THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION ACTIVITIES REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: PRESIDENT
• Keywords: INTERNATIONAL
• Keywords: TRANSMITTAL
• Keywords: PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE
• Keywords: INFORMATION ACTIVITIES
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0000476939
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 131
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2011
• Case Number: F-2011-00231
• Publication Date: June 30, 1953

fLi'agip
'
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
74,7 )) 11 3 61,.. 11 111 )4.\ 4414 'A 14 It ,1-(1' 11-4
IL', '1-41A N'.:P \710, )1, .46_1
REPO
rOi
??_, To
/ e
L ,s y 4.r,
r, ?
, . r'\ r, A
't.'1,VA'..??z, ? '
Jule 309 11953
TOP SECRET
N
Copy 25
SE
SECRET
RITY INFORMATION
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE
ON
INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION ACTIVITIES
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
June 30, 1953
SECRET
APPROVED FOR RELEASE - CIA INFOL
DATE: 27-Jun-2011
P SECRET
SE RITY INFORMATION
TABLE OF CONTENTST,---,
,
-
PART I
Chapter One
Chapter Two
Chapter Three
PART II
Chapter Four
Chapter Five
Chapter Six
Chapter Seven
Chapter Eight
Letter of Transmittal
? The Nature of the Conflict . . . .
? The Soviet Drive for World Domination 6
? The United States Program for World
Order 17
? Operations Against the Soviet System 31
? Propaganda and Information Activi-
ties in the Free World 55
? Covert Operations Within the Free
World 79
? Organization for a More Unified Effort 89
? Informing the American Public . . 104
APPENDICES
I ? Letter of the President to the Executive Secretary of
the National Security Council, dated January 24,
1953, concerning the establishment of the Presi-
dent's Committee on International Information
Activities
II? Memorandum of the Committee to the Executive
Secretary of the National Security Council, dated
March 25, 1953, on the use of radio as a medium for
psychological operations
III ? Letter of the Committee to the President, dated May
2, 1953, submitting preliminary recommendations
concerning the international information activities
of the Government
IV ? Recommendations
V ? List of Committee Staff
SECRET
107
109
114
118
125
avt SECRET
SE INFORMATION
LETTER OF. TRANSMITTAL
June 30, 1953
Dear Mr. President:
We submit herewith the report of the President's Committee
on International Information Activities.
On January 24, 1953, you directed us "to make a survey and
evaluation of the international information policies and activities
of the Executive Branch of the Government and of policies and
activities related thereto, with particular reference to the inter-
national relations and the national security of this country."
This directive in the form of a letter to the Executive Secretary
of the National Security Council is attached to the report as
Appendix I. You also directed that the Committee's final report
and recommendations be in your hands not later than June 30,
1953.
In directing us to prepare this report, you indicated that it
should be made in the light of the general capabilities and inten-
tions of the Soviet system and of the United States and its allies.
In Part I of the report, therefore, we have considered the nature
of the conflict with the Soviet system, the Soviet drive for world
domination and the United States program for world order. We
have not attempted to reach independent judgments on many of
the matters discussed in this Part, believing them to be beyond
both our assignment and our competence. In respect to them,
we have relied on expert testimony and on. relevant official
documents
In the light of the relative capabilities and the conflicting ob-
jectives of the free coalition led by the United States and the im-
posed coalition dominated by Soviet Russia., we have surveyed and
evaluated the international information policies and activities
and related policies and activities of the United States. They in-
T/'
SECRET
SE
-
SECRET
INFORMATION
dude overt and covert information activities, overt and covert
economic and political activities, and clandestine military or
quasi-military operations. We have studied this complex of
activities in the world conflict in Part II.
We do not believe that the terms "cold war" and "psychological
warfare," which are so frequently used, contribute to a clear
understanding of the world struggle. The phrase "cold war" is
an inaccurate description of the present conflict. Moreover,
when used by officials of the United States Government it is help-
ful to Soviet propaganda. There seems to be particular confusion
in regard to "psychological warfare" and "psychological activi-
ties." We have found that psychological activity is not a field of
endeavor separable from the main body of diplomatic, economic,
and military measures by which the United States seeks to achieve
its national objectives. It is an ingredient of such measures.
The Committee held its first meeting on January 30, 1953. At
this and subsequent meetings the Committee and its staff have
of government departments and agencies. Numerous individ-
uals
over 250 witnesses, including many representatives
z
and organizations have submitted written suggestions.
We have received the complete cooperation of all government
departments and agencies concerned with the Committee's work.
They have complied fully with our requests for written mate-
_ rial and have made their officisls available for questioning. We
have also benefited from consulta.tioli with Members of Congress,
particularly the Senate Subcommittee for Overseas Information
Programs of the United States. Its staff studies and report make
a most important contribution on the subject of overt informa-
tion activities considered in Chapter Five of our report.
The Committee has received most valuable assistance from
Abbott Washburn, its Executive Secretary, from Robert Blum,
Director of the Staff, and from the members of the staff, whose
names appear in Appendix V and who were assigned to us in large
part from various government departments and agencies.
SEcieSECRET
INFORMATION
1
In preparing our report we have been inspired by your convic-
tion that a "unified and dynamic effort" in the field covered by
the report "is essential to the security of the United States and
of the other peoples In the community of free nations."
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM H. JACKSON, Chairman
ROBERT CUTLER
GORDON GRAY
BARKLIE MCKEE HENRY
JOHN C. HUGHES
C. D. JACKSON
ROGER M. KYES
SIGURD LARMON
SECRET
SE
SECRET ?
INFORMATION
PART I
Chapter One
THE NATURE OF nit CONFLICT
The policies of the United States are based on the assumption
that the purpose of the Soviet rulers is world domination. There
are various theories concerning the reasons behind this purpose.
One theory points to the ideology of world communist revolution
as the principal reason. Another stresses the ambitions and
belief in a world mission long held by the Great Russians A
third emphasizes the view that the Soviet rulers feel a basic in-
security so long as any power center remains outside their con-
trol and therefore regard any such center as a threat which they
must strive to remove.
All these factors may play a part in motivating the Soviet
drive for world domination. Whatever their relative importance,
it is necessary to base American policy on the premise that the
drive exists and will continue until the free world. has induced
(1) a substantial reduction in Soviet capabilities, at least rela-
tively, or (2) a basic change in the objectives of the Soviet rulers.
The Soviet rulers are employing and almost certainly intend
to rely heavily on political warfare techniques .in carrying out
their drive. In present circumstances they prefer the process of
encroachment to the risks of total war. Because the United
States is the major center of power in the free world and is there-
fore the principal obstacle in the path of the Soviet drive, the
isolation of the United States as a preliminary to its destruction
or domination is a major goal of Soviet policy.
The purposes of the United States in its actions abroad spring
from two basic concerns: first, for the physical security of the
United States; second, for the development of a world environ-
ment favorable to the survival and flourishing of free institutions.
The United States must, therefore, adopt not only those policies
necessary to its military security but also those essential to the
creation of world conditions consistent with the maintenance of
these free institutions.
yel) SECRET
1
de SECRET
SE INFORMATION
National security can ultimately be assured only in conjunction
with strong and resolute allies throughout the world. A world
order of free and peaceful nations has become a general objective
of United States policy. The SOviet drive for world domination
blocks progress toward such a world order and consequently the
relative reduction of Soviet capabilities to the point where they
are inadequate to sustain this drive is probably a necessary step
in the pursuit of the general objective.
The nature of the conflict lies in this fundamental clash, and
the conflict will continue until one side or the other drops behind
in the development of capabilities or loses its will to continue the
struggle. This view is widely held, but there has not always been
a full recognition of the measure of the task imposed upon the
United States, and there are important differences of opinion as to
the policies by which United States objectives can best be pursued.
The Relationship Between Objectives, Capabilities and Policies
The general objectives of the United States ? such as national
security and a just and peaceful world order ? do not change.
They can be defined only in general terms, and can never be
wholly attained, once and for all. . They can only be approached.
The measure of progress toward them is the accomplishment of
subsidiary, specific goals. These specific goals of national action
abroad such as a certain level of forces for the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, or the destruction of communist in-
fluence in the French labor unions, or an increase in agricultural
production in Pakistan ? should be defined in as precise political,
diplomatic, economic, military or psychological terms as possible.
They may be regarded as points Which must be reached on the
way to the ultimate objective. They should be consistent not
only with the ultimate objective but also with capabilities.
The Government has often failed to define its specific goals
clearly and precisely, and this failure has been an important
obstacle to progress. There has been a tendency, as in the case
of NATO force levels, to set specific goals which exceeded United
States and allied capabilities and this has led, through the crea-
tion of unrealistic expectations, to an unwarranted sense of fail-
ure. In the field of political .warfare the announcement of =-
realizable goals and the arousing of excessive hopes in the satellite
countries or elsewhere, may have serious adverse consequences
for the world position of the United States.
SECRET
2
SE
SECRET ?
INFORMATION
'
The policies by which the United States pursues its goals should
be harmonious not only with its general objectives but also with
its capabilities. In practice, failure to understand this principle
is a source of controversy and misunderstanding. Some wit-
nesses who have appeared before the Committee have revealed in
their testimony that they had failed to take adequate account
of the capability factor by advocating courses of action which
eXceed the present capabilities of the United States and its allies.
The United States will be judged not only by the things it is able
to do and does, but also by the gap between these and its an-
nounced policies. The distinction should be clearly made be-
tween policies and objectives with respect to which the United
States commits itself to act and those ends to which we, as a
nation, aspire but regarding which the Government is not com-
mitted to take action. In the conduct of political warfare it
is important that the United States avoid confusion between its
specific policy objectives and its aspirations.
The Committee has not attempted to determine what capa-
bilities the United States and its allies need to have in order to
assure their security, make progress toward a peaceful world
order, and bring about a substantial relative reduction in Soviet
capabilities or a basic change in Soviet objectives. Clearly the
answer depends largely on the capabilities of the Soviet system.
The estimation of relative capabilities is a difficult task, but it is
an essential step in determining what additional efforts are re-
quired and what specific goals are both desirable and feasible.
The Committee recognizes the steady improvement of national
inteLligende estimates under the direction of- CIA. However,
these intelligence estimates must be continually and carefully
matched against United States and allied capabilities and defen-
sive plans, to produce realistic "net" estimates of the capabilities
of the Soviet system. The current appraisal* of the vulnerability
of the United States to Soviet air attack is an important advance,
but so far as can be ascertained it is the first net estimate of rela-
tive military capabilities which has been available to the National
Security Council as a basis for its policy recommendations. We
recommend that the necessary measures be taken to provide net
estimates of political, economic and military capabilities.
In the absence of a satisfactory net estimate, it is our general
impression, based on the available intelligence estimates, (1)
? isma 140/1
T/SECRET
3
(4. *SECRET
SE INFORMATION
4......Milliraltilli111111111111111M1Per
that the ability of the Soviet Union to wage general war is
improving and (2) that the Soviet rulers will probably not delib-
erately initiate or provoke general war in the near future, but
will continue courses of action which involve an appreciable dan-
ger that general war might result. A recent estimate states that
if the Kremlin believes "the security of the USSR is jeopardized
by a Western action, it will probably resort to such counteractions
as it considers necessary, even though it recognizes that these
counteractions involve grave risk of global war." According to
the same source "it is impossible to estimate the view of the rulers
of the USSR concerning the outcome of a global war during the
period of this estimate" It is our belief that the Soviet rulers
will strive to avoid general war, primarily because of fear that
their regime could not be maintained in power after a devastating
atomic attack and because the opportunities for expansion by
political warfare still seem good. We believe, therefore, that
provided the United States and its allies maintain a strong mili-
tary position, general war can be avoided and that the greatest
danger of Soviet expansion lies in political warfare and local com-
munist armed action.
The power relationship between the Soviet system and the free
nations is such that the Soviet rulers will be most reluctant to
run deliberately a grave risk of general war. However, we agree
with the estimate that "the USSR will continue its efforts to un-
dermine and destroy the non-communist world by political war-
fare."** In the circumstances, the United States must intensify
its effort to achieve a greater measure of strength .and unity in
the free world. The United States -and its allies need sufficient
military strength and unity of purpose to make the Soviet rulers
unwilling to pursue courses of action involving appreciable danger
of general war and to induce the Soviet Union to live up to its
obligations under the Charter of the United Nations.
? National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 64, Part I/. This estimate dealt with
`Probable Soviet Bloc Courses of Action through Mid-1953" and was published
several months prior to Stalin's death. However, the main lines of Soviet
action are not likely to change substantially, despite tactical shifts.
" NIE-64, Part II, paragraph 2. Its political warfare techniques include "politi-
cal --and economic pressure, diplomatic action in the TTN and elsewhere,
propaganda and front activities, the action of communist parties and com-
munist-party-controlled trade unions outside the Bloc, sabotage, exploitation
of subversive and revolutionary movements and of civil wars, and psycho-
logical warfare." Because it is not subject to the pressure of public opinion
and can control the Sow of information to the subject peoples, the Soviet
system has a freer hand in political warfare than have free societies.
Tiiie SECRET
4
SECRET
SE INFORMATION
A basic feature of the conflict ? one that underlies and largely
determines the conduct of the struggle ? is that it is a conflict
between coalitions, the one an imposed coalition dominated by
the Kremlin, the other a voluntary coalition led by the United
States. It is of transcendent importance that the American
people understand this and also the corollary fact that the
sequity of the United States cannot be achieved in isolation.*
Several important countries in the free world are as yet uncom-
mitted; and as neither the Soviet Union nor the United States can
alone gain the power position required to make significant prog-
ress toward its objectives, the conflict will probably be most in-
tense in the areas which lie between these two poles of great
power. The Kremlin will intensify its efforts to isolate the United
States and to promote dissension within and between members of
the free coalition and also attempt to exploit the weaknesses and
gain control of other non-commimist countries. In order to
make the free world invulnerable to such efforts, and to reduce
and retract Soviet power and influence, the United States must
seek to strengthen the existing coalition, to win new allies and
to find and exploit weaknesses in the Soviet system.
? See Chapter Eight.
76 SECRET
5
-
cait SECRET
SE INFORMATION
Chapter Two
THE SOVIET DRIVE FOR WORLD DOMINATION
An understanding of the main elements of Soviet strength and
weakness and of the main lines of Soviet attack is basic to the
improvement of the United States organizs ton for and conduct
of the conflict with the Soviet system.
Strengths
Political System
The key to Soviet strength is the tightly organized political
system which permits the effective manipulation of Soviet re-
sources in pursuit of the basic objective of world domination. It
presents the classic advantages of a tyrannical system: the
ability to conduct its affairs with a minimum regard for public
opinion, the lack of moral constraint in its choide of means to
implement its policies, the power to speak with one voice in its
public declarations while following contradictory courses of
action.
The Soviet Union has additional advantages deriving from its
geographical situation and resources, its system of government,
and its internal policies. It has great maneuverability; it can
advance, hold, or draw back as circumstances dictate. It is
_ able to devise a strategic plan, keep it secret, and adhere to it,
at the same time springing tactical surprises and taking tactical
advantage of any opportunities which arise. A free society,
which needs wide understanding and support for its policies,
cannot match it in these respects.
The economic structure of the country, and in large measure of
the satellites as well, is so centralized that the government can
determine with great precision the proportion of the gross na-
tional product which is to be devoted to military requirements
and capital investment. The degree of internal control which
the regime possesses is so great that it is able effectively to isolate
its populations from all but the most limited contact with the
outside world. The whole system is tightly controlled by a single
political party which brooks no opposition and in which absolute
power rests in the hands of one man surrounded by a small group
at the top. Unless conflicts arise within the group, the prospects
SCRE'R
6
-7 -1..,7.11g21MENISISIMEMaiLAL,a7-7--
Te SECRET
SEcuINFORMATION
for weakening the system from within are remote. A significant
element of strength which derives from the nature of the system
is that the Soviet rulers have the ability to employ the satellites
for aggressive purposes with minimum involvement of the power
and prestige of the Soviet Union.
Economic Factors .
The ability of these rulers to control the Soviet economy,
together with the fact that the economies of the free nations tend
to be highly responsive to the state of international relations, is
a factor of Soviet strength. To the extent that the Soviet rulers
can alternately provoke the free nations to undertake large pre-
paredness programs and induce them to relax these preparations,
they can introduce a major unstabilizing factor into the econo-
mies of the free nations while maintaining the Soviet economy on
substantially a war footing.
The Soviet system is rapidly expanding its economic base. In
1952 its gross national product was about one-third that of the
member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In
the same year, the gross national product of the system was more
than one-third above pre-war, and by 1957 it is estimated that it
will be from 90 to 100 per cent above pre-war. This is a very
rapid rate of economic growth, and unless there is a drastic
change in Western economic progress, the rate will almost certain-
ly remain higher than that of the United States or aniother great
power, except possibly West Germany. If this rate of increase
continues, the Soviet system could eventually overtake the west-
ern states, ..but probably not within a generation. During the
next few years the absolute increase in produ-ctiOii in the NATO
states may continue to be greater than the increase in the Soviet
system.
The Soviet Union has been diverting a much larger proportion
of its total output to military purposes and to expansion of indus-
trial facilities than has any Western state; nevertheless, the out-
put of Soviet consumer goods will probably increase by one-fourth
to one-third by 1957. Soviet industrial production will probably
expand by 40 to 50 per cent during the next four years; although
this rate is more than twice that of the United States, the Soviet
base is so much smaller that the United States will retain a sub-
stantial margin of superiority.
With the growth of its industrial potential the Soviet Union
will be better prepared in three or four years to survive an atomic
attack or to support a major war effort along conventional lines
76 SECRET
7
-
c SECRET
SE INFORMATION
than it is now. If general war is avoided, the major significance
of its rate of economic growth will lie in the strengthening of
Soviet political warfare capabilities. A steady improvement
in living standards would have important political consequences
in the free world. The rate of economic growth of the satellites -
and Communist China, though it will be slower than that of the
Soviet Union, will probably be comparable.*
Military Factors
The military strength of the Soviet system and the ability of
its rulers to threaten the use of military force to achieve their
objectives are potent factors in its political warfare capabilities.
The Soviet system now has a significant quantitative superiority
over the Western Powers in standing and reserve forces and in
conventional ground and air armament. The size of the standing
forces, including those of Communist China, will probably not be
appreciably increased by 1957 above the present level of about 9
million men. The estimated present strength of the system's
air forces is about 21,500 aircraft, including 8,600 jet fighters; by
1957, the total will probably be 26,000 aircraft, including 10,000
jet fighters. The number of long-range submarines will prob-
ably increase by 1957 from 106 to 175. The cumulative Soviet
stockpile of atomic weapons (30 to 100 kiloton yield) is estimated
to be 120 in mid-1953 and is tentatively projected to be 500 in.
mid-1957, by which time the Soviet Union will also have more
and better long-range bomber aircraft. The estimates of the
atomic stockpile may be too high or too low, but there will prob-
ably be not less than 80 weapons in mid-1953 and not more than
1,000 in mid-1957. The over-all effectiveness of the ground, naval
and air forces of the system will almost certainly continue to
improve during the intervening period.
Soviet scientific and technical capabilities have increased
rapidly since World War II, and the Soviet Union will doubtless
continue to devote a higher proportion of these capabilities to
military purposes than the West. The Committee believes that
the estimates of Soviet atomic capabilities are of special signifi-
cance in light of the vulnerability of the United States to attack,
as shown in the report of Project East River.
Internal,Security
The security arrangements in the Soviet system constitute an
essential strength on the one hand and evidence of great weakness
? The material in this section on Soviet Strengths is largely drawn from
corresponding sections of NIE-65, dated June 16, 1953.
5fief SECRET
8
SE INFORMATION
iSECRET
cu
on the other. They provide the force required to protect the posi-
tion of the party leadership and they are also a measure of the
regime's fear of the latent strength of opposition and resistance
in the population.
A totalitarian state can permit no internal opposition and re-
quires a reliable instrumentality of repression to enforce its will.
A ppwerful and ubiquitous secret police provides such an instru-
mentality. Under the present regime the internal security forces
perform a variety of functions. Their foremost responsibility is
to ensure the personal safety of the men in the Kremlin. They
are expected to deal ruthlessly with all forms of opposition to
the regime; in the past they were successful to the point where
public expression of disagreement with government policies had
almost disappeared. Recent outbreaks in Czechoslovakia and
East Germany show, however, that all resistance has not yet been
suppressed. ?
Another function of the internal security forces is to maintain
the degree of control over the satellites which Moscow desires.
In the governments established in eastern Europe after the war,
which were usually labeled "governments of national unity" and
were actually coalitions, the Kremlin always made certain that
the Minister of Interior was a communist, thereby ensuring con-
trol of the police. From this vantage point, Russian advisers,
usually themselves members of the Soviet MVD, were introduced
into key positions in the satellite regimes until full Moscow con-
trol could be established and maintained.
Finally, the internal security forces are charged with the task
of maintaining the inviolability of the Soviet frontiers. A similar
function is performed by the police organizations in each of the
satellites. The resulting "Iron Curtain" is so impenetrable that
residents of the countries of the Soviet system are effectively
cut off from any type of contact with the outside world. Con-
tact within the system itself is not appreciably easier. Travel
between the Soviet Union and its satellites is virtually non-
existent except on official business, while within the individual
countries internal passport controls, assignment to places of work
and limited transportation facilities make movement extremely
difficult.
Although security arrangements of the magnitude needed for
these operations require forces numbering approximately one
million men in the Soviet Union alone and constitute a sub-
stantial drain on manpower resources throughout the Soviet
T)41 SECRET
9
SE INFORMATION
Twe SECRET
system, they are obviously considered essential by the party lead-
ership for the maintenance of their power. As long as they pre-
serve their present level of effectiveness, they will constitute a
formidable obstacle to any efforts to penetrate the system and
establish contact with its people.
Political Warfare Capabilities*
The Soviet system has impressive political warfare capabilities
for use against the free world. On the assumption that the Soviet
rulers will seek to accomplish their objectives by means short of
general war, the problem of countering their efforts and of
developing an appropriate counteroffensive becomes of decisive
importance.
A major weapon in the Soviet drive for world domination is
the communist apparatus in the free world. The main instru-
ments are the foreign commilnist parties. These are the central
mechanisms for controlling and coordinating other activities,
such as the operations of "front" organizations, the infiltration
and manipulation of non-communist organizations, the penetra-
tion of governments, and the preparation of secret groups for
violent action. Wherever possible, the communist parties also
attempt to advance their purposes by participation in political
activities as legal parties. This line was strongly emphasized
by Stalin in his concluding speech to the 19th Communist Party
Congress in October, 1952.
The membership of the foreign communist parties reached a
peak of about six million in 1948 and has since steadily declined to
about three and one half million This trend was reversed in
recent elections in France and Italy. Membership in any event
is not an accurate indication of the threat posed by these parties.
The communists have proved that numbers are less important
than discipline, direction and the penetration and control of key
points.
A second weapon of major importance in the drive for world
domination is the communist ideology. This ideology ? despite
all the evidence of the realities of life in the Soviet system. ? still
has a significant appeal to, many people outside the system.
Most of the recruits are i)eople who believe ,that they are
underp-rivileged, discriminated agpinst and exploited, and whose
religious faith or loyalty to existing institutions has been weak-
ened or broken. The ideology also attracts many opportunists
? For a more complete description of the political warfare capabilities of the
Soviet system, see NIE-435.
-
T91 SECRET
10
1
'IZSECRET
SE INFORMATION
who believe that the expansion of communism cannot be stopped
and that power and position will be the rewards- of those who
assist the expansion. The importance of its intellectual and
national appeal, especially in Asia and Africa, should not be un-
derestimated. In part, this appeal derives from the association
of the colonial heritage, with capitalist exploitation. It also de-
rives from the desire for economic development and the belief
that communism has made possible the Soviet Union's rapid eco-
nomic growth.
The foreign communist parties have sought, often with much
success, to identify themselves, according to local conditions, as
the working class party, the anti-imperialistic party or the anti-
discrimination party. The Soviet Union has moved to exploit
discontent through its foreign communist apparatus. Its readi-
ness to create conditions of anarchy as a preliminary to seizing
power is in itself an important advantage in the conflict.
Weaknesses
The Foreign Communist Apparatus
At this stage of the conflict the most vulnerable point in the
world communist movement is its apparatus in the free world.
In fighting this apparatus the policies and programs of the United
States are of primary importance. These include programs of
economic and military assistance, cooperation for mutual secur-
ity, support of the United Nations, resistance to communist
aggression in Korea, support of resistance by others in Indochina
and Malaya and support of the European Defense Community
and the Schuman Plan. These policies and programs have been
and can be effectively supplemented by political warfare opera-
tions. By helping to expose the true nature of communist activi-
ties, by penetrating, undermining and dividing the foreign ap-
paratus and by hampering its access to funds, the basic weakness
of the apparatus can be exploited: that it is subservient to the
Kremlin and employed as an instrument of conquest and domina-
tion. The decline of communist party strength in Western
Europe, the Philippines and in other countries indicates what
can be accomplished by a combination of constructive policies and
political warfare. -
The Communist Record
The gap between communist ideology and Soviet practice is
also a source of weakness. An important task of political war-
Tief SECRET
11
_
li te SECRET
SEac INFORMATION
fare is to call attention to this gap and to make more and more
apparent, especially to the largely uncommitted peoples of free
Asia, that the Soviet Union is an aggressive power seeking to
dominate them, and that its system, far from being superior,
cannot stand free and open comparison with other societies.
The failure of communist regimes to live up to their promises
is a major weakness which should be exploited by United States
political warfare. The failure to produce the extra bowl of rice,
or to carry through a satisfactory land reform program, or to
meet the many specific desires and remedy the many specific
grievances of the subject peoples is highly important material
for political warfare, not only within the communist countries
but also in the free nations in which communism is making
headway.
