POW/MIA CLOSED BRIEFING 25 NOVEMBER 1991

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005381571
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 76
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: August 17, 2010
• Case Number: F-2009-00396
• Publication Date: November 21, 1991

C01352213 SECT
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APPROVED FOR
RELEASE[] DATE:
14-Jun-2010
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
21 November 1991
OCA; 4837-91
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central intelligence
Office of Congressional Affairs
SUBJECT: POW/MIA Closed Briefing 25 November 1991
1. You will be making a brief opening statement to the
Committee. This will go a long way toward convincing the
Committee of the Intelligence Community's commitment to support
its work. We have included reference to-sources and methods in
your remarks because this will be one of the key issues as the
Committee presses for full declassification of all materials
related to POW/MIA matters.
2. Our understanding is that the Committee is interested
primarily in an informal exchange of information with only
limited structure. We do not anticipate that~you will be asked
any particular questions. Essentially the Committee wants a
brief update on what the various agencies are doing in this
area and then turn to questions. DIA's prepared talking points
reflect that understanding as does the short statement prepared
for ADDO Price. Both are in your briefing book. We anticipate
having NSA's statement shortly.
3. There are likely to be several areas the Senators will
want to explore. One is the whole issue of sources and methods
and why sources of considerable vintage and not of central
value must be protected. We have taken the position that while
we are redacting all reporting to be shown to the Committee
staff we will, upon request, show unredacted information to
members or cleared staff on a case by case basis. This is an
even more liberal policy than is our practice with the
Oversight Committees. CIA and DIA have worked out agreed
guidelines in this area, a copy of which is in~the background
material. These guidelines have been shown tolCommittee staff
but not accepted by them.
4. A second issue concerns Laos. The Senators are likely
to focus on the large number of unresolved cases in Laos. DIA
and CIA will be prepared to respond in detail. There is also
keen interest in the status of civilian intelligence operatives
 5. There is also the issue of POW/MIA family members
having access to classified materials. DOD is seeking to
develop a policy in this area in response to Congressional
pressure. DIA and CIA have some concerns but will be
supportive so long as sources and methods are protected.
6. Overall we anticipate most'of this meeting being an
information gathering session with the Senators asking
questions that they could not get answers to in the open
session. Hopefully in this process two points will be made.
One that there are strong reasons for keeping some of the
materials relating to POW/MIA in Classified form. Secondly,
there is a need for the Committee to address classified issues
in a closed forum. On the latter point, both Senator's Kerry
and Smith pressed DIA to discuss code breaking in Laos in open
session. NSA will address this issue in the closed session and
other speakers will be supportive.
7. There is general agreement that there must be a
positive and forthcoming attitude toward responding to the
Committee's interests. Yet all agencies want to avoid carte
blanche access to all information that includes data revealing
sources and the methods of acquisition. Even more, they want
to uphold the overall principal of such protections because of
the .larger equities involved.
 C01352213 SET
DDCI Opening Remarks
ADDO Statement
NSA Statement
DIA Statement
Qs & As
Background Information
--19 Sep 91 Letter from ADCI to Richard B. Cheney,
The Secretary of Defense
--04 Oct 91 Categories for Review/Redaction with
Release of Classified POW/MIA Documents to
Appropriately SCI Cleared Staff of Temporary
Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
--18 Nov 91 Memorandum for the Record re POW/MIA
Committee Hearing on 15 November
--12 Nov 85 Memorandum for National Foreign Intelligence
Board re Interagency Committee on Vietnam MIA's/POW's
--1986 Memorandum of Understanding between the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA)
 C01352213 SECT
 MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, I AM PLEASED TO
APPEAR BEFORE YOU THIS AFTERNOON TO UNDERSCORE THE IMPORTANCE
THAT I AND THE WHOLE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ATTACH TO YOUR
EFFORTS TO WORK TOWARD A FINAL RESOLUTION OF LONGSTANDING
CONCERNS ABOUT POWS. AND MIAS FROM THE INDOCHINA WAR. I REGRET
THAT MY SCHEDULE ALLOWS ONLY A BRIEF APPEARANCE TODAY. I HAVE,
HOWEVER, BROUGHT WITH ME SENIOR MEMBERS FROM THE CONCERNED
AGENCIES-AND THEIR RESPECTIVE EXPERTS-WHO ARE PREPARED TO
BRIEF YOU ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THEIR AGENCIES AND RESPOND TO
YOUR QUESTIONS. FROM THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY--THE LEAD
AGENCY FOR THE COMMUNITY ON THIS ISSUE--IS ITS NEW DIRECTOR,
GENERAL CLAPPER. FROM THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY IS ITS
CHIEF OF STAFF, DONALD PARSONS, AND FROM CIA IS ASSOCIATE
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS TED PRICE.
LET ME SAY EMPHATICALLY AT THE OUTSET THAT THE WORK OF
YOUR NEW COMMITTEE HAS MY FULL SUPPORT AND THAT OF THE DCI.
THE SUBJECT OF POW/MIAS IS A DIFFICULT AND HIGHLY EMOTIONAL
ONE. I AM AWARE OF THE INTENSE INTEREST IN IT, AND OF THE
IMPORTANT ROLE THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS PLAYED AND
CONTINUES TO PLAY IN DEVELOPING AND DISSEMINATING INFORMATION
ON IT. I ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE STRONG VIEWS ABOUT
 INTELLIGENCE REPORTING AND ITS AVAILABILITY TO THOSE DEEPLY
CONCERNED ABOUT THE FATE OF INDIVIDUALS STILL MISSING IN
INDOCHINA. I HOPE THAT THROUGH THIS PROCESS THOSE CONCERNS CAN
BE PUT TO REST.
THE DCI HAS THE STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROTECTING
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS. I WANT TO ASSURE YOU,
HOWEVER, THAT THE INTERAGENCY TEAM THAT HAS BEEN ASSEMBLED WILL
BE AS RESPONSIVE AS POSSIBLE IN SETTING ITS GUIDELINES AND IN
DEALING WITH THE COMMITTEE'S INTERESTS. ONLY WHEN IT IS
ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR THE PROTECTION OF THOSE SOURCES AND
METHODS WILL THERE BE ANY LIMITATIONS ON THE MATERIALS TO BE
REVIEWED, AND ANY SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION WILL BE PROVIDED TO
YOU.
THROUGHOUT THIS PROCESS I RECOGNIZE THAT THERE MAY'WELL BE
AREAS OF DIFFICULTY OR DISAGREEMENT, BUT I ASSURE YOU THAT THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IS COMMITTED TO WORKING WITH YOU TO
REACH ACCEPTABLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE FULL SHARING OF
INFORMATION. I ALSO CAN ASSURE YOU THAT THE COMMUNITY WILL
CONTINUE TO ATTACH THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE TO COLLECTING AND
DISSEMINATING INFORMATION ON THE POW/MIA ISSUE AND WILL DEVOTE
SUBSTANTIAL RESOURCES WORLDWIDE TO THAT EFFORT. WE WANT TO BE
AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE.
