(EST PUB DATE) TRENDS AND PRIORITIES IN SOVIET MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
• Keywords: NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001247372
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 103
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2010
• Case Number: F-2005-01250
• Publication Date: March 1, 1973

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APPROVED FOR
RELEASE DATE:
03-Mar-201 0
USIB
UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE
BOARD
ecret
f,,jcnoHLMED
Scientific Intelligence
Committee
Trends and Priorities in Soviet Military
Research and Development
To . cret
 THE SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE IS COMPRISED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF:
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Department of State
The Department of Army
The Department of Navy
The Department of Air Force
WA NING
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 Scientific Intelligence Study
TRENDS AND PRIORITIES IN SOVIET
MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
VSRET
 TOP~ECRET
RET
I 1
I
PREFACE
This study updates a previous review of the scope and direction,
of Soviet military research and development published in January
1967. (SIC.S-1-67 )
In this review we examine the Soviet military R&D system in some
detail and attempt to describe its essential features. We have paid
particular attention to areas in which significant R&D effort is being
expended and is apt to be continued because of the promise of payoff
or because of a need to correct existing deficiencies. We have looked
for trends that have important implications for Soviet military capa-
bilities over the next 5 to 10 years. But, recognizing that decisions
to embark on weapons programs are not made on the basis of R&D
programs alone, we have not set as a primary goal the forecasting of
specific future weapons which might result in the next decade from
present R&D programs. Such estimates are more properly made in
the huger context of the National Intelligence Estimates dealing with
the component elements of the Soviet military structure. Lastly, we
recognize that significant military programs other than those discussed
could be in an early R&D phase without our being able to identify
them as such.
Much of the subject matter discussed in this report has been
covered in some detail in one or more of the recent National Intel-
ligence Estimates, particularly NIE 11-12-72, NIE 11-3-72, and NIE
11-8-72. With respect to some weapons systems it was found that little
new could be added to the coverage of the subject in the NIEs. In such
cases we have presented only a brief discussion, highlighting R&D
aspects, in order to provide readers with a comprehensive review of
Soviet military R&D in a single publication. Thus, in such subjects as
ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons and naval warfare, the reader will
find the detailed treatment in the NIEs while in this study we have
confined our attention largely to R&D trends. For this study we have
drawn heavily on contributions made by the participating subcommit-
tees to the referenced NIEs.
The following USIB Committees contributed to this interdepartmental
study:
Scientific Intelligence Committee
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee
Guided Missile and Astronautic Intelligence Committee
 CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE ................................................... iii
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ............................ 1
DISCUSSION ............................................... 10
Organization, planning and control .......................... 10
Facilities .................................................. 15
Manpower ................................................ 19
Missile systems ............................................ 20
Military space ............................................. 31
.............................. . .
Aeronautics ...."""""" 38
Ground warfare ........................................... 52
Naval warfare ............................................. 56
Military electronics ........................................ 64
Military electro-optics ...................................... 82
Military medicine .......................................... 89
Chemical and biological warfare ............................. 90
Nuclear R&D .............................................. 93
Long range threat .......................................... 96
FIGURE
Page
Organizations concerned with military R&D in the USSR ........ 11
TOP SE ET
 Im SECRET
TRENDS AND PRIORITIES IN SOVIET MILITARY
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
GENERAL
The strong support that the Soviets have given
to military research and development since World
War II continues. The major portion of the total
Soviet research and development effort continues
to be devoted to military-or closely related-
requirements, including space, with highest priority
on strategic offensive and defensive systems. A
stream of new and improved military hardware
has emerged from this effort.
Many facilities built during the 1950s and 1960s
are still expanding, presaging additional invest-
ments in coming years. It seems clear that the USSR
intends to maintain a vigorous program to update
its military capabilities. For the most part progress
will come through gradual improvements in range,
accuracy, reliability, and other critical parameters
of present strategic offensive and defensive systems.
