USE OF TOXINS AND OTHER LETHAL CHEMICALS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: AFGHANISTAN
• Keywords: SOVIET INVASION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005586155
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2011
• Case Number: F-2010-01380
• Publication Date: March 2, 1983

Director of
Central
I Intelligence
Use of Toxins and Other Lethal
Chemicals in Southeast Asia
and Afghanistan
Special National Intelligence Estimate
Memorandum to Holders
APPROVED FOR
RELEASEL DATE:
16-Dec-2010
SNIE 11/50/37-82
2 March 1983
COPY 3 7 1
 end
IE L)
ATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATI
nauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
L
 MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS
SN I E 11/50/37-82
USE OF TOXINS AND OTHER LETHAL
CHEMICALS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
AND AFGHANISTAN
Information available as of 2 March 1983 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
 THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
 mycotoxins have been identified.
In Laos, Vietnamese and Lao troops, under Soviet supervision,
have continued to use lethal and incapacitating chemicals and toxins
against the H'Mong resistance, through at least December 1982.0
In Kampuchea, the Vietnamese forces have continued to use lethal
and incapacitating chemicals and toxins against the DK and KPNLF
resistance forces, through at least February 1983
In Thailand, in 1982, Thai villages near'the Kampuchean border
for the first time became targets of Vietnamese chemical attacks.
Samples from these attacks have been analyzed and trichothecene
able to identify them through sample analysis
In Afghanistan, the Soviets have continued to use chemical agents
selectively, through at least January 1983. Analyses of physical samples
have, for the first time, provided evidence of mycotoxins. Chemical
agents other than toxins have also been used, but we have not yet been
events of previous years as well as events occurring during 1982
In the year that has elapsed since the publication of SNIE
11/50/37-82, the use of chemical and toxin agents has continued and
we have found nothing in the'evidence acquired since the beginning of
1982 that would contradict our earlier findings on any of the countries
with which we are concerned. The evidence has continued to come
from many different sources and has amplified our understanding of
analysis broadly supportive of US conclusions
Physical samples from both Laos and Kampuchea provide further
confirmation that trichothecene mycotoxins are among the agents used.
Our earlier conclusions on this have been reinforced by much better
medical data and additional chemical analyses and special intelligence.
Toxins have been found in urine, blood, and tissues of victims of "yellow
rain" attacks and in samples of material collected from attack sites.C
Soviet implication in the provision and use of these weapons
continues to be supported by special intelligence and by reporting from
defectors, resistance groups, and refugees=
In 1982, independent investigations conducted by other govern-
ments-notably those of Canada, the United Kingdom, France, and
West Germany-as well as by private groups, yielded evidence and
1
_3ECRET1
 Page 2
Intentionally Blank
 analysis of a Soviet protective mask has revealed the
presence of T-2 toxin (sample 7, annex D, table D-3),
in a quantity of approximately 1 microgram on the
area examined (one-fourth of the mask). This finding
was confirmed independently by three different lab-
oratories.
In Afghanistan
10. The Soviets have continued selective use of
chemical agents throughout the past year against
resistance forces and against villages that did not
cooperate with the Afghan authorities. Reports during
1982 have amplified and added credibility to our
earlier findings. In Afghanistan there is no question
that the Soviets themselves are using chemical agents
and possibly toxins. In addition, we continue to receive
reports that the Soviets have provided chemical agents
to the Afghan forces for use against the Muiahedin.[
11. For the first time we have evidence of the
presence of trichothecene mycotoxins in Afghanistan,
through the discovery of toxin contamination of a
piece of Soviet protective equipment. Laboratory
ably have been used since 1980."
