BRAZIL'S CHANGING NUCLEAR GOALS: MOTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS

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• Publication Date: October 21, 1983

Director of
fi Central
Intelligence
9.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE^ DATE:
09-19-2011
Brazil's Changing Nuclear Goals:
Motives and Constraints
Special National Intelligence Estimate
SNIE 93-83
21 October 1983
Copy 3 0 2
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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 SNIE 93-83
BRAZIL'S CHANGING NUCLEAR GOALS:
MOTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS
Information available as of 18 October 1983 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
 THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
Energy, and the Treasury.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
 CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ............................................................................................................ v
KEY JUDGMENTS .................................................................................................... I
DISCUSSION .............................................................................................................. 5
Ambitious Beginning .............................................................................................. 5
Retreat from Nuclear Accord ................................................................................ 5
The Key Factors ................................................................................................. 5
Disarray at Nuclebras ......................................................................................... 6
West German Reactions ..................................................................................... 6
The Likely Outcome .......................................................................................... 7
The Shift Toward Indigenous Research ................................................................ 7
The Start of Consolidation ................................................................................. 7
Recent Developments ......................................................................................... 8
Weapons Potential .................................................................................................. 8
Motives and Incentives ....................................................................................... 8
Argentina's Role .................................................................................................. 9
Capabilities and Limitations .............................................................................. 9
Weapons Delivery Systems ................................................................................ 10
Constraints on a Nuclear Future ........................................................................... 11
Bureaucratic Infighting ...................................................................................... 11
The Effect of Political Liberalization ............................................................... 11
Continuing Economic Constraints ? ................................................................... 11
Nuclear Export Ambitions ..................................................................................... 11
Nuclear Relations with the United States ............................................................. 12
Hi
SEC
 SCOPE NOTE
This Estimate examines the reordering of Brazil's nuclear priorities
in light of political, economic, and technological developments. It
assesses the reasons for, and the impact of, Brazil's shift from the
acquisition of foreign nuclear energy facilities to a more narrowly
focused indigenous nuclear development effort. It considers possible
motives for a Brazilian decision to seek a weapons capability, the
technologies that might be adaptable to such a program, and constraints
on such a course of action. The Estimate also considers the potential im-
pact on Brazilian decisions of neighboring Argentina's. nuclear develop-
ments, in particular the possible construction and testing of an Argen-
tine nuclear explosive. It suggests the kinds of evidence we might see in
the 1984-88 period if Brazil were to decide shortly to build a nuclear
device. Finally, the Estimate describes Brazil's export ambitions and
examines the ability of the United States to influence Brasilia's nuclear
policies.F__1
V
L
 KEY JUDGMENTS
Brazil has not made a decision to build nuclear explosives and is
not able to commit the resources to do so. It is nonetheless exploring two
approaches that could eventually give it the option to produce the fissile
material for a nuclear explosives capability:
- It is considering the construction of an unsafeguarded natural-
uranium-fueled research reactor that could provide plutonium
for weapons use. This, however, would also require construc-
tion of a reprocessing plant larger than their present laboratory
facility.
- Brasilia is also investigating production of highly enriched
Either approach would probably entail at least five years to produce the
necessary fissile material. Both methods would also require the con-
struction of facilities for high-explosive testing and fabrication of the
nonnuclear component
We believe that, even if Brazil began now an intensive effort to
build a nuclear device, it probably could not achieve this objective
before the mid-1990s. In our view, several problems would combine to
impose significant delays:
- There is no consensus within Brazil's nuclear bureaucracy on
the future course of the nuclear program.
- The Brazilians have a demonstrated tendency to pursue nuclear
technologies that are outmoded or too complex for their
resources and capabilities.
- Economic stringencies are likely to constrain the effort for the
next several years.
- Complications may be introduced by the democratic transition
and reasserted civilian control over the programs.