There is always the chance, however, that radically
new systems may evolve from work now in progress
Centralization of responsibility, specialization of
effort, and continuity in management and leader-
ship are typical strengths of the Soviet military
R&D environment. National-level management is
marked by close partnership of the Party and Gov-
ernment in defining short- and long-term directions
and managing resource allocations. As a conse-
quence, the decision-making process is in many
cases less time-consuming than it is in the US.
On the other hand, a number of shortcomings
impose limitations on the effectiveness of the
Soviet military R&D effort and at least some of
these are not apt to be overcome for many years.
The industrial base that supports Soviet military
R&D lacks the sophistication of the US industrial
sector. The full exploitation of very elaborate re-
search, development, and testing resources is con-
strained by rigid planning and control of programs
and by compartmentation of research. Emphasis
on program plan fulfillment and goal achievement,
combined with the inherent inflexibility of the
Soviet environment, often results in a certain
amount of conservatism in systems design. And
occasionally program goals are adhered to even
after a lack of realism in the schedules related to
the goals must have become apparent. Typical
examples are the tardiness of the fast breeder
reactor at Shevchenko and the nuclear power pro-
grams as called for by the 6th Five Year Plan.
spite the small size and closely knit c er of
the Soviet policy summit and its good internal com-
munications, there is little evidence to suggest that
it is organized and staffed to do routine systems
evaluations of new programs. In practice the policy-
 makers probably defer to professional military
judgment in weapon program decisions. As long as
the Soviet leaders perceive no overriding economic
pressures toward restraint in military programs,
the built-in biases of the decision-making system
appear to lead to the pursuance of military pro-
grams along lines which satisfy all or most of their
military advocates. The Ministry of Defense and
its subordinate agencies appear to exercise a major
influence on which advanced military technologies
are to be pursued.
The apparent absence of elaborate mechanisms
for systems analysis of new weapons and their cost-
effectiveness is perhaps the more striking in a
country which has for 15 years devoted so much
effort to detailed defense planning. But it is rather
consistent with the system we find in practice that
Is, the basic features of a new weapon system are
decided upon, the system is developed, deployed,
and then modified as required on the basis of field
experience. If we are correct in concluding that,
compared to US practice, decision-making times
are shorter and fewer people are involved, relatively
less time would be spent on the decision to initiate
a project and relatively more time on the production
and deployment phases. Such an explanation would
fit the widespread use of off-the-shelf components
which tends to shorten the time in the pre-
production phases. Whether the changed conditions
brought about by arms limitations will cause the
Soviets to do more systems analysis as a prerequisite
for program initiation remains to be seen.
The Soviets clearly have a large and growing
capability to investigate new concepts and exploit
promising avenues in the design and development
of weapons systems. An ability to concentrate the
resources needed to accomplish high-priority R&D
expeditiously has been demonstrated, as has the
willingness to build and deploy the highest priority
systems where field experience hes indicated a
likely need. Many of the Soviet test facilities are
designed to accommodate needs well beyond those
readily apparent at the time of their construction
as, for example, in space vehicle and missile devel-
opment. We therefore believe that the Soviet R&D
program will continue to provide a wide range of
military equipment generally capable of achieving
the purpose for which it is designed. Much of the
future effort will be concerned with the introduc-
tion of new technology and techniques to achieve
incremental improvements.
Flow the Soviets will choose to direct their mili-
tary R&D efforts in the next few years is a matter
of prime interest. We have searched for indications
such as a pattern of Soviet reactions to particular
US actions. In general, we have been unable to
detect reliable overall military R&D patterns. And
now that the USSR has achieved near-parity with
the US in military strength, the "defense of the
homeland" theme may no longer dominate Soviet
weapons choices as it has for so long. The uncer-
tainties about where Soviet priorities in military
that we could be confronted with a technological
surprise.
In a perhaps less awesome sense the prospective
era of strategic arms limitations poses many dif-
ficult questions for those who must analyze Soviet
military R&D. In many cases the qualitative im-
provements that seem likely to be allowed may be
as difficult to detect as were the original systems.
