COMBATANT FORCES IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: BOSNIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005621705
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2011
• Case Number: F-2010-00294
• Publication Date: June 1, 1993

Director of
Central
Intelligence
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
National Intelligence Estimate
Combatant Forces in the
Former Yugoslavia
APPROVED FOR RELEASE^
DATE: 01-31-2011
2L09
+3L7NTGFc REVIEW P44EL
This National Intelligence Estimate represents
the views of the Director of Central Intelligence
with the advice and assistance of the
US Intelligence Community.
NIE 93-23/I
June 1993
Copy 411
 Director of
Central
Intelligence
NIE 93-23/I
Combatant Forces in the
Former Yugoslavia (C NF)
Sec 'ems
 Figure 1
Ethnic Composition in the Former Yugoslavia
Albanians [ILI Montenegrins
Bulgarians Muslims
0 Croats Serbs
Hungarians Slovaks
Macedonians Slovenes
No majority present
Based on opstina data from 1991 census.
The conflict in the former Yugoslavia transcends political boundaries. Substantial
minorities of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, especially in the Krajina, Herzegovina, and
Slavonia, found themselves under the political authority of rival ethnic groups when
Yugoslavia broke up in 1991. Ethnic animosities and the rise of nationalist political
leaders seeking to exploit them for their own advantage virtually guaranteed the
outbreak of civil war. The combatants have been seeking to solidify their. control over
areas they regard as historically theirs; together with "ethnic cleansing" and voluntary
migrations this process has led to major changes in regional ethnic composition.
Combatant forces in the states of the former Yugoslavia
Croatia Bosnia and Herzegovina Serbia and Montenegro
Croatian Armed Forces Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) Yugoslav Armed Forces
Krajina Serb Army Bosnian Army (Muslim)
Croatian Defense Forces (HVO)
In addition, some 100,000 indigenous Serb, Croat, and
Muslim irregulars are active in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
 Key Judgments
Motivated by irreconcilable territorial goals and ethnic rivalries, the
belligerents in the former Yugoslavia are capable of continuing the
fighting for at least another year.
The offensive capabilities of the Yugoslav 'Armed Forces are superior
to those of its neighbors:
? The capabilities of Yugoslav armored and mechanized forces surpass
those of neighboring republics; Belgrade would enjoy air supremacy
in renewed fighting.
? Except against Macedonia,, limited logistic capabilities would con-
strain Yugoslav ground force operations beyond border areas.=
Despite substantial improvements, Croatian Ground Forces lack heavy
weapons and suffer from training and leadership weaknesses; Croatia
has virtually no air force:
? The Croatian Armed Forces can retake portions of Serb-held territo-
ry but cannot completely defeat Serb forces.
? Croatian forces would have difficulty resisting Yugoslav airstrikes or
federal attempts to seize additional territory. F__-]
The Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) can hold virtually all its gains in Bosnia
against local forces. It can take all remaining Muslim-held areas, .but
only at significant military and political costs it prefers not to incur.
Croatian Defense Forces (HVO) can, with the help of the Croatian
army, hold current gains and take additional territory from the
Bosnian Government.
The Bosnian Army can neither hold its territory against determined
offensives nor retake lost ground; without substantial external support,
it will slowly deteriorate.
' "Yugoslavia" and "Yugoslav" refer to the rump federal state comprising Serbia and Montenegro.
iii
NIE 93-23/I
June 1993
 Western Intervention
Western intervention to enforce an agreed peace plan, to create and
protect safehavens, or to enforce a partition of Bosnia could require
military action to roll back territorial gains and/or disarm combatant
forces. These roles would require a large-scale deployment of ground
forces.
The BSA would resist a Western intervention to roll back Serb
territorial gains or disarm the BSA but would quickly disintegrate;
some of its forces would begin sustained guerrilla action against
Western forces:
in place.
? The BSA would harass but tolerate an intervention that left its forces
The Bosnian Army views Western intervention as its best hope for
survival; under some circumstances local Bosnian forces could clash
with Western forces, but they would be quickly overwhelmed. F_
advantage.