We believe, however, that if Brasilia became convinced that Buenos
Aires had made a firm decision to develop, test, or deploy nuclear
explosives, Brazil would initiate a serious effort to achieve its own
I
 nuclear weapons capability. Brazilian leaders are not persuaded today
that nuclear explosives are necessary to their national security or
prestige
We believe that Brazil seeks eventual mastery of nuclear technol-
ogy as part of its quest for technological-industrial autonomy and great-
power status. This quest has included the development of its own
automobile industry, oil technology, conventional weapons industry,
computer technology, and civil nuclear program
Brazil has made a massive retrenchment in its civil program that
will retard its nuclear development generally for many years. Brasilia
has retreated from its 1975 major nuclear accord with West Germany,
which was the centerpiece of the program, because of financial
pressures and uncertainties about future energy needs. Many other
problems-including technology assimilation-have plagued imple-
mentation of the agreement. Brazil now is building only two power
reactors instead of the eight projected in the German accord. As a
consequence, the transfer by Germany of other nuclear fuel cycle
components, including uranium enrichment and reprocessing equip-
ment, is in jeopardy
major administrative and organizational changes within its nuclear
bureaucracy that are intended to strengthen its indigenous program. In
the last two to three years, it has been developing-on its own and with-
out safeguards-technology such as uranium enrichment and reprocess-
ing. Brazil refuses to accept international safeguards on important
aspects of its nuclear research, particularly its small reprocessing
facility, which could ultimately provide an important link in the chain
leading to weapons development.' Brazil has not signed the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and insists that peaceful nuclear explo-
sives are permitted by the Treaty of Tlatelolco. We believe that these
facts demonstrate a determination on Brazil's part to preserve a nuclear
weapons option.
We expect support for Brazilian nuclear research to continue,
regardless of the outcome of the presidential election in 1985. None of
2
~t~.~
 the candidates suggested thus far are known to be hostile toward
nuclear development, and it has not been a campaign issue.
Brazil and the United States recently have moved to improve
bilateral nuclear relations, but important differences over nonprolifera-
tion issues that arose in the late 1970s still pose obstacles to a resumption
of nuclear cooperation. We believe Brazil will be open to offers of US
advice on such matters as nuclear training and safety, but will persist in
its refusal to place its nuclear research activities under safeguards and in
its resistance to any US effort to constrain its nuclear ambitions.
If Brazil decides to embark on a nuclear weapons development
program within the next five years, some of the following developments
might indicate that such a decision had been made:
- An increase. in unsafeguarded nuclear research activities, to-
gether with increased security measures.
- A substantial increase in funding for indigenous nuclear
research.
- The development of a weapons-related high-explosives pro-
gram and/or ballistic missile research and development.
- Expanded favorable media coverage and an official effort to
broaden popular support for nuclear programs.
 /
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Center for Nuclear
Technology Development (CDTN)
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 DISCUSSION
1. Brazil has a major nuclear program that has been
going through a period of readjustment during the past
three to four years. In 1975, with the assistance of West
Germany, it initiated an ambitious program aimed at
expanding nuclear power and mastering the fuel cycle.
Financial pressures and technical problems, however,
led to a curtailment of the nuclear accord and then to
recent shifts in indigenous programs that are crucial to
how fast Brazil can realize its nuclear potential.0
Ambitious Beginning
2. Brazil's desire to master nuclear technology
heightened in the mid-1970s, due to several related
factors. First, the nation was passing through a long
period of prosperity, known as the Brazilian "economic
miracle," which had boosted national confidence across
the board. In addition, Brazil, as a large oil importer,
was just beginning to feel the effects of the international
oil shortage. Brazilian leaders recognized the need for an
alternate energy source and, although the nuclear power
program was expensive, they apparently believed they
could afford RE]
3. In 1975 Brazil signed a sweeping nuclear agree-
ment-a major commercial and diplomatic commit-
ment-with West Germany. Brasilia agreed to purchase
the technology for a virtually complete nuclear fuel
cycle, consisting of up to eight large power reactors, a
uranium enrichment plant, and a fuel reprocessing
plant. With much fanfare, the Brazilian Government
created a new federal agency, Nuclebras, to handle the
accord. The agreement was widely viewed at that time
in Brazil, as well as internationally, as persuasive
evidence of the country's determination to become a
world power and to develop its own nuclear capabili-
ties by mastering a complete nuclear fuel cycle.=
Retreat from Nuclear Accord
4. Despite the initial enthusiastic response, the
agreement gradually became the subject of bitter
controversy. Strong criticism surfaced in the press in
early 1978, and by
knowledged that the power program would be scaled
back and the transfer of West German technology
stretched out. Various sources have attributed the
dissatisfaction to both economic and scientific con-.