Internal Weaknesses
Probably the most serious internal weakness lies in the basic
character of a totalitarian society. Because this form of social
orgsnization involves the concentration of power in the hands of
one man, it tends to be inflexible in the execution of his orders
and dependent on his personal capabilities. The Soviet system
produced striking successes under Stalin; it may be far weaker
under his successor or successors.
There may now be a genuine effort to govern by committee.
Should it succeed, this would itself be indicative of a highly sig-
nificant change in the Soviet system. It is more likely that at
present there is an uneasy balance of power at the top level of
the regime and that a struggle for power will go on, even if it
results in some weakening of Soviet power, until Malenkov or
someone else has established a dominant position. This struggle
will be waged in an atmosphere of suspicion and rivalry.
The present Soviet regime may desire a period of relaxation
of international tensions while it consolidates its position.* A
relaxation of tensions may also represent only a shift in Soviet
policy along the lines indicated by Stalin as the best means of
weakening and breaking up the free world coalition.
The relationship between the Soviet regime and the satellites
and Conimunist China is another source of weakness. Soviet
'Both Lenin and .Stalin, at times when they were preoccupied with the prob-
lems of consolidating their internal positions, appeased the Soviet people by
various political and economic measures and also attempted to improve their
relations with the outside world.
y4 .SECRET
12
Cer Y INFORMATION
SECRET
SE
exploitation has created resentments among the captive peoples.
Satellite rulers maintain themselves in power only by force and
are dependent on the support of the Kremlin. A struggle for
power in the Kremlin may make it difficult for the Soviet regime
to act promptly and decisively toward the satellites and there
may be corresponding struggles within these countries. As a
result, opportunities may arise for satellites to break away from
the Kremlin, though this would seem unlikely before an internal
Kremlin conflict had reached an advanced stage.
Communist China appears to have more the position of ally
than satellite.* The alliance has probably been advantageous
to each partner. There are deep and historic conflicts of interest,
however, which might in time lead to open rivalry. The Soviet
rulers will attempt to gain domination over Communist China
because of concern over its present capabilities for independent
action. The Chinese Communist regime is almost certain to
resist Soviet efforts to reduce it politically and economically to
satellite status; moreover, Mao Tse-tung may now regard him-
self as the independent leader of the communist movement in
Asia and may be reluctant to take directions from the new Soviet
rulers.
Despite these latent sources of conflict, the Chinese Commu-
nists probably attach great importance to maintaining the Sino-
Soviet alliance and may be willing to make some sacrifices to
accommodate their aspirations to Soviet policies. There is small
likelihood that a split will develop between them in the near
future. It also seems unlikely that the regime can be overthrown
from within by popular resistance, even with such covert support
as might be provided.
J
The attitude of the Russian and satellite peoples toward their
rulers is another major weakness, especially in times of crisis.
Millions of Soviet citizens were ready, for example, to regard the
Germans as liberators in World War II. The suppression of
religion is an important source of discontent, especially in the
satellite countries. The large-scale use of terror and of slave
labor is also a divisive force within the Soviet system. There may
not be opportunities to exploit this situation within the Soviet
system by means short of war so long as the present rulers hold
the loyalty of the internal security and armed forces. However,
* See NIE-65.
SECRET
13
cver SECRET
SE INFORMATION
the attitude of the regime toward religion and the use of terror
and of slave labor are elements of weakness which can be used to
discredit the Soviet system in many countries in the free world.
Finally, although the Soviet system is developing its economic
base rapidly, it is still far inferior in this field to the free nations.
It is known that Stalin attached great importance to the economic
disparity between the United States and the Soviet Union,
regarding it as a factor of perhaps decisive importance. The
new regime probably shares this view and clearly intends to
maintain the rate of economic growth. The Western Powers
have been trying to slow down the increase in Soviet military
potential by restrictions on trade. New opportunities to build up
these pressures may arise, but it is doubtful whether additional
restrictions could materially reduce the rate of Soviet economic
growth. Efforts to intensify these restrictions may well be
resisted by allied countries who regard them as harmful to their
own economic interests.
The Soviet economy is already severely strained by the present
demands upon it and has much smaller margins within which
it could expand its military strength than the Western Powers.
It also has the weaknesses inherent in a totally planned economy.
Although such an economy can achieve a high rate of growth, it
lacks the flexibility, resilience, and initiative of a free economy.
Main Lines of Soviet Effort*
Within the System
Within the Soviet system there will continue to be great
emphasis upon the expansion of productive capacity, especially in
those industries basic to industrial growth and to military pro-
duction; upon the enlargement of the atomic stockpile and the
improvement of means of delivery; upon the strengthening of
Soviet defenses, particularly against air attack; upon the in-
tegration of the European satellites and the strengthening of
their internal security. The regime's principal preoccupation,
however, is likely to be the problem of the succession to Stalin.
An intense struggle for power is possible. The United States
and its allies should exploit this situation, particularly by con-
fronting the regime with difficult policy choices.
? In this section-the Committee has relied heavily on NIE-84, Part II. ?
. '7d' SECRET
14
T' SECRET
? SEctr INFORMATION
Outside the System
The Soviet rulers will certainly continue their effort to under-
mine and destroy the non-communist world by political warfare.
They may be prepared to bring about some relaxation of inter-
national tensions. They probably will make no major concessions
such as the reduction or withdrawal of Sovet power and influence
froth areas where it is now established. In fact, a state of inter-
national tension and of hostility toward the outside world is
probably necessary to justify the imposition of the totalitarian
police system on the Soviet people. The regime will be unable
to live in genuine peace with the free nations so long as it must
maintain such controls over its own people.
Although it is of course impossible to foresee clearly how and
where the Soviet rulers will move and although it is likely that
they will be able to spring surprises in the future as in the past,
it seems probable that their objectives will remain constant.
Sharp changes in the tactics used in pursuit of Soviet objectives
may occur, some of which may pose new and difficult problems
for the United States. The following principal lines of Soviet
action are based on the best available government estirnstes, how-
ever, and it is believed that they will not be substantially modified.
With the exceptions of Southeast Asia and Iran, world condi-
tions are not now favorable for successful communist armed
revolts; and there appear to be no significant areas which the
communists can hope to bring into the system by armed aggres-
sion without incurring serious risk of general war. The Kremlin
may be expected to rely upon other methods. -Foreign commu-
nist parties will seek to exploit neutralist, nationalist, racial and
anti-American sentiments and to stimulate demands for more
extensive East-West trade.
In Western Europe, the principal lines of Soviet attack will be
designed to prevent or delay Western European unification and
rearmament, to use economic pressures and inducements and
other political means to gain control of Germany and to divide
the United States and its NATO allies. The several communist
parties in Western Europe will be used to further all of these pur-
poses. The present-political strength of these parties, however,
indicates that in the immediate future their capabilities to achieve
their objectives will be limited.
In Asia, the principal lines of communist attack will be designed
to strengthen communist organizations, to weaken Asian ties
'lye' SECRET
15
rre SECRET
SEcuINFORMATION
with the West and to exploit Asian neutralism and anti-colonial-
ism; to use the Viet Minh to expel the French from Indochina, but
without that direct support or participation which would risk a
wide extension of the war; to use economic pressures and in-
ducements and other means of political warfare to increase com-
munist influence in Japan; to achieve a truce without major con-
cessions in Korea and to use a post-truce political conference to
make progress toward the foregoing objectives. During the last
year, however, an increasing awareness of the communist threat
has been shown by Asian leaders, especially in India.
Throughout the Middle East and Africa, the Kremlin is likely
to conduct an increasingly active political warfare campaign, the
first goal being a Tudeh victory in Iran. Up to now, however,
the communist parties in the area have been able to conclude
working arrangements with nationalist forces in no country ex-
cept possibly Iran.
In Latin America, the Kremlin will give the major part of its
attention to building up and strengthening its organization and
to fomenting hatred of the United States as a means of weakening
the inter-American system.
In summary, we expect an intensification of Soviet political
warfare during the period immediately ahead. We believe, how-
ever, that the Kremlin will avoid initiatives involving serious
risk of general war, especially since it may hope to make addi-
tional gains by political warfare methods without such risk.
c itIZSECRET
SE INFORMATION
Chapter Three
THE UNITED STATES PROGRAM FOR WORLD ORDER
Only the collective strength and determination of the free
world, under United States leadership, can eventually overcome
the challenge we have just described. Only if the free world gains
and maintains a power position which the Soviet Union cannot
safely challenge would it be possible to bring pressures on the
Soviet system which would lead to a reduction and retraction of
its power and influence and eventually to a change in the nature
of the Soviet system. To do this successfully, however, it will be
necessary for the United States and its allies not only to agree on
general objectives but also to develop and carry out common poli-
cies consistent with these objectives. In the past there has often
been a discrepancy between the actions necessary to accomplish
agreed objectives and the specific courses of action undertaken.
Political warfare is an instrument of national policy by which
pressures can be applied. Its employment should always be
adjusted to the needs of foreign policy. The best way of affect-
ing Soviet behavior is to confront the Kremlin with difficult
choices on matters of great importance. Political warfare should
be designed to bring pressure on the regime to choose a course
favorable to United States interests by demonstrating in appro-
priate ways the advantages of such a decision to the Soviet regime
and the disadvantages of a different one.
This principle demonstrating to others their self-interest in
decisions which the United States wishes them to make ? is gen-
erally applicable in political warfare. Decisions are made only
in situations where there is a choice, and the aim is to present
alternatives, both to allies and enemies, in such a way that the
one favorable to United States interests seems desirable in terms
of the self-interest of those who have the power of decision.
On the basis of the analysis presented in Chapters One and
Two, the United States and allied and friendly nations face
the prospect of a protracted conflict with the Soviet system. The
United States cannot at present reasonably anticipate the col-
lapse or drastic alteration of that system from either internal or
external causes. The policies of the United States should be
SECRET
17
SECRET
SECrrY INFORMATION
planned to marimize the chance of collapse, but it cannot be
safely assumed that this result can be produced for many years
even by the best efforts of the free nations. The United States
must place its chief reliance on strengthening the free world,
while maintaining pressures on the Soviet system.
In considering the conduct of national security policies and
the role and contribution of political warfare, the Committee has
examined the program for world order within which political
warfare plays its part. This program is not a detailed blueprint,
but a set of policies which, although the ultimate objective is
constant, must be adapted to changes in the international situ-
ation. We recognize that these policies are now being reviewed
and revised. The essential objectives, however, will not be
changed. In this chapter consideration is given first to the
elements of free world strength which should be developed and
to the elements of weakness to be overcome. The second part
of the chapter presents an outline of the major courses of action
by which the United States is seeking to build that position of
strength in the free world which is the necessary basis for weak-
ening the Soviet system and for progress toward a peaceful world
order.
Strengths and Weaknesses
Economic Factors
The economic strength of the free nations' is one of their most
important assets in the conflict with the Soviet system. At
present, the ratio of the gross national product of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization countries to that of the Soviet
system is about three to one. On the basis of the principal indices
to economic strength, such as the production of steel, aluminum,
coal, oil and electric power, the number of skilled workers, trans-
portation, agricultural production, and so forth, the comparisons
are also favorable to the West.* In the event of atomic attack,
these margins of superiority could be of great importance,
for there would be undestroyed facilities** which, with proper
planning and preparation, could be reorganized to meet wartime
needs. ?The Soviet Union does not have such an economic
cushioli, although it is believed .to have large stockpiles of essen-
tial military items.
? See Chapter Two, pages 7 and 8.
se For a more complete consideration of this subject, see NSC 140/I.
T, SECRET
18
SECRET
5ECITYINFORMATION
? The strength of the American system of free enterprise has
been proven in peace and war. Its flexibility, initiative and
resilience are qualities which a totally planned economy cannot
match. Among the free nations, however, the economic vitality
of the United States is so great and taken so for granted that
complacency Over its *strength is a real danger. The rate of
ecotiomic growth of the Soviet system is not fully appreciated.
The ability of its rulers arbitrarily to allocate its resources for
military and related purposes, moreover, is not matched in peace-
time by a comparable willingness of the free nations to use their
superior resources to similar effect.
The free world can maintain its present economic advantage
only if the magnitude of the Soviet effort is realized and deter-
mined steps are taken to remedy the economic weaknesses of the
free world. The United States has not yet successfully adjusted
to its position as a large and growing creditor, with the result
that the rest of the free world experiences a chronic dollar
shortage. Western Europe, on the other hand, has had great
difficulty in adjusting to its position as a debtor on international
account. Its principal problem is the unsatisfactorily slow rate
of economic growth. This problem makes it difficult for these
countries to deal with inflationary pressures, military require-
ments, various social and economic rigidities and demands for
improved living standards. The older industrial countries, par-
ticularly Germany and Japan, face increasingly difficult prob-
lems of markets and sources of supply. This latter fact, to which
Stalin drew attention in his address to the 19th? Party Congress,
has great political significance.
The underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and (to a lesser
extent) Latin America are in political ferment which is, in part,
economic in origin. These countries need capital and technical
assistance to develop their natural resources. Communism will
continue to gain ground in these countries unless the peoples
learn that free institutions enable them to achieve more rapid
economic improvement. These difficulties could be overcome to
the mutual advantage of all. The United States needs the sources
of raw materials which can be built up in the underdeveloped
countries. In the process these countries will be enabled to buy
industrial and other products from Western Europe and Japan
which need growing markets for their output. Attention to this
;026 SECRET
19
SE
SECRET
INFORMATION
problem is one of the most urgent tasks in a constructive program
for world order.
Military Factors
Although the combined military strength of all free nations
is essential to progress toward the principal objectives of the free
world, United States military strength is the vital factor. It is
the indispensable underpinning of the whole free world position.
At present, the United States has approximately 3,600,000 men
under arms of whom about one-half are in the Army and Marine
Corps, nearly one-quarter in the Navy and a little more than
one-quarter in the Air Force. About one-third .of its ready mili-
tary strength is deployed in the Far East; about one-fourth in
Western Europe; most of the rest is stationed in the Western
Hemisphere. There are nine United States divisions in Korea and
Japan and large supporting air forces in the Japan-Ryukyu-
Korea area. The 7th Fleet is on duty in Far Eastern waters.
ea) There are six United States divisions in Europe supported by
powerful air and naval forces. The 6th Fleet is on duty in the
Mediterranean, but there are no United States military forces
east of Suez.*
It is recognized that the ability of the United States to deter
local aggression will continue to depend upon a position of general
strength plus readiness to counter local aggression by the rapid
deployment of forces to the scene of the trouble and the potential
aggressor's awareness thereof. Although there has been a rapid
and continuing build-up of United States military strength since
1950, the weight of military commitments, particularly in Korea,
ba-s created a situation in which it is estimated that the United
States "general military reserve is at present so small that the
use of any part of it would require its immediate reconstitution
either by further mobilization or by the redeployment of existing
? NSC 141. This paper was prepared in January 1953 by the Secretaries of
State and Defense and the Director for Mutual Security of the last Admin-
istration. It has been considered by the NSC, but not approved by the NSC or
the President The data cited refer only to the United States and do not
Include other free world strength and are therefore not comparable with the
data in Chapter Two for the Soviet system as a whole. Although the free na-
tions may approach approximate military equality in numerical terms with
the Soviet system, this comparison is misleading because the forces of the free
nations are scattered and not subject to central control and because there is
Inadequate strength in certain vital areas adjoining the Soviet system.
yef SECRET
20
cTifiSECRE't
SE TY INFORMATION
forces now committed elsewhere. . . . This involves acute risks in
the cold war."
It is also recognized that the ability of the United States to
deter general war will continue to depend in substantial measure
upon the acknowledged capability of the United States to deliver
an effective atomic offensive against the USSR under all foresee-
able conditions. In this regard, the United States is greatly in-
creasing its own atomic strength and its development of the
thermonuclear weapon will further increase this power: "There
is every indication that the free world's present lead in numbers
and power of atomic and thermonuclear weapons will be in-
creased and that the U.S. will continue to possess substantially
greater variety and flexibility of means in the delivery of such
weapons. By 1954-55, the air force as a whole and the naval air
arm will be substantially modernized, and with improvements in
electronics equipment our air penetration capabilities should be
enhanced."**
The same sources warn, however, that although "U.S. offensive
striking power is now substantial and is improving. . . some
doubt exists whether it is improving relative to the strengthened
Soviet defenses and to the increasing Soviet capability to damage
bases in the continental United States and U.S. bases overseas by
surprise atomic attacks. This doubt leads to the finding that the
present strength and readiness of (U.S.) offensive striking power
would involve acute risks for the United States in the first critical
stages of a general war." There is, in fact, reliable evidence that
the vulnerability of the United States to atomic attack is in-
creasing as fhe Soviet power to attack increases without offsetting
additions to United States air and civil defenses.***
As for the military position of the rest of the free world, the
Committee notes the estimate that "no one of the three major
areas outside the Western Hemisphere has yet achieved adequate
security against the several threats posed by the Soviet system."**
Substantial progress however, has been made in European rearm-
ament, although significant deficiencies exist in the effectiveness
of many NATO units. Under presently funded programs, some
? NSC 141.
**NSC 141; see also NSC 135/2.
***See NSC 141; Project East River; the report on Armaments and National
Policy by the State Department's Panel of Consultants on Disarmament
(Oppenheimer Committee); and the report to the Secretary of Defense by
the Ad Hoc Study Group on Continental Defense (the Kelly Report).
rpi SECRET
21
SE
SECRET
INFORMATION
seven or eight billion dollars worth of military end items should
be delivered to Europe by 1955. This should result in further
progress in the development of effective forces, although Western
Europe will probably not by 1955 have reached a security position
which would be adequate to assure its defense against a deter-
mined Soviet attack.
In the Far East, the United States military aim is to make the
off-shore island chain secure at minimum cost and to resist com-
munist aggression on the mainland of Asia. The South Korean
army has now been raised to 16 active divisions and a further
build-up is planned. The United States is continuing to assist
in developing the military capabilities of the Chinese Nationalists,
but Formosa could not now be defended against a determined
Chinese Communist attack without substantial United States
participation. The United States is giving further impetus to
the development of Vietnamese forces, but it is doubtful whether
Indochina could be defended against a large-scale Chinese Com-
munist attack unless several Western divisions were securely
placed in the area prior to the attack.
Potentially, Japan can again be a major military factor in the
Far East. With United States assistance, the Japanese have
planned a 10-division ground force and a small air force, but for
many internal reasons, including the explicit prohibition against
rearmament in the Japanese Constitution, the development of
these forces will probably be slow. In general, the strength of
local and Western forces in the Far East, with the exception of
Korea, is not in proportion to the dimensions of the military
threat. There is very little local or Western military strength in
the Middle East.
We *recognize that these estimates are not wholly up-to-date,
that they are not based on a thorough net estimate and that ways
may be found to use the military strength of the free nations
more effectively. Relative military capabilities are, however, a
most important factor in calculating the risks involved in polit-
ical warfare offensives against the Soviet system and in deter-
mining the degree of risk which the United States can prudently
accept. The immediate problem is the prevention of further
Soviet territorial expansion, particularly in the Middle East and
Southeast Asia where there is serious danger of continued deterio-
ration of the free world's position. This danger derives in part
from the military weakness of the free nations in these areas.
#704 SECRET
22
4
ce SECRET
SE INFORMATION
Political Factors
There is today a degree of cooperation among the free nations
which is altogether unprecedented except in time of general war.
This cooperation finds its expression in the United Nations, in
NATO, in the Inter-American system, in the Pacific pacts, and
in various economic programs. Nevertheless, the economic
strains, the burden of military requirements and the long-
continued political tensions between the Soviet system and the
free nations and between the free nations themselves, are pro-
ducing an unhealthy political climate in the free world. The
conflicts of interest are manifest in the French reluctance to
grant Western Germany a position of equality, the Arab-Israeli
tensions, the Anglo-Egyptian difficulties, and the deteriorating
relationships between the United Kingdom and France on the one
hand, and their dependencies or former dependencies in the Mid-
dle East, Asia, and Africa on the other hand. In general, the free
nations, because they are free, are necessarily more open to com-
munist penetration and subversion than the Soviet system is to
Western political warfare.*
Courses of Action
The objectives of the United States were discussed in Chapter
One and can be summarized as: (1) the security of the United
States, (2) a peaceful world order of free nations and (3) a sub-
stantial relative reduction of Soviet capabilities or a basic change
in Soviet objectives. The possibility of war involving large num-
bers of atomic bombs has become so appalling that the importance
of avoiding it imposes drastic limitations on the policies by which
the United States seeks to make progress toward these objectives.
The United States will fight a general war if this becomes essen-
tial to the survival of the United States and the free world. But
recognizing as the President has said, that the only way to win a
third World War is to avoid it, the United States will attempt to
conduct itself so that general war can be avoided while it moves
toward its objectives.
Further expansion of the Soviet system would risk the creation
of a situation in which no adequate free coalition could be assem-
bled. Therefore, the first task of United States policy is to pre-
vent such expansion. This will involve continuous efforts to
strengthen the military power, political 'unity, and the economies
? The political strengths and weaknesses of the free world are discussed more
fully below in describing courses of action with respect to individual areas.
Tie SECRET
23
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
of the free nations. Only the ability to accomplish this will
provide the basis for efforts to bring about the retraction and
reduction of Soviet power and influence and eventually a 'change
in the nature of the Soviet system.
At present, the United States and its allies may not have the
capability to prevent by local action the further expansion of the
Soviet system at various points which are under attack or threat-
ened, notably in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. The United
States and other free nations may, therefore, find themselves de-
pendent on the threat of general war to deter Soviet expansion
into such areas.
If the United States is to retain the freedom of action necessary
to meet and counter Soviet threats and to make progress toward
its own objectives, it must possess, in conjunction with its allies
(1) the military strength required to win local conflicts and
(2) the military strength necessary to prevail in the event of
general war. These two essential capabilities are closely related.
The willingness to commit military force to local conflicts will
depend in large measure upon United States readiness for gen-
eral war. Without reasonable assurance of the capability to cope
with the consequences of general war, including attacks on the
United States, the concern of the American people for their own
security will limit the risks which the United States is willing to
accept. The desire of America's allies to limit their risks is al-
ready discernible. In light of the growing Soviet atomic capa-
bility, therefore, the development of more effective air and civil
defenses at least for the continental United States may become a
precondition to continuing freedom of action.
In recognition of these basic facts the United States has under-
taken large programs of military assistance to other countries,
is strengthening its alliances with other free nations and is de-
veloping its own military strength. Military programs, however,
are not only very expensive but are, by themselves, inadequate.
It has become increasingly clear that the vulnerability of a coun-
try to direct or indirect aggression and its ability to resist them
are closely related to its underlying political, social, and economic
health. For this reason, the United States is seeking, by a wide
variety of cooperative measures, to help the free world gain not
only military strength but also moral, political and economic
strength. In places like Berlin, Korea, and other areas where
direct comparison of conditions under free government and com-
munist Control can be readily made, it is especially important that
SECRET
24
ciZ SECRET
SE INFORMATION
the United States seek to assure that the comparison is favorable
to the free way of life by providing economic assistance and by
otherwise strengthening morale in the free area.
Support of the United Nations
One of the ways of describing the basic objectives of the United
States is to say that it desires an international order conforming
to tile spirit and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.
It is, therefore, a major United States goal to strengthen the
United Nations. It is the policy of the United States to cooperate
with other members of the United Nations and through the United
Nations to resist aggression, settle international disputes by
peaceful means, work for the improvement of social and economic
conditions, promote cultural interchange and international un-
derstanding, and meet the aspirations of dependent peoples for
control of their own affairs.
Much has been said about the advantages which accrue to the
Soviet rulers because they have an ideology that is alleged to be
universally valid. The free nations have no such doctrine, for
diversity, not only in customs and practices but in the deepest
interpretations of life, is the essence of freedom. The Charter of
the United Nations represents a very wide area of agreement on
the proper conduct of international relations. The universal
appeal of the Charter and the self-interest of all free peoples in a
world conforming to its spirit could be a powerful unifying force
among free nations.
The United States should, therefore, continue to support the
United Nations, honor fully its obligations under the Charter and
call attention to the persistent failure of the Soviet rulers to honor
theirs. It should seek to persuade colonial or dependent peoples
that the United States supports their desire to have growing con-
trol over their own affairs in accordance with the Charter.
Western Europe
The Western European policies of the United States are de-
signed to assist in accomplishing the following major goals:
1. The political, economic and military unification of the West-
ern European countries and the linking of a unified Western
Europe with the United Kingdom (and thus with the British
Commonwealth) and with the United States in an effective
coalition.
yf S25ECRET
c4 SECRET
SE INFORMATION
2. The realization by the Western European countries of their
full potentialities, including maxim= military and eco-
nomic strength.
3. The recognition by the Western European countries of the
need for, and their full cooperation in working toward, a sub-
stantial relative reduction of Soviet capabilities or a basic
change in Soviet objectives.
4. The development of stable and mutually satisfactory pat-
terns of cooperation, including common effort in resisting
direct and indirect communist aggression, between the West-
ern European countries and their present or former depend-
encies overseas.
5. The restoration and renewal, in these and other ways, of the
vitality, self-respect, and confidence which once character-
ized Western Europe.
There are serious obstacles to the accomplishment of these
goals: Franco-German rivalries and suspicions; the relations of
France and the United Kingdom to their dependencies and former
dependencies, especially those in the Middle East, South and
Southeast Asia, and Africa; the slow rate of economic growth in
Western Europe; the problem of adequate markets and sources
of supply in the free world, particularly for Germany; the pressure
of population in Italy; communist strength, especially in France
and Italy, and so on. Difficult as these problems are, the Western
European countries can deal with them if they can generate the
will and confidence to tackle them vigorously.
The governments and peoples of Western Europe are proud of
their heritage and of their contribution to Western civilization;
they resent the shift of power westward to the United States and
eastward to the Soviet Union. They fear war because of their
exposed and weak position and their concern over atomic attack.