13. Reporting from Afghanistan had long included
descriptions of events similar to the "yellow rain"
attacks reported from Southeast Asia. However, be-
cause of the remoteness of attack sites and difficulties
in sample collection, we have been unable to obtain
physical evidence of the presence of mycotoxins in
Afghanistan until the recent confirmation of the pres-
ence of T-2 on the Soviet gas mask. This now greatly
strengthens our previous assessment that "toxins prob-
Mujahedin have been accused of using
12. Also for the first time, the United States ac-
quired a large quantity (34 sets) of new (unused) Soviet
gas masks, canisters, and complete protective suits
captured from a Soviet convoy by Mujahedin forces in
August 1982. No information on the location of the
attack or intended destination of the convoy is avail-
able. It is reasonable to hypothesize that the Soviets
would not provide such protective gear to their forces
in Afghanistan unless they anticipated a need for it-
that is, for use in connection with employment of CW
agents and weapons. Comprehensive protective gear
of this sort would not be required as protection against
the kinds of nonlethal riot control chemicals that the
14. The biggest mystery remains the identification
of the other agents being used. Some familiar CW
agents can be inferred from descriptions of signs and
symptoms, For example, the medical effects resulting
from some chemical attacks are consistent with the use
of the nerve agent tabun. (Reportedly, tabun is one of
the, agents present in the CW stocks maintained by
Soviet forces in Afghanistan.) Other reports indicate
use of an incapacitating agent that causes unconscious-
ness for several hours
15. As early as 1980 we began receiving reports of
Soviet forces dropping or pumping one or more
chemical agents into tunnels, caves, and underground
waterways where resistance forces and their families
take shelter. Reports of those incidents contain de-
scriptions of symptoms that have puzzled the experts.
Of particular concern are reports of rapid blackening
and decomposition of tissue, a description that fits
none of the CW agents known to us. The frequency
4
3FCh`6~
 and consistency of these accounts from many different
tribal groups have led us to conclude that they must be
taken seriously and that we may be dealing with a new
class of chemical or toxin agent or with combinations
not previously known to the West. In one case, US
intelligence officers interviewed eyewitnesses who re-
ported that gasoline and probably diesel fuel were
poured into tunnels and ignited with incendiary pow-
der and shells. The number of deaths and condition of
the bodies were consistent with fire and asphyxiation.
16. There has been no change in the manner of
dissemination of the chemical substances. The pre-
dominant delivery system still appears to be helicop-
ters firing CW rockets, dropping chemical-loaded
bombs or canisters, or spraying chemicals directly.F_
Findings From Other Countries
17. There is a growing body of international evi-
dence that supports the US findings of chemical
weapons use. Non-US private experts and governments
have collected and independently analyzed samples
and have obtained testimony from witnesses of attacks
and from medical personnel. A few examples follow.
18. Non-American physicians with good credentials
in tropical medicine have testified that they have
treated chemical warfare victims. For example, a
French physician has provided testimony on his treat-
ment of victims at a Kampuchean hospital. Similar
testimony came from a Swedish International fled
Cross worker in Kampuchea. A New Zealand doctor
and his British associate at the World Vision Hospital
at Ban Vinai refugee camp are convinced that H'Mong
villagers are victims of repeated chemical warfare
attacks in Laos. An increasing number of these physi-
cians have made strong public statements and, to date,
not one doctor who has examined victims claiming
CW injury has publicly or privately disputed his
claims after examination.
19. Two French physicians who worked in Afghan-
istan described the unusual wounds caused by what
they believe were poisoned bullets. French scientists
have found trichothecene toxins in samples from
Southeast Asia. Thai scientists have reported finding
mycotoxins in their samples.
20.I lofficers acquired
portions of gas masks from attack sites in Afghanistan.
The tests conducted on them are as yet incomplete,
but early indications and some signs and symptoms of
persons handling the contaminated masks suggest that
chemical agents were used in the attacks
21. Several carefully done epidemiological studies
have been prepared by Canadian governmental and
academic institutions. Their findings are consistent
with ours on all but technically minor points.
