?
Goma
Kiuu
Bukavu irpve,NDA
SUD- KIVU
KASAI-
ORIENTAL
?Mbuy Mayi
/
J
Albertville ?
NORD-KATANGA
Kamina?
SUD-KATANGA
? Lubumbashi (
k(Elisabethville)
take
Tanganyika
a
\.
-.n
r---'
ZAMBIA
NZANIA
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ANNEX
MobutU's Position Weakening
Mobutu's central government has lost control of
the northeast portion of the country. Its clumsy at-
tempts to deal with the three-week-old mutiny of Ka-
tangan troops in Kisangani have produced nothing more
than a truce that leaves the Katangans in control of
most of the city. Moreover, other Katangans who aban-
doned their posts in the northeast have now arrived
in Kisangani. The rebellious troops there may now
number as many as 2,700--a formidable force that the
notoriously inept Con :o Arm cannot handle.
The Katangans therefore seem to be in a posi-
tion to move south toward Katanga--where Tshombe's
secessionist regime held out for several years--or
to remain in virtual control of Kisangani, making
Mobutu and the central government look more ridicu-
lous every day. In any case, the Katangans' with-
drawal from their posts in the northeast has created
a vacuum which the few government troops in the area
cannot begin to fill. As a result, the "simbas" who,
aided by radical African countries, terrorized the
northeast during the rebellion of 1964, are showing
signs of renewed activity.
The mutiny and attendant troubles in the north-
east, enough in themselves to discredit if not over-
throw Mobutu, are compounded by the political situa-
tion in Kinshasa. Mobutu seems less concerned with
the breakdown in the northeast than with his fears
of a plot against him. His relations with Belgium
have improved slightly in recent weeks, but he re-
mains profoundly suspicious that Belgian business in-
terests, or even the Brussels government, are out to
do him in. These suspicions have broadened to in-
clude other Western nationals.
(Ccont'd)
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ANNEX (Cont'd)
Mobutu does not seek or take sound advice and
almost always tries to deal peremptorily and emotionally
with the incredibly complex economic and financial
issues between the two countries. Belgium has already
withdrawn many of its military advisers and seems
likely to reduce its technical assistance as well.
This will reduce the army's ability to cope with un-
rest, and generally add to Mobutu's frustration.
Thus this atmosphere in Kinshasa, in a sort of
vicious circle, makes the government even less able
to cope with the mutiny in Kisangani.(
All this has produced a situation where a seri-
ous effort by Tshombe to return to power looms as a
distinct possibility. Tshombe liked being premier of
the Congo. We believe he wants to regain power--in
all the Congo, not just Katanga--and is being sup-
ported in this effort by a number of non-Congolese
industrial leaders, many of whom are more fanatically
pro-TshombO than Tshombe himself. We have no hard
evidence that he or his followers instigated the
Kisangani mutiny, but they do appear to be exploit-
ing the deteriorating situation in the country in
an effort to return to power.
Such an effort would further disrupt and demor-
alize the Congo. Moreover, if Tshombe should manage
to return to office his reappearance would antago-
nize most other African governments, many of whom
would accuse the US, as well as Belgium, of complic-
ity. At least some of the Congo's neighbors would
probably again lend support to Communist-controlled
efforts to renew the rebellion in the Congo.
An equally discouraging prospect is that the
situation in the Congo will disintegrate into the
chaos of 1960 with all conceivable leaders discredited.
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