Moreover the Soviets can be expected to stress R&D
that may lead to radically new-and uncon-
In assessing the future of Soviet military R&D,
it is useful to consider where Soviet science and
technology stand today after more than two decades
of concerted effort. First, the strong military tech-
nology that has been developed, coupled with
adequate production and operational resources, has
enabled the USSR to attain the long-sought goal of
military strength comparable with that of the US.
Thus, the "catch-up" era that required the expendi-
ture of vast resources during the 1950s and early
1960s has come to a close and the USSR is in a
position to negotiate agreements to preserve its
secure position. Second, a technological base the
near equal of that of the US in most respects has
been established enabling the Soviets virtually un-
restricted freedom to move into areas of their own
choosing. And third, as a result of the first two the
 TO'P"-5ECRET
Soviets are in a position to focus their efforts on
overcoming deficiencies that tend to inhibit their
progress, notably persistent difficulties in areas of
production that are highly dependent on advanced
technology.
These considerations suggest that Soviet military
R&D may lose some of the conservatism, and hence
some of the predictability, that we have considered
to be characteristic of it. This Is not to say that
Soviet scientists will suddenly swing to the other
extreme. But the rather consistent pattern of re-
liance on existing technology and components may
increasingly give way to innovative approaches less
easy to foresee and analyze. In this respect the threat
of technological surprise, not so much in the form
of a scientific breakthrough as in a development
that stretches the limits of available technology,
may increase over time.
In a more conventional way the Soviets will un-
doubtedly continue, even increase, the R&D effort
aimed at improving existing weapons systems.
Given the growing strength of their technology,
they will probably be increasingly inclined to look
for exploitable phenomena as a means of upgrading
military capabilities in such difficult areas as
submarine detection and tracking, increased surviv-
ability of reentry vehicles, and advanced antibal-
listic missile, antisatellite, and aircraft defense
systems. To this end we expect to see vigorous pro-
grams in electro-optics (infrared, long-wave in-
frared, lasers), acoustics, electromagnetics, space
electronics, signal processing and data transmission,
and computer technology.
MISSILE SYSTEMS
Offensive ballistic missiles
The Soviets have equipped themselves with a
large and varied ICBM force based almost exclu-
sively on liquid propellant technology. They have
taken a conservative approach to ICBM develop-
ment-in general using proven technology to up-
grade each successive generation of ballistic mis-
siles. This approach has resulted in a reliable ICBM
force which is versatile enough to cope with a broad
spectrum of potential threats.
With the signing of the Interim Agreement limit-
ing strategic offensive missiles, the Soviets have
agreed to put numerical limits on their ICBM and
SLBM forces. This suggests that they are confident
that the size of their strategic missile force is suf-
ficient which, in turn, suggests that their missile
development efforts in the future will be focused on
quality. This is not to say that the Soviets will not
develop new missiles. On the contrary, they appear
to be flight testing three new missile systems. And,
as long as the provisions embodied in the Interim
Agreement remain in effect, they probably will con-
tinue to bring forth new ICBMs from time to time
as replacements for older, obsolescent systems.
Barring a breakdown in the follow-on SALT negoti-
ations and a withdrawal from the Interim Agree-
ment, the most dramatic technological changes in
the character of Soviet ICBM and SLBM forces
are likely to be qualitative improvements, especially
the development of more accurate guidance and
multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles
(MIRVs).
The Soviets appear to be seeking grtater ac-
curacy for their ICBM systems. One of the steps
they might be expected to take would be the devel-
opment of RVs with higher ballistic coefficients
(betas). There has been a trend in that direction
with some of their more recent ICBM modification
programs-especially the SS-II Mods 2 and 3.
The Soviets appear to be trying to upgrade the
accuracy and reliability of the components used
in ballistic missile guidance systems. To achieve
very accurate systems, they almost certainly would
have to develop a guidance system with additional
features, such as midcourse guidance or terminal
RV guidance. There is evidence that they are
experimenting with more so histicated ixuidance
technioues for naval systems.
Over the past few years the Soviets clearly have
been concerned with evolving US ABM defenses.