22. The December 1982 report of the UN Experts
Group provided as much support as the United States
could reasonably expect from such a multilateral
entity. The document supported individual US claims
in more than a dozen specific technical areas, faulted
the Soviet "scientific explanation" in strong language,
and declared other hypotheses (other than use of CW)
to be remote and inconsistent with the human testi-
mony and the laboratory data at hand. Its failure to
support the US charges fully was attributed by most of
the world press to the political-not scientific-inhibi-
tions of the Experts Group.
Implications for Intelligence
23. The fact that chemical and toxin agents con-
tinue to be used in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan
despite a highly publicized UN investigation, diplo-
matic pressure on the Soviet, Vietnamese, and Lao
Governments, and growing international acceptance
of the evidence suggests that the perpetrating govern-
ments do not believe that their activities are as yet
sufficiently damaging politically to warrant their ter-
mination. This is not to say that Moscow, Hanoi, and
Vientiane have ignored the charges being levied
against them. But rather than stopping the illegal use
of chemical and toxin agents, they have launched a
major propaganda counteroffensive.
24. In May 1982 the Soviets submitted a "scien-
tific" study to the UN blaming the toxin poisoning in
Laos and Kampuchea on US use of herbicides during
the Vietnam war. The Soviet study claims that wide-
spread use of herbicides allowed toxin-producing fungi
to flourish in Vietnam. Winds then allegedly blew the
spores into Laos and Kampuchea, contaminating the
environment. It is surprising that the Soviet Academy
of Sciences would lend its name to the production of
such a scientifically indefensible paper. Nevertheless,
the overall Soviet counterpropaganda effort has not
been without effect in diverting public attention away
from the Soviet actions and focusing them on the
5
SE
 proposed US chemical warfare modernization pro-
gram and on past US use of herbicides in Vietnam. An
international scientific conference was held in Ho Chi
Minh City (Saigon) in January 1983 to call attention to
the long-term effects of herbicide use on nature and
man.
25. The comprehensive assessment of the CW evi-
dence that the United States has published and briefed
worldwide in classified and unclassified form has
helped to persuade many governments that lethal
agents, including toxins, are being used and that the
Soviet Union is implicated. There is a reluctance on
the part of most governments, however, to levy such
charges publicly. Governments are loath to take a
public position on the issue because to acknowledge
that the USSR has violated its international commit-
ments is to call into question the trustworthiness of the
USSR as a party to arms limitation agreements. Even
the most conclusive and incontrovertible intelligence
evidence is unlikely to galvanize other governments
into forceful public positions on an issue that has such
politically unpleasant implications.fl
 Afghanistan
12. The evidence from Afghanistan is different
from that from Southeast Asia. It has been impossible
to obtain fresh samples of any type. However, report-
ing on chemical attacks comes from a wider variety of
sources throughout the coun-
try provides evidence to corroborate HUMINT report-
ing. F_~
13. I I in
September 1981 a Soviet helicopter sprayed a yellow
mist in Paktia Province (Sheik Amir, 3315N 6949E)
that caused 16 deaths. The survivors had bloody tears
and noses; extensive bleeding was reported in those
who died. described a similar
attack in Nangarhar Province in the same month, in
which four persons were killed.=
14. Since early 1980 we have had numerous reports
of Soviet use of chemical agents on resistance forces
and their families who were hiding in caves, tunnels,
and underground waterways. A HUMINT source C
says that, on 20
September 1982, Soviet soldiers poisoned underground
waterways in Lowgar Province south of Kabul where
the Mujahedin were hiding. A Mujahedin commander
in Pakistan reported a similar event in the same
province on 13 September, which resulted in the
deaths of 60 men and 13 children. Both sources
described a chemical substance being pumped through
a hose from an armored vehicle into the waterways.
