SOVIET PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS, AND OPTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN IN THE NEXT YEAR

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: AFGHANISTAN
• Keywords: SOVIET INVASION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005564717
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2011
• Case Number: F-2010-01380
• Publication Date: March 1, 1985

Director of
Central
Intelligence
in-the: Next -Year
Soviet Problems,: Pr. ospects,
and.. Options in Afghanistan
Special National Intelligence Estimate
WARNING: The ial in t
Distribution of this E
ance of their duties.
i&~ent is sensitive.
strictly limited to those
i 'ect matter for the .
APPROVED FOR
RELEASEL DATE:
16-Dec-2010
 Warning Notice
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ntractor/Cons ants
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 (b)(1)
(b)(3)
SNIE 11/37-2-85/L
SOVIET PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS, AND OPTIONS
IN AFGHANISTAN IN THE NEXT YEAR
Information available as of 26 March 1985
was used in the preparation of this Esti-
mate, which was approved by the National
Foreign Intelligence Board on that date,
WARNING: The material in this document is sensitive.
Distribution of this Estimate is strictly limited to those
officials who require access to the subject matter for the
performance of their duties.
 THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
 SCOPE NOTE
Increased insurgent effectiveness and the continuing ineffective-
ness of the Afghan Army forced the USSR into adopting a more
aggressive approach to combat in Afghanistan in 1984. Greater outside
support for the resistance this year and last means that Soviet problems
probably will again increase in 1985. This Special National Intelligence
Estimate assesses the measures the Soviets have taken thus far to deal
with a more potent resistance and projects their options over the next
year or so.F_1
The judgments reached in this SNIE are further developed and the
war in Afghanistan is more extensively analyzed in an Interagency
Intelligence Memorandum, issued separately and also entitled Soviet
Problems, Prospects, and Options in Afghanistan in the Next Year.
5E
 DISCUSSION
1. The Soviet military situation in Afghanistan has
continued to deteriorate as a result of the increased
insurgent capabilities and the continuing ineffective-
ness of the Afghan Army, and despite intensified
Soviet military efforts. The Soviets expect that their
problems will increase as the resistance receives more
and better materiel this year.[]
2. We believe that the Soviets will respond in the
near term by attempting to apply more widely and
skillfully the measures they have sought to apply in the
past year. In support of this effort, additional tactical
adjustments to the current economy-of-force strategy
are likely and some force increases-probably not
more than 5,000 to 10,000 men-are possible.
3. Moscow will continue to hold to its main objec-
tive of assuring a Communist regime in Afghanistan
because:
- The Soviet invasion itself has made it likely that
any successor regime in Afghanistan not support-
ed by Soviet military occupation would be deep-
ly hostile to Moscow.
- The fall of its Afghan regime would be seen as a
serious blow to Moscow's reputation as a resolute
power.
- Control of Afghanistan is seen by the Soviets to
be important to the security of Soviet Central
Asian border regions.
-- The Soviets also see controlling Afghanistan as
helping fulfill long-range aspirations to expand
their influence in the region
4. We believe that the Soviet military are examin-
ing how their military presence in Afghanistan could
be utilized for various military contingencies against
Pakistan and Iran. Major improvements in lines of
communications and air and logistic facilities, and the
deployment of significant additional forces, would be
essential for the Soviets to undertake and sustain large-
scale operations from Afghanistan. The Soviets almost
certainly would not undertake such major improve-
ments until they had consolidated control in Afghani-
stand
5. The Soviets have a combined political-military
strategy for consolidating Communist rule in Afghani-
stan, but appear to have consistently underestimated
the difficulties they face. Initially, they reportedly
thought the mere presence of Soviet forces would be
sufficient to intimidate any resistance. Then they
thought Soviet involvement in combat would militari-
ly destroy most armed resistance within a couple of
years. By 1983, they seem to have reconciled them-
selves to a longer term military strategy aimed at
destroying enough of the resistance to compel the
remainder to see the futility of continuing to fight.
This strategy was coupled with a political strategy of
trying to build up a cadre of reliable Afghan Commu-
nists to govern the country eventually. Nevertheless,
the Soviet Union has made no significant progress in
its attempts to obtain political backing from the
Afghan people
6. In 1984, the Soviets augmented their forces by a
few thousand men and made other tactical and force
adjustments designed to regain the military initiative.
But the resistance, increasingly armed and trained
from the outside, also continued to improve. The net
result by the end of the year was that Soviet losses had
increased and there had been no measurable improve-
ment in the Afghan Government's position. The terri-
tory under government control may actually have
declined slightly in 1984.
