PROSPECTS FOR BOSNIA

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: BOSNIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005621707
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2011
• Case Number: F-2010-00294
• Publication Date: May 1, 1993

Director of
Central
Intelligence
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
National Intelligence Estimate
Prospects for Bosnia
2605
NIE 22 73 463-463
REGISTRY
SENIOR REVIEW PANEL (DCi/SRP)
VIA DOl REGISTRY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE^ DATE:
01-31-2011
This National Intelligence Estimate represents
the views of the Director of Central Intelligence
with the advice and assistance of the
US Intelligence Community.
NIE 93-22
May 1993
Copy 4 6 3
 Director of
Central
Intelligence
NIE 93-22
Prospects for Bosnia
 Figure 1
The UN Proposal and Controlled Areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina
-Slovenia
ZAGREB
Konjic!
8
?
Mostar
102
Serb-controlled area
Croat-controlled area
Muslim area
6
771
Province number
Territory lost by Serbs
Territory lost by Croats
Territory lost by Muslims
Bihac UN-declared safe areas
Vance-Owen proposed distribution
2,4,6 Serb 3,8,10 Croat 1,5,9 Muslim 7 Mixed
LTfff "wA =:=
Vo/vodinar
(autonomous
' province)
vornik
AMR
M
r-Montenegro;=.
5'n^F YitEe t Tm ..
Albania.
 Key Judgments
The Vance-Owen Plan holds little prospect of preserving a unitary
Bosnia in the long run:
? The agreement runs afoul of the conflicting territorial goals of Serbs,
Croats, and Muslims.
? Serbs and Croats will consolidate their military gains regardless of
boundary adjustments agreed to under international negotiation.
? Bosnian Muslims expect that Serbia and Croatia will try to absorb
contiguous portions of a fragmented Bosnia and can be expected to
resist strongly.FI
The warring parties doubt that the international community has the
will to undertake major military operations and sustain the long-term
presence necessary to preserve a multiethnic Bosnia. They will test this
resolve at every opportunity but probably will avoid large-scale, direct
attacks on UN forces.F - - - I
None of the parties can match a NATO-led force operating under rules
of engagement that allow all necessary means to enforce the Plan.
Under such circumstances, assuming early challenges were met with
force, fighting would be reduced and humanitarian problems mitigat-
ed. But terrorist campaigns are possible within and outside the former
Yugoslavia. Even a single attack could cause a large number of
casualties.
International military operations in Bosnia under any plan will be.
difficult to organize and deploy:
? Issues of command and control, rules of engagement, levels of troop
contributions, and cost sharing remain unresolved.
? While capable of making modest additional contributions, NATO
allies would expect the United States to commit a major share of
troops to an international force, as well as logistic, strategic lift, and
intelligence support.
Se\ret
NIE 93-22
May 1993
 ? UN forces will have to supervise and enforce demilitarization and
troop withdrawals and monitor heavy weaponry, internal routes, and
external frontiers.
? UN forces also will have to assume major responsibilities for refugees
and displaced persons, civil administration, and rebuilding efforts in
the areas they occupy.F_~
Regardless of any decision to undertake military operations against the
Bosnian Serbs, Western governments will continue diplomatic efforts
to end the fighting. If such efforts fail, the fighting will continue
indefinitelyF_~
Most likely, the warring parties as well as the international community
are headed toward variants of the Vance-Owen Plan that will not
preserve a multiethnic state: UN safehavens for Muslims perhaps
leading to a rump Muslim-dominated state, Muslim entities associated
with Croatia, or de facto UN protected zones throughout Bosnia.
Developments in Bosnia are closely related to broader regional stabil-
ity. Outbreaks of violence in Croatia, Macedonia, or Kosovo could
destroy a fragile Bosnian arrangement and imperil UN forces. Like-
wise, large-scale international intervention in Bosnia could encourage
various elements to provoke fighting and appeal for armed support
from UN troops, thus expanding the war outside Bosnia.