Furthermore, villagers who have witnessed Soviet
operations against underground waterways have pro-
vided testimony at international meetings describing
in detail how the Soviets have used chemical agents
and explosives in this way. Moreover, a Cuban emigre
A-2
SE
 _nrRf4_
trained in the use of Soviet chemical weapons has
previously described a dissemination technique that
involves pumping lethal gas through a hose
15. In both of these September attacks, the victims'
bodies reportedly decomposed rapidly, and the flesh
peeled away when attempts were made to move
them.' Since 1979 Mujahedin resistance leaders, refu-
gees, journalists, and Afghan defectors have described
chemical attacks that caused almost identical symp-
toms. Most reports have portrayed the skin as being
blue-black after death. Such symptoms seem bizarre,
but the large number of reports from a variety of
sources suggests they cannot be dismissed as mere
propaganda. For example, an Afghan
pbserved a victim of
what he believes was a chemical attack. The patient
had blackened skin, which was very shiny except for a
large number of spots all over the body. F_
are inadequate to allow us to hypothesize about the
contents beyond that
18. The British journalist who interviewed the So-
viet defector cited above also reported on two attacks
he had heard about from other sources. One was an
attack in the spring of 1982 on Kaiba, where Soviet
soldiers shot victims rendered unconscious by a gas.
The other was near Herat in the summer of 1982
when Soviets reportedly loaded the bodies of victims
of a gas attack on a truck and took them away,
possibly for autopsy
19. An Afghan
told US officials on 5 October 1982 tha
15 Mujahedin for red skin lesions which he said were
caused by Soviet CW attacks in Qandahar Province in
May or June 1982. The Mujahedin claimed that Soviet
helicopters fired rockets which emitted gases on im-
pact-black, yellow, and white in color. Three Muja-
hedin died within 12 hours of one attack, in the
causes the flesh to become very soft
More recently, a Soviet soldier who defected to the
Miujahedin said in a press interview that a Soviet CW
agent called "smersh," which is "100 percent lethal,"
16. The defector also said that the Soviets had stores
of "picric acid," "smersh," and an incapacitating
agent in Qonduz and Kabul. In a subsequent interview
it was determined that the "picric acid" referred to
was chloropicrin, an extremely strong irritating agent
with an inhalation lethality nine times greater than
that of chlorine. The defector said that "smersh" was
delivered by rockets fired from a helicopter and that
chloropicrin and the incapacitating agent were con-
tained in cylinders and released through a vent in the
aircraft. Several Mujahedin have described tanks or
cylinders outside helicopters from which chemicals are
sprayed.
17. Further, the defector reported that chemical
agents had been used in June 1982 on a highway
between Termez and the Salang Pass north of Kabul.
He stated that the Soviets have been preoccupied with
protecting the roads and that chemicals were sprayed
by planes along the areas adjacent to highways. Chem-
ical grenades reportedly have been used. We suggest
that the grenades contain toxic smokes, but the data
Y In the late 1960s, the Soviets reportedly tested a chemical agent
that killed dogs immediately and decomposed their flesh within a
half hourl
20. In early December 1981 a group of 15 refugees
attempting escape to Pakistan were attacked by a
helicopter using gas that killed four or five of them
(youngest and oldest) and rendered the rest uncon-
scious for five or six hours. The attack occurred about
60 kilometers northwest of Jalalabad.
21. 1200 to 300 gas
containers at Qandahar Airport that were painted in
greens and browns. The containers generally were 35
to 40 inches high and about 26 to 30 inches in
diameter. (This size generally matches that of contain-
ers known to be used by the Soviets to store CW agents
in their chemical depots.) A friend
said that the containers held chemicals used
against the Afghan resistance. He described three
types. One caused burning in the throat and suffoca-
tion, one caused what looked like smallpox and blister-
ing, and the third made victims tired and sleepy so
that they could not run or fight. Further, the friend
stated that the containers are put into special casings
that are dropped from aircraft and explode on impact,
emitting a large cloud of smoke, usually yellow, but
sometimes other colorsF
 22. Mujahedin sources described tanks firing gre-
nades in August 1981 in the Arghandab Valley which
produced a foggy mist that rendered 10 members of
the resistance force unconscious. The Soviets carried
their lifeless-appearing bodies away in armored vehi-
cles.