They are envious of the material richness of the United States
and feel overwhelmed by the burdens of defense which they think
it is pressing on them. They dislike the "cold war" and many of
them think that it could be settled if the United States would take
a less rigid position toward the Soviet Union.
To attain its goals in Western Europe the United States must
gam ?upport for its policies, instill confidence in its leadership,
encourage a sense of shared responsibility and equal participation
in decisions and actions, and develop an understanding of the
Soviet threat; it must also expose the =willingness of the Soviet
T4ipe SECRET
26
_ellorve . .
me SECRET
SE INFORMATION
Union to reach a settlement genuinely consistent with the security
of Western Europe.
The Middle East, South Asia and Africa
There is a widespread opinion that further deterioration in
these areas is likely. It has been estimated that, with respect to
the Middle East and Africa, Soviet political warfare is the main
external threat, and that an armed attack, which could only be
made by Soviet forces, is unlikely except as a subsidiary action in
the event of general war. These areas are all in ferment,
striving to break away from ancient patterns and to develop new
political, social and economic institutions. They are areas in
which there are great animosities ? between Arab and Jew, be-
tween Hindu and Moslem, between white and colored, between
present or former colonial powers and present or former depend-
encies. These areas of economic. and strategic value in which
any Soviet expansion would have dangerous consequences are
particularly vulnerable to Soviet political warfare.
The immediate tasks are to prevent Soviet gains, particularly
in Iran, to bring about a satisfactory adjustment of the Anglo-
Egyptian dispute, to reduce Arab-Israeli tensions, and to
bring about a better understanding between India and the West.
Beyond this, there are important long-range tasks, such as assist-
ing economic development, encouraging political stability and
developing adequate defense arrangements.
It will be necessary for some time to work with the groups
now in power in much of the Middle East and with the colonial
authorities in much of Africa. New groups, however, are gaining
power or will in time win power and the United States must be
prepared to work with and encourage these new elements. It
would be tragic if pseudo-revolutionary communism were to gain
ground in this area by capturing the new independence move-
ments and appearing as the spokesman of social and economic
reform. So far as possible, the United States should be a cham-
pion and defender of the genuine independence movements.
Latin America
The situation in Latin America has some similarity to that in
the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa. There are also impor-
tant differences, including the fact that the United States has a
dominating position in the area.
0 SECRET
27
'cue SECRET
SE INFORMATION
Since the end of the -second World War, a number of factors
have contributed to a deterioration in relations between the
United States and the Latin American nations. The amount of
aid given to Latin American nations has been minute in com-
parison with that extended to other parts of the world. Strong
movements for the nationalization of resources have appeared in
several countries where American companies have played a lead-
ing role in development projects. In Guatemala, a pro-commu-
nist government has emerged. In Argentina a violently anti-
American government is seeking with at least covert communist
support to create a Latin American bloc based on enmity to the
United States.
Against these difficulties, the Organization of American States
has strengthened the general political framework for inter-
American relationships. Latin American nations also support
the United Nations, where they can speak with a relatively equal
voice. American policy should emphasize support for the prin-
ciples of individual freedom and national independence and work
to overcome the conditions of economic backwardness and politi-
cal instability which may make the area a fertile ground for
communist penetration and agitation.
The Far East
The United States has made progress in developing a collective
security system in the Far East. The treaties with Japan, the
Philippines, and Australia and New Zealand provide the organiza-
tional framework for this system, and are supplemented by the
arrangements with the Chinese Nationalist Government. Once
Japan overcomes its constitutional obstacles, the development of
its defensive strength can proceed and Japan will become a sig-
nificant factor in the Far Eastern balance of power.
For the time being, the main efforts of the United States are
concentrated on resistance to communist aggression in Korea and
Indochina and on strengthening the defenses of the offshore
island chain. The United States is transferring as much of the
defensive burden to the Far Eastern states as possible by assisting
allied and friendly states to develop military strength. In time
it should be possible to build up substantial local forces in this
vital area. It is also United States policy to assist the free Asian
countries in economic development and in the expansion of their
trade with each other.
'94 SECRET
? 28
SE
Aariudiiikaugar
SECRET
INFORMATION
Although there are many favorable factors, the intelligence
estimates foresee the likelihood of a further deterioration in the
Far East, especially in Southeast Asia. There are two main
threats: armed communist action in Indochina, Malaya, and
Korea and communist political warfare in other countries.
All of the countries of the Far East have serious economic prob-
lem;. In Korea, this problem might become so acute as to inter-
fere with the effort to build up the Korean armed forces. The
communist rebellions in Indochina and Malaya-have badly hurt
the economies of these potentially rich countries: Japan must
find larger markets and sources of supply in the. Far East and
elsewhere in the free world in order to support an expanding
population. There are nevertheless great opportunities for eco-
nomic cooperation among the countries of the Far East if political
barriers can be lowered.
Difficult problems of policy lie ahead. Differences over Far
Eastern policy are an important factor in the relations of the
United States with its European allies. There are also obstacles
to political and military cooperation between the Western Euro-
pean countries and many Asian countries, as is illustrated by the
problem of Indochina. Following a Korean truce, many of
these problems will come to a head in a post-armistice political
conference. Effective political influence will be difficult or im-
possible to exert until the United States has been able to formu-
late clear policies on many important issues.
If these immediate problems can be dealt with, there should
be significant opportunities to develop- strength in the Far East.
There, as in the Middle East, South Asia and Africa, where there
are also young nations seeking to develop their institutions and
strengthen their independence, the United States should be a
champion and defender of genuine independence movements and
in general a progressive influence. These countries have gained
their independence largely as a result of the influence of the
United States on world affairs and many of them look largely to
the United States for the external support necessary to maintain
their freedom. For these reasons the United States must work
out stable patterns of cooperation with them.
*
The United States program, as developed and modified by the
President and the National Security Council, is designed to build
growing strength and cohesion in the free world, so that the free
nations will have the unity of purpose and action, backed by
yf SECRET
29
SECRET
SE CITY INFORMATION
power, to create a world order of free and peaceful nations. The
ultimate objective of the United States program is the eventual
inclusion of the countries now comprising the Soviet system in
such a world order.
The execution of American policies demands a constant aware-
ness of one easily ignored fact: the actions of the Soviet and
Chinese Coraraiinist regimes are partially determined by what
the United States does. United States policy is part of the en-
vironment in which these regimes live and operate. Whether or
not a regime emerges in Moscow prepared to negotiate a serious
settlement with the West; whether or not Mao Tse-tung splits
from Moscow; and whether or not the satellites regain their in-
dependence will be determined in part by the alternatives held
out by American policy. Political warfare designed to diminish
communist capabilities must constantly bear in mind this in-
timate connection between United States actions and the choices
open to Moscow and Peking.
The United States must have a base of national security to
practice political warfare successfully. Unless United States and
allied military strength, defensive and offensive, is sufficient
to make general war unacceptable to the Soviet rulers, and unless
the United States can maintain its political alliances effectively,
it will not have this secure base. This is not merely a military
task, but also a task of diplomatic, economic and moral leadership
addressed to the problems of the coalition as they are, not as the
United States might wish them to be.
If the United States can succeed in maintaining a secure base
and denying the Soviet system the alternative of cheap success
by aggression or subversion, then we believe that political war-
fare holds great promise of success in forcing a reduction and
retraction of Soviet power and a change in the nature of the
Soviet system.
/ SECRET
30
d SECRET
SE R jITY INFORMATION
PART II
Chapter Four
OPERATIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET SYSTEM
The various operations discussed in this Chapter are intended
to contribute primarily to a reduction of Soviet capabilities and
a retraction of Soviet power.* Very little progress has been made
in this direction, and although research may develop new and
more effective techniques, these operations must be considered
unsuccessful to date. It may reasonably be asked whether these
operations serve a useful purpose, whether they may be conducted
more effectively with a view to making a greater contribution
toward the achievement of national objectives, or whether they
should be modified or abandoned. Each operation is examined
with these considerations in mind.
Because of the diversity of operations directed against the
Soviet system, it is not easy to present them as components in a
coordinated effort to accomplish the national objectives of the
United States. Lack of effective coordination partly explains
the failure to make progress. Instances have been cited, for ex-
ample, in which different information agencies of the American
Government have extended support to the same foreign group,
thereby resulting in waste of government funds, confusion of
purpose, and, where some portion of the support was covert,
increased risk of exposure. The Committee hopes that its recom-
mendations on questions of organization (Chapter Seven) will
help to remedy these defects.
In this chapter, operations against the Soviet system are
grouped under the following categories: radio operations; covert
resistance and paramilitary operations; the economic denial pro-
gram; psychological warfare activities under military auspices in
Korea; activities involving defectors and refugees from the Soviet
system; and electromagnetic warfare. The first four types of
activity concern operations which are either actually conducted
behind the Iron Curtain or are directed at targets behind the Iron
Curtain from outside bases. The fifth group includes various
activities which, while conducted outside the Iron Curtain and
* See Chapter One, page 5 and Chapter Three, page 17.
SECRET
31
SE
T SECRET
ITY INFORMATION
involving persons in the free world, are carried on because of the
impact which they may be expected to produce within the Soviet
system. The last subject, electromagnetic warfare, involves con-
siderations of a special character.
Radio Operations
Radio broadcasts directed behind the Iron Curtain are of three
types: white, gray, and black. The first type consists of broad-
casts made in the name of the American Government, such as the
Voice of America programs, or by an overtly supported station
such as RIAS (Radio in the American Sector of Berlin) . The
second type includes broadcasts by stations which are overtly
supported by unofficial American organizations, but to which the
Government gives covert financial support. Such stations are
Radio Liberation, supported by the American Committee for Lib-
eration from Bolshevism, Inc., which now broadcasts to Soviet
occupation troops in Germany and Austria and to selected areas
in the Soviet Union; Radio Free Europe (RFE) , supported by the
National Committee for a Free Europe, which broadcasts to the
Soviet satellites; and until recently Radio Free Asia (RFA) , sup-
ported by the Committee for Free Asia, which has now ceased
broadcasts to Communist China. The last, or black, category in-
cludes CIA supported clandestine stations which purport to speak
for groups inside the satellite countries.
In the interest of coordinated effort in the broadcasting field
and of preventing overlapping and duplication between the vari-
ous types of facilities, it is important that there be a clear divi-
sion of responsibility between these types of operations, particu-
larly between white and gray. As a general rule, the Committee
recommends that the white media confine themselves to the type
of programs for which the United States Government is prepared
to accept responsibility, and that all material not falling into this
category be handled by gray or black stations. An exception to
this rule, however, should be made in the case of RIAS which, be-
cause of its close identification with the West Germans and its
unique position in Berlin, can successfully carry a hard-hitting
type of program which would not be advisable on a normal United
States Government channel.
This section discusses VOA and RIAS of the white media, Radio
Liberation, RFE and RFA in the gray field, (together with other
activities of the cover organizations supporting the latter three
stations) and CIA's clandestine operations.
7? SECRET
32
ceSECRET
SE INFORMATION
Voice of America
Because of the variety of conditions existing in various parts
of the Soviet system, it would be misleading to discuss the question
of radio broadcasting to the area as a whole. For the purposes
of this report the system is divided into three parts: the Soviet
Union, the eastern European satellites, and Communist China.
Th b amounts budgeted for broadcasting to these three areas for
the fiscal year 1953 are, respectively: $6,554,000; $4,132,000; and
$2,455,000; or a total of $13,141,000. This represents 63 per cent
of the total budgeted cost of VOA operations; the balance is al-
located for broadcasting to the free world.
1. The Soviet Union
In its most recent policy guidance the International Infor-
mation Administration (HA) sets forth the following objectives
for VOA broadcasts to the Soviet Union: ?
"Objectives: 1) Emphasizing to Soviet rulers and peoples the
reckless nature of Soviet policy and its consequences; 2) estab-
lishing a reservoir of good will between the peoples of the USSR
and those of the free world; 3) making the Soviet people con-
scious of and intensifying the conflicts and divergencies of in-
terest which exist between them and their rulers; 4) providing
the people of the Soviet Union with accurate and full informa-
tion of news and conditions in the United States and the free
world."
These objectives represent the latest in a series of efforts to
sharpen the tone of VOA's Russian-language broadcasts and to
use VOA as an instrument of psychological .warfare against the
Soviet regime. When broadcasts to the Soviet Union were begun
in 1947, emphasis was almost exclusively on the fourth objective
stated above, that is, to provide the Soviet people with accurate
news reports concerning the United States and the free world.
This original concept has been gradually abandoned as interna-
tional tensions have mounted, but serious doubt remains whether
the more aggressive line now taken in Russian-language broad-
casts is effective with Soviet listeners.
One of the handicaps under which Russian-language broad-
casts have labored from the outset is the difficulty of devising
any practical method of measuring audience reactions. The
programs themselves have been subject to several limiting factors.
Principal among these are the scarcity of short-wave re-
ceivers, the personal risk incurred by listeners to VOA programs,
and the physical difficulty of reception as a result of the intensive
715 SECRET
33
ce SECRET
SE INFORMATION
jamming operations conducted by the Soviet Government (al-
though new technical developments may permit this problem to
be overcome).
In addition to these limiting factors, broadcasting to the Soviet
Union also involves the delicate political question of the non-
Russian peoples of the Soviet Union. VOA broadcasts not only
in Russian but also in a number of minority languages. In
theory these broadcasts present the same type of material
carried on the Russian-language broadcasts and are not in-
tended to encourage separatist tendencies. In practice the mere
existence of programs in these languages emanating from an offi-
cial United States station is frequently interpreted by Soviet
propaganda and by Russians in the Soviet Union to mean that
this Government favors a policy of dismemberment Further-
more, the content of programs in these obscure languages is diffi-
cult to control. Finally, the problem of measuring audience re-
action which exists in the case of the Russian-language programs
is compounded to the point where little or nothing in the way of
evaluation data is available for the minority language programs
In view of the limitations on effective broadcasting to the peo-
ples of the Soviet Union and the inadequate data on audience
reaction, a serious doubt arises whether the United States Gov-
ernment should continue to devote resources on the present scale
to this operation ? namely, almost one-third of the total VOA
budget. The Committee believes that if its recommendations are
approved, this proportion would automatically decline.
Even if a clear signal could be delivered to the Soviet listener,
it is difficult to envisage any positive results which could now be
achieved by provocative propaganda, and the risk of losing the
audience would be ever present. It is believed, therefore, that
VOA output to the Soviet Union should be modified in the follow-
ing ways:*
(a) The basis for VOA output to the Soviet Union should be
objective, factual news reporting. It is as a source of truth and
information about world events that VOA has value for the Soviet
listener. If a Soviet citizen listens to VOA outside the scope of his
official duties, he must be presumed to do so in a serious effort to
obtain news and information not otherwise available to him.
Seleciion and treatment of news should be designed to present a
full exposition of United States actions and policies, especially as
they affect the Soviet Union.
? See Chapter Five for recommendations on VOA broadcasts to the free world:
SECRET
34
SECRET
SEC ITY INFORMATION
(b) While straight news should comprise the bulk of VOA out-
put, it should be supplemented by commentaries serving to in-
terpret news events and to provide fuller explanations of United
States actions and policies than would be apparent from the news
reports themselves.
(c) Although objectivity should be paramount, VOA output
should be forceful and direct both in tone and content. As official
relations with the Soviet- Government are on a plain-speaking
basis, the same should be true of the United States informational
approach to the Soviet people.
(d) VOA should stress directness in its approach, but should
avoid a propagandist note. The fact that it is the official voice
of the United States Government argues for restraint and dignity
in its tone. All material intended for purposes of political war-
fare against the Soviet regime should be diverted to Radio Libera-
tion or other non-Official stations.
(e) While programs of the type suggested above might be
broadcast in one or two of the principal minority languages, it is
felt that American objectives will not be furthered by expanding
this program and it is suggested that serious consideration be
given to reducing the number currently in use.
In the event of war, radio will be a political warfare weapon of
major importance, especially in the initial phase. It is essential,
therefore, that the facilities and personnel available to the United
States not be reduced to the point where it would be difficult or
impossible to respond to the exigencies of a war situation.*
2. The Eastern European Satellites
The objectives of VOA in eastern Europe as set forth in IIA
guidance are the following:
"Objectives: 1. To maintain hope and prevent demoralization
under the weight of Soviet oppression by (a) providing contin-
uing evidence of United States and free world concern for their
fate; (b) emphasizing growing western strength; (c) reiterat-
ing our faith in their eventual liberation; (d) expressing our
belief that the Soviet-dominated order will not meet the test
of history.
"2. To resist the inroads of Sovietization, particu-
larly of satellite youth, by articulating the national and re-
* See page 52, for discussion of electromagnetic warfare. The preceding recom-
mendations have been made without reference to the requirements which may
be imposed by electromagnetic warfare.
/Ter' SECRET
35
SEcTle,
SECRET
u
11?16-Atah.
INFORMATION '
ligious traditions of the area, and educating them concerning
the meaning of free institutions.
"3. To provide reliable, objective and relatively full
coverage of developments in the United States and the free
world, and accurate commentary on communist activities in
the satellites."
The situation in the eastern European satellites with respect
to radio broadcasting differs in many respects from that in the
Soviet Union itself. The populations of these countries have been
subjected to the communist system for a relatively short time and
retain vivid memories of a different kind of life. Most of the
countries, especially Czechoslovakia, Poland,. Hungary and Ru-
mania, still have a strong western orientation. Radio receivers
are much more generally available to the population than in the
Soviet Union. Furthermore, the relative proximity to relay sta-
tions on the Soviet periphery makes it possible to deliver a
medium-wave signal which is fairly good in spite of jarnming
operations.
Because of the greater number of refugees from most of the
satellite countries than from the Soviet Union and the greater
ease of communication, it is also possible to form a more accurate
impression of the effectiveness of VOA broadcasts directed to this
area. VOA programs are widely heard and news transmitted
through this channel is passed on to a much larger audience by
word of mouth. It appears that VOA is having a considerable
measure of success in accomplishing its objectives in this part
of the world. It is therefore believed that no major modifications
of VOA programs to the eastern European satellites are required.
Three recommendations are made for guidance in future
operations:
(a) A clear line of demarcation should be drawn between the
legitimate spheres of VOA and RFE. The former speaks with
the authority of the United States Government; the latter pur-
ports to be the voice of the freedom forces of the respective target
countries. VOA should accordingly confine itself to the type of
program for which the United States Government is prepared to
accept responsibility, and all material not included in that cate-
gory should be handled by RFE.
(j)) Should the Soviet Union plusue. a policy of moderation
toward the West, it may be expected that the satellites will
follow suit. In this event VOA will be obliged to revise the nature
,16I3 SECRET
36
G./SECRET
SE INFORMATION
of its broadcasts, and an additional responsibility will conse-
quently be placed on RFE.
(c) The effectiveness of VOA programs to the satellites can be
greatly increased if guidance is received from the American mis-
sions in these countries. Although the size of mission staffs is
sharply restricted by the satellite governments, probably no staff
member can make a greater contribution than a competent officer
who will provide the responsible VOA desk with up-to-the-minute
information on local developments and suggest themes which
would be most effective with the audience in his particular coun-
try. Such an officer should be assigned to the mission staff in
each satellite country. VOA broadcasts have attained their
highest effectiveness in countries where the Chief of Mission has
devoted some of his time to providing advice and guidance.
3. Communist China
Radio listening facilities in Communist China are extremely
limited and broadcasting is an inadequate medium for reaching
the people of this area under present conditions. VOA claims
to have an audience comprising government officials and local
leaders, businessmen, teachers and students, and is presently
engaged in increasing its transmitting facilities to the mainland
of China. Meanwhile, as the result of a survey conducted by CIA
of radio listening within Communist China, Radio Free Asia has
decided that results do not justify broadcasting to this area and
has discontinued its programs to the mainland. There are ob-
vious advantages in maintaining a channel to the Government
and influential circles in Communist China,- and pending more
complete evaluation we believe that present transmission facili-
ties are adequate for this purpose.
As in the case of the Soviet Union, broadcasts to Communist
China over VOA facilities should consist of factual news report-
ing supplemented by commentaries serving to interpret the news
and . to provide fuller explanations of our actions and policies
than would be apparent from the news broadcasts themselves.
RIAS ? (Radio in the American Sector of Berlin)
This station is operated under the direct supervision of the
Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany.
Appropriations for operating costs for fiscal year .1953 were
$866,000, which permitted a staff of eight American citizens and
648 Germans.
P SECRET
/ 37
SE
SECRET
INFORMATION
Berlin provides the most direct confrontation of Soviet and
Western power and has become a symbol of Western resistance
to Soviet imperialism. RIAS has made an important contribu-
tion in impressing on the population of eastern Germany the
determination of the West and in sustaining their hopes for
eventual liberation from the Soviet Union.
By virtue of its strategic position in Berlin, RIAS has unrivaled
facilities for the collection of information concerning develop-
ments in eastern Germany. It has built up a large and devoted
jiis generally believed to be accepted by many of its German lis-
following among the German population in the Soviet Zone, and
teners as a bona fide German station. Until recently it has been
able to blanket the Soviet Zone with its program, but jamming
operations initiated in 1952 have now been stepped up to the point
where the audible range of the RIAS signal is limited to the City
of Berlin and the Province of Brandenburg. An effort should be
made to strengthen the signal in order to overcome jamming
In view of the reputation of RIAS as a German station, the
question has arisen whether it should not be turned over to the
German authorities for operation. There are several factors
militating against such a step at this time. Both the Bonn Gov-
ernment and the municipal authorities in West Berlin agree that
RIAS performs a useful function, but feel that they would not
be able to undel write the cost of operation. This attitude may
change after Germany regains her sovereignty. The participa-
tion by the United States in the operation of the station is a
factor contributing to the maintenance of morale of West Ber-
liners. A further consideration is the fact that as long as the
United States is directly involved, the station is in a much
stronger position to withstand Soviet pressures. The Committee
accordingly recommends that the United States continue to op-
erate RIAS and that the present type of program be maintained
without substantial modification.
The situation of RIAS is unrivaled for broadcasting to Soviet
occupation forces in eastern Germany The suggestion that it
also be utilized for Russian-language broadcasts directed to this
audience has been resisted by the authorities in Berlin on the
ground that it would compromise the reputation of the station
as a true German voice. The Committee does not find this argu-
ment compelling. By accepting the argument the United States
has deprived itself of one of the most effective media at its disposal
141,0f SECRET
38
cidSECRET
SE INFORmATIoN
for communication to Soviet occupation troops. We believe that
Russian-language programs could be broadcast by RIAS without
materially diminishing the impact on its east German audience,
and it is recommended that such broadcasts be given serious
consideration.
The American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism, Inc.
This Committee was founded in 1951 for the purpose of attempt-
ing to utilize the forces of the Soviet emigration against the Soviet
regime. The Committee is under CIA sponsorship and guidance,
and has not attempted to raise funds publicly, which would assist
in providing plausible cover for its activities. Policy has been
determined in close coordination with the Department of State.
The American Committee has assumed that the most effective
propaganda against the Soviet regime can be conducted by former
Soviet nationals speaking in the name of a united emigration.
Proceeding on this assumption, a great deal of time and effort
has been expended in attempting to bring together in one political
center the diverse political groups existing in the emigration,
which themselves have no leader of recognized stature.
The difficulties in the way of accomplishing this aim are two-
fold: first, the extreme hostility existing between Great Russian
groups and those composed of the various non-Russian peoples
of the Soviet Union; and second, basic political differences between
Marxist and non-Marxist elements in the emigration, regardless
of nationality. After long and arduous negotiations, agreement
was finally reached in October, 1952, for the formation of a coordi-
nating center composed of four Great Russian and five nation-
ality groups. The. entire right wing of the Great Russian emi-
gration and such important minority groups as the Ukrainians
and Belorussians have thus far held aloof.
It is the declared purpose of the American Committee to pro-
ceed with propaganda activities utilizing the present coordinating
center, and to attempt gradually to broaden the base of the center
by the inclusion of additional groups as circumstances permit.
Activities of the center include Radio Liberation, a Russian-
language station which went on the air from Munich on March
1, 1953, broadcasting initially to Soviet occupation forces in Ger-
many and Austria, and a Russian Institute intended to utilize
the knowledge and skins present in the emigration for research
on the Soviet Union. A newspaper, addressed primarily to the
SECRET
39
cee SECRET
SE LNFORMATION
Soviet emigration and published in the name of the coordinating
center, is planned.
In the fiscal year 1953 $* was allotted for sup-
port of this project. Of this figure $ was for
Radio Liberation and $ for the conduct of the
4? other activities of the Committee. Ninety-six Americans and
218 aliens were employed.
The results to date have not been noteworthy. Undoubtedly
more rapid progress could have been made if the idea of a political
center had been abandoned and activities on the RFE pattern
begun without regard to political considerations. From the out-
set there have been many advocates of such a course who
argued that the whole history of the Russian emigration since
1917 has demonstrated the futility of attempting to persuade its
diffuse elements to coalesce in a common undertaking. The
prevailing view, however, has been that the psychological impact
of a united voice of the Soviet emigration would so much outweigh
that of a station under transparent foreign control that the time
and effort expended on the formation of a coordinating center
were justified.
In a situation short of war the project can probably make its
greatest contribution by de-emphasizing its political activities
and devoting its major, effort to the improvement of broadcasts
from Radio Liberation. This station should use Soviet emigres
in an effort to weaken the Soviet regime and should concentrate
on the Soviet military, government officials, and other groups in
the population which harbor major grievances against the regime.
Present plans call for the provision- of new transmitting facilities
in Spain. It is important that these or other facilities be devel-
oped in order to enable Radio Liberation to reach a wide audience
within the Soviet Union.