 C01352213 SEC
LET ME NOW TURN TO THE AGENCY REPRESENTATIVES, EACH OF
WHOM HAS PREPARED REMARKS ADDRESSING THE ACTIVITIES OF
THEIR INDIVIDUAL AGENCIES.
 Mr. Chairman, members of Committee, I welcome this
opportunity. to discuss CIA's role in resolving the status of
prisoners-of-war (POW) and missing-in-action (MIA) from the war
in Indochina.
-- This issue has remained an important collection
requirement since the beginning of U. S.
involvement in the war in Indochina.
-- CIA is committed to continue its intelligence
collection program and provide whatever
resources are necessary to resolve the status of
Indochina War POW's and MIA's.
-- As the DCI stated earlier, we are determined to
cooperate with the lead Agency, DIA, in every
way possible consistent with our statutory
requirement to protect sources and methods, in
making available to your Committee and to other
appropriate recipients, materials bearing on
this issue.
 -- Let me emphasize that in almost every instance,
we believe we will be able to satisfy your
legitimate informational needs on this matter.
the first question our officers in the field ask
hom they believe might have access to
 C01352213 EfT
Once collected, we disseminate intelligence
expeditiously to authorized customers for action.
disseminated approximate) n
subjects such as the downing of U. S. aircraft,
possible grave sites, sightings of U. S.
servicemen, alleged discovery of remains and
Hanoi's position on U. S. MIA's.
-- Some 6.5 linear feet of material covering
reporting between 1964 and 1979 has been
declassified in response to FOIA requests.
---5?l2?T
 C01352213
Mr. Chairman, we in CIA are committed to resolving the
POW-MIA matter, and our resources are turned to this purpose.
This concludes my statement.
5
SEC
 C01352213 SEC OT
 C01352213 jlt4ET
DIA'S PRIMARY MISSION IS LIVE PRISM IS E - OLLDCItt]G (STONY BEACEi),
ANALYZING AND REPORTING ON ANY AMERICANS STILL HELD IN CAPTIVITY.
SEOONAARY MISSIONS INVOLVE SUPPORT TO DC AREA POLICY OFFICALS AND ANALYTIC
SUPPORT TO C AC/JCRC FULIMT POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING EFFCRTS.
BOTH MISSIONS INVOLVE HIGHLY SPECIALIZED ANALYSIS THAT USUALLY MUST RELY ON
SKEICI3Y DETAIL. THIS ANALYSIS IN AN ARTECRI.! REQUIRING CNSI Anr2 OJT.
DIA POW MIA OFFICE 0.NTIIVUCLELY IN EXISTENCE SINCE VII'IIWI WAR. REVThW PGt-MIA
AND STONY BEACH RESOURCE NOMBBBS ON REVERSE.
UNTIL GE N VESSEY' S APPOINTMENT AS SPECIAL ENVOY TO VN ON POW-MIA, LflTr.E ACTUTAL
PROGRESS WAS MADE IN RESOLVING CASES -- VIETNAM, LAOS AND CAMBODIA WERE
ESSENTIALLY DENIED AREAS.
WHAT IS NOW CRITICAL IS CRITING VIETNAM, LTA AND CAMBODIAN GOVT APPROVAL OF A
LIVE SIC3tmc INVESTIGA=CN REGIME SIMILAR TO ARMS LII4ITATION A(REDGMS
HI3RED CUT WITH THE SOVIETS -- NAMELY, ND NOTICE VISITATIONS TO SITES OF FIRST
HAND SIG?1'ING REPORTS AND CERTAIN OILIER CAMPS AND PRISONS THAT COULD POTENTIALLY
BE INVOLVED IN FOLDING AMERICAN PRISONERS.
DIA IS NOW WORKING C L ELY WITH THE JOINT STAFF AND CINCPAC TD ITFflWI'E OUR
ANALYTIC AND COLLECTION EETC2'Iu WITH CINCPAC'S PROPOSED POW-MIA JOINT TASK
FORCE. (INTEL SUPPORT ERCM DIA; SHARED TASKING OF STONY BEAM).
o ISSUE RECEIVING APPROPRIATE PRIORITY WITHIN DIA
-- OFFICE REPORRTS TO COMMAND ELEMENT
-- NECESSARY BILLETS TAKEN OUT OF HIIY+ BEECRE ACTIVE CONS INTEREST
-- AGGRESSIVE, MUITVATED AND KNICKLED3MBLE PERSONNEL, ASSIGNED
o OTHER INTEL AGENCIES PROVIDING STRONG SUPPCR'T
o ALL "INI'S" TASKED; COLLECTION PRICZCE'TY SUFFICIENT
o DClD POLICY OFFICIALS NO LONGER RELYING ON DIA 10 "CARRY THE WEIGH"
o DIA IS READY, WILLING AND ABLE TO FULLY SUPPORT THIS 44]?ITEE AND THE
WHAT HAS BECOME KNOWN AS THE WVERX*I 1'S "FULL COURT PRESS" OVER THE NEXT
2 OR 3 YEARS.
SEAR?T------- ---------
 C01352213 5EC T
 001352213 SEC T
ANSWER: The documents were initially classified to protect
national security interests which includes the protection of
the source of the information, the place and manner in which it
was acquired, any foreign intelligence service involvement,
references to other operational activity and administrative
details such as cryptonyms, field report numbers, source and
field comments.
Source information continues to be classified despite the
passage of time because of the continuing ramifications of
protecting sources. Other sources would be wary of cooperating
with us if we released information which pinpoints its origin
with no regard for the effect this information might have on
heirs, survivors or colleagues.
 C01352213 SERET
QUESTION: What information has been declassified and released
to the public via the FOIA?
ANSWER: Ann Mills Griffiths, Executive Director of the
National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing
in Southeast Asia, filed an FOIA case in May 1979 requesting
all documents and intelligence reports, not previously
released, which originated or were held by CIA elements
operating in Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia from May
1964-present (May 79) which relate to American POWs,
Six and one-half linear feet have been released to the
public and DIA in response to this request. The information is
compiled chronologically and it is contained in some twenty-two
volumes representing periodic releases over a ten year period
ending in 1989. A complete set is on file in Information
Services Division, DDA in Ames Building.
These reports are in sanitized form, having details about
sources and methods deleted from them. They may be passed, as
is, in a body to a centrally controlled DIA reading room for
access by the public. Privacy concerns of multiple American
names in many reports have not been addressed and we deter to
the DIA on this issue.
R?-T- -- --._..._
 QUESTION: Is there any intelligence reporting to indicate the
possible presence of POW-MIA's from the Indochina war being
transferred to the Soviet Union or China?
ANSWER: We have neither substantive intelligence or
fragmentary reporting which indicates that American POW's were
transferred to the Soviet Union or China during the.war. We
are in the the process of querying the KGB on this issue.
Because of the previous hostile environment in Moscow,
collection on POW-MIA'
S E C E T
S GR? ------- ----
3j
 C01352213 SEC ET
QUESTION: Are you familiar with the case of the mortician who
claimed there were over 400 sets of remains of Americans from
the Indochina War being warehoused in Hanoi?
as interviewed by
sserted that he personally inspected the remains of
over 400 U.S. military personnel which were in secret storage
in Hanoi. Th~-Ieguested
n an attempt to v e r i f - Y 7 lain: a re u
id not support
se s o r s or that he p y saw three alive American
soldiers in Hanoi. A review
nitec states with results that as to ng the
the time, DIA's conclusion was thatl
(were incorrect
aims on
o ygrap e
we have not seen a copy of the DIA polygraph
report to make an analysis.