 Sec
Discussion
What Vance-Owen Would Accomplish
Western governments are likely to continue
the diplomatic process, whether or not mili-
tary measures are taken against the Bosnian
Serbs. The approaches contained in the
Vance-Owen Plan, however, hold little pros-
pect of stabilizing the region, even if interna-
tional pressure brings about Bosnian Serb
agreement to the Plan. Events on the ground
are likely to drive the parties and the inter-
national community toward outcomes that
will not preserve a multiethnic Bosnia
If Bosnian Serbs approve the Vance-Owen
Plan, a large international military effort
could reduce the level of fighting, improve
the delivery of humanitarian aid, and protect
the remaining Muslim population of Bosnia.
These objectives are achievable only as long
as the United States and other contributors
make a large, open-ended commitment of
military ground forces rivaling in scale and
duration the postarmistice effort in Korea by
the United Nations. A UN effort would also
provide the basis for a more gradual, less
violent dissolution of the Bosnian state, a
dissolution that the Intelligence Community
believes is likely in any case. F__1
Full Compliance Is Unlikely
Serbian President Milosevic takes seriously
the prospect of tightened sanctions and possi-
ble airstrikes on Serbia, as demonstrated by
his failed attempt to push the Bosnian Serb
Assembly into endorsing the Vance-Owen
Plan. He is prepared to use pressure on
Serbia-including restricting the flow of
weapons, fuel, and other supplies-so long as
it prevents the West from acting forcefully or
until the Bosnian Serbs sign on to Vance-
Owen:
? Sealing the border completely will be diffi-
cult, and its military and economic impact
will be not be immediate. The Intelligence
Community has begun monitoring the Ser-
bian-Bosnian border. Initial observations
indicate that traffic has tapered off at that
border, but some goods continue to move
from the former Yugoslavia to Bosnia and
we are not yet certain of the full extent of
compliance.
? Milosevic's willingness to make good his
threats to seal the border will depend on
how credible Western resolve appears, how
much compliance the West demands, and
how vulnerable he believes he is to threats
from domestic ultranationalists opposed to
1 Secmt-,
 his effort to force Bosnian Serb acceptance
of Vance-Owen. In any case, some Serbian
officials will not fully comply. Should Bos-
nian Serbs face a dire threat, Milosevic
will undoubtedly help them.
Although there is still a chance that Bosnian
Serbs may join Bosnian Croat and Muslim
authorities in approving the Vance-Owen
Plan, the goal of preserving Bosnia as a
single, decentralized state runs counter to
the long-term Serb objective of absorbing
large parts of Bosnia. Moreover, none of the
parties can be trusted to act in good faith:
? Serbs, Muslims, and Croats in Bosnia
doubt that the international community
will be willing to sustain the burden of the
long-term military occupation necessary to
implement the Plan.
? The Bosnian Serbs almost certainly will
attempt to consolidate their military gains
in territory not assigned to them under the
Plan.
? The Bosnian Croats have little interest in
preserving Bosnia and are content to main-
tain their grip on western Herzegovina.
While willing to support an independent
Bosnian state, Zagreb increasingly views
Bosnia-Herzegovina as unviable and would
be happy to absorb parts of it should it fall
apart. In any case, Croatia will allow the
Serbs to bear the blame for continuing the
conflict.
? Demoralized by the failure of Vance-Owen
to create a strong multiethnic central gov-
ernment, Muslim fighters will resist moves
by Serbia and Croatia to absorb the re-
maining parts of a fragmented Bosnia.
All sides will scrutinize the behavior of UN
forces to determine their resolve. An early
test will be whether Bosnian Serb forces
withdraw from areas assigned to the Bosnian
Government that the Athens agreement des-
ignates for UN occupation, such as the
northern corridor. Unless a substantial inter-
national force is deployed rapidly and dem-
onstrates a willingness to use force, all
sides-especially the numerous irregular
military units, acting independently or in
concert with national contingents-will try
to subvert the terms of the Plan:
? Serbs are likely to mount periodic guerrilla
and sabotage operations against UN
forces. They may also threaten the civilian
population and take hostages.
