CONTINGENCY PLANNING REGARDING IRAQ

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: IRAQ
• Keywords: PAUL NORMAN
• Keywords: CONTINGENCY PLAN
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0000151333
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: July 27, 2011
• Case Number: F-2011-00668
• Publication Date: October 13, 1959

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
13 October 1959
j-
a
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. G. Lewis Jones
Assistant Secretary - Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs
Department of State
SUBJECT: Contingency Planning Regarding Iraq
1. At the last meeting of the Working Group on
Iraq I undertook to submit a paper listing the various
contingency situations with which we might be faced in
the near future, in order that plans may be drawn for
possible courses of action.
2. Before listing specific contingencies, I
should like to review the current picture in Iraq, as
we see it, and what we know about the plans and atti-
tudes of other countries which are directly concerned
with developments inside Iraq. The full implications
of the assassination attempt on Qasim cannot be assessed
as yet. Prior to this event, we had continued to be-
lieve that, despite certain evidence that he was apply-
ing a measure of control over Communist activities. and
was bringing to justice at least some of the perpetra-
tors of the Kirkuk affair, other recent acts, culminating
in the executions of 20 September, had probably caused
an 1rreparab1a._.bxeach between Qasim and Nationalist
e ` ~en s w n-tcountry. If any clue can be taken
from the frequent references to "imperalists" in state-
4- n A?, ? i n r,' 4-U- - - - A- r _ - - - -
Vlt%il-- "vu.LU Deem O De
-a strong possibility of a further crack-down on the
t
Nationalis
s. This, in turn, is likely to increase the
chances that they will make a desperate attem
t t
p
o re-
move Qasim from the scene and to install themselves in
It i
``
power.
s certain that the Communists, whose lives
and future would be at stake, would resist any such
action on the part of the Nationalists, and that a des-
perate struggle for power would than ens? Th
e
cannot
redi
t
~,7=r~
p
c
ed ~ ~ ~n any confidence. According
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 the Communists feel that they would emerge
1 L - ~- M+ n4--miererl a _ the
t n ationalist elements. The pre-
on
th an c~ie
t
s
.
reng
suggests that the
ponderances
Nationalists are likely to call for outside assistance
unless, as seems highly doubtful, they can quickly and
J decisively consolidate their position.
3. It is virtually certain that such a call for
assistance would be to other Arab States. We know that
Nationalist elements inside Iraq are in touch with the
UAR, and we also know that the UAR is seriously consider-
ing intervention under certain circumstances. We believe
that the UAR would prefer to conceal their hand to the
maximum extent possible, intervening indirectly through
the use of tribal elements, Iraqi exiles, and perhaps
commandos. We do not know the extent to which the UAR
would consider direct military intervention. We also
know that certain Iraqi Nationalists have been in touch
with the Jordanians. It appears that this group is
largely representative of elements which were in author-
ity prior to the July 11th Revolution, although they have
maintained contacts inside Iraq since that time. Further
evidence may temper this conclusion, but it now appears
that there is no coordination of effort between the
, .,-Iraqis who are in touch respectively with the UAR and
with Jordan.
4. Nor is there as yet any coordination of plans
or purpose between Nasser and King Husayn. Nasser has
stated that Husayn's participation in any response to a
call for help from Nationalists within Iraq would be
counter productive, to say the least. Husayn maintains
his deep distrust of Nasser and his motives, and firmly
believes that he would enjoy the support of a large
majority of Iraqis if matters ever came to a showdown.
A recent revival of the propaganda war between the UAR
and Jordan appears to have killed, at least temporarily,
the prospects for a meeting between Husayn and Nasser.
If such a meeting were to occur in the near future, the
outcome would be difficult to predict, but we believe
it unlikely that they could ever agree on specific joint
plans for an operation into Iraq. The position of the
Saudi Arabs in all this is unclear, but we believe that
under any circumstances their participation would be
marginal.
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 7. It is impossible to make our own contingency
plans without taking into account the likely attitudes
of non-Arab countries who would be vitally interested
in the event of a blowup in Iraq. As we see it, their
attitudes can be summarized as follows:
a. Turkey -- The Turkish Government
(even aecou Ong for a slight difference of
view between the Foreign Office and the Mili-
tary) remains convinced that Qasim is a sincere
Nationalist, and should be generally supported
and protected against the intrigues of Nasser.