Croatian and HVO forces would avoid confronting Western forces, but
local clashes could occur as they exploited outside intervention for local
In the event of Western military intervention in Bosnia, Belgrade
would engage Western forces directly only if they attacked Yugoslav
territory or forces.F__-]
ec iv
 Scope Note
In May, 1993,2 the Intelligence Community judged that implementa-
tion of the Vance-Owen Plan would require a large, open-ended
commitment of ground forces rivaling in scale and duration the post
armistice effort in Korea by the United Nations and that:
None of the parties can match a NATO-led force operating under rules of engagement
that allow all necessary means to enforce the Plan. Under such circumstances, assuming
early challenges were met with force, fighting would be reduced and humanitarian
problems mitigated.. But terrorist campaigns are possible within and outside the former
Yugoslavia. Even a single attack could cause a large number of casualtiesF_-]
International military operations in Bosnia under any plan will be difficult to organize
and deploy:
? Issues of command and control, rules of engagement, levels of troop contributions, and
cost sharing remain unresolved.
? While capable of making modest additional contributions, NATO allies would expect
the United States to commit a major share of troops to an international force, as well
as logistic, strategic lift, and intelligence support.
? UN forces will have to supervise and enforce demilitarization and troop withdrawals
and monitor heavy weaponry, internal routes, and external frontiers.
? UN forces also will have to assume major responsibilities for refugees and displaced
persons, civil administration, and rebuilding efforts in the areas they occupyr--]
This National Intelligence Estimate does not assess specific scenarios
in comparable detail but rather examines the-armed forces of the
combatants in the Yugoslav conflict and presents summary assess-
ments of their current military capabilities against one another, against
neighboring states, and against a large-scale Western intervention.
Additional details concerning the capabilities of the combatant forces
will be presented in Volume II, Supporting Analysis, to be published.
'See NIE 93-22 (~~ May 1993, Prospects for Bosnia
 Sources for the Estimate
Our ability to assess the status and capa-
bilities of the armed forces in Yugoslavia
has improved substantially since early
1992. In the cases of the Croatian Armed
Forces, Bosnian Serb Army, Bosnian
Army, Croatian Defense Forces, and the
Krajina Serb Army, observation of over a
year of combat has increased our under-
standing of how each force is organized
and its strengths and weaknesses., Simi-
larly, the Yugoslav army's intervention in
eastern Bosnia and support for the Bosni-
an Serbs afforded additional insights into
its operational capabilitiesF I
 Discussion
Motivated by irreconcilable territorial goals
and ethnic rivalries, the belligerents in the
former Yugoslavia can continue fighting for
at least a year. The capabilities of their
forces, however, vary greatly. Even within
individual armies some units may consist of
well-trained, professional soldiers, while
others are poorly trained militias that depend
on reservists and irregulars. Moreover, nei-
ther the warring republics nor factional lead-
ers within Bosnia have firm political or oper-
ational control over these armed groups.
Capabilities Against One Another
The Yugoslav Military
The Yugoslav military's offensive capabili-
ties are superior to those of the armed forces
of any other former Yugoslav republic in
large part because the federal military has
more men and equipment and the only effec-
tive air force. The federal government has
overhauled the armed forces after their inept
performance in 1991-92 to introduce a com-
bined arms structure, replace aging equip-
ment, and improve training. Belgrade has
also created an ethnically cohesive force by
purging non-Serbs from military ranks. The
military logistics system, however, remains
capable of providing only limited support to
mobile or extended operations.
The Yugoslav military doctrine no longer
depends on a partisan war by the civilian
population. Against an invading force, the
military intends to employ the army's
increasingly professional light infantry and
motorized brigades in protracted infantry
operations. In combat against Croatia,
Yugoslav ground forces would be most effec-
tive in Slavonia, where they could take ad-
vantage of good roads, flat terrain, and easy
access to supplies and reinforcements in
northern Serbia. Although small federal
units have intervened in Bosnia and Herze-
govina and in the Krajina, larger federal
formations would have difficulty fighting in
the Krajina or invading Albania and other
neighboring states because of distance, ter-
rain, and poor lines of communication. Fu-
ture ground force operations would be more
effective than in 1991-92.
The Yugoslav Navy was most affected by
the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. With
the loss of more than 90 percent of its
coastline, Yugoslavia was forced to relocate
virtually the entire fleet to two bases in the
Kotor Bay. Personnel losses resulting from
the breakup affected all ranks-from spe-
cialists to the senior leadership. The Navy
was inactive for most of 1992, but has in
recent exercises been able to sortie most of
its ships simultaneously, suggesting that it-
has overcome many of its logistic and person-
nel problems
The Yugoslav Air Force controls almost all
of the former federal aircraft. Its leaders
claim to have two pilots for each aircraft,
and reports indicate an adequate pool of
trained support personnel. Most pilots are
 unfamiliar with advanced air combat, but
training sorties have increased in recent
months, suggesting an amelioration of logis-
tics and aircraft readiness problems. The Air
Force also has sought to improve aircraft
survivability through dispersal and has in-
creased training for night operations.