? The Muslims and remnants of government
forces will be tempted to create violent
incidents that could be blamed on the
Serbs or the Croats.
? Demilitarization provisions almost certain-
ly will require seizing heavy weapons and
disarming combatants. Few UN members
are willing to commit their forces to this
task.
? Each party will try to hide as much weap-
onry as possible. The Serbs and Croats are
likely to move weapons to their respective
provinces to avoid UN monitoring.
? Renewed ethnic conflict in Bosnia and
elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia will
flare up, with UN troops caught in the
middle.
 The Military Challenge
UN forces are almost certain to face situa-
tions requiring the use of force, most likely
short of major combat operations. Attacks
will consist mainly of sniper fire, hit-and-run
attacks on convoys and bases, and mining of
transport routes. However, even a single
isolated attack on UN forces could cause a
large number of casualties and sap the re-
solve of participants to remain engaged. The
level of fighting will vary throughout Bosnia,
depending on how well senior military com-
manders of all warring factions can or want
to control local units:
? If the UN continues to operate as it has
in Bosnia-that is, limiting the use of
force to self-defense-local factional com-
manders will tolerate aggressive behavior
by their units and defeat the Plan's
implementation.
? If the UN permits troops to exercise "all
necessary means," including the use of
force, the various factions most likely will
temporarily moderate their behavior. The
shelf life of this moderation will depend on
continuing and consistent UN willingness
to employ force and on the success of
demilitarization.
? The draft UN resolution authorizes "use of
all necessary means" to implement Vance-
Owen proposals, but it is unclear how
various UN contingents will apply these
rules of engagement. The UN probably
will approve rules of engagement permit-
ting preemptive action-similar to the
rules adopted in Somalia-largely in order
to ensure participation of a large contin-
gent of US ground troops.F_~
A UN force-particularly heavily armored
units-would have difficulty maneuvering in
Bosnia's rugged terrain and probably would
have to adopt counterinsurgency tactics
against a guerrilla resistance. British,
French, and US forces, the main contribu-
tors to a Vance-Owen troop package, are
well trained and experienced in counterinsur-
gency tactics. Other potential contributors
may not be as capable, however, which could
limit their usefulness.)
Long-Term Challenges
The modifications to the Vance-Owen Plan
reached in Athens indicate that efforts to
implement a settlement will be undermined
by protracted negotiations over boundary
adjustments and population resettlement.
For example, each party is likely to interpret
to its own advantage the provision that UN
forces replace combatant troops protecting
villages in which their conationals form a
majority:
? The Serbs most likely will claim that areas
designated for UN protection be demarcated
according to their current ethnic composi-
tion, including ethnically cleansed eastern
Bosnia.
? The Bosnian Government, however, will
demand that the 1991 census (which was
the basis of the Vance-Owen Plan) be
accepted as the justification for demarca-
tion. (S NF)
UN forces will face major problems with
continuing population movements. Even if
hostilities cease and transportation routes
open up, tens of thousands of refugees will
try to move into regions under the control of
 Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina
We estimate that fighting forces -inT-Bosnia
consist of about 60,000 to 80,000 predom-
inantly Muslim troops in the Bosnian
army, 50,000 to 75,'000 troops in the
Bosnian Serb Army (BSA), and 40,000 to
50,000 combatants in the Croatian
Defense Forces. Irregular forces probably
include about 25,000 Serbs, 50,000
Muslims, and 40,000 Croatians.
The most potent military threat to UN
forces would come from the BSA, if there
were a political decision by Bosnian Serb
leaders to organize a military resistance.
The BSA is the best organized and
equipped armed force in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina and will remain a threat until
demilitarized. In the unlikely event that
the entire BSA did resist, however, it
would be no match for sufficiently
manned and equipped NATO-led forces.