S E C V E T
--- - SCRET----
 ANSWER: Over the years there have been continuing stories
about the possible existence of POW's still being held in
as well as the a emp s o oca .tea I
imagery. -there were reports of alleged POW working in gold
mines or held being held in caves. A report regarding a
Caucasian spotted bathing in a stream in north Laos was
investigated and to the best of our knowledge was a. Czech
.geologist working in the area. Our capabilities in Laos are
somewhat limited but we do attempt to followup and verify
substantive reporting on POW-MIA's. We have no reporting to
support the claim that there may still be POW's or MIA's being
held in Laos. In fact, in spite of all our efforts over a
number of years, we have received no credible evidence that
there are-in fact American prisoners being held in Vietnam,
Laos, or Cambodia.
With regard to pilots or crew members of Air America or
Continental Air Service, there were nine individuals
unaccounted as of mid-1973. All of these cases were turned
over to the Department of Labor for resolution as the
individuals were contract employees of the U.S. government.
 QUESTION: Why was source information given away to the
Vietnamese and Cambodian authorities in July 91 while at the
BACKGROUND: In July 1991 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,
Ken Quinn, passed a list of names of individuals to Cambodian
and Vietnamese authorities requesting access to talk with these
individuals on POW-MIA matters. He did this while visiting
Hanoi and Phnom Penh on POW-MIA matters.
ANSWER: The individuals in question were not sources of
intelligence but were individuals thought by State or the
families of POW-MIA's to have possible information. This was
not a clandestine intelligence collection activity. We do not
know what, if any followup there has been on this issue as we
were not involved in this overt collection effort.
 ANSWER: We are willing to work in concert with DIA on this
issue as they maintain the files on the individual POW or
MIA's. Our concern is that sources and methods continue to be
protected and we are hopeful that we can come up with a
mutually beneficial solution. The files currently under review
for this committee could possibly be made available to the
families if properly controlled in a secure facility to which
the families could be given access.
 C01352213 7RET
kilometers from the North Vietnamese/Laotian border atop Phou
Pha Thi mountain. The site was used to direct and control
attacking jet fighters and bombers to their targets and to
artillery fire, and in the early morning hours that followed,
20 heavily armed infiltartors launched a surprise attack on the
Of th mericans at the site, only five
ive of the six technicans were
ere extracted.
wUurIUWU' U1 hit by fire while in the helicopter
and he died in route. The[:~ emaining Americans were presumed
dead.
An enemy buildup had been underway for several months in
the area prior to the attack and intelligence reporting
indicated that the safety of the site was questionable after 10
March.
 1 9 SEP 5881
The Honorable Richard B. Cheney
The secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000
Dear Mr. Secretary:
The Agency has been contacted by Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Command; Control, Communications and Intelligence Duane P. Andrews concerning
Senate Resolution 82 which creates a temporary Select Committee on PCW/MIA
Affairs... It is my. understanding that this Committee will request access to
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) files, some of which contain CIA-generated
classified information. Assistant Secretary Andrews has asked that the
Agency work with the Department of Defense (DOD) to develop guidelines
concerning committee access to these files.
In response to Secretary Andrews' request for assistance, Agency officers
are working with the newly-created PoWIMIA Data Release office to review DIA
files. once these officers have determined the scope and sensitivity of
the CIA-originated information in the files, we will be able to develop
appropriate guidelines for use with the Committee. In. addition, I have
designated a senior attorney in the office of General -Counsel to work with
DOD attorneys to negotiate with the Select Committee concerning access to
classified information in the files. I want to assure you that the Agency
will cooperate fully with the Committee, and I am confident that guidelines
can be developed that will ensure full compliance with the spirit of Senate
Resolution 82 while at the same time meeting our statutory duty to protect
intelligence sources and methods.
I have designat ief, Policy and Coordination Staff
as the Agency's point matter.
Sincerely,.
a r'~ . z
V
Richard J. Kerr
Acting Director of Central Intelligence
 C)
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 SEC T
CIA C TERIA
Source/Asset identifying data (an identifying number
corresponding to the DIA file will be assigned for
inquiry and accountability purposes)
Foreign liaison identifying information
Third Agency Information with appropriate referral
information added
Place acquired where clandestine collection involved
Agency employee identification (requires DIA
assistance since such information will likely not
appear in the CIA report but in collateral documents)
Cryptonyms
Field Report Number
Reference to current operational activitites
Methodology
Staffer clearances will be granted on the same basis
as those of SSCI staffers.
Committee members may view original reports at DIA
(where iecord' file'?fiaiftaihed) ?-or'at?C~AraEer? -?--
access to original reports will be on-case*by case
basis based upon demonstrated compelling need. .
Committee may not release Agency-as$o_giated...classified,
information to the public without prior Agency
declassification.
Storage of classified material will be in accordance
with procedures established for SSCI storage and as
worked out with Senate Security Officer DiSilvestro.
 OCA 4821-91
18 November 1991
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: POW/MIA Committee Hearing on 15 November
1. I attended a portion of the above-mentioned open
Hearing (list of members attached). This was an opportunity
for the Administration in the persons of Bob Sheetz of VIA,
Ken Quinn from State and Carl Ford from DOD/ISA to address some
of the charges made by other witnesses before the Committee the
previous week. Ford's Statement is attached.
2. During the questions period, several areas of inquiry
developed which could bear on the closed briefing now scheduled
for 1430 on 20 November in 5407. Agency participants at that
briefing should be prepared to deal with some if not all of
these issues.
3. Although unrelated to the actual focus of the
investigation, there was considerable interest in the possible
presence of POW/MIAs in the Soviet.Union given the recent press
article on that possibility. The Senators asked specifically
if there had been contact with the KGB to inquire about this.
State noted the diplomatic efforts. The Agency rep could be
asked about contact with the KGB.
4. Ken Quinn was asked repeatedly about a list of
individuals in Indochina who allegedly had information about
POW/MIAs which he had given to the Vietnamese and Cambodian
authorities in July 1991. Senators Smith and Grassley in
particular asked if, in effect, he was not passing source
information. They went on to ask why the Administration would
give away one type of source information while vigorously
guarding the refugee reporting sources. Quinn explained the
difference between people who are in fact intelligence sources
and those we believe have information and with whom we wanted
to be in contact. Smith and/or Grassley can be counted on to
raise the same issue at the closed briefing.
5. Carl Ford raised the issue of providing POW/MIA family
members access to a broader range of classified information,
saying that he is wrestling with how to arrange such access.
 C01352213 SECRET
SE
PET
(In an earlier conversation Keith Hall told me that this is
something that Defense is pushing and will eventually need an
Agency input relative to the inclusion of CIA material in the
DOD holdings.) The Agency rep should be prepared with some
form of response if this issue comes up. Senator Robb was
particularly interested in this aspect of the discussion.