cerns. These included:
- A growing reluctance to make further capital
investment in nuclear energy.
- Uncertainty regarding industrial growth and the
need for additional energy resources.
- Numerous technical problems, unanticipated
delays, and cost overruns in Brazil's absorption
of nuclear technology.
Increased distrust of West Germany's commer-
cially untested jet-nozzle uranium enrichment
process.
- Doubts about the cost-effectiveness of reprocess-
ing spent fuel.F-1
The Key Factors
5. Costs. Of the several factors working to limit the
nuclear energy program, the most important has been
cost. Government officials, sensitive to public criticism
of nuclear policy, deliberately underestimated the
total nuclear bill. For example, in an effort to help
promote the program early projections excluded fi-
nancing costs. Initial projections also underestimated
costs of construction and equipment. The head of
Nuclebras recently told the Brazilian press that it
would cost $18.4 billion to complete the eight planned
power plants-more than triple the cost cited when
the plans were originally formulated in 1975. Even
this projection could still be on the low side.
6. Nuclebras now maintains publicly that it plans to
build four power reactors soon, and possibly four later.
It seems more likely, however, that only two reactors
under way at Angra III
5
0
 SE
January 1983, the Figueiredo administration con-
firmed that work also had been suspended at the
Angra III site, and announced its decision to cut the
budgets for most federal agencies, including Nucle-
bras. Subsequent reliable reporting indicates that Nu-
7. Uncertainty About Future Growth. A related
consideration in Brazil's decision to trim the power
program is the increased uncertainty regarding the
pace of future industrial growth and the energy
supplies needed to support it. During the 1970s, when
the nuclear agreement was signed, there was near
unanimity that Brazil's rapidly expanding industries
would require vastly increased power reserves. Some
independent studies still predict that nuclear power
will be needed to fuel rapidly growing industrial
centers beginning in the 1990s and that nuclear energy
would be a useful supplement to hydroelectric sources
for Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. However, official
studies by Brazil's electric utility company, Electro-
bras, show that growth rates for electric energy have
dropped since the 1970s-due to both the global
economic recession and the conservation effort stimu-
lated by the sharp rise in energy costs. They expect the
slowdown to persist over the next decade. Given these
divided assessments-against a backdrop of an intense
budget squeeze-Brasilia is unwilling to program
scarce funds for an uncertain distant payoff
8. Technical Problems. Other problems that dic-
tate a retrenchment relate to Brazil's difficulties in
assimilating complex technology. One of the key bot-
tlenecks has been the lack of skilled Brazilian person-
nel to absorb the foreign technology and run the
program. In addition, Brazilian industry has required
longer lead times than anticipated to adapt to the high
levels of quality assurance required in any major
nuclear program.
