NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
0005630495
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
June 24, 2015
Document Release Date: 
April 26, 2011
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
F-2007-01516
Publication Date: 
March 7, 1980
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon DOC_0005630495.pdf484.18 KB
Body: 
Central 1,APPROVED FOR RELEASED DATE: 04-13-2011 NORTH YEMEN - USSR: Soviet Gains North Yemeni President Salih's attempts to maneuver among conflicting pressures have Zed to increased Soviet influence in North Yemen. Frustrated with Saudi Arabia's control' over the supply of US weapons, Salih last summer signed a mcjor arms deal with the USSR. In addition, more Soviet military personnel appar- entZy have arrived in North Yemen, and a substantial number of North Yemenis recently have gone to the USSR for military training. Al- though SaZih is now trying to balance these moves with new over- tures to Saudi Arabia--his primary source of financial support-- the USSR's gains are still intact. Soviet equipment continues to arrive in North Yemen. Last month the Soviets delivered 10 SU-7, SU-20, or SU- 22 fighter-bombers, 20 T-55 tanks, 10 BRDM-2 armored reconnaissance vehicles, some antiaircraft artillery, and ap roximatel 50 metric tons of small arms ammuni- tion. The fighter-bombers and the armored vehicles are new items for the North Yemenis. watch part of the unloading of the first shipment of fighter-bombers on 24 February. The arrival of the equipment reportedly has already resulted in an increase of Soviet technicians in North Yemen. The latest aircraft deliveries probably will require additional technicians. Even if Salih does not agree to accept them, he is not likely to reduce significantly the number of. those already present. Since last November, the Saudis have tried to limit Soviet gains by proposing to Salih that they provide non- Communist technicians and advisers for the Soviet arms. They threatened to suspend their financial support The Saudi move, combined with Salih's own desire not to close irrevocably any option, has led him to accept provisionally the Saudi proposal. The two governments continue to view one another with deep mistrust, however, and an agreement between them probably will be tenta- tive. Growing Leftist Influence The Soviets also have benefited indirectly over the past year by the fact that leftists have replaced pro- Saudi officials and advisers in the government. As a result of his maneuvering, Salih risks losing control over events. While the President may be sincere in asserting that he has had to negotiate over unity with Marxist South Yemen to gain time while rebuilding his military, he probably will be faced with an agreed draft joint constitution in the next few months. Prospects The Yemens take on greater importance for both super- powers following the invasion of Afghanistan and the resulting environment, with its increased potential for Tn^ a et. 14 7 March 1980 TTop Arabian peninsula. US-Soviet military confrontation in the Red Sea - Persian Gulf area. The USSR is likely to exploit and encourage Sana's leftward shift, hoping in the process to counter efforts by the US to obtain bases in the region and to promote the general erosion of Western influence on the the results Aden and Moscow want. Although, in the past, Moscow has sought to dis- courage South Yemen from-military aggression, there re- mains the danger that the USSR will encourage increasing subversion and limited military action by South Yemen-- and the National Democratic Front it sponsors--if the negotiations between North and South Yemen fail to achieve A unified and Soviet-backed Yemen would be larger in population than Saudi Arabia and a potential military challenger. Riyadh would almost certainly look upon the 500,000 Yemeni workers now in Saudi Arabia as a security problem. This would heighten Saudi concern for the grow- ing Soviet role in the region and reinforce Riyadh's sense of vulnerability and encirclement.