6. Senator Kerry wanted information on those unaccounted
for in the "secret war" in Laos. He wanted to know if they
were in the overall 2,000 plus figure carried as POW/MIA.
Ford said that it was only in the late 70's that those
clandestine operatives were included in the overall count. Up
to that time, there had been a secret list of such POW/MIAs.
This bothered Kerry a great deal, and he can be certain to ask
the Agency representative for more information.
7. Kerry asked about code breaking in Laos in 1968-1973.
Witnesses declined to respond in open testimony and pointed to
the absence of an NSA representative. This issue is certain to
arise in the closed briefing. Senator Smith also asked
specifically if there had been any operations into Laos in the
period after 1973. Ford said he didn't know, and Smith was
incredulous. Quinn said that he had recently learned from
another witness one of the
witness had any ions. The
Agency representative should be prepared to address this issue
in detail. -
8. Overall there was a very heavy emphasis on the Laotian
situation throughout the Q and A period reflecting an apparent
belief on the part of some Committee members that there is far
less accountability for POW/MIAs in Laos and more evidence of
there possible presence there after Operation Homecoming in
1973. Agency representatives should be prepared to deal
especially with reporting on Laos and operational activity
there related to POW/MIA matters.
Deputy Director for Senat ffairs
Office of Congressional A airs
 SUBJECT: POW/MIA Committee Hearing on 15 November
OCA/Senate (18 Nov 91)
Distribution:
Original - OCA Record w/att
1 - DCI w/att
1 - DDCI w/att
1 - ER w/att
1 - ADDO w/att
1 - SA/ADDO Watt
1 - DD/LEG/OCA Watt
1 - w/att
1 rono iq/attf
_- SERE-T- ------ --------- __
 SEP'RET
Offices: 705 Senate Hart Office Building
Main Office Number: [phone]
Majority Staff Director Frances Zwenig: 202-224-2038
Minority Staff Director Al Ptak: 202-224-2306
MAJORITY
Chairman John Kerry, Mass.
Thomas Daschle, S.D.
Harry Reid, Nev.
Charles Robb, Va.
Robert Kerry, Neb.
Herb Kohl, Wisc.
Vice Chairman Robert
Smith, N.H.
John McCain, Ariz.
Jesse Helms, N.C.
Nancy Kassebaum, Kan.
Charles Grassley, Iowa
Hank Brown, Colo.
 TESTIMONY AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY
BY
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CARL W. FORD, JR.
BEFORE
THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
NOVEMBER 15, 1991
 SEET
TESTIMONY
AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY
BEFORE 770 SENATE SELECT CDMMM7EE
ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)
November 15, 1991
Mr. Chairman, Senator Smith, members of the Committee, I would like to
thank you for the opportunity to return to comment on issues that have
arisen during the three days of historic hearings that you convened last
week on the POW/MIA. issue.
First, I would like to clarify a point that came up in last Thursday's
testimony concerning the "last known alive" discrepancy cases. The
definition of a discrepancy case is:
A case about which the USG has convincing evidence that the
Governments of Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia should have
specific knowledge.
The term "discrepancy case" includes not only individuals who were 'last
known alive, but also individuals who were known dead, but for whom the
Indochinese Governments should be able to provide information or
remains. As you can see, the definition is broad. Within this broad
definition, we have identified three subcategories of cases. We did? this
because over the years a great deal of confusion has developed over what
 C01352213 SEC T
precisely we were talking about-the terms "discrepancy case,"
"compelling case," "last known alive case," "Vessey case," all meant
different things to different people.
The three subcategories of discrepancy cases are.
LAST KNOWN ALIVE: Those cases in which
the US has information that the individual survived the
loss incident and fell into enemy hands. In the case of air
incidents, this includes cases in which the crew members
are believed to have successfully exited their aircraft and
to have been alive on the ground. In the case of ground
incidents, this includes cases in which the individuals
were last known alive, were not gravely wounded, and
were in proximity to enemy forces who should have
specific knowledge of the incident.
POW AT HOMECOMING: A specific group of
individuals who, during the Vietnam War, were classified
by their commanding officers and Service Secretaries as
POWs but did not return during Operation Homecoming.
These cases are also known to many families as "last
known alive" due to their POW status. There were 97
individuals so listed. Subsequently, 42 listed POWs"
have been accounted for through unilateral SRV
repatriation. The remainder are still unaccounted for.
 KNOWLEDGE'OF THE INCIDENT:
Circumstances of loss or subsequent information is
convincing that Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia should have
knowledge of the incident. In some of these cases, there
is convincing evidence that the individual did not survive
the incident of loss. In many cases, there is convincing
evidence that Vietnam also has remains.
With this background, now I will shift to the 119 individuals who have been
discussed in the testimony here, call ed variously "Vessey cases" and the
"Vessey discrepancy cases." The first point to make is that, from the
beginning, the list was not meant to be all-encompassing. In 1988, DIA,
JCRC, General Vessey and the Office of the Secretary of Defense worked
together to develop a list of most compelling last known alive cases, as
well as other discrepancy cases, i.e., cases of individuals for whom the
Vietnamese should have knowledge of the fate of the individual and
remains if the individual is dead. The list was not exhaustive, merely
illustrative. The'primary purpose was to shed light on the live prisoner
issue by asking the Vietnamese to help us solve. cases in which there was
either hard evidence or a strong possibility that the individual survived the
incident of loss, but did not return at Operation Homecoming, and for
whom, as of 1987, there had been no accounting. So for, despite our
investigative efforts, we have not returned any live Americans or
uncovered proof that unaccounted for Americans are alive in Vietnam.
There are additional cases, beyond the 119 individuals, which fit into the
discrepancy case definition. Again, not all of the "Vessey" discrepancy
 C01352213 S 9 ET
cases involve individuals who were last known alive. Some of them
involve individuals who are known dead-but the Vietnamese should be
able to provide information or remains.
In addition to the 119 individuals whose cases were presented to the
Vietnamese by General Vessey, we determined that there are 64
other individuals who meet the "last known alive" definition as well
as 13 individuals who were classified by their respective Service
Secretary as a POW at Operation Homecoming in 1973, and who are
not included in the "Vessey" cases who are otherwise not accounted
for. This group of cases will be the focus of the full time efforts of the
Hanoi Office under the USCINCPAC Joint Task Force earlier
described to this committee by General Christmas. They will all be
investigated within Phase I of the USCINCPAC plan.
DIA as Family Outreach Organization
Next, I would like to address an issue that has been implicit in
the testimony you have heard from many family members regarding
DIA. The issue of family members and DIA analysts meeting directly
to discuss individual cases has proved problematic. DIA is an
intelligence collection and analysis agency. Their personnel are not
trained for family outreach and the function of family outreach is
not an appropriate one for that agency. The families' primary point
of contact for discussion of their cases is the designated Service
Casualty Affairs Office. Those offices are staffed with personnel
trained to perform the family outreach role. In the case where a
 ! C01352213 SEET
family is dissatisfied with the service received from the Service
Casualty Affairs Office, the proper place to redress that problem is.
with my office.
