CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY-PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0005719002
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RIPPUB
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U
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
June 24, 2015
Document Release Date:
December 16, 2011
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Case Number:
F-2010-01914
Publication Date:
September 15, 1955
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COPY NO. 21
OCR NO. 9429/55
15 December 1955
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE^ DATE:
12-07-2011
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. L I
I ; DECLASSIFIED
DOCUMENT NO.
,_
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE;
AUTH H
PATS ' REVIEWER:
(b)(3)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
111 OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RET
in the rate of increase in
industrial production.
In Britain, for example,
the rate of increasain indus-
trial production declined from
6 percent in the first quarter
of 1955 to 4 percent in.the
third quarter and to 3 percent
in October. A further decline
is probable unless labor and
materials become more plenti-
ful. Even in France, which
has not yet felt the impact.of
inflationary pressures as much
as the rest of Western Europe,
the rate of increase in indus-
trial output declined from 13
percent in the first quarter
to 3 percent in the third.
Prospects
Western Europe's present
economic situation contrasts
favorably with conditions which
led to crises in 1947,,1949
.and 1951. The resurgence of
financial policy as the.pri-
mary'instrument for guiding the
economy is itsei: a measure of
how far Western Europe has.moved
since wartime and the.early
postwar years, when direct con-
trols were resorted to.
The trade liberalization
and the degree of economic
integration achieved since these
years permit national shortages
and price distortions to be
countered to a greater extent
on a .regional basis. The tend-
ency of demand to outrun sup-
ply has been much more gradual
and limited on this occasion,
offering more time for the
application of remedial meas-
ures. Another factor which
should help ease trade and pay-
ments problems has been the
general adherence, in the face
of difficulty, to multilateral
co-operation within the' OEEC.
Furthermore, the high lev-
el of investment--which-was one
of the main ::actors responsible
for current inflationary pres-
sures--will in due course bring
new capacity into operation
and tend to relieve some of the
pressure.
The managing director of
the International Monetary Fund,
in a recent statement charac-
terizing the nature and impor-.
tance of these problems, said
of them: "They are not now
transitional problems arising
from wcortime destruction and
postwar distortion in trade and
payments. They are the ordi-
nary. problems of, a dynamic
world economy,"
STRAINED RELATIONS BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY
INTERFERE WITH REGIONAL CO-M-1.1_10
The continuing diplomatic
"cold war" between Greece and
Turkey makes unlikely the re-
sumption of full Greek partici-
pation in NATO and the Balkan
alliance, until Athens can
present some semblance 'of a
diplomatic victory over Turkey
to the Greek people. The jock-
eying between the two countries
over issues arising from the
anti-Greek riots in Istanbul and
Izmir last September reflects
their traditional competition
for prestige in the eastern.
Mediterranean and more recently
for American favors. Athens ap-
parently feels that the riots
and the Greek defeat in the UN on
the Cyprus issue seriously dam-
aged Greek prestige, and is seek-
ing a way to redress the balance.
T
PART.III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page '12 of 13
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY 'SUMMARY
15 December 1955
Greece has resented Turkeyb
aggressive assumption of leader-
ship in the organization of
Middle East defense and is at-
tempting to counter this by
strengthening its influence
among the Arab states. A Greek
military mission to Egypt last
spring reportedly hoped to
negotiate a Greek-Egyptian al-
liance, and a state visit to
Lebanon is planned by the Greek
king and queen. Although the
problem of Cyprus is long-
standing, the Greek government's
sponsorship of Cypriot claims
in the last two years partly
reflects Athens' desire to
balance the rise in Turkish
prestige.
The Greek foreign minister
recently professed concern over
"neo-Ottoman imperialistic
tendencies" of Turkish foreign
policy and urged the United
States to "help the Turkish
government and nation to remain
as steadily as possible on the
road of proper democratic think-
ing and behavior." The Turks,
absorbed in efforts to create
a Middle East defense organiza-
tion, apparently took no notice
of Greek maneuvers until it
appeared that Britain was weak-
ening in its determination to
maintain the status quo in the
area. The Cyprus issue reached
a climax in the London con-
ference at the end of August.
Asserting that the issue
was another case of Greek ex-
pansionism, Ankara has publicly
assumed an uncompromising stand
against any change in the status
.quo on Cyprus, which dominates
the southern ports of Turkey.
The Turkish nationalism whipped
up just before and during the
conference exploded in the
anti-Greek riots of 6 and 7
September. Although the Turks
have sought to normalize re-
lations with Athens since the.
riots, Greece is exploiting
them to reduce Turkish prestige
and to force moderation in
Ankara's Cyprus policy.
Athens is aggrieved and
frustrated by the relative in-
crease in Turkish power and
influence, but has limited
means of matching them. Thus.
far, Greece has pursued an
international propaganda cam-
paign through the Greek Ortho-
dox Church and philhellenic
organizations abroad to brand
the Turks as anti-Christian
barbarians. It has also held
back from participating in
Western defense arrangements
pending settlement of issues
stemming from the riots in
Turkey. Ankara has retaliated
with an aide memoire to foreign
missions in Turkey which at-
tempts to counter Greek charges
and place the onus on Greece
for the disruption of defense
co-operation.
Athens' relations within
NATO are no longer at issue,
but Athens continues to tempo-
rize on co-operation within
the Balkan alliance.. However,
Athens remains attached to its
alliance with Yugoslavia and
Turkey. Since compensation
claims of Greek victims of the
riots are the sole ostensible
obstacles to renewed co-cpemtion,
Athens will resume participa-
tion in the alliance when
Ankara liquidates the.compensa-
tion problem. The traditional
competition and antagonisms
between Greece and Turkey in
the eastern Mediterranean will
nevertheless present a continu-
ing possibility for new es-
trangement.
-SEGREIT
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
Page 13 of 13