BACKGROUND FOR CHILEAN HEARINGS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: COVERT ACTION CHILE
• Keywords: CHILE
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005496321
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2011
• Case Number: F-2000-01886
• Publication Date: March 23, 1972

APPROVED FOR RELEASE^ DATE:
05-09-2011
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SUBJECT: Backgrouhd for Chilean Hearings
1. Salvador Allende is no ordinary revolutionary.
He is one of the few Latin American Marxists who knows how
to use a democratic system against itself. ? Rather early in
his. career he was a founder of the Chilean Socialist Party
and in the 1930's became a very young cabinet minister in
the First Popular Front government in Latin America.
Though trained as a 'doctor, his life has been devoted to the
practice of-politics. Today, he is acknowledged as one of
the most astute politicians and parliamentarians in a' nation
whose favorite pastime is kaffee klatsch politics.
2. Allende views himself as the man who will do
that which Castro has. thus far failed in doi.-ig: displace
American heeemonv in Latin America. Allende thinks he
has found a better, subtler and more acceptable solution for
Chile and other Latin American countries than Castro's ex-
port of the revolution. And, he may have -- if it succeeds in
Chile. His tactic centers on using constitutional tools to
fashion "a socialist revolution which is irreversible.". But,
while he and Fidel. Castro may have chosen to follow dis-
parate roads in pursuing their revolutions, there can be no
doubt that they have a common objective. As Allende put it
during his 19YU presidential campaign: "Cuba in the C:.ri bcnn
and a Socialist Chile in the Southern Cone will make the revolu-
tion in Latin . America. "
3. Strangely enough, Allende's closest collaborators
are not the leadership of his own Socialist Party but those of
the Moscow-dominated Communist Party. And, this is be-
cause the Chilean Communist Party is more disciplined,
unified, capable, and willing to abide by Allende's wishes
)JZWt)
 than is his own Socialist Party. As a consequence, the
Communist Party is running the economic side of Allende's
government while quietly exercising a heavy influence on the
political side through back doors and inner councils. The
Communist Party's aim, simply stated, is to assure the
success of Allende as president while it uses his six year
tenure to work itself into a position of strength and influence.
Then, the Communist Party feels it would be in a position to.
choose a more orthodox successor to Allende. In short,
whether or not Allende recognizes it, he is being used as a
Trojan Horse by the Communist Party and, in turn, the
Soviets.
4. Allende is relying heavily on Cuban understanding
and assistance. Politics aside, he is a quite close friend of
Fidel Castro. This relationship has been cemented somewhat
recently by the marriage of one of his daughters to a senior
officer of the DGI, the Cuban Intelligence Service.. This DGI
officer of course is now assigned to Chile. Since Allende's
inauguration, the Cuban official prcce.cc ha., burbeo- d frc-M
zero to 54 personnel. Almost one-third of these Cuban
officials belong to the Cuban Intelligence Service and the so-
called Directorate of Liberation. This latter organization
reports directly to Castro and is charged by him with the
responsibility for exporting the revolution. Further, since
Allende came into power, Santiago has begun to rival Havana
as the Latin.American Mecca for the extreme left, particularly
exiles. The Cubans in Chile, incidentally, have been free to
arrange false documentation and transportation for many of
these revolutionaries to Cuba for special training and
indoctrination. Allende knows this is going on -- all he asks
is that it be done quietly. So, despite public disclaimers
for the benefit of his Latin American neighbors, Allende is
providing a safehaven for Latin American revolutionaries
and a secure continental base for Cuban operations. . .