7. Moscow's lack of progress in Afghanistan has
generated. argument and pessimism among Soviet mid-
dle-level military and intelligence officials familiar
with the situation. Many in the Soviet elite harbor
doubts about the prospect of ultimate victory and the
wisdom of the initial Soviet commitment. Soviet offi-
cials privately admit that Afghanistan has entailed
significant costs, but they also assert that the costs of
alternative policies would be even higher and that
they must stay the course. The costs of Afghanistan
have not been so high as to force Moscow to shrink
from its objective of ultimately controlling the coun-
try. Soviet military capabilities elsewhere have not
been substantially diminished, the economic costs are
bearable, and dissatisfaction within the elite and popu-
lace, while noticeable, has remained within tolerable
5~1{Ei~
 levels. The leadership's recent decision to promote
three of the key military figures who are most respon-
sible for the USSR's operations suggests no disposition
to reexamine its commitment or its strategy in Afghan-
8. The new party General Secretary, M. S. Gorba-
chev, like all other top leaders, has avoided significant
direct comment on Afghanistan in public. As a key
figure in the leadership during the last year, Gorba-
chev has presumably developed a degree of commit-
ment to current Soviet goals and strategy in Afghani-
stan. He used his meeting with Pakistan's President Zia
at Chernenko's funeral to chastise Islamabad over its
policy toward Afghanistan. Gorbachev would natural-
ly wish to solve the Afghanistan problem in some way,
but, while be is consolidating his power in the Soviet
leadership over the next year or so, he has a strong
political interest in avoiding positions that might make
him look weak or open him to charges of adventurism.
He therefore does not seem to have an immediate
interest in seeking to revise Soviet goals and strategy.
9. A major escalation or expansion of the war would
certainly raise the costs to the Soviet system while not
necessarily leading to a quick victory. Intensification
of the conflict at roughly present levels of Soviet
commitment-which is what we expect-will raise the
costs somewhat. The Soviet Union has the economic
and military resources to continue this war indefinite-
ly at present or escalated levels. It is the prospect of a
very protracted war with potentially large domestic
and international costs that is politically and psycho-
logically troubling to many in the Soviet population
and elite, and presumably of concern to the Soviet
leadership, The Soviet Union is more capable than
other countries might be of bearing the political costs
of direct involvement in an open-ended war. Its
tolerance for a protracted war in Afghanistan may not
be limitless. We cannot say at this point, however,
what the limits might be and whether or when they
might eventually be reached.
10. On the basis of an improving military supply
situation, we project that the performance of the
resistance in Afghanistan will improve steadily during
1985 as it did in 1984:
- The greater availability of ammunition and other
materiel will increase the operational effective-
ness and persistence of those already under arms.
- The number of near-full-time fighters, now
estimated at about 150,000,1 will increase
substantially.
- Resistance effectiveness against aircraft is likely
to increase substantially, against both airborne
targets and airbases.
- The number of resistance fighters with rudimen-
tary military training will continue to rise, and
all are learning from combat experience,
11. At the same time, the inevitable sluggishness
and unevenness of the resistance logistic network,
shortages in many needed items, food problems, and
the fragmented nature of the war will probably cause
these factors to increase resistance effectiveness only
gradually. They will not confront the Soviets with a
dramatic crisis or sharp deterioration of their military
situation, or prevent the Soviets from making selected
improvements to it.
12. Even so, the Soviets know that in 1985-86 they
will be facing a more militarily capable resistance.
They have already signaled that more outside support
will not dissuade them from pursuing their objective
of full control over the country. They are already
planning military measures aimed at negating the
improvement in insurgent capabilities. These mea-
sures, we believe, are most likely to be extensions of
what the Soviets did in the recent past:
- More operations by Soviet forces without the
Afghan Army.
- More agile and aggressive ground force tactics,
particularly with special and air assault forces,
-- Better use of tactical air and ground-based
firepower.
- Temporary augmentations of Soviet forces for
high-priority operations.
Further efforts to improve tactical intelligence
and command and control.
-- More efforts to interdict resistance supplies near
Afghanistan's borders,
- Continued improvement of the logistic
infrastructure.
' This is the estimated number of resistance fighters for whom
the war is a full-time or primary activity; some 30 percent of them
are in daily action against the Soviets. The number of occasional
 - Continued efforts to build a Communist cadre to
control the country in the long term
13. We expect the Soviets to continue making a
concerted effort to destroy Panjsheri resistance leader
Masood and his men in 1985. We also anticipate more
Soviet effort to improve security in Afghanistan's
major cities. Interdicting infiltration across the borders
with Pakistan and Iran will mean more Soviet/Afghan
air and artillery strikes and perhaps a few ground
incursions-both deliberate and accidental-against
insurgent targets in both these countries. Despite the
Soviet desire to keep them down, Soviet casualties and
equipment losses will probably continue to rise
14, As an adjunct to their military efforts, the
Soviets will attempt to do more politically and diplo-
matically to reduce support for the resistance. Howev-
er, we see no signs that Moscow is now prepared to
seek a genuine political solution that requires aban-
doning Soviet objectives and withdrawing from
Afghanistan;
- In addition to continuing cross-border incidents,
the Soviets will apply strong diplomatic and
propaganda pressures on Pakistan. They may
increase efforts to destabilize the Zia regime.
They have had strong incentives to do so in the
past, but apparently lack adequate means.