The problems experienced within DIA that resulted in the changes
made by the Secretary's Management Inquiry related to functions
assumed by the PW-MIA Office that were not within their mission.
Those functions have been removed and placed within my office.
Allegations by Dr. O'Grady
We certainly understand the grief felt by Dr. O'Grady over her
family's loss. We have reviewed the O'Grady case file and we believe that
Dr. O'Grady's family has been properly served by our casualty affairs
process. The OGrady case is one in which we believe that the family has
been promptly and accurately notified about investigative activity and
information relating to the case.
Dr. O'Grady's sweeping allegations of Government nonfeasance,
malfeasance and misfeasance are without factual basis. For example, Dr.
O'Grady states that her family was advised from the time that her father
became missing that he was dead. That statement is quite simply wrong.
From immediately after his incident of loss, the Air Force believed there
was a good possibility he survived. He was seen to eject from his aircraft.
He was seen with a good parachute, and his chute was seen on the ground,
but he was not in it. All indications were that he survived his ejection.
 Colonel O'Grady was carried in a missing in action status until 1977 when
his status was reviewed, at the express request of his wife, and his status
changed to deceased and a Presumptive Finding of Death was entered in
his case.
A second, most serious allegation was made by Dr. O'Grady which
requires discussion. She alleged in her testimony that "identifications were
made with teeth and teeth fragments but when independent forensic
anthropologists were consulted, there were no dental records to be
compared to. Again, this is absolutely false. There has never been a dental
identification rendered by the U. S. Army Central Identification
Laboratory without benefit of dental records. In every case, either a ante-
mortem dental X-ray or a dental chart was available to provide the factual
predicate for the dental identification. No other forensic laboratory in the
world has as many independent procedural safeguards as has the Central,
Identification Laboratory. Should you have any further questions on this
point, I have the Commander, U.S. Army Central Identification
Laboratory available to respond.
I have a detailed written response to the other allegations made by Dr.
O'Grady in her testimony that I would like to submit for the record.
Robertson, Stevens and Lundy Response
As dissatisfied with the Department's performance as the families
clearly are, the Department of Defense has vigorously pursued the
T-----------
 c01352213 SECKET
investigation of the photo. I have personally made myself available to the
families to answer their questions and respond to their concerns, as has my
staff and the Director of the DIA Special Office for POW/MIA Affairs. We
have been unable to either confirm or disprove the identifications of the
subjects of the photo made by the family members. We are continuing to
investigate the photograph. Any intimation by the families that there has
been less than an honest effort to investigate and locate the source of the
photo is disingenuous. The facts establish otherwise. We have requested
assistance from the Vietnamese at the highest levels of Government We
have sent three separate investigative teams to Cambodia to follow-up
information and attempt to locate the source of the photograph. We have
requested all of our Defense Attaches, world-wide to search for the photo .
in Eastern-bloc magazines. We have tasked national technical means to
obtain information on reports associated with the photographs and have
established all-source collection requirements to obtain additional
information about the photo, the individuals or the associated reporting.
We are continuing to investigate vigorously, however; without some new
leads, we may not be able to solve the mystery of this photo.
Finally, and this is an important point, Colonel Robertson's case is
not dosed. It is still under active investigation and any preliminary
judgements made have been set aside pending further investigative
activity and information.
I would like to submit a brief written response to the specific
allegations contained within the testimony of the families for the record.
 C01352213 .S/ET
Donohue Allegations
Mr. Donohue stated in previous testimony that he has information
about his brother, Captain Morgan Donohue, lost in Laos on 13 December
1968, , and relates the fact that the presence in intelligence reporting of his
father's zip code is proof that his brother is still alive in Laos, because only
his brother could know the postal zip code of his father. In fact, the postal
zip code of Major Donohue's father was contained within a widely
circulated flyer that the family prepared and distributed throughout
Southeast Asia. It is not unsusual that information contained in such flyers
later shows up in intelligence reports about American POWs.
There have been allegations made that fingerprint and other records
have "mysteriously" disappeared from DoD files.. There is no conspiracy
to purge records. The Department of Defense does not maintain
fingerprint records. The FBI is the sole agency with that responsibility. I
request that this letter, from FBI Director Sessions to Congressman Solarz
explaining "lost" or purged fingerprint records be entered in the record.
To prevent a recurrence of this problem in the future. I have tasked
the Service Secretaries to examine possible alternatives to establish a
redundant, independent source for military fingerprints separate from the
FBI records. I will report to the Committee and to the families when we
have implemented a solution to this problem.
 c01352213 SE tET
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Minority Staff Report
Mr. Chairman, W. Tracy Usry of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Minority staff came before this Committee to
defend the minority staff report, An Examination of U. S. Policy
Toward POW/MIAs, authored in large measure by himself. That
report is replete with factual errors. I would like to take just a
moment to discuss a few of the most glaring examples of poor
research and error.
On page 5-8 of the Report, the staff states:
"In fact, only 591 U.S. POWs were repatriated by
the North Vietnamese during Operation
HOMECOMING, which is 12% of the figure of
5,000 U.S. POWs held by the North Vietnamese
reported by the New York Times.
The original New York Times article, the primary source
material, appeared on the front page of the 6 March 1973 issue. The
number "5,000" appeared only once in the entire article-quoting an
American source who stated at a meeting of the joint Military
Commission the previous day, North Vietnam had demanded the
release of 5,000 Communist prisoners held by Sa on.
This 5,000 number cited incorrectly in the report has been oft-
quoted by POW activists and is used within the report to lend
SERE--T --- ---
 credence to the allegation that 85 % of American prisoners of war
were withheld by Hanoi after Operation Homecoming.
. A second glaring inaccuracy is found in the Prologue to Part I,
page i. The report states:
"In spite of 1,400 unresolved reports of first hand live-
sightings, the Department of Defense, remarkably, still
believes it has "no credible evidence." How does it
dismiss these reports?
In fact, there are numerous inaccuracies in just that simple
statement. First, while there have been cumulatively over 1,400
first-hand live sighting reports, only approximately 100 are
,
unresolved. Second, live sighting reports have not been dismissed
In over 75 percent of the first-hand live sightings received, DIA
analysts have been able to establish that the report is trr .eu . These
reports involve POWs who returned at Operation Homecoming, or
have been correlated to other Americans or Westerners, such as
missionaries or individuals stranded in South Vietnam when the
Communists took control. Almost three hundred relate to Private
Garwood, who returned from Vietnam in 1979.
There are numerous other factual inaccuracies throughout the
report. To catalogue the inaccuracies would require a document. of
equal length and would be beyond the scope of my testimony here
today. Further, to do so would require diverting manpower from
 more important tasks related to the function of investigating
POW/MIA cases.
A more important issue that this Committee should address of
Mr. Usry is why he and other staff members of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee staff have withheld from the Department of
Defense information relevant to the investigation of the Stevens
case and the Borah case. Not only has Mr. Usry withheld
information that would have assisted the Department of Defense in
more expeditiously investigating these cases, but he has stood by
while Senate staff members directed sources not to provide their
information to members of my staff, the DIA, or others within the
Department of Defense investigating these cases.