9. Doubts About the West German Enrichment
Process. Brazil chose West Germany as its major
nuclear supplier primarily because Bonn was willing
to provide a uranium enrichment plant. However,
Brazilian scientists, in particular, have become increas-
ingly skeptical of the utility of the costly and compli-
cated West German uranium enrichment process. The
commercial feasibility of the Becker jet nozzle process
has yet to be demonstrated. A small pilot plant,
consisting of 24 nozzle separation enrichment stages, is
scheduled to be on line in 1984, two years later than
the original plan for a full scale 450- to 600-stage
demonstration plant that was to have been operational
by 1982-but at the same cost of $250-300 million. f
10. The Reprocessing Issue. Aspects of Brazil's
fuel reprocessing plans apparently also are being over-
hauled. In late 1982 Brasilia began to question the
wisdom of purchasing a pilot reprocessing plant from
the West Germans under safeguards that would cost
an estimated $300 million and initially recover 9 to 12
kilograms of plutonium a year. In May 1983, a
generally reliable source reported that the reprocessing
project had been canceled altogether
Disarray at Nuclebras
11. Major personnel shifts within Nuclebras also
suggest a Brazilian decision to reduce and slow down its
commitment to West Germany without renouncing the
accord. Early last February the architect and chief
Brazilian proponent of the nuclear accord, Paulo No-
gueira Batista, was forced to resign as head of Nucle-
bras. His replacement, Dario Comes, who previously
occupied senior positions both within Electrobras and
the Ministry of Mines and Energy, contrasts with his
predecessor in publicly stating that his highest priority
is the acquisition of nuclear technology, not the produc-
tion of electricity. In March, a leading Brazilian news-
paper reported that Nuclebras had laid off 250 employ-
ees from one of its nuclear subsidiaries and that Comes
intended to make further cutbacks
12. We believe that Nuclebras probably will not
regain the status it previously enjoyed within Brazilian
policymaking circles and that serious problems of
confusion and disorganization within the entire nucle-
ar program will persist.
West German Reactions
13. Bonn has a compelling economic stake in imple-
menting as much of the accord as possible. West
6
SSEECRIM,
 S T
Germany had depended upon the sale of the power
reactors to Brazil to provide the economies of scale
that would reduce the financial cost of its own nuclear
program. Other motivations include the Federal Re-
public's need to: maintain its reputation as a high-
quality supplier of nuclear technology and equipment;
gain access to Brazilian uranium deposits; and preserve
good relations generally with South America's largest
country[=
14. Despite these inducements, the West Germans
are disillusioned with the slow pace of the technology
transfer and the current status of the accord, and
believe that the original contract cannot be salvaged.
January 1983,
Brazil's Energy mister o
the nation would be better off without the nuc ear
accord, but that it probably would not be renounced,
Several reasons argue for such a course:
- The 1975 accord is composed of a series of legal
contracts, with stiff monetary penalties for
breaking any of them.
- Brazil has had a longtime research relationship
with West Germany, and we believe that it still
needs the latter's nuclear training and assistance.
- Brasilia does not want to offend Bonn and
possibly jeopardize other important economic
and commercial ties.
the Foreign Ministry ears
at raze already stands to lose some of its
international credibility as the result of unilater-
ally slowing the execution of the bilateral nucle-
ar agreement.
The Likely Outcome
16. Despite its slowdown, we believe Brazil is un-
likely to go so far as to renounce its nuclear contract
with West Germany. Instead it probably will complete
two power reactors within the next decade. In early
on a "turn-key" basis.
The. Shift Toward Indigenous Research
17. The curtailment of the West German accord
has been accompanied by what we believe is a
considered decision by Brasilia to give more emphasis
to indigenous nuclear research. In the short run, the
research program will require fewer financial re-
sources. Moreover, Brazil now appears to want to rely
on its own efforts to develop indigenous nuclear
technology, as opposed to acquiring foreign technology
18. In effect, the research programs have been
given a higher priority, and this is reflected in recent
bureaucratic and organizational shuffles. The status of
the Institute of Nuclear and Energy Research in Sao
Paulo has been elevated in conjunction with the drive
to master indigenous technologies. At the same time,
policy moves have enhanced the authority of the
Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) and strength-
ened its focus on nuclear research
7
SSEE `RFT~
 - Increasing CNEN's budget to $49.38 million
(from $36.37 million) and doubling the funding
for nuclear fuel cycle research, according to
press reports.