Their attitude, in the event of the elimina-
tion of Qasim, would depend on the circumstances
which ensue, but it is safe to say that they
would look with extreme disfavor on any attempt
by the UAR to intervene, even in response to a
call for help from the Nationalists. We be-
lieve that the Turks are taking a completely
unrealistic view as to the danger of the Com-
munist threat to Iraq, but we see no evidence
of a change in this view despite what we con-
sider to be a rapidly deteriorating situation.
b. Iran -- The Iranians are deeply con-
cerned a"Gout' the Communist menace to Iraq, and
its possible implications regarding their own
internal stability. They too, however, view
Nasser with the greatest distrust, and would
be presently inclined to throw their support
to Husayn, and perhaps get involved them-
selves, if outside intervention became neces-
sary. The Shah is scheduled to meet soon with
King Husayn and it is predictable that this
meeting will result in firm pledges of mutual
support.
c. Israel -- The Israelis would take a
grave view of'Arab intervention in Iraq, parti-
cularly by Nasser, whom they consider to be
their number-one enemy. It is possible that
they would seize upon the fact of outside Arab
intervention in Iraq as an opportunity for
military action against either the UAR or
Jordan, or both. It should be noted that the
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 Israelis are developing increasingly closer
contacts with Turkey and Iran, particularly
the former, and there is a striking similar-
ity between the Turkish and Israeli assess-
ment of the situation in Iraq.
d. United Kingdom -- The U.K. shares our
4general assessment that a major blowup could
occur in Iraq at any time. Their attitude in
the event of some form of Arab intervention
from outside is not clear. It is known, how-
ever, that they would consider Pdasser domina-
tion of Iraq as a serious threat to the main-
tenance of their vital positions in the Middle
East.
e. France -- The French assessment of the
situation in Iraq is not known to us. We do
know, however, that they maintain very close
ties with the Israelis.
6. The above background is incomplete in many res-
pects, but we believe that it is relevant to a considera-
tion of the contingencies with which we might be faced in
Iraq, and of the manner in which we should prepare to deal
with them. As for the contingencies themselves, there are
any number of possibilities, but most of those which would
demand prompt policy decisions by the United States are
premutations and combinations based on a single central
fact -- the removal of Qasim.
7. If, by the time this happens, the Nationalists
have become completely demoralized and the Communists take
over quickly and without major incident, the interested
governments would be faced with grave decisions which are
beyond the scope of this paper. Alternatively, if the
Nationalists take over in the same manner, and without
apparent external assistance, there would appear to be no
major problem. The more likely contingency, however, would
be a period of prolonged disorder and confusion, with Nationa-
list and Communist elements each calling for help. In view
of the Communist apparent strategy to date of identifying
themselves as true Nationalists, there would appear to be
little likelihood of Soviet intervention, in the absence of
overt military intervention from other countries. In any
event, Soviet intervention in Iraq directly, would present
difficult logistical problems.
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 8. The most pressing, and at the same time most
complicated problem will arise if anti-Communist ele-
ments call for help. To summarize on the basis of intel-
ligence reported above, the United States should be pre-
pared to deal with some or all of the following:
a. A request by Nasser for moral, poli-
tical and material support for intervention
from, and directed by the LIAR. Although such
intervention would probably be indirect ini-
tially, it might become direct under certain
circumstances;
b. A similar request from Husayn, who
would probably consider direct intervention
more readily than Nasser;
c. From either Husayn or Nasser, a
request for guarantees against invasion by
Israel;
d. An Iranian request for support of
their efforts to eliminate Barzani and his
followers, principally through assistance
to friendly Kurdish elements within Iraq.
The Iranians would also exert every pres-
sure to have us support Husayn's efforts;
and
e. Strong representations from the
Turks or the Israelis to the effect that
Nasser should be forced to keep hands of
in Iraq.
9. In the event of a favorable response to the
10. Under any contingent circumstances, it is
obvious that diplomatic discussions would have to be
 undertaken with interested governments in the area. In
our opinion, such d-I.scussions should not be delayed. For
--- 7 _ -t - W.1 -,trim"4-
reasonm wn.L
we also believe that disc scions
should be held as promptly possible
on this problem.
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