LETTER TO THE HONORABLE ALLAN EVANS FROM W. F. RABORN RE - SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: VIETNAM U S
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005588558
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: November 5, 2010
• Case Number: F-2010-01830
• Publication Date: June 12, 1965

12 June 1965
The Honorable Allan Evans
Acting Director, Intelligence and Research
Department of State
The attached was prepared to assist me in pulling together some
of my thoughts on the situation in Vietnam. It was also designed to
serve me as a resume of intelligence community views which have
been set forth in the recent National Intelligence Estimates. Because
every effort was made to keep the present document to minimum length,
departures from the full texts -- as agreed -- were unavoidable. Even
though there are numerous estimates on the subject, they do not cover
all of the major points presently under discussion. Accordingly,. my
staff has supplemented community findings with judgments. very generally'
agreed to within the Central Intelligence Agency.
I 'ems have found the document useful and forward it to you for
your information, emphasizing again that you should consider it a
special-purposebr_i_efing n_e_andrn no sense an agreed pronouncement
of the United States Intelligence Board.
Sincerely,
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
W.. F. Raborn
Copies to:
The President
The Honorable
The Honorable
The Honorable
The Honorable
George Ball
Cyrus Vance
McGeorge Bundy
William Bundy
APPROVED FOR
RELEASEL DATE:
28-Oct-2010
Lt. General Joseph Carroll
Lt. General Marshall Carter
Maj. General Jack E. Thomas
Brig. General C. J. Denholm
Rear Admiral Rufus L. Taylor
TS 188665
cy #1
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
11 June 1965
BRIEFING PAPER
NIE's and SNIE's
Since June 1964 there have been 12 NIE's or SNIE's on South
Vietnamese problems. Only one of these, issued 4 February 1965,
"Short-Term Prospects in South Vietnam," was in any sense a general
assessment of the situation. Eight were on "Communist Reactions to
Certain Possible Courses of US Action" -- these US courses of action
were specifically given to us by policy-makers requesting the
respective Estimates.
Accordingly there 'are no agreed USIB documents which are
currently valid and which provide a general view of the situation
in all its aspects, or which deal with all contingencies which
might arise. \
In Part I, following, w\e attempt to present estimative judgments
on the most immediate issues. Column l poses the questions, or puts
the propositions. Column 2 contains what NIE's or SNIE's have said
on the matter. You will realize that this presentation omits sup-
porting arguments and most qualii cations. It may serve as a basis
for briefing.
Part II is a list of USIB-approved Estimates specifically
related to the Viet n situation, issued during the past 12 months.
It includes a very b lief note on each Estimates.
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T downgrading and
SENSITIVE declassification,
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PRINCIPAL ISSUES IN THE SHORT TERM
I. The Communists think they are
winning the war in South
Vietnam, because:
(a) It is a guerrilla war,
of small-scale operations, in
jungle and difficult terrain,
where advanced weapons,, air
power, and large-unit formations
are not of decisive importance;
The main judgments here are
found most recently in
SNIE 10-6-65 of 2 June 1965
(para. 3 for the DRV, para. 7
for the Chinese).
(b) it is a "war of national
liberation" -- a political and
social struggle -- the kind of
struggle which they believe they
will inevitably win;
(c) they think the US does not
understand how. to fight such a war;
(d ) they,, perceive the weaknesses
of the South Vietnamese government;
(e) they remember that they
defeated the French;
(f') finally, they think they
are winning because in fact they
are winning. '(See General
Westmoreland's recent cable.)
Virtually all the Estimates
stress Communist confidence
n ultimate victory.
No NIE would declare that
the Communists are winning the
war, and none does.
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II. As long as the Communists think This proposition is most
they are winning in South Vietnam, recently in sNIE 10-6-65,
bombing of, North Vietnam is 2 June 1965, applying,.how-
unlikely to lead them to make ever,-only to bombing as in
conciliatory gestures. (a) and (b).
Bombing of North Vietnam could be:
(a)' limited to targets and Since February 1965, SNIE's,
areas approximately as at have stated that.this degree
present; of bombing would not lead
Hanoi to make conciliatory
gestures.
(b) extended to airfields
and SAM sites near Nanoi (and
done with'' SAC aircraft);
(c,)/ extended (gradually) to
North Vietnamese industrial and
economic targets (not population
centers as such);
(d) indiscriminate and
complete.