Under a sustained attack, the Army s
resistance would be reduced to attacks by
small units and bands of Serb partisans.
BSA supplies, in addition to small-scale
arms smuggling across the border in Ser-
bia, would permit these bands to conduct
low-level partisan warfare for an extended
time.)
their respective ethnic groups. Clashes be-
tween returning refugees and members of
other ethnic groups are likely. UN forces
probably will be expected to provide humani-
tarian assistance and overall security for
persons seeking resettlement and those de-
ciding to remain in place. The Plan is mute
on this point.F_-]
Croatian Defense Forces (HVO) consoli-
dated a loose collection of Croatian Dem-
ocratic Union 'activists, local citizens, ex-
Territorial Defense Forces personnel, and
former Yugoslav Army officers and
troops. The HVO is principally responsi-
ble for defending Croat areas of Herzego-
vina, but it lacks heavy weapons, logistic
support, and an effective command struc-
ture. However, allied with the Croatian
Army, the HVO could hold off Bosnian
Serbs indefinitely in the'regions it now
occupies in Bosnia.F---]
The Muslim-dominated Bosnian army is
numerically equivalent to the BSA but is
inferior to it in heavy weapons (tanks,
APCs, and artillery) by at least an order
of magnitude. It can neither hold its terri-
tory against determined Serb offensives
nor retake lost ground. A cease-fire and
the deployment of troops would reduce
pressure on the Bosnian army, which
might try to occupy areas vacated by the
retreating BSA units. The Bosnian army
might also conduct guerrilla attacks on
Serb forces. Should UN forces try to stop
this activity, the Muslims might respond
violently, while trying to place blame on
the Serbs.
UN forces will also have to assume responsi-
bility for civil administration, humanitarian
relief, and rebuilding infrastructure in the
areas they occupy, pending agreement on a
new government for Bosnia.)
 What's Expected of the Warring Parties
The Vance-Owen Plan calls for a cease-
fire within 72 hours of the passage of a
UN implementing resolution. Each side is
then obligated to:
? Avoid forward deployments or offensive
actions.
? Exchange information on the size and
location of forces, defensive works, and
heavy weapons.
? Withdraw heavy weapons from conflict
areas.
? Withdraw forces from defensive posi-
tions to designated provinces.
? Open free passage routes for UN forces,
civilians, and humanitarian aid.
? Guarantee the restoration of civil ad-
ministration.
Implementing the Vance-Owen Plan will
require international forces to oversee
A Limited European Commitment
Although most NATO allies have forces
they could contribute to UN operations, they
will link the size of any additional troop
contributions for Bosnia to the dimensions of
committed US ground forces. They believe
that 25,000 to 40,000 US ground troops will
be required to fill out the force of 70,000 to
80,000 troops that NATO planners deem
necessary. In the Allies' view, a significantly
smaller commitment of US forces would cast
the disengagement, disarmament, and
eventual demobilization of the combat-
ants in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The role
of an expanded UN force will be to:
? Supervise force withdrawals and moni-
tor redeployment of heavy weapons to
designated areas.
? Establish and patrol demarcation lines
and checkpoints between opposing forces.
? Monitor external borders to prevent the
entry of troops, arms, or military equip-
ment. F__1
Bosnia.
Additional UN responsibilities, based on
"clarifications" agreed to at the Athens
meeting, would require international
forces to occupy areas vacated by with-
drawing Bosnian Serb forces and the po-
licing of a Serb corridor running through
a Croatian-controlled province in northern
doubt on Washington's staying power and
fail to provide sufficient manpower.
The Allies face legal, resource, political, and
historic constraints that will limit their will-
ingness to commit significant ground forces
to any Bosnian operation. The bulk of the
additional European contribution will have
to come from France and Britain, but both
are hard pressed to provide trained manpow-
er beyond levels already committed. Other
 Figure 3. "Call the Americans and ask what
they intend doing about all this!"n
Allies, including Spain and the Netherlands,
have expressed a willingness to contribute
modest additional forces.)