Exoatmospheric decoys and multiple reentry vehi-
cles have been tested and several modifications to
ICBM systems apparently intended to enhance
penetration in an ABM environment have been de-
TOPP S?CRET
 veloped. These developments have been overtaken
by the ABM Treaty, however, which limits both the
US and USSR to low levels of ABM defense. While
the Soviets may undertake programs to develop
new and more sophisticated systems to penetrate
ABM defenses as a hedge against abrogation of the
Treaty, these programs probably will move forward
at a more deliberate pace than would be the case
without the Treaty.
The Soviets have developed multiple reentry
vehicles for the SS-9 and SS-11 which are not in-
dependently targetable, however, and apparently
were developed to attack ABM-defended soft tar-
gets. The Soviets probably will develop MIRV
systems for their ICBMs and possibly for future
SLBMs. A MIRV payload could be part of the two
new missiles under development at Tyuratam. If the
Soviets decide to develop a "bus" type MIRV pay-
load, the guidance system tested on their new large
ICBM might provide the flexibility and accuracy
required to attack hard targets.
The USSR has a large and varied solid-propellant
production capability. R&D programs concerned
with solid-propellant ballistic missiles are con-
tinuink. In 1972 a new solid-propellant ICBM
was tested The
USSR is judged to lag the US in thrust vector con-
trol techniques and shutdown mechanisms as ap-
plied to solid-propellant vehicles. The Soviets have
the technological capacity to solve these problems
and undoubtedly will do so if the development
effort is accorded a high enough priority.
Defensive missiles
Truly integrated aerospace defense is believed
to be an overriding Soviet military goal. High-
priority R&D programs to accomplish the overall
objective include early warning and tracking sys-
tems against aircraft, missiles, and space objects;
several complex air defense missile systems; new in-
terceptor aircraft with higher performance; and
ABM defenses. As these new systems are deployed,
the Soviets must inevitably appreciate the need for
integrating these total defenses through advanced
means of command and control and the necessity
for R&D in the areas of computers, displays, and
communications.
ANTIBALLISTIC anssis--The Soviet ABM R&D
effort has been concentrated at the Sary Shagan
Missile Test Center (SSMTC). Since the late 1950s,
Soviet emphasis on radar and missile technology
for ABM applications has resulted in the deployed
Moscow ABM system and the network of Hen
House early warning radars which support the
system. The several very serious limitations of
the system, among them vulnerability to exhaustion,
saturation, and nuclear blackout, and an inability to
discriminate real targets from false ones, appear to
point the way for future Moscow system R&D.
Soviet ABM R&D efforts elsewhere, however, prob-
ably will be directed toward the development of an
entirely new ABM system for the defense of ICBM
silos. In addition, the Soviets probably will even-
tually explore entirely different concepts which
could improve their defense against ballistic mis-
siles, such as synchronous satellite early warning
systems or air or spaceborne laser ABM systems.
The most severe limitation of the Moscow sys-
tem-vulnerability to exhaustion-cannot be over-
come within the terms of the recently signed ABM
agreement. The Soviets are permitted an additional
35 ABM launchers for a total of 100 launchers. The
lack of a large ABM interceptor force assures suc-
cessful penetration of the system by a determined
attacker. Soviet research directed toward allevia-
tion of other limitations of the system is permitted,
however, and with some restrictions the com-
ponents developed may be deployed. For example,
unconventional weaponry like lasers may be devel-
oped but its inclusion in the Moscow ABM system
would require renegotiation or abrogation of the
ABM Treaty.
Soviet efforts to reduce the vulnerability of the
Moscow system to saturation apparently are con-
centrated in the development of planar array radars.
Such radars have better multiple target/interceptor
handling capabilities than the presently deployed
dish-type radars. Research on the problems of
nuclear blackout and discrimination has not yet
been identified. To reduce the system's vulnerabil-
ity to nuclear blackout, the Soviets probably will
develop "cleaner" nuclear warheads (or effective
non-nuclear warheads) or increase radar operating
frequencies.
