PROLIFERATION OF MISSILE DELIVERY SYSTEMS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0005577296
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
19
Document Creation Date:
June 24, 2015
Document Release Date:
June 29, 2011
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
F-2010-01671
Publication Date:
September 25, 1969
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w 5 :) ' iSC
PROLIFERATION OF MISSILE DELIVERY SYSTEMS
OR
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
APPROVED FOR RELEASE - CIA INFO^ DATE:
05-17-2011
It is sometimes assumed that any nation with a moderate
scientific and technical base can develop ballistic missile
weapons systems* without great difficulty. The only nations
that have developed ballistic missile systems using essentially
native resources have been World War II Germany, the USSR,
and the United States, and both of the latter initially made
extensive use of German equipment, personnel, and experience
in their programs. Since World War II, five other nations
have established serious programs to acquire missile delivery
systems capable of carrying nuclear payloads. These are
Communist China, France, Israel, Egypt, and the UK. Despite
a great investment of time and. effort, together with a
considerable amount of foreign assistance, none of these
countries has yet successfully deployed a military missile
system. The Chinese program, although now struggling for self-
sufficiency, originally was primarily dependent on Soviet
assistance and direction. The UK, which received substantial
assistance from the US, has terminated its development
efforts in favor of purchasing a US system. The Egyptian
program, which had European assistance, has all but ended in
failure. Both France and Israel have benefited from
substantial US assistance.
The US Government has not provided major components or
subsystems of actual missiles to any of these native
development programs. However, US industry has been supplying
considerable assistance. One form of this assistance has been
general end-use items such as umbilical connectors, acceler-
ometers,'-gyroscopes, tracking equipment, telemetry equipment,
and computers, which play an important but secondary role in
missile development. A second form of assistance has been
component and subsystem production by foreign subsidiaries
or licensees in the country concerned. These agreements
usually provide for US technical personnel to assist in this
production by means of training programs, both design and
production assistance, and on-the-spot trouble shooting.
*In this paper, surface-to-surface ballistic missile
systems have been clef ined in terms of their ranges as
follows (in nautical miles): SRBA1 (short-range ballistic
missile)--up to 600; A11RBl-1 (medium-range ballistic missile)--
600 to 1,500; IRBM (intermediate-range ballistic missile)--
1,500 to 3,000; and ICBM (intercontinental ballistic
missile)--over 3,000.
E ET
A third category of assistance is the US export of equipment
for use in fabricating and testing missile components. Many
times these machines are general purpose; sometimes they are
.unique items.
There have been few if any instances in which the items
or assistance provided by the US, if withheld, would be
critical to the foreign missile development program. In
each case, it is likely that the country concerned could
acquire a substitute or develop a replacement for any US-
supplied item by paying a penalty.in time, money, and possibly
a degradation in performance. However, when this assistance
is taken in total it is clear that the cost of these foreign
missile development programs and the time required for their
fulfillment would increase markedly if access to US markets.
were denied. This denial would certainly cause a major
policy review of the programs and might prompt cancellation
altogether in certain cases. The time periods estimated in
the following text assume that access to the US aerospace
market remains unchanged.
Except for the Communist Chinese, the Soviets have never
assisted any foreign country in the development of a strategic
missile capability. Their sales of surface-to-surface missiles
have been limited to tactical missiles. .
In the country-by-country breakdown that follows, France
and the United Kingdom have been treated first because they
are the best potential sources of missiles or missile
technology other than the US. The remaining nations con-
sidered have been discussed in a generally descending order of
importance.
French activity in the ballistic missile development
field is of special importance for two reasons. First, it is
the only country other than the US, the USSR, and Communist
China that is developing ballistic missile systems up through
IRBM and possibly ICEM classes. Secondly, it is the only
country other than the US that is supplying a missile system
of strategic value to a foreign country, and it appears that
it might be persuaded to supply missiles to other countries
within the next ten years.
A considerable number of different ballistic missile
.systems with ranges in excess of 200 nautical miles are being
2 -
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developed or are, under study by the French. The system of
most immediate concern is the snort-range MD-620 surface-to-
Sul ace missile, being developed by Avions Marcel Dassault
for the Israeli Government. It is estimated that this
system could become operational about mid-1970 at the earliest.
The, terms of the agreement between the French and Israeli.
Governments are largely unknown but they may permit the sale
of the MD-620 to other countries as well.
Of greater strategic interest is the SSBS system
(sol-sol balistique strategique or surface-to-surface
ballistic missile) being developed for silo launch. This
system is expected to carry a reentry vehicle of 1,500 pounds
to a maximum range of about 1,600 nautical miles with a CEP
of one to two nautical miles. The missile should be
operational sometime in 1970. There is no indication, however,
that the French are considering the sale of this IRBM system
to any foreign country. If it were to becor,:e available, the
most likely customers probably would be India and Japan, and
. perhaps West Germany.
The French also are developing a Polaris-type missile
system called the 17SBS (mer-sol balistique strategique or
sea-to-surface ballistic missile), 'which will be operational
about 1971. The missile may be able to deliver a 1,500-pound
reentry vehicle to a maximum range of about 1,500 nautical
miles or a 3,000 pound RV to about 1,000 n.m. It does not
appear, however, that other countries will be greatly
interested in this system, with the possible exceptions of
West Germany and Italy.
In addition to these three systems, the French have another,
the Saphir, which could be easily adapted for an operational
ballistic missile. The two-stage Saphir originally was
designed as a possible ballistic missile and as an experi-
mental test vehicle. Twelve launches of the Saphir were con-
ducted from Hamrnaguir, Algeria, to test the SSBS reentry
vehicle and guidance system. Development of the Saphir,
therefore, as a ballistic missile system essentially is
complete and would require only a few more flight tests and
the design and construction of the necessary ground support
equipment to bring the system to a deployable stage.
The French al.() -ire
Lt'd a huu tar cuh+thlu u l'
he i_ it ; L1:se ! dS the first stage .
.n the even that one of the less-advanced Countries
eI_%c"-s to develop its own missile system, France probably
be one of the countries approached for missile
technology. Although their technology is not comparable
that of the US, the French have sufficient knowledge