LETTER TO ALLAN EVANS FROM JOHN S. TILTON RE STUDY ON THE HUNGARIAN REBELLION

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: RG59
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005562943
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: June 3, 2011
• Case Number: F-2010-01469
• Publication Date: February 7, 1957

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE - CIA INFO^ DATE: 05-18-2011
7 February 1957
Dear Allan:
Several weeks ago I was asked to produce (or arrange to have
produced) a study on the Hungarian Rebellion covering the following
questions as a first priority:
a. What factors played a role in the start of the revolu-
tion, and to what degree? (Hatred of the Hungarian Communist
Regime, of the Soviets; hatred of any special group within the
Regime, such as the Secret Police (AVH); economic reasons;
religious factors, etc.)
b. How did the revolution actually start and who were the
active forces behind it? Was it totally spontaneous, and if so,
what elements participated initially and kept up the momentum?
Or were organized forces behind it, at least partially, and if
so, who were they (clandestine adherents of the former Hungarian
regime, i.e. "fascists," labor elements, students, military,
church elements, opposition elements within the Communist Party,
etc.) and how and when did organizing start?
c. What were the reasons for the Regime's unwillingness or
inability to "absorb" the oppositional moves in time, as success-
fully done in Poland? Was it lack of the Regime's touch with the
man-on-the-street and resultant inadequate intelligence information,
,rz is the answer largely to be sought in the somewhat intangible
element of difference in the emotional behavior of various nations?
d. Did the revolution initially aim at the overthrow of the
Communist Regime, or was the aim more modest in terms of achieving
a fair degree of "liberalization"? If the latter was the case,
what were factors which determined the all-out course, which in-
evitably had to lead to full Soviet repression?
and these questions as a second priority:
e. The General Strike, its organization and its results.
f. The workers councils, their functioning and their relation-
ship with the Government and the CP on the one side, with the free-
dom fighters and underground groups, if any, on the other side.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
NW m62j39
 g. The technical experiences of street and guerrilla
fighting, the actions against Soviet tanks in close combat, etc.
I felt at the time that we did not have sufficient information
from intelligence, refugee and other sources to justify the preparation
of a sound analysis. I still think that we should perhaps wait for
additional reports from all sources
. However, I am now committed to set up some kin
of schedule, and I would like to ask for your comments on the re-
quested research. Specifically, is OIR planning to cover any of the
listed points in scheduled IR's? Would OIR consider producing a
paper on any or all of the points?
As we have in my shop one analyst who has followed recent Hungarian
developments and has been keeping relevant materials, perhaps we could
work together on some aspects of the research. In any event I would
appreciate your comments some time next week, if possible, and I will
of course be glad to come up and discuss the proposal if you -Wish.
Mr. Allan Evans
Director, Office of Intelligence Research
Department of State
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