Pending a final determination of its effectiveness, we believe
that the activities of the American Committee should be con-
tinued. Because results can be expected in the immediate future
only from broadcasting, however, it is recommended. that major
attention should be concentrated on Radio Liberation. Expendi-
tures on the coordinating center can be reduced but should be
maintained at a level adequate to keep the organization in being,
? Figures in this and subsequent chapters have been omitted at the request
of the Director of Central Intelligence in all copies of this report except the
President's copy, Number 1. The figures will be furnished by the Director of
Central Intelligence if required.
914 SECRET
40
SE
SECRET
INFORMATION.
without active efforts to broaden the base of the center. If
through the efforts of the present membership of the center
additional emigre groups can be persuaded to participate, such
moves should receive the encouragement and support of the
Committee.
National Committee for a Free Europe
The National Committee for a Free Europe (NCFE) was created
by CIA in 1949 with the following purposes:
1. to create an institution in which the emigres from the satel-
lite nations could find employment which would utilize their
skills and, at the same time, document for the world at large
the actions of the satellite governments and Soviet Russia;
2. to utilize the political figures of such emigrations as rally-
ing points and as symbols of unified opposition to com-
munism in this country and abroad;
3. to relieve the Department of State of the need to deal with
emigre political leaders whom they could not endorse as
"Governments in Exile" at a time when the United States
officially recognized the satellite governments; and
4. generally to "aid the non-fascist, non-communist leaders in
their peaceful efforts to prepare the way toward the restora-
tion in Eastern Europe of the social, political, and religious
liberties, in which they and we believe."
The activities of NCFE fall into six categories: the organi7a-
ton and support of refugee political groups; Radio Free Europe
(RFE) , which broadcasts from Munich and Portugal to the
eastern European satellites; research projects on eastern Europe;
the Free University in Exile located at Strasbourg; the compila-
tion of an information digest of current developments behind the
Iron Curtain; and assistance to refugees from the satellites now
residing in western Europe.
In the fiscal year 1953 $ was allotted for the
support of these activities. Most of this support was furnished
by CIA. Of this amount $ was allocated to
RFE, $ to the Free University" in Pile, and
to the support of the other activities conducted
by NCFE. The following personnel are engaged in these opera-
tions: RFE: 252 Americans and 1,526 aliens; Free University in
Exile: 8 Americans and 45 aliens; other activities: 183 Americans
and 345 aliens.
The bulk of available evidence indicates that RFE is widely
heard, particularly in its three primary target areas, Czecho-
XSECRET
41
?
SECRET
SECRITY INFORMATION
slovakia, Hungary and Poland, and that its programs are well
received by its audience. There is less agreement on the effec-
tiveness of other NCFE activities. Efforts to form national coun-
cils composed of political leaders from the various emigrations
have largely been frustrated by the bickerings and jealousies
common to emigre politicians. The Free University in Exile,
which was established to train refugee students for future leader-
ship in their own countries after liberation, has found it difficult
to provide proper motivation and the whole project is currently
under re-examination. The research and news-gathering activi-
ties provide material for broadcasting operations and are also a
source of information regarding developments behind the Iron
Curtain. Aid to satellite refugees in western Europe, which is
designed to supplement the activities of regular relief agencies by
assisting refugees to adapt to their new environment while pre-
serving their national consciousness and national culture, is a
program now in its initial phases.
In the original plan the various national councils were to be
responsible for broadcasts over RFE facilities to their respective
countries. Since the complexities and rivalries of emigre politics
made the organization of national councils difficult, it was decided
to set up RFE on a non-political basis. Emigre staffs were hired
for competence rather thsn political affiliation and programs to
various countries are now identified as the Voice of Free Czecho-
slovakia, Poland, and so on. Although this reason for the nation-
al councils no longer exists, they do have potential value in exile
relations. If the emigre leaders are prepared to create national
councils of their own volition, NCFE should assist them to engage
in such propaganda activities as they may be qualified to conduct.
Primary attention, however, should be given to the broadcasting
phase of NL:k'E activities. The Committee recommends that the
rest of these activities be reviewed by CIA to determine whether
they should be continued or modified.
As in the case of the Russian emigration, support operations
which enable refugees from the satellites to live decently either
in the United States or in western Europe have a certain long-
term value even though their short-range advantages are not ap-
parent. These individuals might constitute a useful cadre in
the event of hostilities in eastern Europe and the research work
they do may prove of value, both now and in the future, if suit-
able arrangements can be made for better distribution of the
results to appropriate agencies.
74' SECRET
42
SECRET
SEC ITY INFORMATION
Certain specific problems arise in connection with NCFE activi-
ties, particularly RFE. There is first the question of cover. It
has been suggested that, because the present cover has worn thin,
RFE's official connections be freely admitted. Such a course,
however, would vitiate the principal reason for the existence of
RFE as a separate organization. So long as its government con-
nections are not officially admitted it can broadcast programs
and take positions for which the United States would not desire
to accept responsibility. The Committee believes that the pres-
ent cover is adequate for this purpose.
A second problem is the question of relations with the West
German Government. RFE's European headquarters and sev-
eral of its transmitting facilities are located in West Germany.
By the very nature of its activities it is inevitable that there
should be conflict between the interests of RFE and those of the
large number of ethnic Germans who have been displaced from
their homes in eastern Europe. These German refugees are criti-
cal of some of the eastern Europeans employed on RFE and fre-
quently disagree with the political solutions which are advocated
or implied with respect to the future organization of this area.
They constitute a compact political pressure group in western
Germany and are in a position to influence the attitude of the
Bonn Government. This will be a continuing problem and may
be expected to become more acute as Germany moves toward full
sovereignty. It is therefore imperative that every effort be made
by RFE to work out and maintain the best possible relations with
the Bonn Government.
t127 the problem offover and that o3relations with the
ermans would be eased if some form of international spon-
sorship for RFE co d be devised. The Central and Eastern
Euro ean Council, which is sponsored by the British Govern-
ment, has indicated an interest in the activities conducted by
NC14 and a desire to participate in some phases of them. If the
joint sponsorship could be broadened to include German repre-
sentation as well, it should do much to alleviate the political
difficulties inherent in operating from a West German base. It
is recommended that some type of international sponsorship for
RFE receive further study y CIA.
Committee for Free Asia
Although the Committee for Free Asia (CFA) is usually con-
sidered to be similar to NCFE in organization and functions, and
T.11 SECRET
43
/SECRET
SE RITY INFORMATION
although the two organizations have joined in the Crusade for
Freedom in appealing for public support, CFA differs from NCFE
in that its activities are directed primarily to the free countries of
Asia rather than behind the Iron Curtain. In its work in these
countries CFA operates on the concept that a private organiza-
tion, particularly in Asia, can accomplish results which an official
agency by its very nature cannot. It presupposes that the more
it obscures its American label the more effective it will be. It
seeks to foster among Asian peoples a sense of their importance
as individuals, to develop in Asia a community of interest in
resisting communism, and to encourage and promote native
leadership of activities which will strengthen freedom. In work-
ing toward these objectives CFA encourages individuals and
groups to act in their own right as Asians, in Asian self-interest,
for Asian objectives.
In May, 1951, Radio Free Asia (RFA) went on the air short-
wave over leased facilities in three Chinese dialects and English.
Surveys revealed that on the Chinese mainland the audience
was restricted to government officials and others specifically au-
thorized to listen to short-wave broadcasts.* Because of this
situation RFA concentrated on the overseas Chinese audience in
Southeast Asia. This audience was not thought to justify the
expense of the program and it was recently decided to discon-
tinue RFA entirely. The amount allocated for the operation of
RFA in the fiscal year 1953 was $
The other activities of CFA, which are directed almost entirely
toward the free countries of Southeast Asia and Japan, are dis-
cussed in Chapter Five.
In the future, United States broadcasts to the Chinese main-
land will be limited to those emanating from VOA and from a
station on Formosa operated by the China Broadcasting Com-
pany. Assistance is being given to increase the power of this
station, and CFA Will provide technical advice to improve the
quality of the programs.
*see page 37 above.
P SECRET
44
A
clrer/SECRET
SE ITY INFORMATION
73 SECRET
45
T,? SECRET
SECUttITY INFORMATION
VSECRET
46
T:7YP SECRET
SEC RITY INFORMATION
e 'I/SECRET
SE RITY INFORMATION
WP SECRET
48
SECRET
INFORMATION
Economic Denial Program
Another phase of operations against the Soviet system is the
economic denial program by which the volume of strategic mate-
rials exported to the Soviet system from the free world has been
substantially reduced.
In order to limit the War potential of the Soviet system and to
increase its economic difficulties, the United States has for the
past several years been engaged in an extensive program "to
prevent the flow to countries supporting the Comm-mist imperial-
ist aggression of those materials, goods, funds, and services which
would serve materially to aid their ability to carry on such aggres-
sion." Under this program, there has been a complete embargo
on arms, ammunition, implements of war, and atomic energy
materials. There has also been an embargo ? with certain ex-
ceptions ? on industrial and transportation materials of primary
strategic significance. Additional items are added to the em-
bargo list as agreement is achieved among the free nations.**
It is believed that the Soviet military build-up has been slowed
by the denial program. A recent analysis*** of the economic con-
sequences of a complete severance of East-West trade concluded
that the amount of commerce still carried on between the Soviet
system and the West is so small in relation to the total productive
capability of either side that its severance could not have a sig-
nificant effect on the general level of economic activity of either
the system or the West. This estimate also concludes that, with
the possible exception of natural rubber and electronic tubes and
components, the Soviet system would be capable of replacing,
within about four years, all goods presently imported from the
West.
The Committee. understands that the Planning Board of NSC
has been directed to review the entire denial program and submit
recommendations to the Council in the near future. In the light
of this current NSC review, the Committee has not attempted to
arrive at independent conclusions concerning the strategic im-
portance of the program or its potential contribution to the
United States effort against the Soviet system.
? Letter from the President to the Secretary of State dated December 28, 1950,
reproduced in NSC 104 dated February 12, 1951, pp. 1-2.
"Second Report to Congress, January, 1953, by the Battle Act Administrator,
PP. 3-5.
??? N-59.
SECRET
49
eel' SECRET
SE TY INFORMATION
Psychological Warfare Operations Under
Military Auspices in Korea
The Committee has not made a careful study of the conduct of
psychological warfare operations in the Korean military theatre.
Evidence seems to indicate that these operations have not been
very successful and we recommend that a study of the problem be
made by the appropriate departments or agencies as directed by
the NSC. Such a study should include an examination of United
States policy with respect to prisoners of war.
Defector, Refugee and Related Activities
In contrast to operations aimed at penetrating the Soviet sys-
tem which have been discussed in the preceding sections, the
activities considered in this section, with the exception of the
initial phases of defector inducement, are of such a nature that
the Soviet Union is not in a position to interfere materially with
their conduct. These activities, which include defector induce-
ment, the formation of a volunteer freedom corps, training of
future leaders from the ranks of the emigration, and measures
for the care and resettlement of refugees from countries behind
the Iron Curtain, can be supported to whatever degree the United
States Government is willing to provide the necessary funds.
NCFE and various private organizations are now engaged in some
activities of this kind.
Defector Inducement
For some time efforts have been made to stimulate the flow of
defectors from the Soviet Union and the satellites to the West,
particularly individuals occupying key positions in the Commu-
nist Party apparatus. However, between February 1951, and De-
cember 1952, only Soviet citizens in all defected to American
authorities in West Germany. During the same period there
werek3
3 high-level satellite defectors, representing only a small
propor ion of total satellite defections. Almost without excep-
tion these defectors were motivated by personal reasons and did
not leave their countries as a result of inducement operations.
If a high degree of tension in relations between the Soviet Union
and the United States continues, it may be assumed that present
border controls will be maintained or intensified and that United
States efforts to induce defection may yield no important results.
allotted for the conduct of defector inducement operations. -
SECRET
50
0 LZ" SECRET
SE ITY INFORMATION
The Committee understands that the present NSC direc-
tive* has been recently modified so as to make possible encourage-
ment of defection among broader groups.
Volunteer Freedom Corps
The NSC recently approved a proposal to establish a Volunteer
Freedom Corps within the American Army. Since this project is
still in the planning stage, the Committee has not attempted to
reach any conclusions regarding it.
Training of Future Emigre Leaders
A difficult problem is to find capable and trustworthy men in or
from the satellite states to participate in developing practical
means to bring about the liberation of the captive countries and
to provide leadership for such activities.
It is in the interests of the United States that such men be
democratically oriented and friendly to the United States and
that they have an enlightened understanding of the continuing
problems of their homelands. Such indigenous leaders will not
be available unless serious efforts are made to select and train
them. Present emigre leaders are in large measure politically
discredited and will probably be too old to play an effective role
in liberation and post-liberation activities. The only sources
which can be drawn on to provide future leadership consist of
younger refugees already outside the Iron Curtain or potential
leaders still within their homelands, if methods can be devised to
bring them to the West. This latter group constitutes an appro-
priate target for defector inducement operations.
irintellitolfidgajlished a Political Action School to provide
-alining to selected iFirtgee from Iron Curtain countries with a
view to their use in their homel ds when circumstances warrant.
The results of the first course ware inconclusive. The students
developed a loyalty to and an derstanding of the principles
of de ;ac.iy?amilra...witrinness to work, under United States
trol and guidance. Due to inability to recruit sufficient num-
It of qualified students, however, it became necessary to close
Training of such leaders is a long-term investment which might
yield large dividends. It is suggested that an office be established
within CIA with the sole function of recruiting and training in-
NSC 86/1.
,XT SECRET
51
T SECRET
SE ITY INFORMATION
digenous leaders. This office should be responsible for over-all
planning in the field of leadership training and should coordinate
all Agency activities of this nature.
Care and Resettlement of Refugees
In addition to the backlog of wartime and immediate post-war
refugees from the East still resident in countries adjacent to the
Soviet system, numbers of non-induced refugees from countries
behind the Iron Curtain still come to the West, particularly from
East Germany. Sporadic efforts to deal with this question have
been made by various organizations, but there is still much dis-
satisfaction with the manner in which the problem is being
handled. There is wide agreement that the failure of the West
to make adequate provision for such refugees has an unfavorable
psychological effect behind the Iron Curtain. In a few instances
refugees have been so disillusioned with life in the West that they
have voluntarily returned to their homelands. Such cases are
always exploited by communist propaganda to demonstrate the
lack of sympathy in the West for refugees and to discourage
defection.
The amount expended and the number of personnel involved
in refugee aid are difficult to estimate, inasmuch as not only the
United States Government but international and private organi-
zations as well participate in the program. In the fiscal year
1953, $6,300,000 was made available for refugee work under the
President's Escapee Program.
The Committee recommends that the necessary legislative and
organizational measures be taken to provide adequately for the
care and resettlement of refugees from countries behind the Iron
Curtain.
Electromagnetic Warfare
In addition to its general directive from the President, the Com-
mittee was requested by the NSC on February 11, 1953, to evaluate
radio as a medium for "psychological operations" in connection
with the NSC's study of electromagnetic warfare. The Commit-
tee replied to the NSC on March 24, 1953;* however, we believe
that the problem of electromagnetic warfare is of sufficient im-
portance to warrant further mention in this report.
Evidence before the Committee indicates that the Soviet Union
is presently engaged in a limited electromagnetic war. It is
* See Appendix II.
1(...>1 14ECRET
52
SECRET
SEQtJRITY INFORMATION
seriously jamming broadcasts into the Soviet system. In a few
cases it has jammed communications in the free world for short
periods. Some intelligence estimates give the Soviet Union the
capability today of seriously interfering with all intercontinental
communications and of disrupting the internal broadcasting of
the majority of free countries adjacent to the Soviet system.
The Committee has been concerned by the apparent inadequacy
of both the defensive and offensive capabilities of the United
States for electromagnetic warfare. Although we have not
studied the problem in view of the fact that it is being considered
by the NSC, we believe that such consideration should be vigor-
ously pressed.
Recommendations:
Radio
1. VOA broadcasts to the Soviet Union should consist of objec-
tive, factual news reporting supplemented by commentary. The
tone and content should be forceful and direct, but a propagandist
note should be avoided.
2. A reduction in the number of non-Russian languages used in
broadcasts to the Soviet Union appears desirable.
3. All broadcast material to the Soviet system for which the
United States Government does not wish to accept responsibility
should be handled by RFE, Radio Liberation, other covert
channels.
4. MFmum guidance for VOA programming to the Soviet
satellites should be provided by the American diplomatic missions
in these countries.
5. VOA broadcasting facilities to Communist China should not
be expanded.
6. Radio programs to Communist China should consist of
factual news reporting supplemented by commentaries.
7. The United States should continue to operate RIAS with the
present type of program.
8. Russian language programs should be carried by RIAS
addressed to Soviet occupation troops in East Germany.
9. The American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism,
Inc., should concentrate on the improvement of Radio Liberation
and reduce expenditures on the emigre coordinating center.
10. The National Committee for a Free Europe should devote
primary attention to RFE. The other activities of NCFE should
be subjected to review by CIA.
1.71ECRET
53
T SECRET
SE ITY INFORMATION
11. The possibility of providing international onsorship for
RFEEI cOVer purposSDhould be studiedE CIA.
12. CIA's clandestine radio operations should be continued.
TEO?Activities
13.di erFesent conditions covert activities against the Soviet
system should?r&concentrated on broadcasting from the periph-
ery and the establishm siall clandestine cells as communi-
cation points for future use.
14. Alleged resistance organizalions within the system should
not be supported in the abs&pee of substantial evidence that the
group in question exiya'Ed is not controlled by Soviet security
agencies.
15. A major 'oft should be made to develop new covert tech-
niques which kill be effective, notwithstanding Soviet counter-
measures, and wim,exploit vulnerabilities in the Soviet system.
CIA should take the leb:d4ra,this effort.
Psychological Warfare Operations under Military Auspices
in Korea
16. The NSC should initiate a study of United States psycholog-
ical warfare operations in Korea, including policy with respect
to prisoners of war.
Defector, Refugee, and Related Activities
17. An office for the recruitment and training of indigenous
leaders from countries behind the Iron Curtain should be estab-
lished by CIA.
18. The necessary legislative and organizational measures to
provide adequately for the care and resettlement of refugees from
countries behind the Iron Curtain should be taken.
Electromagnetic Warfare
19. Current consideration of this problem by the National
Security Council should be vigorously pressed.
SECRET
54
21111M101 ?
cie. SECRET
SE INFORMATION
Chapter Five
PROPAGANDA AND INFORMATION ACTIVITIES
IN THE ? FREE WORLD
This Chapter is devoted to a review of the information and
propaganda activities conducted by four government agencies:
The Departments of State and of Defense, the Mutual Security
Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency. We discuss the
mission of the propaganda and information programs, note the
size and distribution of the effort, make a general appraisal of the
program and finally a more detailed appraisal of the various
media.
Mission of Propaganda and Information
There is a wide difference of opinion concerning the role of
propaganda and its inherent limitations. The most enthusiastic
advocates of propaganda consider it to be a weapon in its own
right ? to have the capability, if skillfully employed, of changing
the opinions of foreign peoples and influencing the actions of
foreign governments. The Committtee believes, however, that
propaganda cannot be expected to be the determining factor in
deciding major issues. The United States is judged less by what
it says through official information outlets than by the actions
and attitudes of the Government in international affairs and the
actions and attitudes of its citizens and officiall, abroad and at
home. American policies, both foreign and domestic, may guar-
antee the security or set the standard of living of entire nations.
Extreme statements made by Americans, often for domestic effect,
are prominently displayed abroad and can create serious doubt
as to the maturity, stability, and constancy of purpose of the
United States.
Propaganda is most effective when used as an auxiliary to create
a climate of opinion in which national policy objectives can be
most readily accomplished. It must perform the function of
informing foreign peoples of the nature of American objectives
and of seeking to arouse in them an understanding and a sympa-
thy for the kind of world order which the United States and other
free nations seek to achieve. To be effective, it must be dependa-
ble, convincing, and truthful. In particular situations propa-
yerf SECRET
55
^1Gfr77...
--....LIMEMEmaimmummw.Trr-217-`17Zt.-77"-
cx. SECRET
SE ENFORMATION
gan.da, overt or covert, may play a role of decisive importance in
the attainment of specific goals, but too much or too blatant
propaganda can be harmful.
One of the principal handicaps under which United States
information and propaganda activities have suffered is confusion
regarding their mission. This has been particularly true of the
foreign information service of the Department of State known as
the International Information Administration (IIA). Upon the
abolition of the Office of War Information (OWI) in 1945, its
functions were transferred to the Department of State, which was
directed to provide foreign peoples with a "full and fair picture"
of American life and of the aims and policies of the United States
Government. The Smith-Mundt Act (Public Law 402) in 1948
established, in addition, an educational exchange service and
emphasized the need to increase mutual understanding by the
dissemination abroad of information about the United States.
In 1950 a "Campaign of Truth" was launched by the President in
an effort to counter hostile Soviet propaganda. After the out-
break of the Korean War, NSC 68 set the propaganda objective of
deriving "the maximum psychological effect from the political,
diplomatic, economic and military measures undertaken by the
United States and its allies." In 1951, the primary mission of the
information service was defined as deterring the Soviet war
effort.* To facilitate the attainment of this objective five tasks
were assigned to LEA which have been reaffirmed in subsequent
NSC documents:
(1) To increase psychological deterrents to communist aggres-
sion..
(2) To intensify, particularly in Western Europe, the growth
of confidence in the free world's ability to stop communist
aggression.
(3) To combat neutralism, particularly in Asia.
(4) To maintain hope of liberation among the peoples behind
the Iron Curtain.
(5) To maintain, particularly in Latin America, a recognition
of the mutual interdependence of this area and the United
States.
In Germany, in addition to HA activities, an extensive and in
large measure independent information program has been con-
ducted since the end of the war, first under the Department of
? NSC 114/2, Annex 5
Tji6 SECRET
56
'?'
SECRET
INFORMATION
Defense and subsequently, since 1949, under State Department
direction (HICOG). In 1951 the Department of State declared
that the objective of the B1COG information program was "to
serve as an instrument of the occupation," and that its "normal
function" was the "full and fair projection of the United States."
The mission was changed in 1953 to that of "affecting the atti-
tudes and actions of the German people" and assuring the
"acceptance of our objective."**
The aims of the other agencies engaged in information work
have been more precise and constant. MSA has been charged
with persuading Europeans to increase their productivity, to
develop their economic and military strength, and to integrate
their economies. The objectives of CIA covert propaganda in the
free world are to combat communist subversion, counter
neutralism, and generally promote United States and Western
concepts and interests. The mission of the Department of De-
fense information activities in the free world is to furnish infor-
mation to troops stationed overseas and to encourage friendlier
relations between the troops and foreign populations.
There is still no unanimity of opinion regarding the over-all
mission of the United States information agencies. Some con-
sider the mission to be the dissemination of truth, particularly
about the United States; some emphasize the importance of win-
ning friends for the United States; and others view the informa-
tion services as a weapon against communism. These differing
points of view have emerged in the prolonged public debate on
the mission of the information program and have contributed to
the uncertainty and confusion among infoiMation personnel
which has proven such a serious handicap to the development of
a coordinated and purposeful program.
The dissemination of truth is not enough. Friendship for the
United States is neither a prerequisite to nor a guarantee of action
in the interest of the United States. Anti-communist propa-
ganda may antagonize more foreigners than it convinces. While
all of these elements have a legitimate place in an information
program, the Committee believes that any program supported
by government funds can only be justified to the extent that it
assists in the achievement of national objectives. ?
? "Statement of Policy Concerning the Revision of the Public Affairs Program
for Germany and the Conclusion of a Cultural Treaty," July 25, 1951.
?? Public Affairs Plan for Germany, January 1953.
SECRE'T
57
Tte' SECRET
SEo = INFORMATION
The primary purpose of the information program should be to
persuade foreign peoples that it lies in their own interest to
take actions which are also consistent with the national objectives
of the United States. The goal should be to harmonize wherever
possible the personal and national self-interest of foreigners with
the national objectives of the United States.
It must be the concern of the United States to find out what
other peoples want, to relate their wants to those of this country
and to explain these common goals in ways that will cause others
to join with the United States in their achievement.
This goal can be achieved only on the basis of clear and con-
sistent statements of the American position on major issues. Too
often the United States speaks with a multitude of voices. Con-
flicting interpretations of national objectives are a serious handi-
cap to successful persuasion in foreign countries.
Size and Distribution of the Information
, and Propaganda Activities
Because of the complexity of departmental budgets and the
transfer of appropriated funds within agencies, the total cost
of propaganda and information activities in the freworlcLpn
be stated only in general terms. A figure of Jfor
operating the program in fiscal year 1953 appears o be a reason-
able approximation. This is divided among the principal agen-
cies as follows:
State Department $120,000,000*
Mutual Security Agency 50,000,000**
Central Intelligence Agency
Defense Department 10,000,000***
The share of the Department of State for activities in the free
world is allocated among three organizations:
International Information Administration (IIA) $82,000,000*
High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG) 30,000,000****
Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) 11,000,000
" An additional $14,000,000 is allotted for propaganda behind the Curtain.
** One half of this amount is for the productivity and technical assistance ex-
change program.
?** This is not a budgetary figure, but is a rough approximation of the cost of
activities related to propaganda in the free world. So many activities of this
department have propaganda overtones that it is impossible to determine
an accurate figure.
**** Funds for information activities in Germany are appropriated separately
from LTA.
;# SECRET
58
SECRET
SECuRITY INFORMATION
Thus, while IIA is the largest agency in the information field, it
expends 'only 40 percent of the total amount appropriated for
propaganda and information activities in the free world.
In geographical terms $140,000,000 or two-thirds of the annual
total is spent in Western Europe. Germany alone absorbs almost
$50,000,000.