- In recent months the Soviets have toughened
their stance toward Iran, and we expect this
trend to continue. However, the Soviets might
try a more flexible approach to Iran in which
they seek to exploit Iran's interest in an improved
relationship to get Iran to cut back its support of
the Afghan resistance.
- The USSR and China have moved to improve
relations with each other despite the "three
obstacles" raised by China-Soviet troops on
China's borders; Soviet support of the Vietnam-
ese occupation of Cambodia; and Soviet occupa-
tion of Afghanistan. Even if the Afghan issue has
become more significant because of the growing
Chinese role in aiding the Mujahedin, we judge
that neither side is likely to make the continuing
improvement of relations contingent on its
resolution.
- Toward the United States, the Soviets could
attempt to make US support for the resistance
more of a factor in bilateral relations than they
have in the past. But there are inhibiting risks in
either of the two approaches they might take.
Should they suggest that other improvements in
the relationship, such as arms control progress,
are jeopardized by US policy toward Afghani- :
stan, they risk sacrificing other important politi-
cal goals, such as encouraging restraint in US
military programs. Should they, on the other
hand, hint at the possibility of a Soviet withdraw-
al from Afghanistan without prior guarantees for
the Kabul regime in order to encourage reduc-
tions in US support for the resistance, they would
risk signaling their own vulnerability in Afghani-
stan and emboldening their major adversary. For
these reasons we do not believe that the Soviets
will wish to make Afghanistan stand in the way
of changes in US-Soviet bilateral relations in the
near futureF__1
15. We doubt that any of these military or political
measures will be sufficient to put the war convincingly
on the path toward a Soviet victory. To the contrary, if
our appreciation of the situation is correct, the Soviets
are likely to find themselves no better off after another
year or so of tactical adjustments and small troop
increases. At some point, a continued military stale-
mate might no longer be tolerable to the Soviets and
they might consider radical alternatives to their pres-
ent strategy. These could include a large Soviet mili-
tary buildup in Afghanistan and more forceful at-
tempts to diminish Pakistan's support to the resistance
or-less likely-serious efforts to get a political solu-
tion involving Soviet military withdrawal.
16. For the time being, however, we believe that
Moscow prefers to avoid the military costs and risks of
a major troop increase. Logistic preparations for an
increase of 50,000 troops, for example, would require
several months and would probably not decisively
affect the course of the war. A much larger expan-
sion-to a level of 400,000 to 500,000 troops-de-
signed to assure Soviet control would take a year or
more to accomplish and still might not lead to quick
suppression of the insurgency
17. We also believe that Moscow is not yet ready to
face the military risks and political consequences of a
significant expansion of hostilities into Pakistan or
Iran. Major action against either country from Afghan
territory would require extensive logistic preparations,
including securing of supply lines.
18. We believe, therefore, that the Soviets will
continue for at least the next year or so to try to make
progress against the insurgents without a major expan-
sion of their forces or of the geographic scope of the
war. But we believe that such progress will continue to
elude themF_1
3
 19. There are a number of developments, which do
not now seem likely, that could upset our calculations.
Although we see no evidence that Gorbachev is ready
to depart far from current Soviet strategy, Soviet
leadership politics could produce debate that leads to
more radical changes in Soviet policy than we current-
ly foresee. A Pakistani government without President
Zia might be less committed to current Afghan policy,
despite the consensus that supports this policy now.
Iran might reduce its support for the Afghan resistance
to improve its relations with Moscow; but an increase
of Iranian support is as likely in the near term.
Regional political development adverse to the Afghan
resistance might curtail but probably would not alto-
gether cut off Mujahedin resupply. If there were a
cutoff of outside support for the resistance in Afghani-
stan, the Soviets would start making progress toward
gaining control of Afghanistan. This would reduce
pressure on them to escalate their commitment to the
war or to seek a political accommodation
20. If present trends continue, the Soviets may well
face 10 years or more of fighting in Afghanistan. We
cannot judge with any certainty how this will impact
on Soviet society and the Soviet political system. The
case can be made that the USSR would find the
prospect of indefinite and costly conflict preferable to
the alternatives of significant reinforcement or aban-
donment of Soviet objectives, and will continue the
present course indefinitely in the belief that eventually
the resistance and its outside supporters will give up.
The contrary case can be made that the prospects of
indefinite and protracted conflict in Afghanistan
would be unacceptable to Moscow; that sooner or later
the domestic and international costs of a continuing
war in Afghanistan will force the leadership to either
radically increase the Soviet military commitment to
the war, accepting the costs and risks of its expansion
beyond Afghanistan's borders, or to seek a political
path for withdrawal, even at the cost of the Kabul
regime's collapse. If the Afghan resistance continues to
grow in scale and effectiveness in the years ahead, the
odds increase that the Soviets will eventually confront
such choices. ^
21. We think our view of the war and how the
Soviet leadership sees it is a reasonably accurate one.
Changes in insurgent effectiveness, morale, and the
size of forces actually fighting might take some time to
detect. Nonetheless
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