The Bosnian Serb Army
With its superior firepower and organization,
the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) controls the
direction and scope of the conflict in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. The BSA took over most
of the arms and munitions of the former
Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) stored in
Bosnia, and these stockpiles are sufficient for
months of combat at current levels. The BSA
is largely self-sufficient in most other mili-
tary consumables, but it has relied on Bel-
grade-mostly for deliveries of fuel and
transportation assistance. If Belgrade follows
through with its recent promise to cut off aid
to the Bosnian Serbs, the BSA's mobility
would gradually decline. F--~
BSA military capabilities and morale have
not yet been tested by a capable enemy.
Most BSA fighters are not military profes-
sionals; rather, they are locally recruited
troops whose morale is only fair, particularly
when they are deployed away from their
homes. Morale in engaged BSA units fell
sharply in the face of unexpectedly strong
Muslim attacks in eastern Bosnia earlier this
year. The BSA suffers from a shortage of
infantry, which is spread thin across Bosnia
and Herzegovina, conducting a series of
sieges characterized by thin siege lines sup-
ported by overwhelming artillery superiority.
Consequently, BSA leaders follow a cautious
strategy, avoiding direct attacks in favor of
less costly or tactically complicated sieges.
Sanctions and the Yugoslav Armed
Forces
International sanctions on Yugoslavia
are having little effect on the federal
army. Belgrade apparently has suffi-
cient fuel for its forces and has large
stocks of weapons and munitions.
Moreover, the reduction of the army
and creation of a large surplus of equip-
ment provided Belgrade with a substan-
tial stock of replacement systems and
parts. Belgrade can call on civilian as-
sets, especially trucks and vehicles, to
keep its forces going. Sanctions, even if
rigidly enforced, will not begin to bite
unless the army operates a large pro-
portion of its forces in combat for an
extended period, depleting military
spares. F__1
A Yugoslav military response to West-
ern naval sanctions and embargo opera-
tions in the Adriatic would be con-
strained by Yugoslav naval inferiority
and would focus on operations that
penetrate their territorial waters. They
might attempt to confront Western na-
val forces by escorting sanctions viola-
tors, mining their territorial waters, or
using coastal cruise missile batteries to
threaten Western naval units. On the
Danube, surrounding states are vulner-
able to Yugoslav political and economic
counterpressures; they also have been
implicitly threatened with Yugoslav
military retaliation-a threat they find
credible.)
Sec 2
 The Yugoslav Military, the State,
and the People
Although the Yugoslav federal constitu-
tion asserts civilian control of the mili-
tary, the armed forces remain an indepen-
dent center of power. The federal
president is nominally commander in
chief, exercising power through a Supreme
Defense Council consisting of himself and
the republic presidents. In fact, he has
little control over the armed forces. Con-
sequently, the military has wide latitude
to pursue its own concepts of Yugoslav
national interests.)
Conditioned to centralization and au-
thoritarianism, the officer corps is sympa-
thetic to nationalist hardliners, who are
competing for their support. The Air
Force is the most stridently nationalist
and aggressive of Belgrade's armed forces,
and has taken an increasingly independent
stance. Preservation of the military's priv-
ileged status is, however, also a principal
concern, and the officer corps probably
believes Milosevic will guard the mili-
tary's interests. The military leadership
has avoided becoming the arbiter of do-
mestic political disputes. F__1
Nevertheless, the BSA can hold virtually all
of the territory it currently controls in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. It is also capable of con-
quering remaining Muslim-held areas, al-
though only at a substantial military and
political cost. Because the Serbs control
much of the flow of civilian supplies into
Muslim areas, they can starve both residents
and defenders. The Serbs can concentrate
their forces and firepower and reduce Mus-
lim pockets one at a time, as they have been
Commanders are taking steps to enhance
public support for the armed forces. The
military leadership believes popular will
to resist aggression is the bedrock of
Yugoslav defenses. Early in 1992, polling
data suggested substantial popular sup-
port for the armed forces-over 50 percent
of the Serb population were very satisfied
with the army's operations; more than 55
percent voiced confidence in the army in
December 1992, a higher approval rating
than that of any political party. Support is
strongest, however, for the defense of ter-
ritory, which the Serbs view as clearly
theirs, and would almost certainly in-
crease, should the West attack Serbia
proper. As in 1991, however, public sup-
port would undoubtedly fall, should the
military become mired in a conflict over
regions in which Serbs are in the minority.