In terms of personnel, both American and alien, IIA has the
largest staff, with more than 9,000 employees. HICOG now has
4,000 employees compared to its earlier maximum of 7,000. The
MSA information staff is 700. IIA has the heaviest concentra-
tion in the United States, one-third of its personnel being sta-
tioned here in comparison with only five per cent of the MSA
information staff. IIA also relies to a greater degree on American
personnel, one-half of its staff being citizens. The comparable
figures are 20 per cent for MSA and 10 per cent for HICOG.
Appraisal of Propaganda and Information Programs
Any appraisal must take into account the principal character-
istics of Soviet and American propaganda. These derive chiefly
from differences in governmental structure and philosophy and
from the wide divergence in national objectives.
For the last 30 years the Soviet propaganda program has been
large and centrally directed. From the time they seized power,
the Bolsheviks have given high priority to propaganda, both in-
ternal and external. As a result of this long experience, the
Soviet Union possesses a large group of propagandists which
is continually replenished by new and well-trained recruits.
They are inhibited neither by the need to tell the truth nor by
public opinion at home. In addition, the Soviet propaganda
machine has an effective apparatus abroad in the foreign com-
munist parties, which contribute their own funds and labor.
The United States also has advantages. Its people share funda-
mental beliefs and basic values with millions of the men and
women the United States is attempting to win to its side: belief
in God, belief in individual and national freedom and the right
to ownership of property, belief in a peaceful world and in the
common humanity of men and nations compromising their differ-
ences and cooperating in the United Nations. Sharing such
beliefs, the United States has partners and allies abroad, not
subservient satellites held by force.
The military strength of the United States, its economic system,
its standard of living, its technical development and productive
SECRET
59
sEceSECRET
INFORMATION
capacity are appropriate subjects of information programs as
showing the capability both to resist aggression and to give power-
ful assistance in the creation of a peaceful world order. Of
fundamental importance, however, the program should speak
in terms of the deeper spiritual values uniting this nation with
the rest of the world.
Central Direction
The national information program has suffered from the lack
of effective central direction. In spite of the establishment of
the Psychological Strategy Board, coordination has been lacking
and the various agencies concerned have largely gone their sep-
arate ways. Opportunities have been missed to take the offen-
sive in global propaganda campaigns. Too often, the program
has been merely defensive. Lack of coordination has resulted
in the haphazard projection of too many and too diffuse propa-
ganda themes. No single set of ideas has been registered abroad
through effective repetition. This is in sharp contrast to the
technique of the Soviets, who have consistently hammered home
a few carefully selected central themes: land reform, peace, anti-
imperialism, youth. The headquarters staffs of all agencies en-
gaged in information work should concentrate more on the con-
ception, planning and coordination of global campaigns and less
on detailed control and execution of day-to-day operations.
Another serious problem has been confusion regarding the
guidance provided by the information agencies in Washington to
their staffs in the field. Each has issued detailed guidances to
its own field staffs, usually after some coordination by the inter-
departmental Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee
(POC). The agency primarily concerned, IIA, in order to meet
media deadlines, has often issued its information guidances be-
fore political guidances were prepared in the Department of State.
Such guidances have not always been in agreement.
The Committee believes that, although guidance on specific
or local objectives of information activities may often be required
from Washington, such guidance should generally be confined
to global or regional themes. .When United States policy and
objectives have been explained to the field, information officials
abroad should be permitted discretion in adapting their infor-
mation activities to particular local situations.
;4 SECRET
60
ite SECRET
SEc INFORMATION
Adaptation to Local Conditions
One aspect of ITA activity which has been repeatedly criticized
is the mass preparation and distribution of material. Frequently,
there has been insufficient concentration on particular targets
and programs have not been best calculated to achieve the desired
result. Much of the material prepared in the United States is
of little use for any foreign audience. This criticism applies with
pa;ticular force to short-wave broadcasts by the Voice of America
to the free world and to publications prepared in the United
States. Insofar as possible, information material should be pre-
pared abroad to meet local needs.
More decentralization of tactical control of the information
program to the country level and the local preparation of more
material should permit a substantial reduction in the informa-
tion staffs located within the United States. This is particularly
true of IIA.
Audiences often do not believe information provided by any
foreigner and are particularly quick to take offense at advice and
exhortation received from abroad. They are likely not only to
reject such an approach but to complain of interference in their
internal affairs. Not all of the free world is prepared to view its
problems in the context of a struggle between the United States
and the Soviet Union. The note of self-praise and the emphasis
on material achievements by the United States frequently creates
envy and antagonism.
Attribution
As a general rule, information and propaganda should only be
attributed to the United States when such attribution is an asset.
A much greater percentage of the information program should
be unattributed.
Attribution to the United States can be prevented not only by
avoiding the use of specific labels, but also by the utilization
abroad of personnel other than American in the preparation and
dissemination of material. In certain countries the large num-
ber of Americans engaged in information activities is a handicap
rather than an asset to effective work. Competent and experi-
enced local employees are usually far more familiar than Ameri-
cans with conditions and personalities in their own. country.
They are in much better position to establish the type of personal
contacts through which =attributed propaganda can be dis-
seminated. In countries where there are large concentrations
lite SECRET
61
cer SECRET
13E INFORMATION
of Americans engaged in information activities, their number
should be substantially curtailed and they should be replaced
where necessary by qualified local employes.
Another method of avoiding official attribution in propaganda
is the utilization of the numerous private American organizations
active abroad. This very substantial asset has been insufficiently
exploited by Government information agencies. While only a few
companies, such as the wire services, are directly engaged in the
dissemination of information, many participate in activities
which are important to the local population. American business
firms often comprise a significant segment of a foreign country's
industry. American universities and foundations have a long
and impressive record in the exchange of students and encourage-
ment of scientific research. American missionaries, particularly
in Asia and Africa, have brought spiritual guidance and material
assistance. In recent years, American labor groups have estab-
lished direct relations with foreign trade unions. Far greater
efforts should be made to utilize private American organizations
for the advancement of United States objectives. The gain in dis-
semination and credibility through the use of such channels will
more than offset the loss by the Government of some control over
content.
Although the United States is a leading member of the United
Nations and an active participant in numerous other interna-
tional organizations, its propaganda appeals to the rest of the
free world have been largely couched in strictly American terms.
There has been reluctance on the part of the United States to
participate in coordinated international information efforts lest
the content of its propaganda be controlled by its foreign partners.
The United States, however, is associated with numerous nations
of the free world in various joint endeavors, all of which are
primarily intended to strengthen the free world against the
Soviet Union. The partners of the United States should be able
to make a substantial contribution to the achievement of Ameri-
can propaganda objectives, and increased emphasis should be
placed on this form of international cooperation.
Control at the Country Level
While maximum decentralization of information activities is
required to provide meaningful and purposeful programs suited
to the requirements of local audiences, effective centralized con-
trol is needed in each country. In some countries the various
Tiid' SECRET
62
,
2iviSECRET
SE ITY INFORMATION
United States agencies engaged in information work have con-
ducted their programs independently of one another. In other
countries, an effective and coordinated information program has
been worked out under the direction of the Chief of Mission and
a country team composed of the senior representative of each
1 ai toltrearOitanizations in order to gain influence over their
2.3ency.
ree--
All United States information agencies have extended assist-
programs. This chnique has sometimes proved very effective.
In some instances, owever, several American agencies have un-
wittingly supported tae same local organization. This is not
only wasteful of Government funds but can be extremely com-
promising if any of the support is covert. An attempt to resolve
this problem was made in a 'paper to which all the information
agencies agreed on November 1, 1951. The agreement made CIA
exclusively responsible for projects'Ille disclosure of which would
"seriously embarrass the United Stats Government," "seriously
discredit the activity" or "seriously dpmage the outlet." If dis-
agreement existed in the field concerrimg the seriousness of possi-
ble exposure of any particular protect, the question was to be
referred to Washington for decisiok Although this agreement
provides a logical solution to the pr6b,1em, it has frequently been
ignored, sometimes with serious conAueRces. We believe that
the principles of this agreement are valid di-id-411kt coordination
of unattributed propaganda is vital. The responsibility.for suc
coordination should be placed on the Chief of Mission.
Continuity and Flexibility
An effective foreign information program can only be achieved
and maintained if firm executive and congressional support is
accorded to ensure permanency of organization, consistency in
appropriations, and flexibility in management.
Lack of agreement regarding the information program has
resulted in frequent and often drastic changes in organization.
Since 1945 the major information effort has been vested succes-
sively in an independent agency (OWI), in the Department of
State under the direction of an Assistant Secretary, and in a semi-
autonomous organization under an administrator reporting to
the Secretary of State. Under the reorganization plan now under
consideration, the information program would again be placed in
a separate agency combining the functions of IIA with the infor-
mation activities of MSA and TCA. Irrespective of the merits of
the various organizational arrangements, these frequent changes
SECRET
63
04 SECRET
BE INFORMATION
have resulted in great uncertainty, impaired the continuity of
policies and programs, hurt morale and hamstrung effective man-
agement. The Committee's views on organization of the infor-
mation activities are stated in Chapter Seven, pages 99-102.
Both the executive and the legislative branches of the govern-
ment have lacked any firm conviction with respect to the nature
and extent of the program, with the result that appropriations
have fluctuated irregularly from year to year and continuity
of effort has been impaired. MSA's information program has
undergone rapid expansion and contraction. HA's annual bud-
get has varied irregularly between $20,000,000 and $120,000,000.
Fluctuations of this magnitude have made efficient management
almost impossible.
While the adoption of the recommendations in this report
would result in less spending in some portions of the program,
particularly within the United States, spending might be in-
creased in other sections. The Committee, therefore, recom-
mends that appropriations not be drastically reduced until the
new principles and procedures have been tried.
Lack of flexibility in budgetary and personnel matters has
handicapped HA and made management even more difficult.
The information program requires more flexibility to permit de-
centralization as well as rapid concentration on targets of oppor-
tunity. Flexibility is also essential for the successful utilization
of unattributed propaganda due to the diversity of channels and
techniques.
Public Support
Another disability under which the information program has
labored has been a lack of understanding of its purpose on the
part of the American people and of official American representa-
tives abroad. While the latter difficulty is gradually being over-
come through association and cooperation in the field, the role of
the information program remains something of a mystery to the
American public. The degree of misunderstanding of the pur-
poses of the program is revealed in current investigations. This
misunderstanding results in part from the provision of the Smith-
Mundt Act (PL 402) which enjoins IIA from informing the Amer-
ican people of the nature of its activities. The Committee sup-
ports the recommendation of the United States Advisory
Commission on Information in its Seventh Semi-Annual Report
to Congress, January 1953, that HA be authorized to release do-
mestically, without request, information concerning the program.
'O. SECRET
64
SE
SECRET
INFORMATION
Security Handicaps
The information program of the United States, both in the free
world and behind the Iron Curtain, has been severely handicapped
by certain current security policies and practices. This has
affected the information program in three distinct ways. First,
it has interfered with the recruitment of qualified personnel and
contributed to the prevailing low state of morale among infor-
m'ation personnel. Second, it has hampered the implementation
of certain phases of the program such as resettlement of Iron
Curtain refugees, exchange of persons, and selection of books for
overseas libraries. Finally, the adminigtration of the security
program in the United States has had unfavorable repercussions
abroad, particularly among our Western European allies, which
cut directly across the objectives of the information program.
Although the security program and immigration regulations are
not within the jurisdiction of the Committee, we wish to point out
the damage to the information and propaganda program which
has resulted from certain aspects of each.
Current Activities of the Information
and Propaganda Services .
For the sake of convenience, the following five sections follow
the media breakdown employed by IIA. Although this organiza-
tion is not used by other agencies with information programs,
their activities are also discussed under the appropriate headings.
Radio
Three agencies, the Departments of State and Defense and CIA,
own radio broadcasting facilities. All United States agencies
with information programs make some use of local stations in for-
eign countries. The Voice of America (VOA) , part of IIA, pro-
vides the most extensive radio coverage and is the most contro-
versial portion of the IIA program. VOA operates about 70
transmitters, most of which are short-wave, and has some 2,000
employees, three-quarters of whom are Americans. The VOA
effort is concentrated on countries behind the Iron Curtain, only
$9,000,000 of its total operating budget of $22,000,000 being spent
on broadcasting to the free world. At the peak of the Campaign
of Truth, it broadcast in 46 different languages. Since funds to
complete its transmitter network have not been appropriated, it
has not been able to provide an adequate signal in many areas.
VOA is attempting increasingly to utilize local stations for radio
broadcasts, some of which are not attributed to the United States.
7/P SECRET
65
T SECRET
ITY INFORMATION
The Department of Defense also operates extensive radio facili-
ties in the free world. The Armed Forces Network (AFN) has 70
stations, mostly medium-wave. There are 22 in the Far East
and 13 in Europe. The remainder are chiefly in United States
possessions. The annual cost of operations in foreign countries
is roughly $4,300,000. Although AFN broadcasts only in English
and aims its programs at American troops, it reaches a large
foreign audience. A Swiss radio magazine declared in 1953:
"The Armed Forces Radio Service programs are in much larger
measure than the Voice a reflection of American life because they
represent Americans speaking to Americans, which requires no
special slant."
The radio effort of CIA is directed primarily behind the Iron
Curtain,
but approximately $1,000,000 is spent on radio in the
ge w arid: The Committee for Free Asia,Eiich draws its prin-
-al support from CIA has discontinued Radio Free Asia and
now places programs on local transmitters in the countries of
Southeast Asia. CIA subsidizes another private aroup
broadcasting to Southeas Asia and Japan
There are three methods for transmitting radio programs.
Each has its advantages and disadvantages for disseminating
propaganda and information.
1. Short-wave transmitters controlled by the United States.
Short-wave is the only type of radio broadcasting which pro-
vides intercontinental coverage and permits the transmitters
to be located in territory which is firmly controlled by the
United States although it may be a great distance from the
audience. The United States can, therefore, control the pro-
gram content without interference by the foreign government,
except for jamming. Short-wave radio is the only available
method of providing information to most of the Soviet Union
and to other unfriendly countries remote from the point of
transmission.
Programming is done far from the audience, however, which
poses serious problems in adapting programs to suit foreign
interests and attitudes. The size of the audience for short-wave
programs is limited by the fact that special receiving equipment
is necessary which is beyond the means of most people in foreign
countries.
SECRET
66
SECteSECRET
TY INFORMATION
2. Medium-wave transmitters controlled by the United
States.
The range of medium-wave radio is relatively limited and
transmitters must therefore be located closer to the audience.
Medium-wave is the normal channel for radio broadcasting
and is heard on standard receivers. Consequently, it reaches
a much larger audience within a given area than does short-
wave. Since most governments will not permit the operation
of foreign transmitters on their territory, the areas where
United States medium-wave transmitters may be located are
restricted. American relay and medium-wave facilities abroad
are now largely concentrated in Germany and Austria by vir-
tue of the privileged position resulting from the occupation.
This is a situation which may not long continue. Whereas
short-wave programs are fully under control of the United
States, programs broadcast on medium-wave must be careful
to avoid offense to the government on whose territory t
transmitter is located.
3. Transmitters indigenously owned.
Most countries in the free world have extensive radio pro-
grams broadcast on medium-wave. It is sometimes possible
for American agencies to utilize these facilities for broadcasts
which may or may not be attributed to the United States. Such
programs, of course, must be entirely acceptable to the local
government and their propaganda content must normally be
limited. Utilization of local facilities insures the largest local
audience and obviates the necessity for American-owned trans-
mitting facilities.
The Soviet Union relies more heavily on short-wave radio than
does the United States. Due to a more favorable geographic loca-
tion, the Soviet Union is able to provide a strong signal with fewer
and less powerful transmitters. Soviet short-wave broadcasting
concentrates on Asia. Moscow is on the air approximately twice
as much as the United States in about the same number of lan-
guages. Roughly the same ratio applies if the total short-wave
radio output of the Soviet Union and its satellites is compared to
that of the free world. Such large use of short-wave radio may be
for purposes of frequency denial.
Local radio programs on medium-wave always far exceed those
from foreign sources. In most countries, medium-wave programs
originating in foreign countries of the free world are more numer-
SECRET
67
rSECRET
SEC INFORMATION
ous than those from communist countries. France, for example,
has 500 hours a week of locally originated programs and 200 hours
from other non-communist countries. There are less than 40
hours from behind the Iron Curtain.
Short-wave broadcasts appear to be of limited use for United
States propaganda or information in the free world. In some
areas the signal is inaudible, in some the audience is extremely
limited, and in others the program content is criticized. On the
other hand, American short-wave facilities, including those op-
erated by VOA, are a part of the nation's radio and communica-
tions assets for electromagnetic warfare. In its memorandum of
March 25, 1953 to the NSC (Appendix II), the Committee noted
that neglect of electromagnetic warfare has created a serious
weakness in the nation's defenses and recommended further
study by the NSC.
The Committee recommends that the continuance of short-
wave programs to the free world be reviewed on a country basis in
consultation with the Ambassadors concerned, to determine the
areas in which there is some expectation of accomplishing propa-
ganda objectives through the use of this medium. We recom-
mend that short-wave broadcasts be discontinued to those areas
where such an expectation cannot be demonstrated, subject to
the requirements of national security in electromagnetic warfare.
Attributed American broadcasts, particularly those of VOA,
should concentrate on objective, factual news reporting. Selec-
tion and treatment of news should seek to present a full exposi-
tion of United States actions and policies, especially as they affect
the target country. While a tone of exhortation and abuse should
generally be avoided, VOA should not be precluded from making
dignified, forceful, and factual refutations of Soviet accusations.
Satire and humor may also have their place. Music, entertain-
ment, and such other miscellaneous program material as may
be considered necessary by United States chiefs of mission to
maintain audience interest in individual target countries may
properly be used.
rple
use should be made of local broadcastinglittiero be effec-
to lessen attribution and to reacritlits1t audience, maximum
tive, this will require that the Chief of Mission cooillinatg the
try, radio should be iThr &only op a non-attributed basis. In order
in a foreign coun-
try,
is desired to obtain specific results locally, as for ex-
SECRET
68
SECRET
SEQRITY INFORMATION
cted
di
Et
radio-pragram.s -of-the-various-United ,Statesagencie?? re
, ,
o his country.
We recommend that consideration be given to changing the
name "Voice of America," since the name is associated both in
the United States and in many foreign countries with programs
which have been widely criticized and discredited.
Exchange of Persons
Nineteen different Federal agencies* are engaged in the ex-
change of persons with free world countries for various types of
training. There are four major programs, each designed to meet
a different need, which altogether annually bring about 18,000
foreign nationals to the United States and send 2,000 Americans
overseas. The total cost, exclusive of the large military exchange
program, is about $60,000,000.
Annually, IIA and HICOG together spend about $22,000,000 to
bring in 7,000 foreign nationals and to send some 1,600 American
citizens abroad. Half of the exchangees are students, the re-
mainder adult specialists. German and Austrian citizens pre-
dominate because $6,000,000 of the total annual appropriation is
earmarked for these countries by Congress.
With a view to increasing productivity in backward countries,
TCA spends in the order of $10,000,000 per year to provide tech-
nical training in the United States for approximately 1,000 foreign
government employees, most of whom are roughly equivalent in
rank to a county agent.
Roughly $25,000,000 annually is currently being spent by MSA
to train 4,000 foreign specialists and 400 workers in the United
States in order to increase foreign industrial productivity. Some
700 United States technicians are sent abroad annually to train
and teach in Europe and the Far East.
The Department of Defense brings to the United States each
year roughly 6,000 foreign nationals. Ninety per cent of these
exchangees receive low echelon military training. One hundred
fifty senior officers and 100 newspaper editors and other leaders
*Four agencies conduct exchange programs of some magnitude. They are:
IIA (State) , TCA (State) , MSA and Defense. Smaller programs are con-
ducted by five agencies: CIA, Atomic Energy Commission, National Institutes
of Health (Department of Health, Welfare and Education), National Science
Foundation, Maritime Commission (Commerce) . Ten additional agencies
cooperate in the carrying out of primary exchange programs on a paid basis.
They are: Labor, Agriculture, Commerce, Health, Welfare and Education,
Interior, Housing and Home Finance, Federal Communications Commission,
General Services Administration, Bureau of the Budget and Veterans' Admin-
istration.
SECRET
69
SECRET
ITY INFORMATION
receive special training or are taken on tours of the military estab-
lishments. While the Defense program is intended primarily to
increase military preparedness in the free world, it has the by-
product of increasing firsthand knowledge of the United States.
CIA and other Federal agencies have exchange programs of
limited scope for special purposes.
In addition to the programs financed by the Government, there
are numerous exchanges arranged by foreign governments and
by private groups, both American and foreign. The aggregate of
these may well be greater than the Federal program.
Exchanges play a major role in the Soviet effort to influence
foreign peoples in the Soviet interest. It is estimated that 45,000
persons are brought to the Soviet Union annually from the free
world for training, not only in propaganda but in many forms of
political action and clandestine operations. This large group is
augmented by others, especially from backward areas, who are
brought to the Soviet Union for technical training or merely on
good will visits. This form of activity has been successfully de-
veloped by Moscow to provide skilled local communist leaders in
foreign countries and to win friends and sympathizers for the
Soviet Union.
acontrast toAlle_Boyjct program, of the 18,000 foreigners who
come to the United States a4inually under government auspices
only,a?hvantlftri ,o)(_ \0,-- agents receive deliberate propaganda
The Committee agrees with the policy of not exposing
exchangees to open propaganda indoctrination. It further be-
lieves that all agencies concerned should exercise great care in
placing and looking after exchangees. Cases have been reported
where the attitude of the local American community was so hos-
tile as to jeopardize any beneficial effects which might have been
anticipated from the exchange.
There has been difference of opinion among administrators of
the exchange program concerning the criteria for selection of can-
didates, particularly the relative importance of short and long-
term objectives, and whether candidates should be chosen pri-
marily for their academic or technical ability rather than for their
potential usefulness to the United States. The Committee con-
siders that the long-term exchanges, particularly of students,
have been worthwhile and should be continued, but we also
believe that more use should be made of exchanges to influence
the attitudes of important local individuals. The Chief of Mis-
"(SECRET
70
ceriSECRET
SE ITY INFORMATION
sion should supervise exchanges of a short-range political char-
acter conducted by United States agencies within his country.
Press and Publications
The United States is carrying on a large program utilizing
press, pamphlets and miscellaneous printed propaganda. Indi-
vidual projects vary from the overtly American-owned Neue
Zeitung, one of the largest daily newspapers in Germany, to the
clandestine publishing of leaflets attributed to the Communist
Party. Since only the Department of State breaks down its bud-
get by media, it is difficult to ascertain the magnitude of this
effort. Total annual expenditures are probably in the neighbor-
hood of $50,000,000.
The Wireless File is prepared and distributed by IIA to provide
American missions throughout the world with a fast news service.
In many countries it is in competition with the commercial wire
services, but provides more complete texts of official statements.
There has been considerable criticism of this activity. The Com-
mittee recommends that it be reviewed and continued only to
those countries where Chiefs of Mission have expressed a desire-'2
for its retention.
Dozens of magazines and hundreds of pamphlets are produced
by IIA. Volume is in the tens of millions of copies and until re-
cently has been constantly growing. Much of the output is still
labeled American; most of it is prepared outside the country in
which it is distributed, largely in the United States. The sheer
volume of material bearing the American label is harmful, and
the Washington services have largely failed to produce the type
of publication required to meet the specific problems of the field.
A large program in Germany is conducted by HICOG which
includes the overt publication of major newspapers and special-
ized magazines, such as Ost-Probleme and Der Monat. The qual-
ity of these publications has been good. When Germany regains
her sovereignty, the overt publication of such major periodicals
by the United States should cease but an effort should be made to
have suitable indigenous groups continue their publication.
fth""
Q!, covert propaganda in the free world employs
e printed word. In,so,w,gases these propaganda operations are
closely tied to political actirrp.p4Oects, which are discussed in
Chapter Six.
"Tircp SECRET
71
?P SECRET
SE RITY INFORMATION
1 A number of pOIter-an,d leaflet operations conducted by CIA
reach a wider group than i'i'eenerally?accessible for other types
of printed matter. Posters have proved to be one of the most
effective vehicles for ridicule, to which the comiii-unistsare par- )
ticularlv sensitive
In its information work, MSA has likewise made lar e-scale
use of publications, particularly in Western Europe. Its..aotivi-
ties have ranged all the way from attributed pamphlets to covert
operations. _The.Committep considers the latter type of activity,,,
as u9stfited to MSA. Covert propaganda
cen6a11zeiL2.,CIA.
The Soviet Union makes extensive use of publications for for-
eign propaganda purposes; its effort in this field considerably
exceeds that of the United States. Furthermore, through local
communist parties and front groups the Soviet Union controls
many newspapers and magazines and is able to carry on large-
scale leaflet and poster campaigns. In most areas, however, local
non-communist publications far overshadow all foreign efforts.
Publications are one of the most important propaganda weap-
ons, but they can be used to much better advantage than in the
past in advancing national objectives. IIA should carefully re-
view its program and decentralize wherever possible, so that mate-
rial can be prepared which is more responsive to local needs. The
programs of all agencies should also be reviewed to determine
whether publication activities have been too highly concentrated
in Western Europe with a resultant loss of opportunities in the
remainder of the free world.
Motion Pictures
Films are used by all overseas information agencies of the Gov-
ernment, although the dollar volume is less than for any medium
except libraries. It probably is less than $20,000,000 per year.
Overt documentary films comprise the bulk of IIA output, al-
though IIA has also financed a few excellent unattributed films.
Most IIA films are exhibited not through commercial outlets but
in United States Information Centers and by means of mobile
units.
,e/P SECRET
72
-
GyupdP SECRET
SE R
?I ? LA
Soviet-produced motion pictures have little propaganda effect
in the free world. Communists, however, have been successful
in infiltrating local film industries ? both in the United States
and throughout the rest of the free world. By this tactic they
have been able to influence a large number of commercial films.
