SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS FOR TURKEY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005617859
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 28, 2011
• Case Number: F-2010-01912
• Publication Date: July 19, 1960

CkiiC SNIE 33-60
~Sc,J 19 July 1960
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 33-60
SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS FOR TURKEY
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
on 19 July 1960. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence
and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of
Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assist-
ant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of
the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF;
the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; the Assistant
to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Di-
rector of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy
Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the sub-
APPROVED FOR RELEASE[]
DATE: 19-Sep-2011
N? 334
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 SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS FOR. TURKEY
To assess the present situation and to estimate likely developments in Turkey
during the next year.
1. POLITICAL
1. The military junta which overthrew the
Turkish Government in a smoothly executed
coup on 27 May appears to be firmly in control
of Turkey, and there is no evidence of signifi-
cant organized opposition to its rule. The
coup had been in preparation for some months
by a group of relatively junior officers who
constituted themselves the Committee of Na-
tional Union (CNU). It was stimulated pri-
marily by Prime Minister Menderes' increas-
ingly ruthless suppression of his principal op-
position, Ismet Inonu's Republican People's
Party (RPP), by growing signs that Menderes
was preparing to use the army and security
forces to crush his opponents, and by mount-
ing disaffection for the regime on the part of
students and other urban groups. Except for
a handful of top officers who owed their posi-
tions directly to Menderes, the Turkish armed
forces promptly gave their support to the new
government, and it has received impressive in-
dications of popular approval as well. The
rank-and-file of Menderes' supporters have
made no significant moves against the junta,
despite its arrests of the leaders of the Demo-
crat Party (DP), including virtually all Demo-
crat members of the former Grand National
Assembly.
2. It was probably only shortly before the coup
that the CNU brought in General Gursel,
recently retired as Chief of the Ground Forces,
to head the operation. Soon after the coup,
the CNU promulgated a provisional constitu-
tion giving itself the powers of the Grand Na-
tional Assembly until such time as a new con-
stitution is adopted and an assembly elected
under new electoral laws. General Gursel,
Chairman of the CNU, was also designated
head of state. The cabinet appointed im-
mediately after the coup included three mili-
tary and 14 civilian members.
3. Most members of the CNU have avoided
publicity, and the group's inner workings are
carried on with a secrecy which makes it
difficult to obtain information on its personal-
ities, power relationships, and basic intentions.
Gursel himself is considered a forceful man,
who had made known his disapproval of the
Menderes regime well before the coup. De-
spite recurrent reports that one or another of
the CNU officers exercises the real power be-
hind the scenes, we believe that Gursel, as
active operating head of the Provisional Gov-
ernment, is in fact the key figure and at least
first among equals in the CNU. After Gursel,
the most publicized figure on the CNU is
Colonel Turkes.* Another leading figure is
Major General Madanoglu, who probably
played a central role in organizing and execut-
ing the coup.
? Colonel Turkes is an ardent Turkish nationalist.
He was arrested by Inonu in 1944 for his ac-
tivities in the Pan-Turkism movement, which
aims at uniting the Turkish speaking peoples,
particularly those living in the USSR, with
Turkey. He has been friendly toward the US
and West Germany.
 4. Gursel and his colleagues originally indi-
cated their intention to hold national elec-
tions and to restore civil government in the
shortest possible time. Nevertheless, the group
has clearly become more cautious about how
and when to take the step, and more impressed
with the difficulties of doing so. While sub-
stantial progress has been made in drafting
a constitution, important questions remain to
be resolved-e.g., whether to have proportional
representation. Initial suggestions that a
new constitution might be promulgated in
July and elections held late this summer or
early fall now appear premature. Elections
may be put off until next spring or even later.
5. On the whole, we believe that the regime
remains sincere in its desire to restore civilian
government. ? Indications are that the CNU
does not intend to establish lasting control on
the pattern of Nasser's free officers. The bulk
of the evidence is that the junta's efforts are
still directed at the eventual transfer of power
rather than the prolonged consolidation of its
own. Undue delays would run counter to one
of the major reasons for staging the coup-
the restoration of political freedom-and
would invite the strong disapproval of former
President Inonu, whose leadership of the RPP
and whose association with Ataturk give him
enormous prestige and authority among Turk-
ish civilian and military elements alike.
Inonu has carefully avoided identifying him-
self and his party with the military regime.
6. There are personality clashes and some
policy differences among the members of the
CNU, as well as a certain amount of nervous-
ness and lack of self-confidence. Tnis sort of
thing is inevitable at this stage in a politically
inexperienced military regime. Some opposi-
tion to the regime is likely to appear from time
to time. It is also probable that some senior
military officers resent the power of the junta's
predominantly junior membership. There is
probably apprehension within the civil service
over the uncertain outlook. On the present
evidence, however, we do not believe that
either internal disputes or possible opposition
will be allowed to imperil the regime's control
of the country. Nor do we believe that the
government's power will be threatened by or-
ganized uprisings, for example among the
Kurds or Democrat Party elements.
7. Though the CNU has declared its intention
to restore civil government, its members prob-
ably differ on when this should take place and
on the nature of the government to be estab-
lished. There is probably disagreement be-
tween those who favor the return of Inonu
and the RPP, and those who take the view that
the coup was not simply aimed at installing
the RPP in power. The junta almost certainly
wants to avoid a single-party system, and with
the DP largely disorganized and discredited,
members of the present regime may attempt
either to encourage such lesser forces as_ the
Nation Party, to revitalize the DP after dis-
posing of its former leaders, or even to sponsor
a new political movement. Establishing party
organizations in the provinces is an onerous
job. It is more likely that CNU members with
political ambitions will retire from the armed
forces and seek to use their prestige to estab-
lish a position in one or another of the existing
political parties.