I am personally outraged by the obstruction that Mr. Usry has
presented to the DoD investigations of these cases. That any
American would withhold relevant information or otherwise not
cooperate with an on-going DoD POW/MIA investigation is
shocking and should not be tolerated by you-his employers-the
Members of the United States Senate. The families of the two
individuals deserve better treatment than that.
Mr. Chairman, I hope that you will question Mr. Usry about
how long he had the Borah information before July 1991. When the
Department of Defense finally received the information, we
resolved the case in less than 2 months.
 Response to Judge Gayden'a Allegations
The Borah and Carr families have been the losers as a result of the
allegations made by a number of individuals before this Committee.
Family confidence in their Government has been further eroded by the
unsubstantiated and specious claims of Government conspiracy. Mr.
Sheetz will later discuss the Can case in detail, however, I would like to
spend a moment on the Borah case and the allegations made by judge
Gayden before this Committee.
Judge Gayden's allegation that the Department of Defense would
knowingly provide to the family, the Congress and the American people
altered photographs of the meeting between our investigator, Bill
Gadoury, and the individual is ludicrous. Even more disturbing is the fact
that judge Gayden, an officer of a court, would allege that he had obtained
a photo analysis of the photos of the meeting and then assert that the DoD
photos are frauds. This Committee can not stand by and let these gross
distortions of fact go unnoticed. If Judge Gayden's photo experts believe
the DoD photos are a fraud, he should produce their reports, or their
testimony, or an affidavit or other suitable evidence.
Our investigators, with the help of the Lao, found the individual
photographed in Laos and identified as Lieutenant Borah. The individual
is not Lieutenant Borah. The Borah family has been convinced by Judge.
Gayden's bailiff, Khambang Sibounheuang, that the individual is
Lieutenant Borah, and Khambang has accompanied the two Borah sons to
Laos. Khambang's blood relative in Laos passed the roll of film containing
 the Borah photos to Khambang in the United States. Khambang has a
long history of providing POW related materials, from as early as 1985;
and none- not one- of his leads has ever proven valid.
I have a fact sheet on Khambang that I would request be entered into
the record. The Judge Gayden/Khambang connection needs to be
thoroughly investigated. I hope that this Committee will undertake that
task.
Bailey Cooperation
Finally, I would like to clarify a point raised by Lieutenant Colonel Bailey
in his testimony. Lieutenant Colonel Bailey suggested that the Secretary
of Defense may have misspoken in his testimony before this Committee.
Lieutenant Colonel Bailey suggested that the Secretary was mistaken in
his recitation of what Bailey agreed to provide to the Department of
Defense in Thailand and that he was further mistaken in attributing to
Bailey a comment that the "Carr" photograph "may have been" taken in
Thailand or Burma. I would like to make clear for the record that the
Secretary of Defense did not misspeak nor was he mistaken in any of the
testimony he provided to this committee relative to Lieutenant Colonel
Bailey.
Bailey's promises of cooperation were made to the Secretary of Defense in
the presence of myself, and Congressmen McCloskey and Visclosky in the
Secretary's office. The Secretary's testimony correctly reflected who and
 ~C01352213
what Bailey stated he would make available to our investigators. It also
correctly reflected what Bailey told our investigators in Bangkok about
where the photograph may have been taken. We have a chronology of our
conversations with Bailey which I would like to make a part of the record.
I have with me the individuals who were.involved.in.the:Carr
investigation with Colonel Bailey and who will provide you the facts about
their investigation. Mr. Bob Sheetz, the Chief of the Special Office for
POW/MIA Affairs will address the specifics of the. conduct of the Carr
( investigation of which Bailey was a part.
Thank you Mr. Chairman and Senator Smith. I am prepared
now to respond to your questions.
 SE ET
The DiRCbr d 9ftal Inldllaencr
tbSwp .oumos
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board
SUBJECT: Interagency Committee on Vietnam MIA's/POW's
Eyeruuve R2g'stry
y/ 3Br/
12 NOV 1985
1. I hereby establish an Interagency Committee on Vietnam
MIA's/POW's under the chairmanship of Brigadier General James Shufelt
(OIA). The purpose of the Committee Is. to exhaust all. intelligence
within. the Community regarding the location and identification of
Americans who might be held or interned in Southeast Asia.
2. I request that the appropriate NFIB agencies nominate
representatives to serve on the Committee under Brigadier General
Shufelt's chairmanship. Representatives will also be responsible for
ensuring that any intelligence information presently held within the
Intelligence Community is proferred to the Committee.
3. I am asking Lieutenant General Leonard Perroots, Director of the
Defense -Intelligence Agency, to oversee this activity on my behalf.
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - DCI Chrono
DDCI Chrono
ER
CONFI NTIAL
- - SECR?T- ---
 I C01352213 SE'ET
/
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
between the
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA)
and the
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SERVICE INTELLIGENCE REPRESENTATIVES
on
PARTICIPATION AT INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INDOCHINA PW/MIAs MEETINGS
A. PURPOSE
This memorandum of understanding clarifies the roles and responsibilities
of each organization during participation in Interagency Committee on
Indochina PW/MIAs meetings on the collection, oversight and coordination of
intelligence relating to American servicemen and civilians who remain
unaccounted for as a result of the war in Indochina (1961-1975).
B. BACKGROUND -
Resolution of the PW/MIA issue is a matter of personal interest to the
President of the United States, who has pledged that it is a matter of the
highest national priority within his Administration. In implementation of
this priority the purpose of the committee will be to formulate, coordinate,
and manage new collection initiatives to ensure that all intelligence
disciplines are sensitized to the issue. It will provide a clearing house for
the exchange of PW intelligence and a forum for the discussion and resolution
of related collection problems and requirements. The committee will make
aggressive use of appropriate resources of specialized components of the
intelligence community to identify, augment or supplement, confirm, or
otherwise qualify intelligence information relating to U.S. PW/MIAs.
C. ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT
1. DIA shall provide the chairmanship and staff and administrative
support for the committee.
2. The committee shall be comprised of one principal general-flag
officer or equivalent civilian lever' representative of the following U.S.
Government components: Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central
 001352213 S/RET
Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), Department of State, Office of the Secretary of Defense
(0SD), and Service Intelligence representatives. The DIA representative at
the committee meetings will also be the principal Joint Chiefs of Staff
representative. All members and other attendees shall have TOP SECRET and
SI/TK clearances.
3. Responsibilities of member representatives pertaining to the
collection of PW/MIA related intelligence shall be consistent with the charter
of the parent Department, Agency or Bureau.
4. The committee shall meet at the call of the Chairman but not less
than quarterly.
D. IMPLEMENTATION AND TERMINATION
This memorandum of understanding shall become binding and enter into
force upon signature by all parties. It shall remain in effect until revised
or terminated and will be reviewed annually.