The American film industry, working with CIA and FBI, has
cooperated in removing communists from production milts and
in withholding contracts until unions provide non-communist
labor. With their large overseas investments, American com-
panies can assist materially in combatting communist infiltra-
tion of the film industry abroad.
Films can be a useful adjunct to the Government information
program, provided their subject and level of presentation are
suited to the audience. As with other media, the IIA program
has produced too many films which were incomprehensible to
foreign audiences. Wherever possible, Government films should
be unattributed and produced by local industry.
Seventy-five per cent of the free world's screen time is held by
American commercial films. Notwithstanding this preponderant
position, the impact of American commercial films on foreign
audiences is not always to the advantage of the United States.
Many films have been damaging to United States interests.
There is evidence that the film industry is prepared to cooperate
with the Government, and every effort should be made by the
latter to increase the positive contribution of commercial films
to the United States propaganda and information program.
Libraries and Information Centers
For over ten years, the United States Government has operated
or participated in information centers overseas at a cost of about
$6,000,000 annually. IIA, which is now the principal Govern-
ment agency participating in this activity, maintains approxi-
mately 250 information centers, some of which are operated in
conjunction with the host country. The information centers
contain sizeable libraries, consisting primarily of the works of
American authors, and engage in a wide range of community
activities. In most foreign countries access to indigenous librar-
ies is on a very restricted basis. By making their books available
to the general public the libraries in United States overseas in-
formation centers have made American authors accessible to a
P SECRET
73
JP SECRET
SE RITY INFORMATION
wide foreign readership, thus making a valuable contribution
to the information program.
A book translation program is supported by IIA to supple-
ment the output of commercial publishers. IIA has recently
taken over from MSA the administration of a $10,000,000 revolving
fund which was established to stimulate the commercial export of
American titles by guaranteeing that publishers will be able to
recover the proceeds of their foreign sales in countries restricting
foreign exchange transactions. The operations of the fund have
materially augmented the sale of American books, and it should
be increased to permit larger exports.
The communist book program is large and extends to many
countries. Although the Soviet Union operates only a few reading
rooms in foreign countries, it assures a wide circulation for com-
munist authors by selling books at prices well below cost, conduct-
ing large-scale translation programs and subsidizing local book
stores. In most areas of the free world the communist effort
exceeds that of the official American program, and in some areas
surpasses the combined official and commercial American volume.
Libraries, information centers, and books are an essential part
of the United States information effort. Cheap communist books
must be prevented from dominating local markets by making
available equally inexpensive non-communist books. The Gov-
ernment should cooperate with private industry and be prepared
to subsidize exports where necessary. While the Government
should guard against distributing or aiding in the distribution of
subversive books, it should not hesitate to facilitate the distribu-
tion of books which contain justified criticism of one phase or
another of American life.
Television
Use of television is expanding rapidly outside the United States
and offers a new propaganda medium of potential effectiveness
y6 SECRET
74
71*(SECRET
SEC TY INFORMATION
which Government information agencies have thus far hardly at-
tempted to utilize. Outside the United States, television networks
exist in over 20 countries of the free world, with a total of about
3,000,000 sets. Twenty additional countries are expected to enter
the television field by 1956. The Soviet Union is steadily expand-
ing its television facilities, and Soviet programs can be received in
parts of Western Europe along the periphery of the Soviet orbit.
A trans-Atlantic television network is technically possible today,
although its ultimate desirability must be decided within the
context of electromagnetic warfare.
In view of the relatively advanced technical position of televi-
sion in the United States, this country should be in a position to
provide advice and assistance to foreign television industries in
their formative stages. Unattributed programs of American
origin could be carried on local television networks in much the
same way as radio programs of American origin are broadcast
over local stations abroad.
Recommendations
General
1. The Committee believes that the primary and over-riding
purpose of the information program should be to persuade foreign
peoples that it lies in their own interest to take actions which are
also consistent with the national objectives of the United States.
The goal should be to harmonize wherever possible the personal
and national self-interest of foreigners with the national objec-
tives of the United States.
2. A continuing, coordinated effort should be made to inform
the world clearly of the American position on major issues.
3. The headquarters staffs of all agencies engaged in informa-
tion work should concentrate more on the conception, planning
and coordination of global propaganda campaigns and less on
detailed control and execution of day-to-day operations.
4. Although guidance on specific or local objectives of informa-
tion activities may often be required from Washington, such
guidance should generally be confined to global or regional
themes. When United States policy and objectives have been
explained to the field, information officials abroad should be per-
mitted discretion in adapting their information activities to their
local situations.
704C(P SECRET
75
'I/SECRET
SEC ITY INFORMATION
5. Insofar as possible, information and propaganda material
should be prepared abroad to meet local needs.
6. The number of operating information personnel in the
United States, particularly within IIA, should be substantially
reduced.
7. Propaganda or information should be attributed to the
United States only when such attribution is an asset. A
much greater percentage of the information program should be
unattributed.
8. In order to be less obtrusive, there should be a substantial
reduction in American information personnel overseas in coun-
tries where they are heavily concentrated. They should be re-
placed where necessary by qualified local nationals.
9. Far greater effort should be made to utilize private Ameri-
can organizations for the advancement of United States objec-
tives. The gain in dissemination and credibility through the use
of such channels will more than offset the loss by the Govern-
ment of some control over content.
10. Both international organizations and allied governments
should be able to make a substantial contribution to American
propaganda objectives. Increased emphasis should be placed on
this form of international cooperation.
11. More effective tactical control of the information and prop-
aganda program of the Various United States agencies is needed
at the country level. This can best be accomplished by the Chief
of Mission with the advice of a country team composed of the
senior representatives of each agency operating information
programs.
12.`-Mbre-ceer,dinati2n of all types of unattributed propaganda
is necessary to prevent both"Va?teAand,cpmwmise of the covert
portion. Covert propaganda should be centraliYed4rthACI4. The
responsibility and authority for such coordination shouleVe"-
Lp.?ced in the Chief of Mission.
13. An effective foreign information program can only be
achieved if it receives firm support to ensure permanency of
organization, consistency in appropriations and flexibility in
management. The Committee recommends that firm executive
and congressional support be extended in order to stabilize the
organization and size of the information program. Regulations
should be amended where possible to permit greater flexibility in
the allocation of funds and recruitment of personnel.
"dP SECRET
76
T SECRET
SE ? d RITY INFORMATION
14. Appropriations for the information program should not be
drastically reduced until the new procedures recommended have
been tried.
15. Public understanding and support of the program is vital.
The Committee supports the recommendation made by the United
States Advisory Commission on Information in its Seventh Semi-
Annual Report to Congress, January 1953, that IIA be authorized
to release domestically, without request, information concerning
its programs.
16. Consideration should be given to reducing, where possible,
the adverse propaganda effects of certain security and immigra-
tion regulations.
Media Recommendations
17. (a) Short-wave radio programs to the free world should be
continued only to those areas where the Chief of Mission expresses
a desire for retention or where the broadcasts are required for
purposes of electromagnetic warfare.
(b) Broadcasts attributed to the United States Govern-
ment should concentrate on objective factual news reporting and
seek to present a full exposition of United States actions and
policies.
(c) Radio should be used for exhortation in the free world
only on a non-attributed basis. In order to lessen attribution
and to reach the largest audience, maximum use should be made
of local broadcasting facilities.
(d) Consideration should be given to changing the name
"Voice of America."
18. (a) Exchange of persons, particularly students, for long
term cultural purposes is worthwhile and should be continued.
(b) More use should be made of the medium of exchange of
persons in influencing the attitude of important local individuals.
19. Publications can be used to much better advantage. IIA
should carefully review its program and decentralize wherever
possible so that material will be more responsive to local needs.
The programs of all agencies should be reviewed.
20. (a) Wherever possible, government films should be un-
attributed and produced by local industry. Films must be more
suited to audiences.
(b) Greater efforts should be made to influence United
States commercial film production in order to increase its contri-
bution to the national information program.
71 SECRET
77
SECRET
SECRITY INFORMATION
21. (a) The Information Centers fill a cultural need and
should be continued.
(b) The Government should cooperate with the commer-
cial publishing industry and subsidize its exports when necessary
to combat the flood of inexpensive communist books in the free
world.
(c) While the Government must not aid in the distribution
of subversive books, it should not hesitate to facilitate the distri-
bution of books which contain justified criticism of one phase or
another of American life.
22. The United States should be in a position to provide advice
and assistance to foreign television industries in their formative
stages. Unattributed programs of American origin could be
carried on local stations.
1/SECRET
78
SECRET
SEC ITY INFORMATION
Chapter Six
rCOVERT OPERATIONS WITHIN THE FREE WORLD
For\five years after the end of World War II, governments of
n\on-coNmunist nations, especially in Western Europe, were sub-
jected t&strong pressure from communist minorities. Many
of these go eznments had communist cabinet members and were
incapable of 4:strong action against communist groups. Nearly
st, .
all had communists in key administrative positions. Independent
covert action bNhe United States frequently offered the only
possible method ofXrengthening national anti-communist forces.
For considerations b9th of security and policy it was generally
impossible for the UMted States to work with and trust those
governments which wee under the heaviest communist attack.
Because of this special slivation and also because there existed
a basic and continuing 'wed for a covert arm of government
capable of conducting certain activities abroad which could not
be acknowledged as officially''%Donsored, an office of covert opera-
tions was established within the Central Intelligence Agency in
1948.*
The United States is currently expending $ per
year on covert political and psyciVlogical activities within the
free world.**
As the political and economic recoveiy in Western Europe
permits, some reduction of CIA's covert activities in this area will
be possible. In addition, European govel:nments or private
groups may be induced to assume, either independently or jointly
with American agencies, responsibility for sonie of the political
action programs now being carried on by CIA. \This would mean
that CIA would lose much of its direct control over\these activities.
The Committee believes, however, that such direct control must
.
in many cases be relinquished or relaxed if serious ohtical corn-
\
plications are to be avoided.
* NSC 10/2; see also Chapter Seven, p. 97.
** Excluding covert operations undertaken solely to support overt milita\Yr ,,forces
in wartime.
pSECRET
79
T9 SECRET
SECI1ITY INFORMATION
\ The critical countries of South and Southeast Asia and of Africa
shave presented very great obstacles to the conduct of covert as
tll as overt activities. Successful covert operations can be
d Jeloped only over a long period. The Committee believes that
thtse areas should receive a higher priority than they now enjoy
,t
with respect to assignment of key personnel and development
of e -panded covert capabilities for future activities.
The4covert activities in the free world which have been under-
taken \y CIA fall into three categories: political action, propa-
ganda, and direct action against communist parties and fronts.
\
Covert POlitical Action
\
Covert operations have supported a large number of foreign
?,
political orgapizations throughout the free world, particularly in
Western Eurape, in order to make them more effective instru-
ments againsommunist subversion. In a parallel effort, at-
tempts have alsokbeen made to establish covert influence directly
over key individu*41s and groups in foreign governments. Such
political activities tkave the great advantage that they permit the
United States covertly to influence developments in other coun-
tries in the interest of the United States to a degree which can
not be accomplished ortly. They have the disadvantage that
they entail a risk of eXposure which may result in damage to
United States interests.
Evidence indicates that, iril general, covert political activities in
the free world have been an\ong the more successful of CIA's
operations. Because of the lac of adequate previous experience
in the field of peacetime covert ,perations, and because quickly
mounted operations were needed iii\ meet serious threats of com-
munist advance in 1948 and 1949,\some of the initial opera-
tions suffered from hasty improvisgtton. They did, however,
assist materially in countering communist subversion during this
critical period. The experience gained i'S\now of value in estab-
lishing more effective controls over curreni\activities and in bal-
ancing the advantages and disadvantages of \dontinuing them on
a covert basis.
In a few countries, such as Italy, CIA has u dertaken the
fiaancial support of non-communist political parties, articularly
n campaigns prior to elections in which there has b n danger
of major gains by communist or communist-controlle arties.
Such activities have been restricted by CIA to elections wh e the
Department of State has asserted an important United S ates
SECRET
80
2(SECRET
SEC ITY INFORMATION
J1 2
political interest and where the support gave promise of achiev-
ing' important results. Despite the exception of the recent
Italian pitlections, such support has been generally successful in
that the %parties supported have maintained or increased their
voting stre Igth while the hand of the United States has remained
concealed.
Three major difficulties arise in this type of activity. First,
the introductiontiof funds into the party or organization at the
top, which is dictated by reasons of security, can result in the
absorption of a late part of those funds by the top party bureau-
cracy, with only limited amounts reaching the party field organ-
izations where thelfunds are most needed. Second, if sufficient
funds are providedt to make a substantial difference in the out-
come of the elections, it is hard to conceal the fact that the party
,,,
is spending funds iri excess of its own resources. Third, where
more than one non communist party is involved in an election,
4
it is inevitable that part of the subsidies will actually be used
by the parties to fight each other instead of the communists.
In the field of labor, ECA, CIA and the DepV,rtment of State all
began action in 1948 designed to break communist control over
important national and international confederations. Particu-
lar emphasis was placed on France and Italy, whereRolitical and
economic stability was gravely threatened by communikxploita-
ton of the national labor federations. CIA, utilizing ECA
counterpart funds, augmented the aid furnished to the\Free
Trade Union Committee by the International Ladies Garnielit
Workers Union and thereby assisted in creating in France tfte
'1?7SECRET
81
TP SECRET
SECU ITY INFORMATION
Furth reduction in the strength of communist-controlled
labor fed ations will be a slow and difficult process. Present
programs ht, ve about reached the limit of their capabilities and
their continuance will serve primarily to preserve gains already
%
made. A further reduction in communist union strength will
1.,
depend less on tie size of the subsidies granted to non-communist
labor organizatio , s than on the success of the foreign govern-
ments in solving their internal political and economic problems
and on the adoptiorNby the United States of policies which will
assure the support of?uch efforts. During the fiscal year 1953
CIA will provide $ \, for the support of non-communist
labor activities. Of this 1 a, ount per cent will go to organi-
zations\ in France and Italy.
A principal operational diffi ulty in carrying out this program
has been that three American a encies, the Department of State,
MSA and CIA, have all been activ 'n the labor field, often working
with the same unions but withouttadequate knowledge of each
other's activities. As noted elsewhere in the report,* the Com-
mittee believes that such overlappink should be eliminated by
giving the American Ambassador increased authority to coordi-
nate these activities. ts
CIA has also either created or been tlk principal source of
financial support for several other major potitical action organi-
zations. These organizations have concentrakd on youth, intel-
lectuals and veterans, all of whom receive co\stant attention
from the communists and are considered by theick to be crucial
groups. Evidence indicates that operations through these
groups are among the most effective conducted by VA in the
free world in exposing communist subversion. Supportto politi-
cal action organizations of this type accounts for per cent
\
of CIA's operational budget in the free world, and for the Tscal
ye1r 1953 totals $
*Chapter Five, p. 63.
P SECRET
82
SECRET
SEZ
URITY INFORMATION
Tih SECRET
83
14ECRET
SE, RITY INFORMATION
As a re? It of experience gained in the last four years, and
because of major changes within the free world during this period,
certain basietmodifications in present concepts of covert activi-
ties should nal'w4t, be made. Free world governments are becoming
increasingly 9willing to tolerate independent American activi-
ties aimed at their own populations. CIA activities to which
foreign governants closed their eyes in 1948 can today become
the basis either kr official protests to the United States, or if
publicly exposed, Mr a wave of popular indignation against Amer-
ican "intervention"
Because of the siz% and complexity of many covert projects,
large numbers of people both within and outside the government
are familiar with them.
Such wides read knowledge seriously reduces the
chances of keeping an acti *ty secret over a long period.
CIA covert support to sevet,a1 major activities has recently been
reported in the American pre?s.* Such reports can destroy the
effectiveness of the organization concerned and can also be inter-
preted as an attempt by American intelligence agencies to take
over and control such organizatiblzis for reasons totally incon-
sistent with professed American itlleals. Under these circum-
stances, few foreigners would accept ate view that the only objec-
tive is to strengthen free world institiltions against communist
subversion. Unlike the communists, wilve political code admits
the necessity for subversion, the strength of the American position
abroad is dependent upon the voluntary a ociation of foreign
nations and groups with the United States.
Covert Propaganda Activities
The broad objectives of covert propaganda are to ombat com-
munist subversion, counter neutralism and promote he accept-
ance of pro-Western concepts and the advancement of merican
* Activities reported in the press include the National Committee fo a Free
Europe, the support of French and Italian labor federations and the port
'of a West?German youth group.
SECRET
84
P SECRET
SEOtIRITY INFORMATION
%interests. CIA is spending $ in fiscal year 1953 on
Ickovert propaganda in the free world, -.utilizing all types of mass
-- co -munication media inNarying degrees.
I the past, CIA directed its efforts more toward the establish-
mentf new propaganda media than to influencing the content
of the pajor commercial media which are already reaching most
of the fhe world. This emphasis has now been reversed and, as
a result, tke covert propaganda efforts of CIA should become more
effective wit,!1 smaller expenditure of money and manpower.
The subjectof covert propaganda has been discussed more fully
in Chapter Fie.
Covert OperatiOns Against Communist Parties and
Communiskronts
Communist pakies and front organizations outside the Iron
Curtain are an iniRortant target for covert political operations
because they are thexmost vulnerable and accessible elements in
the communist appar?tus. The aim of such operations has been
to weaken these groups by splintering them, by undermining
morale, by exposing pubticly the true nature of their backing and
activities, and by controlling individual leaders. Exposure of the
true nature and objectiVes of communist parties and fronts
within the free world can 'usually be done more effectively by
local organizations receivingcovert support from CIA than by
official United States government action. The ultimate objective
is the disintegration of the conimunist groups or a break with
Moscow.
ot er technique seeks to disrupt communist "financing in
countries outside the Soviet system. Such operations are directed
at local sources of income and at cutting the flow of funcillupplied
from the USSR itself. This important field of activity %is only
now being developed. To be effective it will require close coo\N:a-
SECRET
85
SE RITY I/SECRET
N'FORMATION
n not only between the United States overt and covert agencies,
.also between the United States and foreign governments.
Review of CIA Operations
114
Sub4antially more than half of CIA's covert operations budget
is useafor the covert support oflarge foreign and international
organizkons which are either fighting communism directly or
actively SU pporting other United States objectives such as the
-- European dense Communitr Except for the source of funds,
most of these activities are completely overt. Because of the
number of pkwle within and outside the Government who of
necessity have \ome to know of these activities and because of
the American weakness for loose talk, CIA experiences great
difficulty in maiataining over long periods the security of this
type of operation. kykny exposure is not only fully exploited by
the communists, bu,t also enables the neutralists and neo-
fascists to demonstrakthe "aggressive" and "provocatory" nature
of American foreign ptdicy. It is recommended, therefore, that
covert operations in the fflee world i especially the support of large
AMititEr: be thoroughly reviewed by CIA. The following
major criteria are suggegted in examining the soundness of
projects:
1. Allied or friendly govern ents should be encouraged to take
over responsibility for sp eific projects within their own
countries. If financial aid ','s still required, this might be
hidden in normal inter-govervental transfers of funds.
2. Where foreign governments areviot able to assume responsi-
bility for a project for political orNsAecurity reasons, considera-
tion should be given to obtainirig the host government's
agreement to the continuation of ti'l activity by CIA. Such
agreement should include provisiont, for the protection of
United States interests in the event ofvubsequent exposure.
3. Consideration should be given to proViding some form of
international backing to projects in suppc'ko t of international
or anizations.
/SECRET
SE RITY INFORMATION
Tne greatest limitation on effective covert activity is the short-
age of skilled personnel. Although the total personnel strength
of CIA is probably adequate, only a small part of it is as yet
qualified to plan and carry out covert operations effectively
and securely. The Committee recommends that for the immedi-
ate future CIA give higher priority to training, development of
improved operating principles, expansion of its pool of qualified
operators, and construction of a covert mechanism abroad. In
making this recommendation the Committee recognizes that such
a policy might reduce CIA's current capabilities. It would mean,
however, that within two or three years its capabilities for secure
and effective operations should be greatly enhanced.
Because covert operations should not be subjected to the usual
public and legislative scrutiny, and because of the profound in-
fluence ? both good and bad ? which covert operations may have
on national policy, the Committee believes that CIA's covert
operations should be reviewed periodically by a group within the
Government competent to pass on the effectiveness of such activi-
ties. An appropriate body within the National Security Council
structure, such as the Operations Coordinating Board,* might
properly undertake such review. It is therefore recommended
Chapter Seven, p. 91.
SECRET
87
'ZIECRET
SEC, ITY INFORMATION
th t the Director of Central Intelligence report semi-annually to
the ouncil on the conduct of covert operations by the Agency,
both those within the free world and those directed against the
Soviet '''tem.
.Recommendations:
1. Efforts ghould be made to have the nations of Western Eu-
rope, espeically France, Italy, and Western Germany, assume
greater reshisibilities for covert political and propaganda
action.
4. All covert operations in the free\yorld, especially the support
of rattge4lait activities, should be thoroughly reviewed by
CIA.
5. For the immediate future, CIA should'give higher priority to
training, development of improved principles of operation,
expansion of its pool of qualified operator44nd construction
of a covert mechanism abroad.
6. The Director of Central Intelligence should \rkeport semi-
annually to an appropriate body within the Nation,a1 Security
Council structure, such as the Operations Coordinating
Board, on the conduct of covert operations by the 'Agency,
both those within the free world and those against the S9viet
system.
rIy4ECRET
88
Chapter Seven
ORGANIZATION FOR A MORE UNIFIED EFFORT
Th l Need for More Effective Coordination
There is need for a better integrated direction of the program
of the United States in the world struggle so that the "unified and
dynamic" effort called for by the President will be made. We be-
lieve that there exists a serious gap between the formulation of
general objectives and the detailed actions required to give effect
to them. This gap can, in our opinion, be filled by the creation,
within the National Security Council structure, of a group capa-
ble of assuring the coordinated execution of national security
policies.
The National Security Council having recommended a policy
and the President having approved it, continuing executive
responsibility should be delegated to an operations coordinating
body which would:
1. coordinate the development by the departments and agen-
cies of detailed operational plans to carry out the approved policy;
2. assure the timely and coordinated carrying out of such
plans;
3. initiate new proposals for action within the framework of
national security policies in response to opportunity and other
changes in the situation;
4. assure that each project or action is so executed as to make
its full contribution to the particular "climate of opinion" which
the United States is seeking to achieve in the world.
The Psychological Strategy Board does not fill the need which
we have described. We believe that the present conception of
the Psychological Strategy Board is unsound. The Psychological
Strategy Board is charged with planning, coordination, and evalu-
ation of "psychological operations," a term which is nowhere
adequately defined. We find that while the Psychological Strategy
Board has concentrated heavily on planning it has possessed
neither sufficient power to exercise effective coordination nor the
techniques adequate to produce meaningful evaluations. Even
the planning function has been carried on in the midst of ambi-
guity and serious interdepartmental controversy.
SECRET
89
_
SECRET
INFORMATION
The directive which created the Psychological Strategy Board
assumes that in addition to national objectives formulated by the
National Security Council, there are such things as "over-all
national psychological objectives"; PSB is indeed charged with
the formulation and promulgation of these. The PSB directive
also speaks of "psychological policies" and the Board has been
working to develop "a strategic concept for psychological opera-
tions." We believe these phrases indicate a basic misconception,
for find that the "psychological" aspect of policy is not separa-
r-ble from policy, but is inherent in every diplomatic, economic or
j military action. There is a "psychological" implication in every
L act, but this does not have life apart from the act. Although
7 there may be distinct psychological plans and specific psychologi-
cal activities directed toward national objectives, there are
no "national psychological objectives" separate and distinct
from national objectives. There is no "strategic concept for
psychological operations" separate and distinct from a strate-
gic concept for gaining national aims without war. When PSB
has developed, for example, a ".regional psychological plan," it has
really formulated a plan for the achievement of national aims
involving the use of propaganda, diplomacy, economic pressure
and military strength in various combinations. It is this fact
which has caused so much controversy between PSB and the
established planning agencies within the State Department.
For these reasons, we believe that the Psychological Strategy
Board was improperly conceived and that it has not, under its
charter, been able to contribute materially to the national effort.
We accordingly recommend that it be abolished.
We have also studied the changes in the composition and
functions of the NSC staff, as approved by the President on March
17, 1953. In our view, these provide for more systematic and de-
tailed policy planning- and contribute as well to the achieve-
ment of coordinated execution of policy in the following respects:
1. the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs is pro-
vided with a staff which shall make an "independent analysis
and review" of each policy paper emanating from the Planning
Board in order to determine (among other things) that "the
conclusions reached are meaningful as operational guidances";
and
2. after a national security policy ha i been approved by the
President and _"assigned among cabinet members for perform-
.SECRET
90
FL77?;;;;ITIAK..
-
?
?
SECRET
INFORMATION
ance", the Special Assistant has the task of bringing to the Presi-
dent's attention "situations where progress is delayed, with
recommendations for action."
These changes are useful, but do not by themselves accomplish
a fully coordinated execution of policy, nor were they intended
to do so. The appointment by the President of a Special Assistant
with particular responsibility in regard to "cold war" activities
constitutes a further recognition of the need for better coordina-
tion. There remains, however, a need for a central operations
coordinating body within the NSC structure:
Operations Coordinating Board
We therefore recommend that the President establish, within
the NSC structure, an Operations Coordinating Board to provide
for the coordinated execution of approved national security poli-
cies ? specifically to carry out the functions listed on the first
page of this chapter and such other functions as the NSC may
from time to time prescribe.