8. In any case, at least some members of the
junta are likely to play roles of importance in
future Turkisn affairs. Not only are they
likely to develop some taste for power and an
interest in seeing that their program is not
abandoned, but they are probably also uncer-
tain about their future under any new Turk-
ish government. They will thus almost in-
evitably be concerned with the course of Turk-
ish political affairs, though opinions as to how
they should make their influence felt are prob-
ably still being formed and changed. The
original objectives and attitudes of those in
power will remain subject, to modification by
the press of circumstances and the interplay
of personalities. Decisions in these matters
are likely to require some time, and may easily
provoke dissension within the group, though
we do not consider it likely to prove fatal to
the junta's control.
9. The outcome of a national election will de-
pend to a large extent on the role played by
the CNU. If it merely oversees the holding
of free elections, the RPP-being strong in
its own right and the most likely gainer from
the DP's near-disintegration-would probably
 gain control of the government. If, on the
other hand, the CNU actively encourages lesser
parties, and particularly if proportional repre-
sentation is established, the RPP's power
would probably be limited. Nevertheless, if
an election is held within the next year or so,
we still consider the RPP the most likely
winner.
II. MILITARY
10. The coup has inevitably diverted to some
extent the energies and attentions of the mil-
itary from tneir primary mission. A number
of competent officers are engaged full time in
overseeing the operations of civhian ministries
and in otner nonmilitary duties arising from
the new situation. Moreover, the removal of
a handful of top military officers and reassign-
ment of others has created some organiza-
tional dislocations, including some disruption
of liaison with JUSMMAT. There are indica-
tions that the regime intends to go through
with long-standing plans to reorganize the
armed forces, involving the retirement of a
considerable number of officers. On the whole,
however, we foresee no significant weakening
of Turkey's military capabilities, except in the
unlikely event that the regime is forced to
use the armed forces to put down some large-
scale uprising against its authority.
III. ECONOMIC
11. The provisional government's principal im-
mediate economic problems are Turkey's weak
financial position and the stagnation of busi-
ness activity which began early this year.
The government is attacking its economic
problems with considerable determination.
Competent civilians have been appointed to
key economic positions and given commen-
surate authority. The government has taken
the politically courageous step of resisting
pressures for the higher agricultural subsidies
which Menderes had planned. It has also an-
nounced plans to improve its financial position.
by selling bonds to the public and sharply cur-
tailing government spending, rather than by
raising taxes. While its retrenchment pro-
gram probably will cause some discontent, this
is unlikely to be a major problem unless the
present economic stagnation turns into a
recession. If, as seems more likely, business
confidence returns as uncertainty about gov-
ernment policies fades, the economic prospects
for the rest of 1950 will be generally good.
Harvest prospects are excellent. The stabiliza-
tion program inaugurated in 1958, while only
partially adhered to, has curtailed inflation,
improved Turkey's export position, . and
enabled Turkish industry to expand produc-
tion. Nevertheless, the actions taken by the
new government will not of themselves over-
come the weakness of Turkey's financial posi-
tion and its chronic foreign trade deficit, and
continued foreign aid will be necessary.
12. More important for the long run are the
steps being taken to substitute an integrated
economic development plan for Menderes'
overambitious and uncoordinated spending
program. A National Planning Office has
been established to draw up this plan with the
aid of experienced foreign experts and UN
organs. Projects which are in their early
stages have been halted until it can be de-
termined whether they will fit into the new
program. The government plans to curtail
deficit financing and to minimize subsidies to
state-owned enterprises. While these policies
will yield only limited results in the near
future, they should place Turkey's economic
development efforts on a sounder if less ambi-
tious basis. Should the RPP succeed to power,
it would probably accept and continue this
more restrained and realistic approach to eco-
nomic development.
IV. FOREIGN POLICY
13. Immediately after the coup, the provi-
sional government gave assurances that it
would honor Turkey's international commit-
ments and that no change in Turkish foreign
policy was contemplated. In general, we
think this is likely to be the case. Turkish
participation in NATO and CENTO councils
has continued without interruption and with
no discernable change in tactics or purpose.
The same has been true with respect to Turk,
ish participation in multilateral negotiations
concerning Cyprus. The regime's decision to
 reduce Turkey's contingent in Korea from a
brigade to a company was taken in the face
of US opposition, but we do not believe it
augurs any weakening of Turkey's essential
commitment to the Western Alliance. Turkey
has a shortage of regular officers, and in view
of the military's increased responsibilities in
civil affairs, the government probably does
feel that the brigade, especially its officers, is
needed at home.
14. The decision about the brigade in Korea
does, however, illustrate one likely difference
between the present regime's attitude on for-
eign policy and that of its predecessor. Gursel
and his colleagues, though desirous of main-
taining the same basic ties with the Western
Alliance as did Menderes, will almost certainly
prove more independent and less readily ame-
nable to US influence on certain issues. They
will, for example, probably show more sensi-
tivity about Turkish sovereignty in matters
arising from the presence of US troops in Tur-
key, and be less inclined toward informal ar-
rangements. On the other hand, cooperation
in economic matters may improve. Thus while
the course of US-Turkish cooperation may be
less easy than in the past, the basic relation-
ship is not likely to be undermined.
15. The USSR is seeking to exploit the situa-
tion. Khrushchev has sent two letters to as-
sure the new regime that Soviet aid is avail-
able, and some officials are already pointing to
Soviet offers as cogent reasons for stepped-up
US assistance. Basically, however, we think
that the present government is as anti-
Russian as its predecessor and no more likely
to become neutralist. However, it might ac-
cept limited Soviet aid, as did the Menderes
government. Should the RPP come to power,
it, too, would probably pursue a more inde-
pendent course than Menderes, at the same
time preserving the broad framework of co-
operation with the West.