Recent Developments
21. Since September 1982, the National Security
Council has consolidated nuclear research activities
even more under the control of the Nuclear Energy
Commission, which in turn designated IPEN Brazil's
primary nuclear research center. The most important
changes reflecting this consolidation include:
- Appointing Dr. Rex Nazare, formerly the CSN's
nuclear adviser, to head CNEN.
- Transferring control of IPEN to the federal
government, placing it under the direct supervi-
sion of Nazare.
' Brazil accepts nuclear safeguards administered by the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency, which cover only transfers of nuclear
technology, equipment, and materials that it receives from foreign
suppliers. Comprehensive safeguards, which are now prescribed by
US and Canadian laws governing their nuclear exports, require that
all nuclear facilities and materials of recipient nations-regardless of
origin-be open to international inspection before nuclear transfers
are approved. For example, a reprocessing plant-or any other
nuclear facilities-built in Brazil outside the IAEA's safeguards
system would have to come under safeguards before Washington
could authorize assistance to the Brazilian nuclear program.)
own nuclear research technology
This funding represents a much smaller share of the
total budget than that required for the civilian power
program, and we expect it to be relatively less affected
by future budget cutbacks.0
22. We expect Brazil to persist in its unsafeguarded
nuclear research even though funding is likely to be
quite limited for the next several years. A Foreign
Ministry spokesman recently affirmed Brazil's right to
develop an indigenous nuclear program for peaceful
purposes, and the Minister of Mines and Energy has
publicly indicated that Brazil plans to produce pluto-
nium as a nuclear fuel. We believe that these public
statements are indicative of continuing official support
for Brazil's unsafeguarded nuclear research program.
Moreover, the assignment of Rex Nazare to head
CNEN has been characterized by various sources,
including the US science counselor, as symbolizing a
new commitment by Brazil to the development of its
Weapons Potential
Motives and Incentives
23 Bra-
zilian leaders clearly see the eventual mastery of
nuclear fuel cycle technology as necessary for the
ome influen-
tial figures within the Brazilian military, including
those with technical expertise, see the development of
nuclear submarines, ballistic missiles, and nuclear
weapons as important concomitants of Brazil's emerg-
ing world-power status. Moreover, as a rapidly indus-
trializing nation that is highly competitive in world
markets, Brazil strongly resists what it perceives as
foreign efforts to limit its access to new equipment and
technologies. It has a long history of seeking-and
largely gaining--technological-industrial independ-
ence. This quest for autonomy has included the devel-
opment of its own automobile industry, oil technology,
conventional arms industry, computer technology, and
the nuclear program. Brazil's adamant refusal to sign
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or to
8
 wave into force the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which desig-
nated Latin America a nuclear-weapons-free zone,
allows Brasilia to retain the freedom to develop nucle-
ar explosives.
Argentina's Role
24. Brazil's determination to keep its options open
to develop a nuclear weapons capability derives both
from its desire for great-power status and the realiza-
tion that Argentina has outpaced it in nuclear develop-
ment. Relations between the two nations are marked
by intermittent rivalry rather than overt hostility. A
bilateral nuclear agreement signed in 1980 provides
for training, joint uranium exploration and various
kinds of technical cooperation in nonsensitive areas.