SNIE 10-6-65 (2 June 1965)
says odds are against this
\leading Hanoi to conciliatory
estures. (Air Force dissents)
pNIE 10-3/1-65, 18 February,
said (with State dissenting)
that "if the US vigorously
c9ntinued in its attacks and
depmiaged some important economic
or litary assets the DRV ...
mij ht decide to intensify the
St ggle,. but ... it seems to
us somewhat more likely that
th y would decide to make some
ef~Fort to secure a respite
f om US attack ...."
The 2 June SNIE, however,
in effect though not specifi-
cally, reversed this judgment.
This has not been considered
in any USIB paper.
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YII. As long as the Communists think .
they are winninFr in South Vietnam
it is unlikely that Chinese
Communists or c~oviets will inter-
veneu with substantial military
forces of their awn, in combat.
Note however that con-
tinuance of the flow of mili-
tary supplies, equipment, and
probably small numbers of tech-
nical and training personnel
from China and the USSR to
North Vietnam is virtually
certain.
The message of all recent
SNIE's is in agreement with
this proposition, for three
main reasons:
1. Such intervention would
not be.necessary.
2. It would involve China
and Russia in undesired risk of
larger war with the US.
~3. The North. Vietnamese do
no want a massive Chinese
Communist presence in their
country; at least not until
their re ime is facing severe
defeat.
The chances of-large-scale DRV
invasion, 'of attacks on US aircraft
carriers or bases, or of large-scale
Chinese Communist'military interven-
tion call for further consideration,
as follows
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1. Large-scale, overt DRV
invasion of South Vietnam--
on the "Korean model.
:(a),' Appears to us to be mili-
tarily, imprudent.: The only north-
south road is the coast road, open
to US air and,naval bombardment.
(b) Caution. This does not
rule out accelerated and sub-
stantial infiltration of regular
DRV forces along trails west of
the coastal plain. This is
occuring and probably will
continue.
Estimated in 10-6-65, 2 June,
as unlikely in response to SAC
bombings of North Vietnamese
airfields and SAM sites, because
of the risks to the DRV in such
an invasion. '
But SNCE 10-5-65, 28 April,
says that if the US bombed
China in sustained fashion
"the-DRV armed forces,.with
Chinese-support, would probably
open an offensive against South
Vietnam." (This may not mean
a "Korean styled offensive,
however, but a greatly in-
tensified insurgency effort
within South Vjetnam.)
All Estimates On the matter
allow fo the possibility of
such an invasion. State con-
sisteitly has judged it more
likely, in certain contingencies,
than/have the other Agencies.
II. Attacks on US carriers or on
US air bases in South Vietnam.
Attacks on carriers are barel,
possible with Chinese Communist-_1
submarines, possible with Soviet
submarines, possible but almost
suicidal with IL-281s.
Attacks on airfields in South
Vietnam are possible but very
dangerous with IL-28's from North
Vietnam; are highly likely by
sabotage teams.
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The possibility of such
attacks is recognized in
SNLE'e, but (except for
sabotage or sneak attacks
on US airfields) they are
deemed unlikely.
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III. Substantial Chinese Communist
Military Intervention in
Vietnam, in Combats with
(a) Chinese Communist air-
craft and pilots,. based in
North Vietnam.
(b) Chinese Communist air-.
craft from bas%~. in China.-__
(c) Chinese Communist attack
on the offshore islands, Taiwan,
or South Korea.)
(d) Large numbers of
Chinese Communist "volunteers"
in the Korean style.
Considered likely,-in response
to US bombing of North Vietnam,
as far back as SNIE 10-3-65,
Al February 1965. Limited,
however, by capability of North
Vietnamese airfields, especially
if these airfields were under
US attack.
State considered this likely
if US bombing extended to
northern North Vietnam. All
other-agencies considered it
unlikely. SNIE 10-3-65,
11 February. A1a6~ NIE 10-6-65,
2 June.
Considered unlikely in
SNIE 10-5-65, 28 April; even
if the US bombed South/China
with sustained air stzikes.
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Question: When would the Chinese
Communists intervene militarily with,
ground.forcea in a substantial
fashion (so as to change the
character of the war)?
(a) If the US/GVN were winning
the war in South~Vietnam? Probably
not.
Not ;estimated by USIB.
(b) If US air attacks began ' Judged unlikely in SLATE
military sector of North Vietnam?
Probably not:-
to. damage the industrial and 10-3-65, 11 February 1965
(with partial State dissent).
This Estimate almost certainly
still holds.
(c) If the US bombed fighter
bases in South China? Probably
yes, if the bombings continued
over some time.