Deputy` Director for Operations, uepury ,
Plans and Training Coordination Staff
Defense Intelligence Agency Central Intelligence Agency
Chief, Operations Directorate 85
National Security Agency
/ A
? 7 4 ,,::, Lam, C
Date : J 2 t
Assistant Director, Intelligence
Division
Federal Bureau of investigation
 C01352213
Bureau of Intelligence & Research
Department of State
Director, 'Intelligence Systems
Office of the Assistant Chief of
Staff Army Intelligence
Department of the Army
Date: A_ C _ _
Director, Joint Services Support
Directorate
Department of the Air Force
Date: m Apt ; Y
Sr
Director, East Asia & Pacific Region
Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs
Department of Defense
Date: a 09 f9$(0
 Offices: 705 Senate Hart Office Building
Main Office Number: [phone]
Majority Staff Director Frances Zwenig; 202-224-2038
Minority Staff Director Al Ptak: 202-224-2306
Thomas Daschle (D-SD)
Harry Reid (D-NV)
Charles Robb (D-VA)
Robert Kerry (D-NB)
Herb Kohl (D-WS)
Vice Chairman Robert
Smith (R-NH)
John McCain (R-AZ)
Jesse Helms (R-NC)
Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS)
Charles Grassley (R-IA)
Hank Brown (R-CO)
 1. senator Kerry, Senator Smith, it is a priviledge for me to
appear here today. We all recognize the importance of your endeavor and
I an here to emphasize the commitment of NSA to supportg your efforts.
For years, NSA has been actively involved on this issue primarily with
the Defense Intelligence Agency, but also with individual Congressman
and Congressional Committees. As we have done with these organizations
in the past, we will make available to you all the data that can assist
you in your investigation.
2. To ensure we would be prepared to be responsive to the committee
we have again conducted a comprehensive review of MINT holdings for
the period 1966 to the present. This review included:
.Y.'
a. manually scanning all SIGINT material which might contain
any reference to POW/MIAs during or attar the war.
b. interviewing selected analysts and managers who served at
NSA Headquarters or in the field,
c. reconstructing and evaluating the SIGINT process used
during the war.
Additionally, we attempted to uncover any material which might be
related to recent allegations and to review any new information that has
come to light since our last complete review in 1987.
3. I would like to take a few minutes and explain how NSA has
conducted its business in regard to the POW/MIA task. During the
Vietnam War, our ability to access the communications of Southeast Asian
SOET
 C01352213 '91 0921 82110 Ti
SE/ET
IFUI
communist Forces was very good. over seventy (70) ground-based
collection sites, no fewer than twelve (12) types of airborne collection
platforms, and numerous shipborne collectors worked 24-hours a day
against the full range of target communications. Thousands of people,
primarily uniformed military personnel, were involved in this massive
signals intelligence effort. The SIGINT system had an excellent
capability to collect information an aircraft shootdowns and on downed
fliers. We intercepted information that some crew members did not
survive the shootdown. In other cases, we were able to detect initial
capture and subsequent movement of prisoners by the capturing unit to
either a holding location or to a place designated as a camp, We were
aware of the existence of more permanent prison camps from non-SIGINT.
sources, but in spite of our vast collection resources, we never heard
any communications emanating from these camps.
4. The enormous amount of data collection during the war had to be
processed manually. Because of this we did not always process
everything, but we did process everything related to downed fliers or
captured Americans. This was our highest priority mission. intercept
operators were trained to recognize critical information, and were
instructed to notify supervisors immediately when information on downed
fliers or captured servicemen was intercepted. This information was
processed immediately and reported in the most expeditious manner to
tactical units to aid in search and rescue operations.
5. our information can be divided into two categories. We have a
total of 1530 "incident" reports which are based on military
 C013522134ov 2s '91 0923 R2119 Ti
SEC ET
SE ET
communications and relate to specific losses. We have approximately 500
"non-incident" reports which are associated with the general topic of
POW/MIAs. We reported both tactical and strategic information.
Tactical reporting included information on such subjects as shootdowns
of aircraft and locations of enemy forces. A special reporting series,
called SONGBIRD Reports, was established for information pertaining to
prisoners, prisoner locations, movement of prisoners, shootdown of
aircraft, or any other information relating to the fate of U.S.
servicemen. Strategic reporting included such activities as North
Vietnamese infiltration and resupply. This information came from
communications serving the network of roads, transportation units, and
rest stops known as the No Chi Minh Trail and from communications
serving military elements in?i4orthern Vietnam.
6. We understand that the committee is especially concerned about
the fate of American MIAs captured in Laos. L tian codes were broken
during the war and the communications of Pathet Lao Headquarters were
intercepted. Regretably, while we had voluminous intercept of Laotian
communications, they do not provide any new information on the fate of
our men lost in Laos.
7. Also, no SIGINT evidence is available to either confirm or deny
allegations o involvement with American
POWs. NSA has completed a review of pertinent material. As
with our study of Vietnamese communications, there is no evidence to
indicate that involved POWs. Our search o
communications that may be related to the POW/MIA issue continues, but
SF/ET
 C01352213 91 09:25 82110 Ti
as with our efforts in researching Vietnamese communications, we have
yet to find any SIGINT evidence o
S. NSA currently holds approximately 2000 SIGINT reports, dating
from 1965 to the present, relating to the loss, capture, and status of
U.S. personnel in Southeast Asia. To illustrate the challenge of
following individual POWs, of all the POW/MIA related incidents reported
in SIGINT during the war, less than 100 names of captured Americans are
contained in our reporting. The majority of these people were
subsequently accounted for. All of this information was reported in our
normal system and made available during previous investigations. Let me
emphasize however, that'none of our data contains evidence that American
service personnel remain in Vietnam today or were left behind after
Operation HOMECOMING.
9. We spent many years after the war searching for communications
that could reveal evidence that U.S. personnel were held in Vietnam but
were not successful. The only collection, reflecting POW/MIA matters we
POW/MIA issues.
on the question of-releasing intelligence data, there are good
reasons why even after 20-25 years, some intelligence information
relating to POW/MIAs is, and should remain, classified. For example,
similar sources and methods are used today by NSA against other targets,
particulars Moreover, some of these sources and
 C01352213,91 09:27 82110 TL
We recognize the concerns of POW/MSA families, and we want to
explore methods for them to gain access to data associated with their'
kin while at the same time protecting our sources and methods. I would
like to caution everyone, however, that what We hold as described above
only applies to a very few families and even that involves not more than
one or two SIGINT reports%per family.
On the other hand, for you and/or your cleared staff, we stand ready
to show our entire SIGINT POW/1MIA-related reports and to help interpret
them as necessary for you and respond to any of your questions.
 C01352213 S E SE E T
ANSWER: In the intelligence collection process, whether it be
on POW's and MIA's or other requirements, we have a statutory
responsibility under the National Security Act of 1947 and E.O.
12356 to protect the source of the information, the place and
manner in which it was acquired, any foreign intelligence
service involvement, references to other operational activity
and administrative details such as cryptonyms, field report
numbers, source and field comments.