We believe, however, that Brazilian officials are dis-
tressed by their inability to match the nuclear ad-
25. Nonetheless, we believe that Brazil has not
made a decision to build nuclear explosives and is not
able to commit the resources to do so. This situation
could change, however, if Brazil were to feel threat-
ened or challenged by Argentine developments. Bra-
zilian officials have been circumspect in their com-
ments on Argentina's nuclear program,
gentine capability to design and build nuclear explo-
sives could quickly become an incentive for Brazil to
proceed along similar lines, particularly if Brasilia
becomes convinced that Buenos Aires has made a firm
decision develop, test, or deploy nuclear weapons.,
26. If Brazil were to learn that Argentina had built
a device, we believe it would probably exert strong
diplomatic pressure on Buenos Aires to refrain from
conducting a test. Should a test occur, however, Brasi-
lia would be constrained by its own advocacy of
peaceful nuclear explosives from initiating any puni-
tive or retaliatory measures. It would probably accel-
erate its own efforts to match Argentina's explosives
capability. It might also seek through diplomatic
channels to respond with countermeasures designed to
place limits on Buenos Aires's effective use of its
capability. These could include: persuading various
international forums, such as the organization of
American States and OPANAL-the organization es-
tablished by the Treaty of Tlatelolco to keep nuclear
weapons out of Latin America-to voice concern for
the peace and security of South America; exerting
pressure on Buenos Aires directly, and through other
Western nations, to leave future devices untested.P
Capabilities and Limitations
27. If a determined military effort were to begin
shortly, we estimate that Brazil could not achieve the
construction of a nuclear device much before the mid-
1990s. In contrast to neighboring Argentina, Brazil
currently lacks a source of fissile material suitable for
weapons. Brazil's light water reactors, the type used in
the United States, will produce spent fuel containing
plutonium that is largely unsuitable for weapons pur-
poses. Moreover, the power reactors to be acquired
from West Germany will be placed under IAEA
safeguards. =
28. Acquiring Fissile Material. The most expedi-
tious method for Brazil to acquire fissile material
would entail the construction of a reactor that utilizes
natural uranium as fuel. A well-placed Brazilian
source of undetermined reliability reported in January
1983 that $50 million had been allocated over the next
five years to build a heavy water-moderated, natural
uranium-fueled research reactor at IPEN in Sao Pau-
lo. If construction begins now, the source estimates
that the reactor could produce enough spent fuel to
separate more than 3 kilograms 6 of plutonium annual-
ly beginning in 1988-89.
9
SE6R~
 29. Once such a reactor were completed, Brazil
could reprocess the spent nuclear fuel to obtain pluto-
nium in the small unsafeguarded reprocessing labora-
tory at IPEN, which was completed in January 1982
with West,German assistance and some French equip-
If the facility were
upgraded, it could produce possi y 3 to 4 kilograms a
year by 1989. Should Brazil decide to construct a
larger reprocessing plant, it would probably have to be
done clandestinely because Brazil's nuclear agreement
with West Germany forbids the replication of repro-
cessing technology. We have no indication that such a
facility is planned or even contemplated.
31. We judge the Brazilian effort to develop the
necessary technology and equipment to enrich urani-
um by means of gas centrifuge to be serious, even
though it is still in an early stage of development. It
appears that the Brazilian Government has authorized
and intends to fund the project as an alternative to the
West German Becker jet nozzle process described
earlier in this Estimate]
32. Since 1981 various sources, including the Brazil-
ian press, have confirmed the existence of a centrifuge
research project for the enrichment of uranium. Ac-
cording to Brazil's Minister of Mines and Energy, the
project, authorized by CNEN, is being carried out at
three Brazilian institutes. IPT is providing the micro-
electronic instrumentation and control equipment for
gas centrifuges, CTA/IEAV is conducting tests to
eliminate problems arising from the high velocity of
the rotor system, and IPEN is responsible for coordi-
nating the project. IPEN is also comparing the older
West German centrifuges with designs
modern equipment.
