SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005640401
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: April 8, 2011
• Case Number: F-2011-00763
• Publication Date: May 9, 1968

 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
13 May 1968
NOTE TO RECIPIENTS
....The subject matter of this Memorandum is extremely
sensitive. It should not be reproduced, and its distribution
must-be strictly limited to those who have responsibilities
relating to the subject.
Richard Helms
Director
 THE SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES.
FOREWORD
1. NIE 11-14-67 (16 November 1967) expressed uncertainty regarding the-
actual equipment holdings of Soviet line divisions, as follows (paragraph 14) :
Hitherto we have estimated that all divisions in Categories I and II had
a full set of equipment on hand or immediately available. It. now.
appears that this may not be true of many divisions in the USSR, but we
are as yet unable to determine with confidence the actual extent of the -
shortages that may exist.
2. An intensive study has been undertaken to resolve this uncertainty and,
eventually, to reassess the combat and reinforcement capabilities of Soviet ground
forces. This study is far from complete, but our findings to date with regard
to.the actual holdings of major.. items of equipment by Soviet line divisions in
East Germany and in the Belorussian, Carpathian, and Kiev Military Districts
(MDs) in the USSR require the issuance of a Memorandum to Holders of NIE
11-14-67.
3. We take occasion to include, in paragraphs 11-12 below, an updating of
the discussion of Soviet theater air defense in paragraphs 42-43 of NIE 11-14-67
and of new attack submarines in paragraph 56.
The 'Equipment. of Soviet Line Divisions 1
4. We have very good evidence regarding the major items of equipment held
by two divisions in the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG), one a motorized
'Maj. Gen. Wesley C. Franklin, the Acting Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, De-
partment of the Army, believes the methodology utilized in the study has provided useful
additional data. However, in his opinion; the findings must be regarded only as tentative
indications of what major equipments may-currently be held by Soviet divisions and may
create an erroneous impression that the capabilities of line divisions have been reduced. Since
the intelligence community cannot state with certainty the subordination and location of all
divisional elements, unit holdings for any given division in the USSR so far considered.in
this analysis may be somewhat larger than indicated. Gen. Franklin believes the methodology
employed in this analysis includes ? many judgments and assumptions which tend to minimize
the estimates of divisional holdings and should not be used as the only basis for judging readi-
ness of any given division. He believes that as more is known about the divisional equipment
and the many as yet unsubordinated units located outside known divisional areas, the number
of divisions which the Memorandum to Holders has designated; as combat ready, will increase.
He also anticipates that the total number of Soviet divisions throughout the USSR will rise
during the conduct of this analysis.
SE ET ~ 1
 rifle division, the other a tank division. ..Our analysis indicates that the motorized
rifle division has about 2,300 major items of equipment, the tank division about
2,200.- The provision of major items of equipment thus indicated is some 25
percent lower than we previously believed. The number ,of tanks and artillery
pieces,. however, remains essentially the, same. The difference lies principally
in the number of wheeled vehicles and major items of support equipment organic
to the division. This difference would not affect either the firepower or the
initial mobility of these divisions.
5. We have not reexamined the other 20 Soviet divisions in Germany and
Poland sufficiently to be. able to compare them with these two. divisions in detail,
but we are satisfied that this particular motorized rifle division is typical of the
10 Soviet motorized rifle divisions in Germany, and that this particular tank
division is typical of-the 12 Soviet tank divisions in :Germany and Poland.
6. We have no doubt that the Soviets consider all of their line divisions in
Germany and Poland to be "in a full state of readiness for immediate operations."
We take the two divisions cited. to reflect the Soviet conception of what is re-
quired to qualify as. "ready for immediate operations" and have used their indi-
cated holdings of major items of equipment as the criterion by which to judge
the readiness of ...the 34 other Soviet line divisions that we have reexamined
to date.2
7. On the basis of this criterion and good evidence, we conclude that nine
divisions in the Belorussian and Carpathian, MDs should be judged to be "in
a full state of - readiness for immediate operations." Five are motorized- rifle
divisions, four of them in a cordon close to the western frontier of the USSR.
Four are tank divisions belonging to a tank' army located not far west of Kiev.
8. We judge that the other 25 divisions in the Belorussian, Carpathian, and
Kiev MDs (11 motorized- rifle divisions and 14 tank divisions) fall short of the
GSFG criterion in their holdings of major items of equipment. In most cases,
their equipment amounts to 50-75 percent of that standard.
9. We must stress that our study to date. has been directed solely toward de-
termining the quantities of major items of equipment actually held by Soviet
line divisions. We find these to be lower than we had previously supposed in
the case of "combat ready" divisions, and much lower in the case of other line
divisions. This reduction in our estimate of the amount of equipment held by
these. divisions would imply some reduction in our estimate of their manning,
but we have not, as yet studied the direct evidence regarding manning and are
as yet unready to present an estimate on that subject.
10. We must note also that we have not yet studied the army and front level
supporting elements in the Soviet ground forces, and consequently are as yet
unable to reassess the Soviet organization for combat as a whole. Neither have
2 Six of the line divisions in the Baltic MD and the five line divisions in the Moscow MD
are also relevant to the reinforcement problem, but we have not yet examined them sufficiently
to include them in this- analysis.
 we studied what would be required" to bring a "reduced strength" division up
to combat strength, how that could be accomplished, and consequently how
quickly such divisions could be made ready "to proceed to areas of concentra-
tion." These matters will be addressed in NIE 11-14-68.
Theater Air Defense
11. Since the publication of NIE' 11-14-67, we have _ obtained firm evidence
of Soviet efforts to strengthen their theater air defense; particularly against low-
altitude attack. The ground electronic environment has been improved. At most
operational airfields aircraft revetments have been constructed, dispersed aircraft
parking patterns employed, and antiaircraft artillery positions occupied. The SA-3
missile system has been deployed to tactical airfields in East. Germany; Poland,
and Hungary. We now have evidence that the Soviets have begun deployment
.of both the mobile SA-4 missile system and the radar-controlled, quad-mounted,
23-mm weapon system; ZSU-23-4, with their field forces.
New Torpedo Attack Submarines
12. We now have firm evidence'ofthe construction of two new types of torpedo
attack submarines in addition to the new class, of nuclear-powered attack .sub-
marine noted in paragraph 56 of NIE 11-14-67. All three of these new types
have streamlined hulls and large rounded bows suggesting high speed, lower
noise levels, and improved sonar capability. At least two of the three new types
are probably nuclear-powered. These two may be capable of speeds. up to 30
knots and operating depths on the order of 1,300 feet. All three types will
probably be operational by mid-1968. We continue to believe that some 45
to 60 new attack submarines will be in service by 1977.