 ANNEX C
DETAILS OF CHEMICAL ATTACKS
This annex comprises four tables (C-I, C-2, C-3, and
C-4) providing detailed information on CW attacks in
Laos, Kampuchea, Thailand, and Afghanistan-loca-
tion of attack, source of information, method of
delivery, form of chemical, and number of casualties.
 Table C4
Afghanistan: Summary of Chemical Warfare Attacks, 1982-83
Date of Source of Form of
Attack Location Information Delivery Method Chemical Persons Killed Persons Taken Ill
Early Feb North of
Shindand
4, 5 Feb South of
Shindand
19 Feb Badakhshan
Province
2nd week of Vardak Province Afghan exile Helicopters with Blue smoke 300
Apr bombs
May Badakhshan Mujahedin Helicopters Smoke-producing ?
Province bombs (blue-
green)
May-Jun Qandahar Mujahedin Helicopter Black, Yellow, ?
Province rockets white gases
5-9 Jun Lowgar Province Afghan exile After military ?
attacks, Soviets
used unknown
chemicals on
bodies killed in
action
11 June Qandahar Mujahedin Aircraft bombs Poisonous gas 15
Province
Jun Northern Faryab Pakistani Press Helicopters, Red, white, black ?
Province bombs gases
Jun Road between MI-24 Pilot Helicopter ? ? ?
Kabul and (Soviet defector)
Termez
Jul Panisher Valley Afghan defector Aircraft Tabun nerve gas ?
20 Jul Syed Karom ? "Chemical gas" 3
20 Sep Lowgar Afghan observer Chemicals Gas
pumped from
armored vehicle
early Oct
"Chemical gas" ''Chemical gas" 73
pumped from
armored vehicle
16 Nov Dewaghal, in
Konar Valley
Chemical bombs ? ? ?
dropped on rebel
stronghold
3 Feb 1983 Kandar Province Afghan military
officer
 S~
COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF SAMPLES OF
CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS AND TOXINS
I. Identification of the specific chemical agents
being used in conflict areas (such as Laos, Kampuchea,
and Afghanistan) depends on collection and analysis of
at least one of the following: environmental samples
contaminated with agent, the munitions used to de-
liver agents, or biological specimens from attack
realistic prospect for yielding positive results. When-
ever random samples are collected, even under ideal
conditions, there is a wide variability in the concentra-
tion of agents detected in the samples. This is not
surprising when one considers the many factors that
can affect sampling.
victims
2. Obtaining contaminated samples that will yield
positive traces of specific chemical agents is dependent
on a number of factors. These include the persistency
of the chemical; the ambient temperature, rainfall,
and wind conditions; the media on which the chemical
was deposited; and the time, care, and packaging of
the sample from collection to analysis in a laboratory.
Many standard chemical warfare agents are nonper-
sistent and disappear from the environment within a
few minutes to several hours after being dispersed.
These include, for example, the nerve agents sarin and
tabun, the blood agents hydrogen cyanide and cyano-
gen chloride, the choking agents phosgene and diphos-
gene, and the blistering agent (urticant) phosgene
oxime. Other standard CW agents-such as the nerve
agents VX and thickened soman, and the blistering
agents sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, and lewis-
ite-may persist for several days to weeks depending
on weather conditions. The trichothecene toxins are
persistent but may be diluted to below detectable
concentrations by adverse weather conditions. Al-
though the trichothecenes are quite stable under con-
trolled laboratory conditions, in the field they may be
subject to microbial degradation
3. To maximize the chances of identification and
detection, sample collections should be made as rapid-
ly as possible after a chemical assault, and with many
agents this means minutes to hours. Under the circum-
stances of Southeast Asia and Afghanistan this has
simply not been possible; nor has there been hardware
specifically developed and disseminated to these areas
to aid collection of perishable samples. While numer-
ous samples have been collected, few of them held any
4. Samples have been collected from Southeast Asia
since mid-1979 and from Afghanistan since May 1980.