(d) If US ground forces in-
vaded North Vietnam in such
strength as to control most of
the country? Probably yes;
almost certainly yes if US
.forces approached the Chinese,
frontier.
Question: What about Soviet
military intervention in combat.
Such intervention is Judged to
be extremely unlikely.
(a) Vietnam is too far
away for the Soviets to support
a useful military operation,
especially in view of their un-
friendly relations with Communist
China.
(b) The Soviets wish to
avoid a military confrontation
with the US.
SNIE 10-5-65, 28 April 1965,
says that the Chinese under
these circumstances would
-probably move forces "into
Nor?hVietnam" and'Northern
Laos, and~ould threaten
Thailand. \\
This is a 34dgment agreed in.
USIB a long time ago. There
has been no occasion to repeat
it in the.pal~t year.
i
SNIE s generally estimate
Soviet reactions to be confined
to propaganda, diplomatic
maneuver, and supply of weapons
and equipment to North Vietnam.
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SOME POLITICAL FACTORS
I. The Chinese ?Cbr nunists are
violent, unyielding, offering
no avenue to settlement:
acceptable to the US.
though not
II. The l'JRV is almost
,
quite, as obdurate as the
Chinese, and have apparently
grown more so in recent; weeks.
III. The Soviets would probably like
to get the problem settled, but
they cannot force the DRV to a
settlement, and there is no rea-
son to suppose that they feel,-
either the necessity or the
desire to work towards a settle-
ment on US terms. Their atti-
tude has hardened in recent
weeks. It is worth noting that
Brezhnev and Kosygin have
reversed Khrushchev's policy of
disengagement from the
Vietnam problem.
All'this i..ii accord with
SNIE's and NIE'&
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IV. The Sino-Soviet quarrel is a
factor of?irst importance.
Mien simpli
(a) :The . Chinese maintain
their extreme revolutionary
cessful. outcome in Vietnam (from
their point' of view) will enhance
their position in the Communist
world and among underdeveloped
nations. They wish to maximize
their influence in North"Vietnam, Generally in accord with
at'Soviet expense. N. 1. various USIB pronouncements.
(b) The Soviets cannot afford
(even if they wish) to appear
backward in their support of a
"revolutionary struggle." But
they are challenging Chinese
influence in North Vietnam by
supplying things (SAM's,
IL-28's) which the Chinese
cannot produce.
(c) The DRV appears eager
to balance the overwhelming
Chinese presence (owing to size
and proximity) in their
affairs with a growing
Soviet involvement.
V. The fragility of the governmental
structure in South Vietnam is also
an important factor in Communist
calculations.
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 the area and scope of the war.
VI. Free World Attitudes'
There is widespread die- Not covered in NIE's.
approvaLl'of US actions in Vietnam
in the Free World generally, in-
cluding; the,~US itself.
We believe that. the Communists -Emphasized in all SNIE's.
rely . heavily. on this feeling to'
restrain the US from (1) anything
approaching unrestricted bombing
of North Vietnam and (2)'widening
Communist diplomacy and
propaganda is vigorous in en-
couraging the disapproval of US
policy. It is an extremely
important element in their
general line of policy.
Emphasized in all SNIE's.
FINAL NCTI'E
One Estimate -- that on reactions *'GOUS bo bing of China --
deals in its final section with a situation of general war in the
Far East -- perhaps in the world. We note that' except for this, all
the Estimates deal with situations of moderate/or limited escalation
(or no escalation). The general proposition is that the Communists
will try to restrain further expansion of military conflict -- if
only because they are doing well in conflict on the present scale.
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PART II
\.11 June 1965
USIB-APPROVED ESTIMATES SPECIFICA~'l,LY RELATED TO THE
VIETNAM SITUATION, ISSUED DURING '~h PAST TWELVE MONrHt
8 September 1964, SNIE 53-64, Chances for a Stable Government
nin South Vietnam
Written as General hanh took control. "At present the odds
are against the emergence of a stable government capable of
effectively prosecuting the war in South Vietnam. Yet the situation
is not hopeless...."
1 October 1964, SNIE 53-2-64, The Situation in South Vietnam
The Problem was "To examine the situation as it has developed
since early September, and to assess its implications for the US."
It said: "Since our estimate of 8 September 1964 the situation in
South Vietnam has continued to deteriorate... We believe that the
conditions favor a further decay of GVN will and effectiveness.
The likely pattern of this decay will be .ncreasing defeatism,
paralysis of leadership, friction with Americans, exploration of
possible lines of political accommodation with the other side,
and a general petering out of the war effort...."