doing in eastern Bosnia since early February
1993. They can follow this strategy until
only Tuzla, -Bihac, and Sarajevo are left and
then take these towns one at a time after a
prolonged siege. This approach would take
many months, involve a level of casualties
greater than the BSA has so far been willing
to accept, and risk Western intervention.
Consequently, the Bosnian Serbs will not
attempt to conquer all of the remaining .
 Figure 2
Controlled Areas in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina
Slovenia
Serb-controlled area
Croat-controlled area
Muslim area
0 40 Kilometers
0 40 Miles
a, ea
Serbia a,nd Monte.e nepto have a
the formation of. aJoinYmdepei
state; but this entity has not be
Vojvodina
6f, i
(autonomous
i province)t
.,Serbia`
AlbaniaF
 Muslim-held territories but will maintain
pressure on them. At the same time, they
will continue operations to seize militarily
critical objectives, such as the Posavina Cor-
ridor near Brcko
The Bosnian Serbs have the only fixed-wing
combat capability in Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na. Before the implementation of the "no-fly
zone," the Bosnian Serbs used their air force
primarily in support of their siege activities.
They would be easily overwhelmed by West-
ern air power.F__1
The Bosnian Army
Consisting mostly of Muslims from local
militia, reserve, and paramilitary units,
Bosnian Army units vary widely in man-
power, organization, and military capability.
Command and control is loose. Because
fighting takes place in isolated pockets, local
commanders are virtually autonomous. Bri-
gades-which vary greatly in size and com-
position-are incapable of shifting areas of
operation or undertaking coordinated tacti-
cal maneuvers. The army is further crippled
by desperate shortages of all types of. weap-
ons, munitions, transport, and military sup-
plies. For example, up to one-third of the
troops in some units reportedly lack personal
weapons. Nevertheless, morale is high, and
capable local commanders have emerged
during combat. F__1
Without outside help, the Bosnian Army will
steadily deteriorate. Underequipped and
poorly trained, the Bosnian Army cannot
hold territory against determined Serb or
Croat offensives. Because they lack mobility,
heavy weapons, and ammunition, the Bosni-
ans can rarely reply to enemy artillery,
counter armor, or use massed firepower to
stop infantry attacks. Local Bosnian units
have frequently attacked Serb-held areas
near Sarajevo and in eastern Bosnia, for
example, taking and holding ground for short
periods. Invariably, however, the Serbs re-
group, counterattack, and eject the Bosnians.
The Croatian Defense Forces
The Croatian Defense Forces (HVO)-the
indigenous Croatian force in Bosnia-is a
light infantry force lacking striking power
and mobility:
? Equipment and training are inadequate for
unassisted offensive operations.
? The HVO's transport, communications,
and command structures do not permit
mobile operations.
With. the help of the Croatian army, howev-
er, the HVO can hold the regions it now
occupies indefinitely against the Bosnian
Serb Army or Bosnian forces. In joint action,
the two forces could also take additional
territory from the Bosnian Government.
The Croatian Armed Forces
Croatian Ground Forces are likely to im-
prove slowly, but currently they are unable
to completely defeat Croatian Serb forces.
Zagreb has streamlined its command struc-
ture and bolstered its offensive capabilities
by organizing a small number of Guards
mobile brigades as attack forces. Overall,
however, the Croatian Armed Forces lack
striking power and suffers from training and
leadership weaknesses:
? The army lacks sufficient heavy weap-
ons-tanks, armored vehicles, and artil-
lery-to conduct or defend against a large
armored attack.
 Estimated Manpower and Equipment Inventories
Yugoslav
Armed
Forces
Croatian
Armed
Forces
Bosnian
Army
Bosnian
Serb Army
Croatian
Defense
Forces
Krajina Serb
Army
Personnel (thousands)
100
60-80
60-80
50-75
40-50
Up to 40
Tanks
1,300-1,800
250