PROBABLE SOVIET POSITION ON A CONTROLLED "CUT-OFF" OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL PRODUCTION FOR WEAPONS PURPOSES

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005657452
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2011
• Case Number: F-2010-01484
• Publication Date: October 1, 1960

PROHABZB SOVIET POSITION ON A CONTROLL? " CtJ1+-OFF" OB
FISSIONABLE MATERIAL PRODUCTION FOR iIEAPONS Pi1R~'OSES
I. PR~DS1~4
To assess (a) the probable Soviet poaitioa oa a "cutwff"
of fiasioaable materiels productioa aatd the relative oreight
of weapons regtdste and other considerations in determiaing
it; cad fib) the likelihood of evaaiou if the Soviets acaept?d,
including em estlmste of the miaim~mm likely aa-ual quantity
(or "threshold") of diverted oat clactdestinely produced
fissionable material for which the Soviets might risk violatioa-
of an agreed cut-eff. Pbr"estimatiag porpoaes aye asau?e e
cutoff Plata of 1 Jamnary 196$.
u. psscossmN
1. Hoe+ much fissiaaable material sill the Soviets
probably have sacumnlated as of 1 January 196$4
2. To what esteAt x311 this meat ~timatad Sovi~
military requiremmnta for the period 1963-7Q4
3. If more fissloa:able material will probably be
required by the soviets for military purposes after 1963,
has much? When3 Has vital will rheas requisaments
r, ~.., .<
APPROVED FOR RELEASEfI
DATE: 03-Aug-2011
 appear to be under varying cireia?steacea?
4. What military limitations ~eauld the Saviets
have to aca~t if a eut-off lasts eo8orced ea of 1963?
To what estemt eaauld Soviets regsx+d these as offset
by military advantages of etapping prod~xtioa of
fissionable material in other ~untriea?
S. ghat to ties likely Soviet view on the US~propoaed
transfer of fissionable material already produasfl from
weapoa~s purposes to peaas?ui nsesY i14at avoid their
vieov be oa lidd~g this transfer to ~ agreement an
controlled cut-affY
B. poll ~ta~
6. mat are the political advantagss and disadvmatages
of a "nut-off" fs~om a soviet paint of viva? Nhat are
the g~;g,and ~ from their point'of view of negotiating
a separate agreeya~t one "cut-off"Y
7. libcely^vie~a on true
deal of s
 8. What is their likely vise oa the gradual
dsatructioa of ea~apose stockpiles os their transfer
to ea lateretatioaal custvdiaaY What weld be their
og parity is such a plaaY
9. Boa weld the Soviets evaluate the political
risks of attesting illegal ps+odwctiou of fiesLaoabie
me~sriaL?
C. ~a Factors
lA. What is C1~ estimated capability of s aatwfF
awtu+ai syst~i
a. iba mnah Fiesica~abls material iii the
Soviets tread to produce per Yeas' ~vlth oar ~aithaut
trweFe~e to peaceful uses of a ~ of their
etoal~tles~ (l) for domestic ~~~~= (Z) For interwRtis3tal
aid poro~grams7 Boa ma~ay pleats could seed to be srrgeged
in sash pxodwtiea4
b.. Assuming that all please cot For g
above are closed Hadar inepeestiast+ cad that plants
s+oveinirtg open alll pxod~e fror only sire period requ~.red
,.,
~~~ k ~ .
 each year to meet ~ above.. about hoe ranch wed
material could be diverted Exam an operating pleat
under inap~tion per year:
(ij todth the benefit of complete past production
recos+ds
(2) wl.th the benefit of a~oly curr~t production
s+ecos+ds.
Edtat is the likelihood the Soviets wail have,
to belag,by 1969 ps+oductioa faailitiea of varying eisea
or oapaaity for plutonium and tbZ3S that are not kacwnc- a~ a~-,~,a.~-
to vst lihat is the litoafii6ood the Soviets will beitev+a
~ ~ opeacate aaae or more of rheas faaLiitLea without
detection for a perLod of one or moue yearaY
d. Hoi- aacvrataiy oauid oe assess the validity
of eny Soviet deciaratioa of outing atechpilesY
pram, ~ above)
ui. ~$
11. On the bash of adXitBry~
political sad tecbeaical (i.e., feasibility of inspeoti~
 faetosst
e. itould the Soviets be likely to accept a aut-ofP
oai l January 1963? t~ith or ~rithoat a eoneurrent treasfer
to peacefal uses? ~iith what degree of i~pectiom2
b. Assuming a positive aus+rar to ~ above, to
o~hat axt~t mau].d the Savi~a aoasider Lhst the potential
gains from evasion wu],d o the sieka?
a. If the anssier to g abofne is paaitive, hom far
mnn~d the Soviets be liloaly to think they a+oold ~ in
svaaton befot+s t~ risks began to ou~eigk the gatsts?
(Saw Bch illegal m~'iatl ssighC they tempt to grotbtce?)
d. ea~v sdght these Savt+et viema over time?
(1965.1970?)