33. High Explosives. If Brazil decides to develop a
weapons capability we would expect it to build addi-
tional facilities for high-explosive (HE) testing and the
fabrication of the nonnuclear component. We believe
that Brazil has neither plants capable of producing a
wide range of high explosives suitable to nuclear-
related HE development, nor the experience pertinent
to nuclear explosive design. F___1
Weapons Delivery System
34. Various sources indicate that Brazil intends to
develop its own medium-range ballistic missile for
commercial satellite launch and possibly for military
purposes. Without considerable foreign assistance,
however, we judge it unlikely that Brazil will produce
a ballistic missile weapons system, either as a spinoff of
its space launch vehicle program 9 or as a separate
Brazil has developed a solid fuel rocket propellant in support of
its space program, which ostensibly is devoted to scientific research.
 venture, before the late 1990s. Brazil has built rockets
and small tactical missiles, and it has begun to acquire
the guidance and control technology required for such
missiles. The technological and industrial support for
its space program, however, is still quite limited. It also
lacks the sophisticated propulsion and materials tech-
nologies necessary to develop a ballistic missile system,
although several sources report that research and
acquisition efforts in these specific areas are continu-
ing.
Constraints on a Nuclear Future
35. We believe that several serious problems contin-
ue to constrain Brazilian nuclear ambitions in general.
For example, overlapping lines of responsibility retard
progress and contribute to low morale at working
levels. In addition, partly because nuclear programs
and institutes are still in flux, we believe Brazil's
pursuit of nuclear technologies is unfocused, encom-
passing processes that are outmoded or too complex for
Bureaucratic Infighting
36. We believe that present bureaucratic infighting
and inefficiency will persist and continue to impede
nuclear progress. This stems from the fact that Brazil's
nuclear establishment is so diffuse that, even with
recent moves toward some consolidation, there is no
clear chain of command or mechanism for setting
goals and priorities.
Perce struggles over energy policies between
Electrobras, Nuclebras, and CNEN as well as a con-
tinuing rivalry in nuclear research between CTA and
IPEN. As a result, rival programs are still pursued and
scarce resources expended unnecessarily. For example,
beginning in 1980, both CTA and IPEN were charged
with developing gas centrifuge technology. This rival-
ry was not resolved until late 1982, when full responsi-
bility for research and development was assigned to
IPEN
The Effect of Political Liberalization
37. The process of political liberalization in Brazil,
which has already begun to affect nuclear develop-
ments, could also eventually serve as a brake to
i0 These include work with centrifuge equipment dating from the
late 1950s and, conversely, the development of highly sophisticated
laser isotope separation technology=
nuclear ambitions. The increasingly open Brazilian
press over the last several years has exposed various
sensitive aspects of the nuclear program, including
military-related research activities. Most of the press
statements thus far have been critical of the program,
focusing on such issues as the high cost of foreign
nuclear technology, dangers of radioactive contamina-
tion, and the inadvisability of building nuclear explo-
sives. The more liberal environment has also facilitat-
ed the organization of small antinuclear groups,
consisting mainly of civilian scientists and environ-
mental protectionists, who would like to see Brazil's
nuclear programs terminated. There also have been
some scattered antinuclear demonstrations, attracting
support mainly from youth groups and residents in
areas close to nuclear facilities.
38. President Figueiredo has decisively altered the
nuclear policies of the Brazilian Government by scal-
ing down and stretching out the West German accord
and placing new emphasis on the development of
indigenous technologies. We expect support for Brazil-
ian nuclear research to continue, regardless of the
outcome of the presidential election in 1985. None of
the candidates suggested thus far are known to be
hostile toward nuclear development, and it has not
been a campaign issue. A new civilian government
may have to be more responsive than, the present
military incumbents to political pressure from a wide
variety of constituencies. Alternatively, civilian leaders
may seek to ensure military support by emphasizing
programs in which the military and national security
establishments have an interest, including the nuclear
program
Continuing Economic Constraints
39. We believe that, if current economic problems
persist, even a civilian government favorably disposed
toward nuclear development might be forced to trim
existing programs. Civilians have complained for
many years that the regime has emphasized industrial-
ization at the expense of a more equitable distribution
of income or improved living standards. Riots this year
in major Brazilian cities indicate, in part, the willing-
ness of Brazilians to demonstrate their dissatisfaction,
and their impact on national policy may grow.