Coordination of departmental execution of national security
policies would be the principal task of the Operations Coordi-
nating Board. Detailed operational planning for the activities
to be carried out pursuant to approved policies would continue to
be done by the departments. The distinctive role of the Opera-
tions Coordinating Board would be to assign detailed planning
responsibilities to departments, to examine the resulting plans for
adequacy, consistency with policy and with each other, and then
to coordinate and follow up the execution of such plans, seeking
in the process to achieve the maximum advantage for the United
States. This would require a shift to the Board .of the "follow-
up" responsibility now vested in the Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs. The Board would also make progress reports to
the NSC from time to time.
We recommend that the members of the Operations Coordi-
nating Board should be:
The Under Secretary of State;
The Deputy Secretary of Defense;
The Deputy Director for Mutual Security;*
The Director of CIA; and
The Special Assistant to the President (for "cold war plan-
ning").
? Until he designates his general deputy to serve on the Board. the Director
for Mutual Security should represent his agency.
74 SECRET
91
The Special Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs should have the right to attend meetings of the Board.
The head of the foreign information program should act as an
advisor to the Board and should be invited to attend those meet-
ings of the Board at which the subjects under discussion relate
to his function. In addition, appropriate members of other
departments and agencies should be invited to attend those
meetings of the Board at which the subjects under discussion
bear directly upon the responsibilities of those departments and
agencies.
The Operations Coordinating Board cannot be effective without
continuing and vigorous leadership and without its own staff.
In order to ensure such leadership, we make the following recom-
mendations:
1. The Under Secretary of State should be Chairman of the
Board. He should be the presiding officer at meetings of the
Board.
2. A person appointed by the President should be the principal
executive officer of the Board. He should serve full-time in this
capacity. He should attend all meetings of the Board, but should
not be a member thereof. His duties should include among
others:
(a) determining the agenda for, and presenting material for
discussion at, Board:meetings, subject to the approval of the
Chairman;
(b) supervising the work of the staff of the Board;
(c) maintaining the flow -of- work through the Board, the
standards of presentation, -and the quality of the staff work.
(d) insuring, in the name of the Board, that its decisions
are put into effect;
(e) in the event of lack of progress in carrying out a re-
sponsibility that has been assigned to the Board, bringing the
matter to the attention of the National Security Council, after
consultation with the Board, with recommendations for appro-
priate action;
(f) preparing for the Board's consideration reports to the
National Security Council;
(g) maintaining liaison with the Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs in order to insure coor-
dination of the Board's work with the activities of the National
Security Council.
/SECRET '
92
.a.e.-4,r4 Item "Txn???
EMU INFORMATION
xi SECRET
3. The principal executive officer should be assisted by a staff
responsible to him which should have such duties as he may
assign and the Board approve. This staff should include persons
qualified in the political, economic and military matters consid-
ered by the Board and persons competent to advise on the psy-
chological implications of the problems before the Board.
In order to provide continuity and independence, a substantial
part of the staff should be permanent employees of the Board.
The balance should comprise persons on assignment from depart-
ments and agencies. Each department should make internal
arrangements for the continuous handling of Board matters.
The Board would replace the PSB as the agency responsible
for assuring coordination between the foreign information pro-
gram and covert activities. With respect to the latter, NSC 10/2
states that the Director of Central Intelligence shall receive policy
guidance from the Secretaries of State and Defense. The present
Consultants Group was established to provide a channel for such
guidance. We believe that the general coordinating and review
functions of the Operations Coordinating Board would render it
logical to abolish the Consultants Group and make its function
a responsibility of the Operations Coordinating Board and the
OCB staff. For the same reason, we think it would be appro-
priate to rescind paragraphs 2 and 3 of NSC 10/5 which relate to
PSB responsibilities for the review of covert programs.
The Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee (POC)
was created pursuant to NSC 59/1 to provide a mechanism
through which the State Department could coordinate the overt
foreign information program. We believe -thee is a manifest
need for this coordinating function, but recommend the POC be
abolished and its function be made a responsibility of the Opera-
tions Coordinating Board and the OCB staff.
Coordination in the Field
Coordination in the field is essential to the effective carrying
out of the plans developed at home. If lines of authority for
United States representatives in a foreign country are confused,
if these representatives speak with conflicting voices, then the
impression created will not inspire confidence and the United
States will dissipate its efforts.
We have based our consideration of coordination in the field
on the assumption that there will continue to be a separation of
authority for foreign activities in Washington. This means that
'94 SECRET
93
the authority of a chief of mission in. the field will continue to be
qualified by the fact that his economic, military, and intelligence
officers, who are nominal subordinates, have direct communica-
tion with Washington through separate channels of command.
The proposed setting up of the foreign information program out-
side the State Department would create still another separate
channel of communication.
This difficulty was one of the major factors that led us to con-
sideration of the proposal to create a federal structure under the
Secretary of State comprising three operating departments
headed respectively by a Secretary of Foreign Political Affairs, a
Secretary of Foreign Economic Affairs and a Secretary of Foreign
Information. The Secretary of State (and his Under Secretary)
would have the power of direction over the three departments,
although a broad delegation of operational responsibility would
be implicit. This arrangement would lend itself well to projec-
tion into the field. The Ambassador would report through the
Secretary of State and would, therefore, represent not only .the
embassy staff, but the economic and public affairs interests as
well. He could have three ministers under him, each correspond-
ing to one of the functions grouped under the Secretary of State.
While we recognize that it may not be feasible in present circum-
stances, such an arrangement would, in our opinion, greatly un-
prove the coherence of/ the national performance in overseas
areas. We therefore urge that it be given continuing study and
consideration. .? .
Since, for the present, however, a continued separation of
authority in Wa-chington is the realistic premise, it is of particular
importance to establish the Ambassador as the principal field
authority. This is provided for in. the President's message to
Congress, June 1, 1953, accompanying Reorganization Plans Num-
bers 7 and 8, and in the President's letter of the same date to the
heads of all executive departments and the Director for Mutual
Security.
From the information we have received, it appears that the
"country team" idea has worked best in ? those countries where
the United States has had an Ambassador who regarded his post
as one of action, rather than merely of observation. We believe
there are important implications in this for the kind of men
selected as United States mission chiefs in countries whose proper
orientation is crucial to success in the present conflict. The in-
creasing intensity of the world struggle, particularly the fact that
rl SECRET
94
SRL; xx INFORMATION
'I/SECRET
it has blurred the previously clear dividing line between peace
and war, is a compelling reality to which the United States has not
yet fully responded organizationally. The control of United
States policy has been rendered very much more difficult by the
active participation (and therefore the necessary coordination)
of a large number of separately administered governmental agen-
cies 'which either had not previously existed at all, or had not
previously exerted any influence on foreign relations. In each
country of major importance, this new condition has imposed
different and heavier responsibilities on the United States chief of
mission. To be successful he has had to add executive functions
to his traditional tasks of observation, negotiation and commu-
nication. We believe that these broad new tasks are not passing
obligations, but will last for many years. Accordingly, more
emphasis should be given to breadth, force and executive com-
petence in the selection of United States mission chiefs, although
we do not mean to imply that these qualities are in any way
substitutes for political training and acumen. The ideal Am-
bassador would possess all of these qualities.
In a number of countries where United States armed forces are
stationed, it is important that the military commander be a mem-
ber of the country team. In such places as Japan and Germany,
his role will be of major importance. The degree to which Ameri-
can military personnel harmonize their activities with local
civilian life will have great effect on the political mission of the
Embassy. In the next section, we discuss the conditions which
we believe must be established to bring about a more systematic
military participation in the effort to achieve pOlitical objectives.
Political Implications of Military Activities
The activities of the Defense Department are a major factor in
the success or failure of the national effort in the political struggle
with the USSR. They have a marked impact upon foreign atti-
tudes and actions. A million and a half Americans are serving
overseas in military uniform and coming into daily contact with
foreign peoples. Additionally, the reality of United States mili-
tary power ? whether it is an adequate deterrent; whether it is a
source of reassurance or anxiety to friendly nations; the way in
which United States leadership is exercised in the several mili-
tary coalitions now formed; the way in which such military
assistance programs as off-shore procurement are administered
?all of these affect the success of United States policies.
T/6 SEC=
95
,
? ?
-GokSECRET
SETY INFORMATION
The contribution of the armed forces to political warfare has
been limited by the lack of definition of the military role by higher
authority,. and by an inadequate understanding on the part of
military authorities that they and their commands are full partic-
ipants in the political aspects of the present struggle and must
conduct themselves accordingly. Military commanders and plan-
ners tend to regard the allocation of military resources to current
political operations as an unauthorized diversion from tasks for
which the armed forces are explicitly responsible. They natu-
rally resist efforts to utilize these resources in ways which might
be disadvantageous in the event of war, because the primary mili-
tary task is preparation for hostilities.
The activities of military forces abroad must, however, be con-
ducted in such a manner as to enhance the prestige of the United
States, produce maximum support for its policies and minimize
the unfavorable aspects of the presence of its military forces.
Good troop behavior is essential. Troop maneuvers, fleet visits
and fly-overs can be helpful if skillfully timed. Military trans-
port and Fdmilar resources can be used to assist in solving prob-
lems of the local communities in which United States troops are
stationed ? to transport school children or to repair roads which
have been damaged by American military activity. United States
military authorities have not always used these resources with
political imagination. ithey have been slow, for example, to use
the off-shore procurement program as an effective anti-commu-
nist weapon in Western Europe, which it could undoubtedly be-
come if managed with flexibility _ and imagination. They have
argued that their aim is only to obtain military equipment which
meets their specifications and that they cannot impose the burden
of political judgments upon relatively low-ranking procurement
officers in the field. In part, this attitude reflects the rigidity
of military procurement regulations, but it also illustrates the
failure to recognize and determine the full part that should be
played by the military services in supporting United States
political objectives.
The employmentof military resources for political effect in the
present situation of tension and partial war is essential; and suc-
cess in this endeavor requires an understanding by military com-
manders of the contribution which military forces can make to
the achievement of political objectives. We believe such under-
standing can be improved by a more precise definition of the
i'dR SECRET
S ITY INFORMATION
tary role. Fuller participation of United States military com-
manders abroad in the "country teams" headed by the American
Ambassador would also help.
The armed forces have developed for use in wartime certain
specialized assets, such as Radio Broadcast and Leaflet Com-
panies and Air Resupply and Communications Wings, which
might further assist in the conduct of current political activities.
The fuller utilization of such assets should receive continuing
attention.
We recommend that the Operations Coordinating Board, in its
plans for the implementation of national policies, ensure that
military activities make their full contribution to the attainment
of political objectives.
Responsibility for Covert Activities
he growing importance and size of covert operations, as indi-
cate in the preceding chapters, make it desirable to review how
they shQuld be coordinated and who should have responsibility
for them.
There are,three types of covert activities for which respon-
sibility must bs? fixed:
(1) covert political operations; (2) covert raider-type opera-
tions; and (3) giiseuilla warfare.
With respect to tl? first, we believe responsibility for covert
political operations shORld remain in CIA. The following reasons
seem to us to be compelliv:
1. Covert political opeNions and covert intelligence use
the same clandestine technicruls and technical support facilities.
Such supporting functions as dOcument collection and reproduc-
tion, Agent radio communications,
secret writing, coun-
terespionage protection and agent reoTiting and training are
common to both activities. Separationo,f the activities would
require the duplication of these technical 'S'qpporting functions.
2. The greatest limiting factor today on covert: intelligence and
covert operations is the shortage of skilled operational personnel.
Years of training are required before an individual is sufficiently
experienced to be permitted to operate in the covert fiby,1 without
immediate and direct supervision. The separation of int?lligence
from covert operations would inevitably result in great\in.effi-
ciencies in the use of the very limited pool of qualified &weft
operators.
y,d:' SECRET
97
T SECRET
SEC ITY INFORMATION
3. The supply of foreign personnel qualified to act as covert
'agents, particularly in operations behind the Iron Curtain, is very
small. More efficient use can be made of this limited supply by
a .ingle covert agency than by two competing agencies.
4. All covert operations require effective counterespionage pro-
tection. Experience has shown that this protection can be pro-
vided effectively only if the counterespionage element is an
integral cpart of the covert organization. Separation of covert
functions,,, would therefore entail the duplication of counter-
espionage facilities.
5. CIA now has legislative authority for the use of unvouchered
funds. It would be undesirable to request such broad authority
for another agency.
Covert raider operations and guerrilla warfare are special types
of covert operations for which CIA has responsibility at the
present time. It is important to understand, however, that
they are two separate types of activity. Guerrilla warfare may be
defined as armed activity behind the enemy lines which draws its
support primarily from_ the indigenous population. Raider op-
erations, on the other handAsuch as those being conducted with
gOIA support- from the Chinese off-shore islands by Nationalist
irregulars, do not require such support from the native popula-
tion. This latter operation ii?s required a major commitment of
CIA resources.
We believe that CIA should b'e,relieved of its current respon-
sibilities for itglWsUpport of thek coastal- raiding operations
against the Chinese Communists aii14 that it should not in the
vfuture assume such responsibilities iii\other areas unless a de-
---termination is made by the NSC that them is an overriding neces-
sity to conceal the hand of the United Stakes Government. The
Defense Department should accept operatiOilal responsibility for
the support of such raider operations, subject to guidance from
the Operations Coordinating Board.
In contrast to raider operations, guerrilla operations are based
permanently within enemy-held territory and require large, well-
organized, indigenous underground organizations.- %, CIA is the
only organization in the government which has the Clandestine
skills and covert support facilities necessary to the development
of these activities. For this reason, we recommend that the
preparation for and development of guerrilla activities remaiii the
responsibility of CIA.
-
747 P SECRET
98
SECRET
INFORMATION ?
The Foreign Information Program
In Chapter Five of this report, we have examined the informa-
tion program. In this section we discuss our views on the proper
location of the foreign information program within the govern-
ment. We have already communicated to the President, by letter
dated May 2, 1953, our views on this subject (see Appendix III).
Three distinct proposals have been considered by us, and we have
surfunarized them below, together with our principal reasons for
accepting or rejecting them.
1. The separation of IIA from State and its establishment as an
independent agency under the NSC. This agency would also
assume the information activities of MSA and TCA.
This proposal involves the claims that the propaganda
function, like the military and economic, is sufficiently differ-
ent from diplomacy to warrant separate administration; that
propaganda should serve national policy, which is made by
the member departments of NSC rather than the State De-
partment; and that any information program operated by
the State Department will tend to be timid and unimagina-
tive because diplomacy operates primarily through contact
between governments, whereas propaganda must involve
large-scale operations directed at whole peoples.
We believe this proposal is based upon a misconception of
propaganda and greatly exaggerates its role in the national
effort. Overt propaganda conducted by a free society is
necessarily based upon policy and has no rife apart from it.
While it is true that national security policy is formulated
by the member departments comprising the NSC, rather
than by State alone, the fact remsins that State is primarily
responsible for carrying out those policies to which informa-
tion activities can be of assistance. Moreover, the NSC is
not organized to provide day-to-day policy guidance. To
create an independent agency to conduct propaganda and
related activities, even if some provision were made for policy
guidance from the State Department, would be to risk the
emergence of contradictory interpretations of foreign policy.
Moreover, it would strongly imply the belief that propaganda
is a separate element of policy, rather than a subsidiary
instrument thereof.
The nature of the propaganda problem requires close and
frequent interchange between policy people and operators
during the development of a program, and this is difficult
114/ SECRET
99
t?t'e
cSECRET
SE INFORMATION
when the policy-makers and the propagandists are separated
by jurisdictional boundaries. We fear that if HA were in-
dependent, the level of liaison with State would be so high as
to leave a number of significant issues of policy to be dealt
with by HA as "operations."
An argument for this proposal to which we attach more
weight involves the claim that effective management of HA
is impossible so long as it remains within the State Depart-
ment. This claim is based upon an antagonism on the part
of some political officers in the State Department toward the
entire information effort and personnel engaged in it. There
is also some evidence of the use of HA funds for general State
Department purposes and a refusal to yield the promised
autonomy to the Administrator of HA in the matters of re-
cruiting, assigning, and managing la personnel. There is
little doubt in our minds that the information program has
been administered under great difficulties and we agree that
these must, insofar as possible, be removed. However, we
are not convinced that a remedy lies in separating HA from
the State Department and re-creating it as an independent
agency. The weakness and vulnerability of new, untried
government agencies is attested by long experience; the his-
tory of OWI is instructive and discouraging on this point.
Moreover, we believe that understanding between HA and
the regular political officers of the State Department has
been steadily improving and that it is entirely possible to pro-
vide the HA with sufficient administrative flexibility within
the State Department to permit effective management. ?
2. Retention in State of most of the educational exchange pro-
grams and establishment in an independent agency of all
"fast media" (radio, press, movies) together with respon-
sibility for the interchange of books and periodicals and aid
to libraries and information centers.
It is the widely held view that the State Department is
handling the educational exchange programs very well and
that they should accordingly continue to be the respon-
sibility of that Department. The proponents of this pro-
posal accept this view. They argue, however, that those ele-
ments of the information program which have a day-to-day
impact abroad should be placed in an independent agency.
/ SECRET
100
me SECRET
SE INFORMATION
We have rejected this proposal for substantially the same
reasons as we rejected the first proposal above ? because
propaganda should be a servant of policy. and should there-
fore be clearly subject to policy guidance. The "fast
media" are precisely the tools which the State Department
needs to explain and exploit policy on a day-to-day basis.
The library and information center programs are not, of
course, propaganda and therefore this line of argument
does not apply directly to them. But we would doubt the
wisdom of placing segments of the information program
under separate administration.
3. Retention of IIA in State, but with higher rank for the Ad-
ministrator and with effective provision for autonomy in the
selection, assignment and management of personnel and in
the control of IIA appropriations.
It is our conclusion that this proposal embodies a sound
approach to the problem of locating and properly organizing
the foreign information program. This arrangement facili-
tates policy guidance and provides the necessary unity of
program through the inclusion of all media within a single
administration.
In our opinion, the most satisfactory arrangement would
be to retain within the Department of State those functions
now assigned to the IIA and to combine with them the in-
formation activities heretofore conducted by MSA and TCA.
Under such an arrangement the Committee would favor
higher rank (equivalent to that of Under Secretary) for
the Administrator of the information agency and provi-
sion for autonomy in the selection, assignment and man-
agement of personnel and in the control of its own appro-
priations.
In the interest of the closest possible integration of foreign
information activities with the development of foreign policy,
the Committee believes that the program should be left with-
in the Department of State. We recognize, however, that
there are strong arguments in favor of taking the informa-
tion program out of the State Department. Inasmuch as
the Department itself is reluctant at this time to exercise the
operating functions involved and a reorganization plan has
715' SECRET
101
cler SECRET
SE INFORMATION
been sent to Congress, the Committee does not make any
recommendation on this point.*
Personnel
While we have not been able to give close attention to the prob-
lem of personnel, it is clear that no organizational arrange-
ments for a more unified effort will be effective unless the agencies
concerned are manned by capable and dedicated people. This
problem should be recognized as crucial to the achievement of
the national objectives. The wise and successful conduct of
United States external policies is dependent upon expanding the
numbers of trained people in the field of national security affairs
and making more effective use of them.
The personnel problem of the government in this field is largely
one of leadership and continuity, the need being to produce a
clear understanding of the national policies and an individual
determination to support them. If the proper motivation is
provided through the example of leadership, we believe the Gov-
ernment will not want for able and dedicated people to work for
the realization of United States objectives abroad.
More specifically, better efficiency and morale in the ranks of
the public service will, in our view, depend upon new efforts to:
1. Improve training programs for those entering into the field
of national security affairs so as to provide not only greater
technical competence and language and area knowledge but also
a broader understanding of the significance of their own assign-
ments.
2. Broaden and strengthen the concept of career service so that
well-motivated personnel, having received specialized training
and experience, can be retained in government service. This re-
quires, among other things, the protection of individuals from
unjustified attack.
Recommendations:
1. The Psychological Strategy Board should be abolished.
? In considering this subject, the Committee had before it the severf3.1 staff
studies and the Report of the Subcommittee on Overseas Information
Programs of the United States of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
(Hickenlooper Committee); the memorandum of recommendations of the
President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization dated April 7,
1953 (Rockefeller Report) ; and the Seventh Semiannual Report to Congress
of the United States Advisory Comm110n on Information dated January,
1953 (Mark May Report).
lye SECRET
102
-
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
2. The President should establish, within the National Security
Council structure, an Operations Coordinating Board to provide
for the coordinated execution of approved national security
policies.
3. The Consultants Group, established under NSC 10/2, should
be abolished and its functions assumed by the OCB and the OCB
staff.
4. The Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee
(POC) ?hould be abolished and its functions assumed by the OCB
and the OCB staff.
5. Every effort should be made to strengthen the position of
the Chief of Mission as the principal United States authority in
overseas posts.
6. The Operations Coordinating Board should ensure that mili-
tary activities make their full contribution to the attainment of
political objectives.
Covert political operations should remain the responsibility
of CI
8. CIA should be relieved of current responsibility for sup-
port of coastal raiding operations atitt-this responsibility given
to the Department of Defense.
9. Guerrilla operations should remain the responsibility of CIA-4.
0. Inasmuch as a reorganization plan with respect to foreign
information activities has been submitted to Congress for con-
sideration, the Committee makes no recommendation on this
point.
11. ew efforts should be made to improve personnel training
programs in the field of national security affairs and to broaden
and strengthen the concept of career service.
TOP SECRET
103
ce SECRET
SE INFORMATION
Chapter Eight
INFORMING THE AMERICAN PUBLIC
In Part I of this report we have attempted to analyze the nature
of the conflict with the Soviet system, the Soviet drive for world
domination, and the United States program for world order. We
have emphasized the fact that the conflict is a struggle between
coalitions, one an imposed coalition dominated by the Kremlin
and the other a free coalition led by the United States. We be-
lieve that the United States must base its policies on the assump-
tion that the purpose of the Soviet rulers is world domination and
that this purpose will constitute the fundamental motivation of
all its actions. The basic objectives of the United States program
for world order are (1) to assure the security of the United States,
(2) to attain a reduction or retraction of Soviet power or a funda-
mental change in Soviet objectives, and (3) to achieve a peaceful
world composed of free nations.
The drive and resources which the Government can put behind
this program depend upon the national will. The national will
consists of the composite thought of the American people. They
do not yet grasp the import of the President's recent words that
we live in an age, not an instant, of peril. They do not fully
understand the dangers that confront them, the power of the
enemy, the difficulty of reducing that power, and the probable
duration of the conflict.
It is the belief of the Committee that a greater degree of candor
toward the American people is necessary.
The American public needs information concerning the rapid
growth of the Soviet atomic capability. This development brings
the communities of the United States into the front lines; it
places in doubt the claim that quantitative atomic superiority is
a conclusive deterrent to attack; it threatens to limit the ability
of the nation to maintain its full freedom to act vigorously against
the enemy overseas. In formulating public statements on this
matter, consideration would have to be given to their impact
upon other nations of the free world, particularly in Europe. This
presents a delicate problem, but a balance can be struck between
Tie SECRET
? 104
-
ilISECRET
SECITY
INFORMATION
providing the American people with information that will permit
them to grasp one of the basic realities of their world, and driving
more vulnerable and therefore nervous allies into neutralism.
Such information is the vital prerequisite to public support for
the development of countermeasures to this threat, a matter with
which the Government must be increasingly concerned.
The public needs to be informed of the steady growth of the
Soviet economy and the corollary fact that the rate of its growth
is much more rapid than that of the United States and the NATO
allies. Authoritative discussion of these trends would help to
make clear the magnitude of the effort required on the part of
the United States. It should tend also to spur increased pro-
ductivity both here and in Western Europe.
There is confusion in the nation regarding the ways in which
the United States can most wisely meet the communist threat.
Methods of fighting communism at home and abroad are advo-
cated, and in some cases practiced, which are poorly adapted to kt?-? ?-z
the true nature of the threat. They risk doing more harm than
good. The concepts that have been urged throughout this report
? that it is not enough just to be anti-Communist, that the
United States must appeal to foreign nations in terms of their own
self-interest, that alliances with other nations of the free world
are critical to the survival of the United States are not fully
understood by the American Public. As a result, the effectiveness -
of national policies and programs is reduced.
There is need for authoritative information concerning the
Government's position with respect to the Department of State
and the foreign information program. The Committee, during
the five months of its existence, has seen the Department of State
and the foreign information program harassed and assaulted by
criticism, much of which is inaccurate, unfair and destructive.
As a result, the morale of the Department has been lowered and
the information program has been seriously weakened. The
American people should know what the Administration's position
is with respect to such criticism and what its policy is with respect
to the future of the program.
In order to obtain the common understanding between the
people and the Government which is so important, it is also de-
sirable that there be less confusion among the voices that speak
for the Government on matters of foreign policy and national
security. It should be possible to achieve a greater unity of ex-
pression, at least within the Executive Branch of the Government,
yif SECRET
105
ce SECRET
SE INFORMATION
so that the public does not receive a_ picture of conflicting claims
and contradictory interpretations of important policy matters.
Information and guidance can, of course, come most authorita-
tively from the President himself.
In order to accomplish these results, it is important that secu-
rity regulations not be allowed to restrict the flow of information
except in those cases where the need for security is clearly demon-
strable. The Committee is aware that this problem has been of
concern for a long time. It is sufficiently important to national
policy to warrant continued study at the highest levels of
Government.
Only a clear and consistent exposition of the United States
program can produce that measure of public understanding and
support which will constitute the great moral foundation re-
quired for the effective conduct of external relations.
T/ SECRET
106
me SECRET
SE INFORMATTON
APPENDIX I
THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington
January 24, 1953
Dear Mr. Lay:
I have today established a Committee, to be known as the
President's Committee on International Information Activities.
I have authorized and directed it to make a survey and evalua-
tion of the ' temational informat_ilolikies and activitie f
the Executive Branc of the Government and o po cies and
activities related thereto with particular reference to the inter-
national relations and the national security of this country.