Major issues remain unresolved in NATO
military and political consultations, includ-
ing member participation, the level of na-
tional force commitments, cost sharing, and
the rules of engagement. US assistance in
strategic lift and intelligence assets will be
essential. Command and control will contin-
ue to be a thorny problem within the UN and
NATO. UN Secretary General Boutros-
Ghali insists on UN authority over any
operation. NATO authorities will oppose ex-
tending this beyond political supervision and
will seek wide latitude over operations.
Contingent on the necessary command and
control arrangements, NATO has agreed to
convene a group to facilitate the participa-
tion of non-NATO countries in planning the
implementation of the Vance-Owen agree-
ment. Additional forces might be available
from East Europe, Ukraine, and Russia, but
they would pose both political and military
burdens. The UN almost certainly will seek
to include Islamic and other non-European
states. Such participation will increase com-
mand and control problems and run into
resistance from the Serbs and perhaps the
Croats.F---]
Looking Ahead to Dissolution
Bosnian Serbs and Croats expect Bosnia-
Herzegovina to fall apart regardless of
Western efforts to implement a negotiated
settlement. For now, they may be willing to
tolerate a rump central government in
Muslim-controlled areas, but Belgrade
would oppose a state that harbored revanch-
ist sentiments against Serbs. Serbia is also
determined to prevent linkages between
Bosnian Muslims and Sandzak Muslims.
Because of heightened Croat-Muslim ten-
sions, Croatia will oppose Muslim efforts to
acquire weaponry in quantities large enough
to threaten Croatian areas in Bosnia.)
Plan.
The Muslims will be embittered by Western
lack of support for the government's defense
effort, indifference to the collapse of the
peace process, or a diplomatic process that
leads to the partition of Bosnia. They would
view UN reluctance to roll back Serb territo-
rial gains as a betrayal by the West, which
recognized the Bosnian state and admitted it
to the UN a year ago. Terrorist attacks
would probably occur inside and outside the
former Yugoslavia. Serbian- or Croatian-led
terrorist attacks would be less likely if it
became clear that UN forces have no inten-
tion of fully implementing the Vance-Owen
We believe that all the protagonists and
Western parties have moved incrementally
away from the original Plan and will move
further toward less ambitious concepts.
Modifications of the Plan already conceded
to the Muslims in exchange for their signa-
ture and to the Serbs at the Athens meeting
portend further demands for changes by all
sides. Redefining the initial goals of the
Vance-Owen Plan, however, will strain coali-
tion cohesiveness and diminish the credibility
of Western resolve.
S't 6
 Figure 4
Current and Likely European Ground Force Commitments
in the Former Yugoslavia a
Country
Current Ground Forces
Likely Additional Contribution
France
4,790
2,000 - 5,000
United Kingdom
2,648
4000-5,000
Canada
2,559
500
Denmark
1,107
100 - 300
Netherlands
1,020
500 -1,000
Belgium
989
300
Spain
930
200-500
Russia
878
400-1,000
Poland
870
200
Czech Republic
478
100
Norway
427
100
Ukraine
400
400
Sweden
256
1,000
Finland
216
100
Slovakia
120
0
Luxembourg
41
0.
Portugal
30
0
Turkey
0
0
Italy
0
0
Total
17,759
7,900 - 15,500
a The Europeans also have a small number of troops in Serbia the combatants and personnel on AWACS monitoring the no-fly
and Croatia as European Community monitors and aircrews zone over Bosnia. Finally, the British and the French have
flying relief supplies to Croatia and Bosnia. Moreover, the some ships on standby in the Adriatic to evacuate their forces
Allies also have naval warships in the Adriatic as part of NATO . if necessary.
and WEU task forces monitoring the ban on arms shipments to
 Russia has expressed concern about the
"restricted" command structure for the
proposed operation to implement the
Vance-Owen Plan and the possibility
that Russian forces would be subordi-
nated to NATO. Moscow believes that
UN authorities must have more than
nominal operational control and that
the UN should establish a command
structure that includes all the major
contributing countries. Russian officials
have urged US-Russian consultations
and suggested using the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council, which links East
European countries and former Soviet
republics to NATO, as a forum for
planning operations:
? Russian officials across the political
spectrum suspect that NATO forces
would be used only against the Bosni-
an Serbs.