 T E[PFT
Future Soviet developments in optical devices,
lasers, long wave infrared (LWIR) sensors and
high resolution radar technology could contribute
to the development of a capability to discriminate
reentry vehicles from accompanying penetration
aids. A more immediate Soviet approach, however,
would probably include the use of simple atmos-
pheric filtering and the development of a high
acceleration interceptor. Such an interceptor, de-
sirable for an ABM system designed to defend
ICBM silos, as permitted by the ABM Treaty, ap-
parently is not yet being developed.
sURFACE-TO-AM MISSILES-The Soviets have been
engaged in a well-conceived program of surface-to-
air missile (SAM) system development. The sys-
tems generally have been designed to counter a
specific threat or a facet of an expected new threat.
Over the years an attempt has been made to develop
SAM defenses capable of coping with aircraft at
low altitudes, primarily through incremental im-
provements In all aspects of low-altitude defense.
The use of older systems and the introduction of
new systems have resulted in a diversity of equip-
ment, redundancy of coverage, and improved capa-
bility against all threats. All of the ground-based
short-range Soviet SAMs (except the SA-1) are van-
mounted and characterized by transportability.
SAM design approach has typically used a com-
mand guidance scheme with track-while-scan fire-
control radars to minimize system complexity.
During the period of our forecast, we expect the
Soviets to employ R&D resources in the design of
new equipment that would provide for shorter
reaction times, lower vulnerability to electronic
countermeasures, and better low-altitude defense
capabilities. The reaction time problem is expected
to be alleviated by the additional use of computer
control equipment in SAM batteries and improved
command-coordination-control data transmission
systems which have been in limited use for some
time. The vulnerability of Soviet SAM systems to
electronic countermeasures is being reduced to
some degree by the employment of straightforward
techniques which include the use of frequency
diverse radars and the addition of optical and
electro-optical trackers to the fire-control radars.
Improvements in the acquisition and fire-control
. radars and SAM proximity fuses, which would pro-
vide more efficient operation in a clutter environ-
ment, could result in a better low-altitude capa-
bility. Other expected improvements in Soviet SAM
systems could include the development of multi-
purpose radars
optical trackers with most short-range SAM radars
to complement the primary tracker.
Antiship cruise missiles
The USSR has been developing antiship cruise
missile (ASCM) systems since the late 1940s. The
Soviet ASCM developmental programs tend to re-
flect two major concerns. These are the increasing
number of US attack carriers (CVAs) which could
be brought to bear against the USSR and the area
and terminal defenses which their cruise missiles
must penetrate to reach the primary target, the
attack carrier. The result of Soviet developmental
programs is an impressive family of cruise missile
systems. As the CVA threat has evolved in terms of
increasing numbers as well as sophistication, im-
provements in the Soviet cruise missile capability
have been phased in appropriately. Changes during
recent years have included increased standoff
range, supersonic cruise velocity, electronic counter-
countermeasure (ECCM) features in the guidance
systems, and greater numbers of cruise missiles per
launch platform. Of particular significance was the
recent introduction of the element of a possible
surprise attack through the use of an underwater
launch platform.
a continuing Soviet antiship cruise missile
development program. Such a program will con-
tinue to be evolutionary in nature and focus on
those limitations which significantly influence the
effectiveness of the targeting system, cruise missile,
and launch platform. Improvements expected to ap-
pear -during the next decade include smaller cruise
missiles, utilizing technological advances to increase
the firepower of a single launch platform and to
reduce the radar cross section, and greater standoff
range to reduce launch platform vulnerability. A
significant improvement in Soviet ASCM targeting
capability could result from the development of an
improved ocean surveillance system. Major ad-
vances in technology would not be required for
such a development. Also, the Soviets are expected
to make greater use of advanced ECCM techniques,
 Increase missile maneuverability in the terminal en-
counter, and develop better discrimination tech-
niques for identification of high-value targets.