If we were unable to guarantee this protection, it would
impact on our ability to collect intelligence. Other sources
would be wary of cooperating with us if information were
released which pinpoints its origin without consideration of
the effect this information might have on the source, and his
heirs, survivors or colleagues. It is important to understand
that in many cases, especially with regard to information
 C01352213 SECET
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S E C E T
EGRET
 C01352213 SECRET
S E C E T
 OCA
INCOMING
 'OF
FT
 SEQRET
SECRET
1. FILES AT DIA: A total of 496 "live-sighting" files in
the Prisoner of War-Missing in Action (PW-MIA) Task Force for
will be assist d by
sed wit he n
to assis with
to DIA. All archived files on the subject are being retrieved
and will be reviewed. We will also look at substantive issues
such as programs in Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia associated with
reporting. The agreed-upon Inter-Agency guidelines were used in
deleting identification of sources, names of Agency personnel,.
place acquired, liaison involvement, and methods of
acq imition. DI PW-MIA appreciated our Agency's cooperation
and ffort is particularly noteworthy.
2. Response to the Committee's letter: During ADDO'S 4
December one-on-one with DCEA, the wording of the response
letter to the Commi ee w raised. You should be receiving the
draft of this lette hich in-part reads "It has been
agency practice to nformation on PW-MIA's to DIA
and this information should be available in their files. In
response to your request, we are undertaking a review of all
files held by the Agency which bear on this issue to ensure that
all pertinent data has been passed to DIA."
W-MIA: This component is being formed with
EL-L Chief to review our files on PW-MIA's and
the reporting on this issue has been forwarded
eiving excellent cooperation
from all concerned and has been particularly helpful
with several aspects o-
 ER E
S//ET
4. The KGB Connection: Imet with former KGB
General Oleg Kalugin on 29 N ? ss PW-MIA issues.
Kalugin made it clear he was not intimately familiar.with the
subject and those statements he did make were not supported by
ttne vietnam war had been incarcerated in the Soviet Union for
"ideological retraining." comment was included
in this report which in p records contain no
information that Grigoriyev held a leading position in the KGB
and that the report merits little if any credence from analysts.
5. Call to Security Duty Officer on Alleged POW's: The
PW-MIA Office at the Pentagon is investigating the call made to
our Security Duty Officer on 2 December by an alleged Navy Seal
reporting sighting Cambodia
al zs
.A PW-MIA has not been
able to identify the individual who claimed to be
They are going to follow this up with the Seal Team in Coronado,
California, and will advise when further details are obtained.
 CO 1352211MIWI1I1W
JOINT STAFF
INFO SERVICE CENTER
COPY NUMBER t]L-_-011 A
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 ND END OF REPORT PAGE I OF y PAES
SCASR~T AT BE NNiNG A C
REPORT CLASS. C 0I N P I DI E
I A L-WNtNTEL-- REPORT NO.
DATE DISTR.
SUBJECT Alleged Soviet Incarceration of REFERENCES
U.S. Vietnam Prisoners of War
(DOI: 1970) i
SUMMARY: A cording to KGB Lieutenant General.Petr Ivanovich
Crigoriyev, Specially selected U.S. prisoners of war were being
received in o the Soviet Union circa 1970 for long term or
lifetime in arceration and "ideological retraining." Be implied
the number Involved to be about 2,000. The goal of the program
was indefinite, but involved intensive psychological investiga-
tion of the prisoners and retraining to make them available
as required to serve the needs of the Soviet Union. Grigoriyev
n t
1. ~o-enc? ::
caution
 N SUBJECT
TO CONTROLS STATE AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT PACE 2 OF 4 PACES
the USSR, much leas that 2,000 such individuals are leading "reasonably
normal lives" inlthe same region where numerous Soviet political
prisoners have resided in exile.
from analysts.
However, in ligh of continuing high interest in the question of U.S.
personnel still isted as missing in action in Southeast Asia, this
report is being isseminated with appropriate caveats to concerned
members of the U S. Intelligence Community.)
2. hich was held circa 1970, KGB
Lieuten Grigoriyev)) stated that many
specially select d U.S. prisoners of war were being received from North
Vietnam for long term or lifetime custody and "ideological re-training"
in the Soviet Ua Lou. Grigoriyev did not state
specifically the num olved. The term he used was
"v poryadke nes l'kikh tysyach v use tozhe year" which translates
as "on the order of several thousand," implying the number to be about
2,000). The pri oners were destined for confinement at a facility near
Perm. Grigoriyer, who learned of the program from an unnamed high level
KGB colleague, understood that Soviets rather than North VieL.,amese
were involved in the initial selection process and that participants
were to be conti ually assessed for suitability. He implied that
individuals dete mined to be unsuitable would be eliminated and replaced
with other candi aces rigoriyev made his comment
while serving as a po personnel officer at the
All-Union Scient fic-Technical Information Center of the State
Committee for Scienceand Technology in Moscow. He had previously served
as Chief of the B's Personnel Directorate and in that capacity would
have very likely made con?acts among KGB officials auQquently
responsible for rganizing any such prisoner program.)
program were ind
of the individua
needs of the Sov
facility was not
could lead reaso
recalled that pr
and cited simile
nationals. He s
encouraged to ma
finite bus involved intensive psychological studies
s and utilization of them as required to serve the
ec Union. Grigoriyev understood that the detention
a standard prison, but rather one in which inmates
bly normal lives. rigoriyev
~cedents existed fo . Viet Union
previous efforts with Spanish, Japanese, and Chinese
ated that in past programs, participants were
ry Soviet women.
i.. 2291 a.attcn
Mau.ou. mrtw.s ccr+..,,.w" v.m
 SE/RET
i. ri on ev volunteered the is ore~ation regarding the Vietnam
prisoner wring the late 1960's
and earl demanding after his
years as an admia strator in the KGB. He was often finished with his
work in the earl afternoon and, rather than go home or enga
- I f.,= di*eumala"a in his 6M
SEC/ET--
 IC01352213
SECRET
6. Crigoriyev was trained as a professional military officer and
served in the tank troops during World War II. After the war he was
assigned to the Party Central Cosmittee as an army representative.
In the period 1953-1954 he became KGB Deputy Chief for Personnel. He
subsequently became critical of the recruitment policies of KGB head
Vladimir Yefimovich ((Semichastnyy)) and was transferred from his
position to that of KGB Security Chief for Soviet Bloc nations. So3n
thereafter he developed a heart ailment and retired. In the late 1?60's
he accepted the position ac the Information Center.
7. General Skrynnik joined the Russian cavalry in 1917 and
subsequently entered the Odessa artillery school. Upon graduation he
was assigned to the Zhitomir military district. In 1931 he entered the
Frunze Military Academy. He advanced rapidly and in the 1933-1934
period was sent to China as Deputy Military Attache. He joined Mao's
long march and began to establish intelligence agent networks for the
Soviet Union. He remained in China until 1942 except for a brief
return in 1939 to establish an intelligence school in Moscow for
China operations. In the spring of 1962 he was recalled from China
to become chief;of intelligence on the northwestern front, where he
remained for the duration of the war. A-'-!or the war he was assigned
as Soviet representative to the Berlin Joint Commission for Repatriation.
After serving ! Berlin from 1945 to 1949 he returned to Moscow as
either chief orldeputy chief for intelligence at the Frunze Academy.
He then served is Deputy Intelligence Chief of the Far Eastern Military
District. Re retired from the military In 1953. Skrynnik was
DnnpT CIASS r nx F YD E T I A
PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND COh"IROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.