3x974
 5. The Soviets so far have left to the Cubans most
of the revolutionary, dirty work being done in Chile with other
Latin Americans. They have taken on the problem of trying
to bolster the sagging Chilean economy. Over the past year
Soviet Bloc credits amounting to $20.0, 000, 000 have been
extended to Allende. This, of course, does not include the
$65,000,000 credit recently granted to Allende by the Chinese
Communist regime. But, more to the political point, the
Soviet Union is now dangling an offer of $300, 000, 000 to the
Chilean military for purchase of military equipment. This
has put the Chilean military in a very difficult position. The
military feel they need this type of military aid, but they want
very much to avoid becoming dependent on the Soviets. On
the other hand, Allende understandably sees this as most
desirable since, in the end, he could probably use Soviet
military assistance as a lever to defuse the latent political
threat represented. by the Chilean military. Thus far, the
military have resisted all Soviet blandishments as well as
strong pressures from Allende on this issue. Their only
concession has been to accept an invitation for a high ievei
Chilean military mission to visit the USSR in June 1972 -- at
which time, they.will undoubtedly be subjected to many pres-
sures and enticements to take advantage of the Soviet offer.
6. The key issue is, however, how successful has
Allende been thus far. It can be fairly said that the reaction
of most non-Communists to Allende's election in November
1970 was close to panic. A flight of capital and the more
affluent people from Chile ensued almost at once. The
political opposition to him was deflated, fearful, and.dis-
organized. As a matter of fact, many began to consider, if
not actively seek, an accommodation with the new government.
On top of all that, Chilean political tradition insists that the
first hundred days of an administration belong to the new
president. And, while not inviolate, good taste dictates that
should at least not appose p. ids:tial iriti:t .e..'during
that period.
39975
 7. The first scheduled political event of any consequence
was to be the nationwide municipal elections in April 1971, some
six months after Allende's inauguration. Gradually, the three
major opposition parties began to focus on this event.
8. The municipal elections became the turning. point for
the opposition: they managed to almost split the popular vote with
Allende despite all the advantages he enjoyed. This restored some
measure of their confidence in themselves and their ability to
challenge Al ende.
g. After that, the political opposition to Allende began
gathering momentum. In July 1971 and January 1972, Congressional
by-elections were held to fill a total of three vacancies. Allende
invested considerable political and material resources into each
election, even defining the central issue as being a vote of confi-
dence in his.government and its conduct of affairs. The opposition
parties were. victorious in every instance despite the fact that none
3 95'7 S
 10. Today, the opposition is challenging Allende on a
variety of fronts and Allende has clearly lost much of the earlier
political initiative he enjoyed. ,Further, the opposition now has
the added benefit of public reaction to the unpleasant economic
straits in which Chile finds itself as a 'result of Allende's policies.
Consumer shortages and inflation have been particularly galling
11. We have noted that, in the last two months, Allende's
own supporters have begun to worry about his weakened position.
Castro himself has privately admitted the prognosis is so bad
that Allende might well not be able to survive in office. .The
East German Communists who have been called in as economic
advisors to the Chilean Communist Party have sent messages
to East Germany that they no longer consider a defeat for
C ommuniarn, in Chile to be out of the question. Oln .xtr
left group in Chile is making definite plans for guerrilla warfare
should the Allende Government fall. A small non-Communist
party in the Allende Government coalition has also begun to dis-
integrate and is edging toward the exit to join the opposition.
The military are quietly exhibiting more concern amongst them-
.Selves about the increasingly grim economic outlook for the
country. and. its people. They are more vocally disturbed by
continuing evidence that the Communists are trying to penetrate
and neutralize the armed forces. Allende himself recognizes
the growing dissidence. Only last. week he stressed to his top
Communist advisors that. the two major problems facing him
are the armed forces and the opposition press.
12. To sum up, Allende may be a different, even to some, _:..-
-a benign-appearing, type of revolutionary. He is not inflexible
like most of his kind. This though is precisely why he is so
dangerous. His example i6 encouraging Communists else-where
 in Latin America to adopt the same formula: that is, promoting
"popular front" coalitions with non-Communists for window
dressing as was done in the Uruguayan general elections in
November of last year. I don't believe it is too much to say
that the success or failure of Allende not only concerns Chile,
but will have significant side effects in the rest of Latin
America as far as U.S. interests are concerned.
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