To date, about 350 individual samples-of greatly
varying types and usefulness for analytical purposes-
have been collected and analyzed for the presence of
traditional CW agents, none of which have been
detected. On the basis of recommendations by medical
and toxicological experts and of findings by the US
Army Chemical Systems Laboratory (USACSL), many
of the samples have been analyzed for the trichothe-
cene group of mycotoxins. Details concerning the
samples, including the circumstances of their collec-
tion and results of their analysis, are provided in tables
D-1, D-2, and D-3.0
5. All environmental and nonbiological samples are
submitted to USACSL for comprehensive analysis for
unknowns, to include traditionally recognized chemi-
cal warfare agents and other possibly toxic materials.
Tissue specimens and body fluids from victims of CW
attacks are submitted to the Armed Forces Medical
Intelligence Center (AFMIC). Before 1982, AFMIC
was known as the US Army Medical Intelligence and
Information Agency (USAMIIA).' Analyses of biologi-
cal samples for trichothecene and other myc oxins
are conducted under the sponsorship of AFMICI
The US Food and Drug Administra-
tion has also assisted in analysis, as has a pollen expert
from the Smithsonian Instituted
' Unless otherwise indicated, all human tissue and urine speci-
mens listed in the sample set tables were refrigerated (5-8 degrees C)
from the time of collection until they were received by the
p-1
SE
 Afghanistan: Sample Collection and Analysis for Presence of Chemical Warfare Agents
Sample No. Sample Description History of Sample
1 Rocket and bomb fragments Fragments were obtained in Konarha
with Soviet markings Province, sent to USACSL on 18 April
1980.
2 Soviet gas mask and canister Purchased in Kabul. Sent to USACSL
on 18 September 1980.
3 Knit polyester cap, a polyester Obtained in Islamabad, Pakistan, from
knit jacket, badly worn shirt, an Afghan refugee, who claimed he
which appeared to be recently was subjected to a gas attack, Collected
washed. on 2 November 1980, shipped from
field on 19 November 1980, received
by USACSL on 8 December 1980.
5 7.62-mm cartridges The cartridges, which reputedly were
coated with a poison, were carried by
special Afghan police and some Soviet
advisers. Samples were collected in No-
vember 1980 and received for analysis
at USACSL on 4 February 1981.
6 Cotton garment and socks Clothing appeared to be very dirty.
Clothing obtained from Afghan refu-
gee in Islamabad, Pakistan. Refugee
reportedly subjected to CW attack. Re-
ceived by USACSL 12 February 1981.
Transferred to USAMIIA for toxin
analysis.
7 Soviet Shlem gas masks Five masks were procured in Kabul at
various times and were sent as received
to USACSL for analysis between 24
August 1981 and 21 December 1981.
No background information is available
with these masks.
8 Expended Soviet 5.45-mm car- Obtained by Mujahedin about 1980.
tridge case The bullets had been captured from
the Soviets and used by Afghan Islamic
insurgents. During a firefight, insur-
gents using the bullets became ill, with
severe vomiting and nausea for several
hours. They suspected that the Soviets
had contaminated the powder charge.
Sent to USACSL on 25 August 1981.
9 Soviet gas mask with canister Item was reportedly taken from a Sovi-
et after a Soviet gas attack in early
1981. Item was collected by an Afghan,
who is associated with the Mujahedin
and who loaned the item to US person-
nel for analysis. USACSL received the
mask on 18 December 1981.
Analytical Results
No evidence of standard CW agents.
No evidence of standard CW agents.
Dioctylphthalate, which probably was
used to test gas mask filter, was
identified.
Analysis showed no evidence of any
known CW agent but detected a high
molecular weight ester, which could be
indicative of a trichothecene, and adipic
acid esters. Also detected malathion, an
organic phosphate insecticide.
Not analyzed because of deterioration of
sample enroute.
No evidence of standard CW agents was
found on bullet coating or scrapings from
slug. Not analyzed for toxins.
