PROLIFERATION OF MISSILE DELIVERY SYSTEMS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
0005577296
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
19
Document Creation Date: 
June 24, 2015
Document Release Date: 
June 29, 2011
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
F-2010-01671
Publication Date: 
September 25, 1969
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PDF icon DOC_0005577296.pdf1.05 MB
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w 5 :) ' iSC PROLIFERATION OF MISSILE DELIVERY SYSTEMS OR NUCLEAR WEAPONS APPROVED FOR RELEASE - CIA INFO^ DATE: 05-17-2011 It is sometimes assumed that any nation with a moderate scientific and technical base can develop ballistic missile weapons systems* without great difficulty. The only nations that have developed ballistic missile systems using essentially native resources have been World War II Germany, the USSR, and the United States, and both of the latter initially made extensive use of German equipment, personnel, and experience in their programs. Since World War II, five other nations have established serious programs to acquire missile delivery systems capable of carrying nuclear payloads. These are Communist China, France, Israel, Egypt, and the UK. Despite a great investment of time and. effort, together with a considerable amount of foreign assistance, none of these countries has yet successfully deployed a military missile system. The Chinese program, although now struggling for self- sufficiency, originally was primarily dependent on Soviet assistance and direction. The UK, which received substantial assistance from the US, has terminated its development efforts in favor of purchasing a US system. The Egyptian program, which had European assistance, has all but ended in failure. Both France and Israel have benefited from substantial US assistance. The US Government has not provided major components or subsystems of actual missiles to any of these native development programs. However, US industry has been supplying considerable assistance. One form of this assistance has been general end-use items such as umbilical connectors, acceler- ometers,'-gyroscopes, tracking equipment, telemetry equipment, and computers, which play an important but secondary role in missile development. A second form of assistance has been component and subsystem production by foreign subsidiaries or licensees in the country concerned. These agreements usually provide for US technical personnel to assist in this production by means of training programs, both design and production assistance, and on-the-spot trouble shooting. *In this paper, surface-to-surface ballistic missile systems have been clef ined in terms of their ranges as follows (in nautical miles): SRBA1 (short-range ballistic missile)--up to 600; A11RBl-1 (medium-range ballistic missile)-- 600 to 1,500; IRBM (intermediate-range ballistic missile)-- 1,500 to 3,000; and ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile)--over 3,000. E ET A third category of assistance is the US export of equipment for use in fabricating and testing missile components. Many times these machines are general purpose; sometimes they are .unique items. There have been few if any instances in which the items or assistance provided by the US, if withheld, would be critical to the foreign missile development program. In each case, it is likely that the country concerned could acquire a substitute or develop a replacement for any US- supplied item by paying a penalty.in time, money, and possibly a degradation in performance. However, when this assistance is taken in total it is clear that the cost of these foreign missile development programs and the time required for their fulfillment would increase markedly if access to US markets. were denied. This denial would certainly cause a major policy review of the programs and might prompt cancellation altogether in certain cases. The time periods estimated in the following text assume that access to the US aerospace market remains unchanged. Except for the Communist Chinese, the Soviets have never assisted any foreign country in the development of a strategic missile capability. Their sales of surface-to-surface missiles have been limited to tactical missiles. . In the country-by-country breakdown that follows, France and the United Kingdom have been treated first because they are the best potential sources of missiles or missile technology other than the US. The remaining nations con- sidered have been discussed in a generally descending order of importance. French activity in the ballistic missile development field is of special importance for two reasons. First, it is the only country other than the US, the USSR, and Communist China that is developing ballistic missile systems up through IRBM and possibly ICEM classes. Secondly, it is the only country other than the US that is supplying a missile system of strategic value to a foreign country, and it appears that it might be persuaded to supply missiles to other countries within the next ten years. A considerable number of different ballistic missile .systems with ranges in excess of 200 nautical miles are being 2 - ET T developed or are, under study by the French. The system of most immediate concern is the snort-range MD-620 surface-to- Sul ace missile, being developed by Avions Marcel Dassault for the Israeli Government. It is estimated that this system could become operational about mid-1970 at the earliest. The, terms of the agreement between the French and Israeli. Governments are largely unknown but they may permit the sale of the MD-620 to other countries as well. Of greater strategic interest is the SSBS system (sol-sol balistique strategique or surface-to-surface ballistic missile) being developed for silo launch. This system is expected to carry a reentry vehicle of 1,500 pounds to a maximum range of about 1,600 nautical miles with a CEP of one to two nautical miles. The missile should be operational sometime in 1970. There is no indication, however, that the French are considering the sale of this IRBM system to any foreign country. If it were to becor,:e available, the most likely customers probably would be India and Japan, and . perhaps West Germany. The French also are developing a Polaris-type missile system called the 17SBS (mer-sol balistique strategique or sea-to-surface ballistic missile), 'which will be operational about 1971. The missile may be able to deliver a 1,500-pound reentry vehicle to a maximum range of about 1,500 nautical miles or a 3,000 pound RV to about 1,000 n.m. It does not appear, however, that other countries will be greatly interested in this system, with the possible exceptions of West Germany and Italy. In addition to these three systems, the French have another, the Saphir, which could be easily adapted for an operational ballistic missile. The two-stage Saphir originally was designed as a possible ballistic missile and as an experi- mental test vehicle. Twelve launches of the Saphir were con- ducted from Hamrnaguir, Algeria, to test the SSBS reentry vehicle and guidance system. Development of the Saphir, therefore, as a ballistic missile system essentially is complete and would require only a few more flight tests and the design and construction of the necessary ground support equipment to bring the system to a deployable stage. The French al.() -ire Lt'd a huu tar cuh+thlu u l' he i_ it ; L1:se ! dS the first stage . .n the even that one of the less-advanced Countries eI_%c"-s to develop its own missile system, France probably be one of the countries approached for missile technology. Although their technology is not comparable that of the US, the French have sufficient knowledge