? The Foreign Ministry probably be-
lieves that UN control of operations
would ease Russian military reluc-
tance to participate and would under-
cut domestic criticism that Moscow is
selling out to the West.F_~
The gradual modification of the Vance-
Owen proposals suggests at least three possi-
ble outcomes. All would require a large
international military presence and the ac-
quiescence, if not agreement, of all parties to
border changes and population movements.
UN-Sponsored Safehavens or Eventually a
Rump Muslim State
UN Security Council resolutions designating
Srebrenica, Sarajevo, and other cities as
protected areas is a step in this direction but
still requires operational clarification. A
large international presence would ensure a
semblance of Bosnian Muslim control, facili-
tate humanitarian assistance, and keep Ser-
bia and Croatia at arm's length-but at a
cost of supplying military and financial sup-
port indefinitely. Belgrade would remain sus-
picious of Muslim intentions toward the
Sandzak; Croatia would fear both renewed
Serbian incursions and a rearmed Muslim
population. The current Bosnian Govern-
ment would be placed in limbo. These tem-
porary safehavens could lead over time to a
rump Muslim-dominated state that would be
heavily dependent on UN military protection
and Western assistance.
Muslim Entities Affiliated With Croatia
Affiliation of Muslim areas to Croatia pro-
vides a more feasible arrangement than long-
term international protected areas. Despite
frictions between Muslims and Croatians,
President Izetbegovic has discussed "confe-
deration" between Bosnia and Croatia on
several occasions. Under such an arrange-
ment, Croatia would provide the Muslims
protection from the Serbs. The Croats would
gain access to Bosnia's mineral resources and
provide the Muslims protection against the
Serbs while viewing a Muslim client state as
a buffer against future Serbian aggression.
Nonetheless, mutual Muslim-Croat distrust
will most likely exacerbate tensions and
would make implementation of this arrange-
ment problematic. F__1
 De Facto UN Protected Areas
Under another variant, the parties might
request UN protected zones for their disput-
ed areas. As in the Croatian case, Bosnian
Serbs are likely to refuse to permit the return
of areas they occupy to Muslim control. In
Athens, Bosnian Serb leaders insisted that
UN forces replace their forces withdrawing
from eastern Bosnia. Under this scheme,
they would hope to consolidate administra-
tion by local Serbs and eventually to secure
formal international acceptance of their au-
thority. Similarly, Bosnian Croats and Mus-
lims might resist relinquishing territory to
Serbs or to each other unless it were part of a
general land swap
Bosnia and Regional Instability
In the absence of an internationally super-
vised settlement, fighting will continue indef-
initely. Even with an agreement, the Bosnian
situation will remain vulnerable to develop-
ments elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia.
Outbreaks of violence in Croatia, Kosovo, or
Macedonia would jeopardize the fragile
cease-fire, strain UN operations, and threat-
en regional stability.
Likewise, a larger UN operation in Bosnia
risks encouraging various elements in neigh-
boring states to use force to achieve their
goals. The Croatian Government reportedly
plans to attack Croatian Serbs in the event of
a Western military intervention in Bosnia.
Albanian radicals in Kosovo also reportedly
hope to take advantage of a Western military
presence in the area by fomenting an upris-
ing against the Serbs. Such elements are
likely to provoke fighting and then appeal for
armed support from Western troopsF--]
 National Security Unauthorized Disclosure
Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Information available as of 14 May 1993 was used
in the preparation of this National Intelligence Estimate.
The following intelligence organizations participated
in the preparation of this Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
also participating:
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence,
Headquarters, Marine Corps
This Estimate was approved for publication by the
National Foreign Intelligence Board.