Air-to-air missiles
The Soviets have five basic operational air-to-air
missile (AAM) systems, all except the earliest
(AA-1) produced in both an infrared and semi-
active radar guidance version. Their AAM develop-
mental program has been well-planned; each new
model introduced into service has reflected ad-
vances in technology. A family of weapons has been
developed which is capable of destroying targets
in the medium- to high-altitude regimes by means
of head-on or tail attack in all weather conditions.
But all of the missiles lack the capabilities required
for ,low-speed, low-altitude engagement in a
ground-clutter environment.
We expect the Soviets to develop a new, short-
range missile with decreased minimum launch
range, high maneuverability and good low- to
medium-altitude capability against low-altitude
penetrators and maneuvering targets. Such a mis-
sile could probably be developed using current
state-of-the-art technology for all major components
and appear by the mid-1970s. Also a new, long-
range AAM could be required if the postulated ad-
vanced long-range, all-weather interceptor is de-
veloped.
MILITARY SPACE
We expect the USSR to continue to emphasize
military uses of space and to conduct active R&D
programs in support of such uses. While the Soviet
space program generally has been successful, it has
been plagued with a succession of problems over
the years both with spacecraft and launch vehicles.
During the next several years better environmental
ground testing, improved checkout procedures, and
the use of improved technology should result in
increased reliability in Soviet military-related space-
craft. The Soviets probably will develop new or
modified stages to the proven boosters to provide
cost effective delivery of heavier payloads into
varied orbits. Current Soviet technology is believed
adequate to support the power, guidance, and atti-
tude control requirements for military space systems
over the next 10 years. In the long term, the Soviets
could develop reusable launch systems should the
launch rate demand them. To do so, however, ad-
vances in the technologies associated with high
temperature structures, lightweight heat protection,
and hypersonic aerodynamics would be required.
The development phase of a Soviet orbital satel-
lite interceptor may be nearing completion. Anti-
satellite capabilities could be extended to geosta-
tionary altitudes during the next five years, based
on existing technology. Advances in reconnaissance,
surveillance, and meteorological satellites are pred-
icated on advanced sensor development. We are not
aware of any limitations of Soviet military research
facilities that would hamper such development.
Experiments with manned spacecraft indicate an
interest in missile-launch detection/ surveillance
sensors and photoreconnaissance. We expect the
Soviets to pursue the development of new recon-
naissance sensors and.systems to monitor US com-
pliance with the strategic arms limitation (SAL)
Soviet experimentation with ocean
area observation could lead to ocean surveillance
systems using multi-spectral sensors.
AERONAUTICS
For at least the past 10 years the Soviets have
pursued vigorously a broad and uninterrupted pro-
gram in practically all areas of aerodynamic R&D.
They have increasingly emphasized use of experi-
mental capabilities to support existing high-quality
analytical and numerical capabilities. They are
capable of addressing the complex development
problems of more advanced system concepts. Re-
search programs include studies intended to im-
prove aerodynamic efficiency in all speed regimes
and the examination of unique problems associated
with specific vehicle types.
The Soviets continue to devote extensive aero-
nautical R&D resources to the development of tur-
bine and jet engine concepts. Relatively short
engine life continues to be a major shortcoming of
the Soviet aircraft gas turbine industry. The Soviet
turbine materials that have become available for
exploitation continue to be "dirty" with inclusions
and high porosity. This apparent inability to manu-
facture high-quality turbine materials is the prob-
 able reason for low turbine Inlet temperatures and
the short life of current Soviet engines. This short-
coming is expected to be overcome through the use
of more effective cooling schemes, better fabrica-
tion techniques, and improved alloys.
Despite the above shortcoming, Soviet engine
technology has shown a number of strengths in inlet
technology, positive expulsion tanks, and com-
pressor design. The Soviets have been developing a
turboramjet engine (which they define as an after-
burning turbofan) since about 1964. They are also
aggressively pursuing the technology necessary for
the development of rocket-ramjet combined cycle
engines. Various missiles and an airbreathing
booster for a space shuttle vehicle are their in-
dicated goals.