No evidence of known CW agents. Re-
sults on trichothecene pending comple-
tion of analysis.
No evidence of traditional CW agents.
An analytical sample from the external
surface of one-quarter of a mask, ob-
tained in September 1982, showed the
presence of toxin T-2 (approximately I
microgram). The result was verified by
two independent laboratories.
No evidence of any generally recognized
agent or toxic compound was found. Was
not analyzed for toxins.
Preliminary analysis by thin-layer chro-
matography (TLC) of material from hose
connection of the mask indicated the
presence of T-2. This could not be con-
firmed, No evidence of traditional CW
agents.
 Table D-3 (continued)
Afghanistan: Sample Collection and Analysis for Presence of Chemical Warfare Agents
Sample No. Sample Description
10 Grain
History of Sample
Sample was collected. by
who reported that it may have
been poisoned. USACSL received sam-
ple on 24 February 1982. Portion of
sample to be analyzed for toxins.
Alleged CW sample taken from the site
of a 19 February 1982 CW attack on
Provided the sample to e
US briefing team during its visits to
Pakistan (1-5 April 1982). One-half the
sample retained by the UK. Remaining
sample given to USACSL for analysis.
(2) Cartridges reputedly
poisoned
The samples were received by
rom a Mujahedin leader,
The cartridges reported-
ly caused discoloration of the face (pur-
ple and green), choking sensation, and
death within 15 minutes, This occurs
even when similar injuries from ordi-
nary cartridges were not lethal. The
material was captured during an attack
on a Soviet convoy between Ghazni
and Zabol Provinces on its way to
Qandahar. Sent to USACSL on 31
March 1982 for analysis.
Sample received on 7 July 1982 and
submitted to USACSL on 8 July for
exploitation.
btained sample from a
relative, who got it from contacts in
Nimruz Province. USACSL received
August 1982.
Insurgent from Panjsher brought pow-
der to Kabul. Powder reportedly was
used by Soviets in the Panisher Valley
to contaminate food and water; also
dropped from aircraft. USACSL re-
ceived on 15 July 1982.
Analytical Results
Preliminary analysis by TLC indicated
the presence of trichothecene toxins.
Three alternate methods of analysis were
used but none were confirmatory. No
evidence of traditional CW agents.
High-purity tetryl (trinitrophenyl meth-
ylnitramine). Tetryl is a high-velocity
initiator used to detonate TNT. It burns
at 295?C when unconfined and explodes
at 180-190?C when confined. No evi-
dence of traditional CW agents.
(1) Wheat sample: Vapor analysis showed
traces of unidentified compounds (molec-
ular weights 413 and 460) less than 0.26
ppm As, and hydrocarbon carbonyl. No
evidence of traditional CW agents. TLC
supportive of T-2 toxin or diacetoxyscir
penol. Not confirmed by additional
analysis.
(2) Cartridges: X-ray identified bullets as
tracer type. Analysis showed no evidence
of known CW agents or suspect toxins.
Vapor sample: biphenyl, dimethylauino-
line. Unidentified mass 141. No standard
CW agents present. No trichothecenes
were present. Analysis complete.
Primarily carbon. Vapor sample con-
tained biphenyl, dimethylquinoline, and
possible cyclic polysulfides. Also found
Inorganic salts, possibly Perchlorates.
Probably residue from munitions. No
evidence of CW agents or poisons. TLC
was negative for trichothecenes.
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h. Assistant Director, F , for the Federal B eau of Investigation
i. Director of NSA, r the National Security ency
j. Special Assists to the Secretary for Nationa ecurity, for the Department of the
Treasury
k. The Dep y Director for Intelligence for any other De rtment or Agency
2. This d ment may be retained, or destroyed in accordance ith applicable security
regulatio , or returned to the Directorate of Intelligence.
3. hen this document is disseminated. overseas, the overseas recipients retain it for a
p iod not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the document shoul a destroyed
or returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the warding
agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953.