NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE)

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005505100
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2011
• Case Number: F-2009-01666
• Publication Date: December 7, 1978

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Latin America
Review
APPROVED FOR
RELEASEL DATE:
04-Apr-2011
 Argentina-Chiles Plans for Military Action
Argentina's
down.
armed forces plan to initiate a military confrontation
in mid-December if Chile does not make a substantial
territorial concession in the Beagle Channel area at the
Foreign Ministers' meeting scheduled for 12 December.
Argentine President Videla, who has been making efforts
to reach a peaceful settlement, could lose control of
the situation if the Foreign Ministers' meeting breaks
as an indicator of preparation for battle.
in Puerto Belgrano--the main Argentine naval base--are
already in a 24-hour readiness posture and that their
hull numbers have been painted out--generally regarded
The Argentine high command reportedly has ordered
all operational units of the armed forces to be fully
deployed and ready for combat by 15 December. The US
defense attache in Buenos Aires reports that all warships
Both Argentina and Chile are continuing to purchase
more arms and materiel. Since late 1977, Argentina has
contracted for an estimated $550 million to $750 million
worth of military equipment and ammunition. During the
same period, Chile has probably spent about $25 million.
The difference suggests that Chile still does not believe
it will have to engage in a protracted conflict. For
 its part, Argentina is not only preparing for any con-
tingency in the current dispute, but also apparently in-
tends to upgrade its military inventory for more general
defense purposes.
Although Argentina and Chile have agreed to the
Foreign Ministers' meeting, they still differ on the
purpose of the talks. Argentina apparently intends to
press for continued substantive bilateral discussions as
a prerequisite to third party mediation. Chile has
agreed only "to review the diplomatic record" and wants
immediate mediation. These differences over how to pro-
ceed could cause the talks to break down before a media-
tor can be selected.
Both nations seem to attach more importance to
their jurisdictional claims than they do to a peaceful
settlement. Fundamentally, Argentina wants Chile's
oceanic control limited to the Pacific, with no "minor"
intrusions into the South Atlantic that might later be
expanded. To defend its unencumbered control in the
South Atlantic, Argentina insists on ownership of a spe-
cific landmark as a boundary point. Chile, on the other
hand, refuses to give up its proprietary rights to islets
located in the South Atlantic--which are not part of the
juridical dispute--and insists that mediation be limited
to fixing a maritime boundary determined by meridians
instead of territory.
Videla's failure to obtain any significant conces-
sions from the Chileans has further weakened his posi-
tion, especially with several influential military com-
manders who seem increasingly disposed to force a reso-
lution of the channel issue through armed confrontation.
Videla's government in recent months has been ineffective
in handling a broad range of policy matters,
f hostili-
ties ensue, Videla's apparent inability to take command
could result in his bean pushed aside by more aggressive
military leaders.
7 December 1978