It shall make recommendations to me for such legislative,
administrative, or other action, respecting the said policies and
activities as in its opinion may be desirable.
It has long been my conviction that a unified and dynamic
effort in this field is essential to the security of the United States
and of the other peoples in the community of free nations.
The Committee's final report and recommendations are to be
in my hands not later than June 30, 1953, and the Committee
will cease to operate thirty days after submitting its final report.
All executive departments and agencies of the Federal Govern-
ment are authorized and directed, as a matter of common con-
cern, to cooperate with the Committee in its work and to furnish
the Committee with such assistance not inconsistent with law as
it may require in the performance of its functions. The estab-
lishment of this Committee and the scope of its inquiry were
discussed at the Cabinet meeting Friday morning and received
full and complete support.
1/ SECRET
107
Twe:SECRET
SE INFORMATION
I am today appointing the following members of the
Committee:
William H. Jackson, Chairman
Robert Cutler, Administrative Assistant to the President
C. D. Jackson, representing the Secretary of State
Sigurd Larmon, representing the Director for Mutual
Security
Gordon Gray
Barklie McKee Henry
John C. Hughes
_
Abbott Washburn has been designated as Executive Secretary of
the Committee.
The appointments of C. D. Jackson and Sigurd Larmon were
respectively made after consultation with, and at the designation
of, Mr. John Foster Dulles and Mr. Harold E. Stassen. A designee
to represent the Secretary of Defense will be named to the Com-
mittee before the end of the month.*
The Committee will have its offices at 901 Sixteenth Street,
Northwest, Washington, D. C.
Sincerely,
IS/ DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Honorable James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
Washington 25, D. C.
? On February 19, 1953, the President appointed Roger M. Kyes, Deputy Secretary
of Defense, a member of the Committee upon the designation of Secretary of
Defense Charles E. Wilson.
Ylf SECRET
108
cSECRET
SE INFORMATION.
APPENDIX II
PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE
ON INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION ACTIVITIES
MEMORANDUM FOR: NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SUBJECT : The Use of Radio as a Medium for
Psychological Operations
REFERENCES : (a) Memorandum for the Chairman
from the Executive Secretary, NSC,
dated 11 February 1953.
(b) NSC 137.
(c) NSC 137/1.
(d) Memorandum for the Executive
Secretary, NSC, from the Telecom-
munications Advisor to the Presi-
dent, dated 25 February 1952.
(e) Memorandum for the Executive
Secretary, NSC, from the Director,
CIA, dated 25 January 1951.
In your memorandum of 11 February 1953, the PCIIA was
requested to evaluate, in consultation with the Telecommunica-
tions Advisor to the President, the use of radio as a medium for
psychological operations, particularly: -
1. Its value in relation to other media.
2. The effect of curtailment as suggested in NSC 137.
3 Liinitations placed upon the extent and flexibility of its use
by such things as Soviet countermeasures, international
agreements, adverse effect on friendly nations, and difficul-
? ties caused to other U.S. radio services.
These questions appear to be concerned with two related but
distinct subjects: radio as a medium for propaganda and, sec-
ondly, electromagnetic warfare, a far larger subject involving all
Tiff SECRET
109
communications, which, as described in Appendix II of reference
(c), have a direct bearing on diplomacy, limited or total military
operations, economic warfare, psychological warfare and telecom-
munications policy.
The PCIIA will discuss the first question ? radio as a medium
for propaganda ? in its report to the President. The preliminary
findings of the Committee indicate that, from a radio propaganda
point of view, there is a major difference between the countries
behind the Iron Curtain and the free world. Radio is the only
major technique for piercing the Curtain and therefore has a
unique utility. In the free world, radio is one of a number of
possible media and its relative usefulness varies from country to
country.
The second question in your memorandum is concerned
specifically with the curtailment of VOA and not with radio in
general. The main recommendation in Reference (b) appears
to be to have VOA cease broadcasting behind the Curtain on high
frequency. Since this is the only effective means of reaching
most of the area behind the Curtain, the PCIIA tentative conclu-
sions are that its abandonment would be a most serious error
from the propaganda point of view. The Committee recognizes,
however, that many other considerations enter into the decision.
These considerations involve all the aspects of electromagnetic
warfare: technical, military, political, psychological and eco-
nomic. For example, the Committee is not competent to judge
whether the curtailment of VOA as suggested in reference (b)
would in fact reduce the capability of the Soviet Union to wage
electromagnetic warfare on a large scale.
The remaining questions in your memorandum, particularly
those raised by the President, can only be considered in the total
context of electromagnetic warfare. The Committee notes that
reference (e), dated 25 January 1951, and now more than two
years old, brought the problem of electromagnetic warfare before
the National Security Council as a matter of urgency, pointing
to the great vulnerability of the U.S. and our general lack of
preparedness. A year later, 25 February 1952, in reference (d),
Vie SECRET
110
lISECRET
sEct
INFORMATION
the Telecommunications Advisor to the President accepted the
responsibility for coordinating plans and programs for electro-
magnetic warfare and stated that he had commenced studying
the problem. However, Appendix 2 of reference (c), dated an-
other year later, 15 January 1953, again recommends that the
total problem of electromagnetic warfare be considered. The
Committee has been told that our capabilities for waging electro-
magnetic warfare have not changed materially in the two years
since reference (e) was submitted to the Council, while the Soviet
position has been steadily growing stronger.
The PCIIA believes that it would be inappropriate for it to
enter the discussion of electromagnetic warfare but wishes to
stress the serious nature of the gap which seems to exist in our
defenses. However, the possibility, as described in reference (c),
of new Soviet action resulting in the free world being "faced with
a new and peculiar kind of accomplished aggression" has a direct
bearing on all the problems under consideration by the Com-
mittee and deserves the attention of the National Security
Council.
WILLIA1VI H. JACKSON
Chairman
APPENDIX 2 of reference (c)
National Policies and Plans with Respect to
Electromagnetic Warfare.*
1. The Department of State is of the opinion, based largely on
References a, b and c of this paper, that there is a strong possi-
bility that the Soviets have developed or are well advanced in the
process of developing jamming, related disruptive techniques,
and preclusive use of the radio spectrum as a strategic instru-
? Electromagnetic warfare, sometimes called electronic warfare, is the con-
test through use, Jamming interference, and related measures, for the con-
trol and use of parts or all of the radio spectrum or the denial of use to others.
/ SECRET
111
e SECRET
SE INFORMATION
ment which if not so intended is at least capable of being used
in the pursuit of national objectives under a variety of political
and military conditions. Electromagnetic aggression by the
Soviet Union or electromagnetic war could take place in support
of Soviet objectives in general war, or under conditions short of
general war.
Some possible applications of Soviet electromagnetic warfare
potential might be:
(a) Support of military conquest.
(b) Destruction of internal broadcasting of countries
marked for future political or military conquest.
(c) Communications isolation of strategic countries or areas
in support of (1) economic warfare, (2) political or subversive
action, (3) psychological warfare keyed to important events or
program.
(d) As an instrument of international blackmail to (1) im-
pose indirect censorship and control on the internal mass media
of non-Soviet countries, especially broadcasting and press serv-
ices, (2) impose Soviet concepts and plans for use of the radio
spectrum upon the world at future international conferences.
2. Soviet jamming and interference practices and acts of pre-
clusion in the radio spectrum, when viewed in conjunction with
the development within the Soviet orbit of landwire and micro-
wave systems which are relatively invulnerable to non-Soviet
counter-action, form a more or less coherent picture of Soviet
preparations for an extension of the electromagnetic war in some
manner or other.
3. In consideration of Soviet jsmming capabilities (Reference c)
and the apparent vulnerability of our own military and civil
communications and navigation aids (and presumably those of
other non-Soviet countries) to Soviet electromagnetic warfare
offensive action, it appears that a power vacuum in this important
area of national activity exists in the world today. The Depart-
ment of State is of the opinion that ill considered or unwise action
or inaction on the part of this country or on the part of other non-
Soviet countries may result in additional and new Soviet action,
/ SECRET
112
ce SECRET
ITS INFORMATION
in which case the non-Soviet world may be faced with a new and
pecnlisx kind of accomplished aggression.
4. It is believed that the US would find it difficult to successfully
pursue an independent or isolated policy or course of action apart
frofn other non-Soviet countries with which this country has
broad political, economic and military commitments with respect
to Soviet aggression.
5. The use or misuse of the radio spectrum is of vital impor-
tance to many areas of national activity. These include military,
international political, psychological warfare, economic, commer-
cial transport, civil government, and perhaps others. The De-
partment of State feels that it is advisable for the various govern-
ment agencies responsible for or having an interest in these vari-
ous areas of national activity, whether carried on by public or
private agencies or both, to study the problem of electromagnetic
warfare and the threat of electromagnetic warfare from the stand-
point of its effect upon these respective areas of national interest
and upon the free world and to submit comments and recommen-
dations to the National Security Council from which it may ap-
praise the dimensions of the problem and determine what further
action, if any, is necessary to safeguard the Security of the Nation.
6. The Agencies of Government should consider, inter alia, the
desirability and feasibility of the following:
(a) Measures to deter the Soviets from expanding the elec-
tromagnetic war or to induce them to abandon it.
(b) Measures necessary to safeguard the National Security
against all probable Soviet action in this field.
(c) Preparations necessary to mount a counter attack
against Soviet broadcasting, communications, and radio navi-
gation aids.
pte? SECRET
113
e SECRET
SEc INFORMATION
APPENDIX III
May 2, 1953
Dear Mr. President:
Your Committee on International Information Activities has
given a good deal of thought to the organization of the Govern-
ment's foreign information activities. This subject will be dis-
cussed in detail in the Committee's report. however, in view of
the recommendations for the reorganization of the International
Information Administration which have been placed before you
by the Rockefeller Committee and the proposals for the imple-
mentation of these recommendations which are now being pre-
pared in the Bureau of the Budget, the Committee desires to sub-
mit certain recommendations to you at this time.
In determining the most satisfactory organization of interna-
tional information activities, the Committee has attempted to
define the mission and to agree on principles under which 'these
activities can be most effectively operated. The Committee has
reached the following Conclusions:
(1) Propaganda should be a flexible instrument of policy. It
is a basic misconception to regard it as an independent instru-
ment separate from policy.
(2) The cold war cannot be won by words alone. What we do
will continue to be vastly more important than what we say.
(3) The principal objective of our information activities is to
increase support abroad for those policies and programs which
we consider necessary to pursue in the national. interest and
to persuade foreign governments and peoples that such U.S.
policies and programs are also in their interest. While friend-
ship for the United States may be a useful means of persuasion,
it is not in itself a necessary objective of our propaganda efforts.
10165 SECRET
114
ce SECRET
SE INFORMATION
Regardless of organizational arrangements, the Committee be-
lieves that the following operating principles would further the
attainment of our objectives:
(1) The presence abroad of large numbers of Americans in gov-
ernment employ tends to impair the effect of our foreign infor-
mation programs Every effort should be made, therefore, to
reduce the size of American establishments abroad to that
necessary for the efficient conduct of the business of this Gov-
ernment in foreign countries.
(2) Evidence presented to the Committee indicates that the
effectiveness of U.S. information programs in foreign countries
is enhanced by the employment of local personnel. For this
reason, as well as in the interest of a general reduction in Amer-
ican personnel abroad, American information staffs should be
composed of local employees insofar as possible.
(3) People resent and reject advice or criticism from foreigners.
The United States foreign information media should accord-
ingly avoid undue use of exhortation. In particular, the
acknowledged U.S. broadcasts should be restricted to news, offi-
cial pronouncements and the entertainment programs essential
for the maintenance of audiences.
(4) New impetus should be given to the trend toward decen-
tralization of authority and responsibility. While the need for
a central nucleus of media services in Washington is recognized,
the conduct and initiation of information programs should as
far as possible occur at the country level under the guidance of
the Ambassador. The delegation of increased initiative to the
field should permit a considerable reduction of information per-
sonnel in the United States.
The Committee has considered a variety of proposals for the or-
ganization of the international information activities of the Gov-
ernment. It has concluded that the most satisfactory arrange-
ment would be to retain within the Department of State those
SECRET
115
SEceSECRET
INFORMATION
functions now assigned to the International Information Admin-
istration and to combine with them the information activities
heretofore conducted by MSA and TCA. Under such an arrange-
ment the Committee would favor higher rank for the Administra-
tor of the information agency and provision for autonomy in the
selection, assignment and management of personnel and in the
control of its own appropriations.
In reaching this conclusion, the Committee has been guided by
its conviction that information activities conducted by a free soci-
ety are necessarily based upon foreign policy and have no life
apart from it. The Department of State is primarily responsible
for the development of such policies. In the Committee's judg-
ment the creation of an independent agency to conduct foreign
information activities, even if provision were made for policy guid-
ance from the Department of State, would risk the emergence of
contradictory interpretations of foreign policies. The nature of
the problem requires close and frequent interchange during the
development of the programs between those responsible for the
formulation and conduct of policy and those responsible for its
interpretation and projection to foreign audiences. The Com-
mittee feels that this problem, which has presented difficulties
even while IIA has been within the Department of State, would be
further complicated by placing responsibility for the conduct of
foreign information activities on an independent agency.
In the interests of the closest possible integration of foreign in-
formation activities with the development of foreign policy the
Committee would, therefore, prefer to leave the program within
the Department of State. The Committee recognizes; however,
that there are strong arguments in favor of taking the informa-
tion program out of the State Department. Inasmuch as the
Department itself is reluctant to exercise the operating functions
involved, the Committee therefore does not oppose the recom-
mendations submitted by the Rockefeller Committee.
#SECRET
116
SECeINFORMATION
SECRET
The Committee wishes however to submit certain comments with
respect to the proposed reorganization plan based on the recom-
mendations of the Rockefeller Committee. The Committee con-
curs in the importance of providing the Director of the new agency
ton a current basis with full guidance concerning the foreign
policy of the United States. It questions, however, the desir-
ability of assigning to the Secretary of State responsibility for the
preparation of program material to be utilized on the informa-
tion media. In the view of the Committee any official statements
regarding the position of the United States emanating from the
Secretary of State will in the very nature of things be utilized by
U.S. information media. It is the conviction of the Committee
that program responsibility should rest exclusively with the in-
formation agency subject to foreign policy guidance from the
Secretary of State. Accordingly, we recommend that Sec. 202
(b) (2) of the proposed reorganization plan be deleted.
The role of an independent information agency in the conduct
of the whole information effort of the U.S. Oovernment and the
content of U.S. information programs will be dealt with at greater
length in the Committee's final report.
Respectfully,
WILLIAM H. JACKSON
Chairman
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
pieSECRET
117
SECRET
SEcXRITY INFORMATION
APPENDIX IV
RECOMMENDATIONS
Chapter One
The Nature of the Conflict
1. The necessary measures should be taken to provide net
estimates of political, economic and military capabilities. (page 3)
Chapter Four
Operations Against the Soviet System
Radio
2. Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts to the Soviet Union
should consist of objective, factual news reporting supplemented
by commentary. The tone and content should be forceful and
direct, but a propagandist note should be avoided. (page 35)
3. A reduction in the number of non-Russian languages used
in broadcasts to the Soviet Union appears desirable. (page 35)
4. All broadcast material to the Soviet system for which the
United States Government does not wish to accept responsibility
should be handled by Radio Free Europe (RFE), Radio Liberation,
rr other covert channA (page 36)
5. Maximum guidance for VOA programming to the Soviet
satellites should be provided by the American diplomatic missions
in these countries. (page 37)
6. VOA broadcasting facilities to Communist China should not
be expanded. (page 37)
7. Radio programs to Communist China should consist of
factual news reporting supplemented by commentaries. (page 37)
8. The United States should continue to operate Radio in
the American Sector of Berlin (RIAS) with the present type of
program. (page 38)
,'SECRET
118
e./SECRET
SE RITY INFORMATION
9. Russian language programs should be carried by RIAS
addressed to Soviet occupation troops in East Germany. (page 39)
10. The American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism,
Inc., should concentrate on the improvement of Radio Liberation
and reduce expenditures on the emigre coordinating center.
(page 40)
11. The National Committee for a Free Europe should devote
primary attention to RFE. The other activities of NCFE should
be subjected to review by CIA. (page 42)
12. The possibility of providing internationals onsorship for
RFEtt COver purpotishould be studiedkePIj A (page 43)
13. CIA's clandestine radio operations -should be continued.
(page 44)
Covert Activities
. Under present conditions covert activities against the Soviet
stemshould be concentrated on broadcasting from the peripli
(page 47)
Ia. Alleged resistance organizeionS within the system should
not be supported in the absence of ;s4ibstantial evidence that the
group exists and is not controlled by 'Soviet security agencies.
(page 48)
16. A major effort should be made to develop new coverttech-
niques which will be effective, notwithstanding Soviet counter-
measures, and will exploit vulnerabilities in the Soviet sysleR.,
A--Sho take the lead in this effort. (page 48)
r??????????????????1.N.
Psychological Warfare Operations under Military Auspices
in Korea
17. The National Security Council should initiate a study of
United States psychological warfare operations in Korea, includ-
ing policy with respect to prisoners of war. (page 50)
Defector, Refugee, and Related Activities
18. An office for the recruitment and training of indigenous
leaders from countries behind the Iron Curtain should be estab-
lished by the CIA. (page 51)
19. The necessary legislative and organizational measures to
provide adequately for the care and resettlement of refugees
from countries behind the Iron Curtain should be taken. (page 52)
le(SECRET
119
ile1ECRET
SEC ITY INFORMATION
Electromagnetic Warfare
20. Current consideration of this problem by the NSC should
be vigorously pressed. (page 53)
Chapter Five
Propaganda and Information Activities in the Free World
General
21. The Committee believes that the primary and over-riding
purpose of the information program should be to persuade foreign
peoples that it lies in their own interests to take action consistent
with the national objectives of the United States. The goal should
be to harmonize wherever possible the personal and national
self-interest of foreigners with the national objectives of the
United States. (page 58)
22. A continuing and coordinated effort should be made to
inform the world clearly of the American position on major issues.
(page 58)
23. The headquarters staffs of all agencies engaged in informa-
tion work should concentrate on the conception, planning and
coordination of global propaganda campaigns and less on de-
tailed control and execution of day-to-day operations. (page 60)
24. Although guidance on specific or local objectives of infor-
mation activities may often be required from Washington, such
guidance should generally be confined to global or regional
themes. When United States policy has been explained to the
field, information officials abroad should be permitted discretion
in adapting it to their local situations. (page 60)
25. Insofar as possible, information and propaganda material
should be prepared locally to meet local needs. (page 61)
26. The number of operating information personnel located in
the United States, particularly within IIA, should be substantially
reduced. (page 61)
27. Propaganda or information should be attributed to the
United States only when such attribution is an asset. A much
greater percentage of the information program should be un-
attributed. (page 61)
/.1? It'SECRET
120
'IcXT
SECRE
SE INFORMATION
28. In order to be less obtrusive, there should be a substantial
reduction in American personnel overseas in countries where they
are heavily concentrated. They should be replaced where nec-
essary by qualified local nationals. (page 62)
29. Far greater effort should be made to utilize private Ameri-
can organizations for the advancement of United States objec-
tives. The gain in dissemination and credibility through the
use of such channels will more than offset the loss by the Gov-
ernment of some control over the content. (page 62)
30. Both international orgari izations and allied governments
should be able to make a substantial contribution to American
propaganda objectives. Increased emphasis should be placed on
this form of international cooperation. (page 62)
31. More effective tactical control of the information and propa-
ganda program of the various United States agencies is needed
at the country level. This can best be accomplished by the
Chief of Mission with the advice of a "country team" composed
of the senior representatives of each agency operating informa-
tion programs (page 63)
. 32. More coordination of all types of =attributed 'propaganda
is necessary to prevent both waste and compromise of the covert
portion. Covert propaganda should be centralized in CIA. The
responsibility and authority for such coordination should be
placed in the Chief of Mission. (page 63)
? 33. An effective foreign information program can only be
achieved if it receives firm support to ensure permanency of
organization, consistency in appropriations and flexibility in
management. The Committee recommends that firm executive
and congressional support be extended, in order to stabilize the
organization and size of the information programs. Regulations
should be amended where possible to permit greater flexibility
In the allocation of funds and personnel. (page 63)
34. Appropriations for the information program should not
be drastically reduced until the new procedures recommended
have been tried. (page 64)
35. Public understanding and support of the program is vital.
The Committee supports the recommendation made by the United
States Advisory Commission on Information in its Seventh Semi-
Annual Report to Congress, January 1953, that IIA be authorized
to release domestically, without request, information concerning
its program. (page 64)
SECRET
121
ilSECRET
SEC RITY INFORMATION
36. Consideration should be given to reducing, where possible,
the adverse propaganda effects of certain security and immigra-
tion regulations. (page 65)
Media Recommendations
37. (a) Short-wave radio programs to the free world should be
continued only to those areas where the Chief of Mission ex-
presses a desire for retention or where the broadcasts are required
for purposes of electromagnetic warfare. (page 68)
(b) Broadcasts attributed to the United States Government
should concentrate on objective factual news reporting. Selec-
tion and treatment of news should seek to present a full exposi-
tion of United States actions and policies. (page 68)
(c) Radio should be used for exhortation in the free world
only on a non-attributed basis. In order to lessen attribution
and to reach the largest audience, maximum use should be made
of local broadcasting facilities. (page 68)
(d) Consideration should be given to changing the name
"Voice of America". (page 69)
38. (a) Exchange of persons, particularly students, for long
term cultural purposes is worthwhile and should be continued.
(page 70)
(b) More use should be made of the medium of exchange
of persons in influencing the attitude of important local in-
dividuals. (page 70)
39. Publications can be used to much better advantage. IIA
should carefully review its program and decentralize wherever
possible so that material will be more responsive to local needs.
The programs of all agencies should be reviewed. (page 72)
40. (a) Wherever possible, government films should be unat-
tributed and produced by local industry. Films should be more
suited to audiences. (page 73)
(b) Greater efforts should be made to influence commercial
film production in order to increase its contribution to the nation-
al information program. (page 73)
41. (a) The Information Centers fill a cultural need and should
be continued. (page 74)
(b) The Government should cooperate with the commercial
publishing industry and subsidize its efforts when necessary to
SECRET
122
T SECRET
SEC ITY INFORMATION
combat the flood of inexpensive communist books in the free
world. (page 74)
(c) While the Government must not aid in the distribu-
tion of subversive books, it should not hesitate to facilitate the
distribution of books which contain justified criticism of one
phase or another of American life. (page 74)
42. The United States should be in a position to provide advice
and assistance to foreign television industries in their formative
stages. Unattributed programs of American origin could be car-
ried on local stations.
Chapter Six
C.,overt Operations within the Free World
43. Efforts should be made to have the nations of Western
Europe, especially,France, Italy, and Western Germany, assume
greater responsibilities for covert political and propaganda action.
(page 79)
46. All covert operations in the,free world, especially the sup-
port of large front activities, should be thoroughly reviewed by
CIA. (page 86)
47. For the immediate future, CIA should give higher priority
to the development of improved principles of operation, training,
expansion of its pool of qualified operators, and construction of a
covert mechanism abroad. (page 87)
48. The Director of Central Intelligence should report semi-
annually to an appropriate body within the National Security
Council structure, such as the Operations Coordinatipg Board,
on the conduct of covert operations by the Agency, both, those
within the free world and those against the Soviet system.
(page 87)
'7/SECRET
123
_
)5.54S- overt political operations should remain the responsibil-
ity orCIA,,,,Cpage 97)
56. CIA should be reileve,cl. of its current responsibility for sup-
port of coastal raiding operltrris-,arkct this responsibility given
to the Department of Defense. (page 98) "----,
57. Guerrilla operations should remain the responsibility of
LEL (page 98)
58. Inasmuch as a reorganization plan with respect to foreign
information activities has been submitted to Congress for con-
sideration, the Committee makes no recommendation on this
point. (page 101)
59. New efforts should be made to improve personnel training
programs in the field of national security affairs and to broaden
and strengthen the concept of career services. (page 102)
/SECRET
SE RITY INFORMATION
Chapter Seven
Organization for a More Unifed Effort
49. The Psychological Strategy Board should be abolished.
(page 90)
50. The President should establish, within the National Security
Council structure, an Operations Coordinating Board to provide
for the coordinated execution of approved national security poli-
cies. (page 91)
51. The Consultants Group, established under NSC 10/2, should
be abolished and its functions assumed by the OCB and the OCB
staff. (page 93)
52. The Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee
(POC) should be abolished and its functions assumed by the OCB
and the OCB staff. (page 93)
53. Every effort should be made to strengthen the position
of the Chief of Mission as the principal United States authority
in overseas posts. (page 94)
54. The Operations Coordinating Board should ensure that
military activities make their full contribution to the attain-
ment of political objectives. (page 97)
P SECRET
124
SE
SECRET
RITY INFORMATION
APPENDIX V
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE
ON
INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION ACTIVITIES
Executive Secretary
ABBOTT WASHBURN
STAFF
Director of Staff
ROBERT BLUM
(Mutual Security Agency)
FRANK C. COOK
(Central Intelligence Agency)
EVELYN K. HALL
(Central Intelligence Agency)
TOWNSEND W. HOOPES
(Department of Defense)
WAYNE G. JACKSON
(Central Intelligence Agency)
FRANKLIN A. LINDSAY
(Central Intelligence Agency)
HENRY LOOMIS
(Central Intelligence Agency)
ROBERT L. LOUNSBURY
(Central Intelligence Agency)
LEWIS C. MATTISON
(Office of Defense Mobilization)
A. ATLEY PETERSON
(Department of Defense)
ELLIS L. PHILLIPS, JR.
FRANCIS B. STEVENS
(Department of State)
ROBERT W. TUFTS
(Department of State)
T SECRET
125