CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005632699
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2011
• Case Number: F-2010-00766
• Publication Date: May 25, 1961

WEEKLY
REVIEW
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security, of the UnitedStates within the meaning of the espionage
laws. US Code Title. 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
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COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS.
No;action is'to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONS INTELLI-
GENCE which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantages
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of Central Intelligence.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
 The Supreme'Counoilfor
National Reconstruction, the
military group wliich has control
of the government in South Korea,
is continuing . to consolidate its
Position'and 'to neutralizepos-
sible sources`of,opposition.
However, there are indications
that coup, strgngman Maj. Gen.
Pak Chong-5ui, is becoming in'
creasingly displeased with Army
Chief of;'Staff 'Lt. Gen. Chang
To-yong?who is believed to
favor a relatively. early return
to civilian government Should
Chang be "forced out. of the ruling
junta, the regime would probably
be strongly influenced by junior
officers, who desire. an abrupt
break with the past and an In-
definite period of military
rule.
The retention of President
Yun Pc-sunas chief of state
has given the insurgent govern
ment a semblance of.constitu-
tionality.. Government ministries
have beenreopened'and a new
all-military cabinet appointed.
However, administrative and
technical ,talent is scarce, and
most of those ' wbo,qualify for
important positions are tainted
by association- with either the
Chang Myou"or Rh'eeadministra-
tions.
The shortage of capable
senior personnel i s particularly
apparent-in theeconomic field.
The regime has taken; stopgap
measures to prevent a serious
dislocation,.of the economy, but
there are indications of busi-
ness,stagnation. .Bank of'Korea
officials.; report that mounting
administrative confusionis im-
peding economic activity.
The., new government is com-
mitted t o improve living'condi-
tions. Unless it: can fulfill
its economic promises, it prob-ably will experience the same
public antipathy as the Ching
administration.. Apprehension -is developing
among educated civilians over
the repressive:tactics of the
military rulers. Political
parties and organizations have
been ordered abolished, and most
members of the former adminis-
tration have been placed under
housearrest or imprisoned. A
nationwide roundup of all left-
ists and suspected Communists
is under way. According to
local press reports, between
3,000 and 4,000 persons, many
of them probably hoodlums and
criminals, have been 'seized.
Strict press and radio censor-
ship has' been imposed, and many
persons are reportedly listening
to Communist' broadcasts from
Pyongyang for news of events in
South. Korea.
Asian Communists, whose
cautious initial reaction to the
coup suggested;'a lack of first-
hand information, have now taken
the measure of Seoul's new lead-
ers,` and hostile.propaganda has
mounted steadily during the past
week. Peiping's People's Daily
charged in an edi or a of 21
May that the US stage-managed
the coup to maintain its "colo-
nial rule.."
Speaking. at a rally of
200,000 in. Pyongyang 20 May,
North Korean Vice Premier Kim
Ilcalled on the South Korean
population to'smash the coup;
Pyongyang earlier had urged all
South Korean military personnel
to,resist the coup leaders. The
North Koreans-have used the dis-
turbedsituation to renew their
call for reunification, claiming
that only by joining with the
"self-sufficient" economy of
the North can South Korea solve
its economic problems.
While there is no evidence
of North Korean. military prepara-
tions to take advantage of the
unsettled situation, dissension
within the coup, group could
make South 'Korea increasingly
susceptible to Communist ro a-
andg a and subversion,
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