9 October 1964, SNIE 10-3-64, Probable Communist Reactions to Certain
Possible US GVN Courses of Action
After dealing with two lesser courses, this.estimate addressed
itself to Communist reactions to "a systematic program of gradually
intensifying US/GVN /ai 7 attacks against targets in the DRV itself,,
including those associated with -infiltration routes and military and
economic targets...." This estimate tended, very hesitantly, to the
judgment that such a program of air attacks, if continued, would
probably cause the DRV to stop its military attacks in South Vietnam,
press for a negotiated cease-fire in the South, and try to promote
an international conference to pursue their ends, expecting, however,
to fight another day. State-dissented, believing that the DRV would
carry on the fight.
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4 February 1965, SNIE 10-65, Comii' i'stMilitary Capabilities and
Sb~ uth:?Vietnam
This paper assesses the/meaning of recent Communist force
build-ups in South Vietnam/bb Laos;, it sees them as having the
purpose of improving Communist military capabilities in those areas,
and deterring the US from expanding the war to North Vietnam. They
did not (according to the estimate) "appear to be of the nature or
scope that we';would.=e pect.to precede. a major change in the nature
of Communist military activity in Laos or Vietnam such as would
precede a major offensive." Also: "We believe that Hanoi and
Peiping are determined to. continue their present policies in Laos
and South Vietnam. While the Communists are probably not yet
ready to embark on a general military offensive, it is almost
certain that they will continue their support of insurrectionary
forces and will prepare to exploit any new opportunities which
arise in either Laos or South Vietnam."
4 February 1965, SNIE 53-65, Short-Term Prospects in South Vietnam
This was an estimate on significant political forces and
attitudes in South Vietnam, with an assessment of the prospects
over the next month or so. It grew out of the current conflict
between Buddhists and Catholics, and analyzed the nature of these
and other forces at work.
11 February 1965, SNIE 10-3-65, Commimi st Reactions to Possible
US Actions
The Problem was "To estimate'Communist reactions, particularly
Soviet reactions, to a US course of sustained air attacks on North
Vietnam." The Soviet response "would consist both of a vigorous
diplomatic and propaganda effort to bring the US to the conference
table and the provision of military support to North Vietnam." This
support would almost certainly include anti-aircraft artillery and
radars; the chances were about even that the Soviets would provide
some SA-2 defenses. In the world generally the USSR would harden
its policies toward the US. The DRV would probably not reduce'its
levels of activity. China might send some few volunteers but
would not intervene on a substantial scale. Fighters based in
North Vietnam would probably be employed to the extent of their
capabilities against the US attacks. If US attacks reached the
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 northern part of the DRV.:China might: act over North Vietnam with
fighters from its own bases. (State 'relieved China "woiAd
probab:
18 February .1965, SNIE 10-3/1-65, ommun9.st Reactions to Possible
I US Courses of Action !'4p amast
North Vietnam
This estimate was a supplement to the .preceding' one. The
majority here inclined slightly to the:view that Hanoi would make
some effort-to she a respite from such attacks, if they were
declared. and sustained, and if they damaged some important economic
or military assets. (State dissented.)
19 March 1965, SNIE 10-4-65, Probable Communist Reactions to Deplo -
meat of.a BOX Combat Division for Base
Security Duty in South Vietnam
This paper estimated that there would not be much Communist
reaction, beyond propaganda.
28 April 1965, SNIE 10-5-65, Communist Reactions to Certain US Actions
Problem: "To estimate likely Communist, particularly Soviet
and Chinese, reactions to non-nuclear air strikes by the US against
.China." The paper dealt with three possibilities: (a) to an initial
exchange, and similarly limited US responses to further Chinese
air attacks; (b) expanded US air attacks to include other'targets
of military significance in South China (beyond airfields); and
(c) US air strikes expanded to include hundreds of.targets of major
military significance throughout China.
2 June 1965, SNIE 10-6-65, Probable Communist Reactions to Certain US-
Actions
4 June 1965, SNIE 10-6/1-65, Probable Reactions to Certain US Courses
of Action
4 June 1965, SNIE 10-7-65, Implications of a Certain US Course of
Action
These three papers dealt with probable reaction to a US air
attack, using heavy bombers, aimed at destroying fighter and bomber
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sites,.light bombers, and fighters/recently furnished to the DRV
by the; USSR.
to i c: heavy bomber strikes on enemyipositions in South Vietnam;
and the: implications'. of not at-Lackiniz the surface-to-air missile
aircraft andsurface-to-air.missiles\in North ViP_tnnmi rAnrtinna
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