Nuclear Export Ambitions
40. Brazilian nuclear development, however, will
probably have some nearer term impact on the global
 nonproliferation regime in the area of nuclear exports
over the next four to six years. Brazil's shift in
emphasis from the acquisition of foreign nuclear
power facilities to the development of indigenous
nuclear technology dovetails with its export-oriented
development strategies and its pursuit of political
prestige. Brasilia is proud of its nuclear. industrial
achievements, which include:
- The development of a uranium dioxide produc-
tion line.
- A pilot-scale uranium hexafluoride line.
- An export-quality reactor vessel production
plant.
- Uranium conversion facilities.
- The West German-supplied Resende fuel fabri-
cation plant, built with Brazilian participation. (s
NF)
41. Brazil's ' interest in promoting its exports in the
nuclear field is growing. Recently, Brazil seems much
more inclined to compete aggressively against Argenti-
na-which heretofore has had the regional market
largely to itself.
Brazilian
exports are beginning to include nuclear materials and
technical assistance, and, although these have been
limited to date, they can be expected to grow as
Brazil's industrial capability develops
42. Brasilia has also already signed nuclear agree-
ments with nations that have signaled an interest in a
nuclear weapons capability, such as Iraq and Libya.
Prior to the Israeli destruction of Iraq's nuclear facili-
ties, Brazil had concluded an agreement-still in
effect-with Baghdad.
Brazilian press sources alleged, the
secret transport of unsafeguarded uranium dioxide
from Brazil to Iraq in 1981. Although the current level
of Brazilian involvement in the Iraqi program cannot
be precisely determined
Nuclear Relations with the United States
43. Brazil's nuclear development ambitions were
a major irritant in its bilateral relations with the
United States in the late 1970s, when Washington
strongly objected to the planned transfer of urani-
um enrichment and reprocessing technology under
the Brazilian-West German nuclear accord. Prior to
the signing of that agreement, the United States had
been Brazil's principal source for enriched uranium
and nuclear reactors: it provided a small research
reactor to IPEN and Westinghouse built Angra I.
Relations deteriorated further in 1981 when Wash-
ington refused to provide any more enriched urani-
um on the grounds that Brasilia had not placed all
of its nuclear facilities under international safe-
guards. Brazil subsequently turned to a European
consortium for its nuclear fuel and, according to
reliable sources, clandestinely began to seek alterna-
tive unsafeguarded supplies from China. =
44. Brazil's refusal to sign the NPT or to adopt
the full-scope safeguards required by US nuclear
export law continues to prevent a resumption of
major nuclear trade relations with the United States.
This issue, however, appears to have been pushed to
the side-at least temporarily-by recent US initia-
tives, including the formation of a bilateral nuclear
working group. The Brazilians have been receptive
to the possibility of cooperation in such areas as
nuclear safety and spent fuel storage. We do not
believe that the United States can deter Brazil from
pursuing its fundamental objective of mastery of
the nuclear fuel cycle, but the improved atmo-
sphere does serve to lessen the impact of what has
been a major irritant in bilateral relations.
45. Nevertheless, we believe that Brasilia will
persist in its refusal to place its indigenous nuclear
activities-on which it is apparently concentrating
12
_~'
 current efforts-under full-scope safeguards. As a
result, it will be difficult for the United States-or
any other nation-to have a major impact on its
nuclear policies.
46. Brazil has not become openly hostile towards
the International Atomic Energy Agency, and has
recently sought the chairmanship of the Board of
Governors.. Brazil is not one of the more aggressive
nuclear threshold states. It is critical, however, of the
allegedly discriminatory nature of the NPT and has
been so since the inception of the Treaty. Brazilian
leaders have a strong determination to pursue their
own self-interest-especially with regard to the acqui-
sition and development of nuclear technology-and
the confidence to oppose those who stand in their way,
,but they are not convinced today that nuclear explo-
sives are necessary to national security or prestige.F-
13
'~R.F~
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