The Soviets continue to build and fly an im-
pressive number of prototype aircraft of all types.
Additionally, progressive improvements have ap-
peared in numerous new models. Three new and
different types of fighter designs are currently' in
flight testing; two of these are in the weapon sys-
tems test stage. Continuing emphasis on VTOL and
STOL developments is being supported by in-
vestigation into flow field effects around such
vehicles operating near the ground in hover or in
transition to forward flight modes. Development of
new bombers in addition to those now being tested
does not present an insurmountable technological
challenge to the Soviets.
A unique Soviet vehicle which appears to have
no Western counterpart is the 10-engine vehicle
300 feet in length which has been in existence at
Kaspiysk on the west coast of the Caspian Sea since
1966. The vehicle appears capable of exploiting
propulsion and lift interaction to provide several
modes of operation and may be able to lift payloads
comparable with those of the C-5A in STOL opera-
tions from water or ice.
there may be a family of vehicles of this type
with lengths of 50, 75, 100, and 300 feet.
GROUND WARFARE
Efforts to modernize Soviet ground frees have
been moderately successful. Since World War II
roughly three generations of weapons and support
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X
equipment have been furnished to the Soviet
ground forces. Much of the old materiel is obsolete
but usable and often effective. We see no trends
in Soviet ground weapons R&D which would
materially affect ground forces doctrine during the
next decade.
Future Soviet ground warfare R&D probably will
be directed toward development of equipment
which will improve river crossing, airborne, over-
snow, and amphibious capabilities. Better self-
propelled armored support weapons and close-
range missile and artillery support weapons should
be forthcoming. Soviet smoothbore technology is
the most advanced in the world, and further devel-
opment of smoothbore weapons for firing rocket-
assisted and guided projectiles may be expected.
The Soviets will continue their efforts to upgrade
command and control systems and develop an effec-
tive military operations research program which
encompasses all areas-from electromagnetic prop-
agation studies, communications devices and ADP
usage to selection and training of technical person-
nel.
NAVAL WARFARE
During the past several years the Soviets have
developed a wide variety of new naval weapon sys-
tems, including submarine-launched strategic bal-
listic missile systems, improved antiship and anti-
aircraft missile systems, and antisubmarine warfare
ships and systems. While the new major surface
combatant types have designations which indicate
a main mission of antisubmarine warfare, surface-
to-surface missile armament makes them formidable
threats in ship-to-ship combat. Soviet naval R&D
during the next 10 years will continue to be directed
largely toward improvements in existing weapon
systems. New naval systems, however, are possible.
Soviet efforts to improve their submarine forces
continue. Four modifications of existing ballistic
missile submarine designs are in the experimental
stage. Of these, a large nuclear-powered submarine,
the newly designated D-class, has appeared and is
assessed to be the platform for the SS-NX-8 missile.
The speed of this submarine is unknown but pre-
sumably will be comparable with that of the Y-class.
The D-class submarine possibly will incorporate
improved sound quieting features over those of the
 Y-class. As anticipated, the Soviets have developed
a new and quieter second generation nuclear tor-
pedo attack-class submarine, designated the V-class
SSN, but they apparently have chosen not to sacri-
fice speed in order to incorporate quieting features.
In addition to noise reduction, Soviet submarine
R&D during the next decade probably will con-
tinue to emphasize precision navigation, command/
control systems, and improved steels and welding
for deeper diving hulls.
The new Krivak-class combatant probably will be
used primarily in an ASW role and may be followed
in the latter part of the decade by new surface
combatants having a primary role of ASW. The new
aircraft carrier under constniction at Nikolayev,
designated the 444B, probably will be operational in
several years. This ship is expected to carry
V/STOL aircraft and probably will be used in an
air support and/or air defense role. The ship may
also carry ASW helicopters for surface ship ASW
screening operations or be equipped with assault
helicopters for projecting forces ashore.
Soviet ASW has been largely dependent upon
acoustic detection of submarines and has increased
substantially over the past few years. Only one
Soviet nonacoustic system-magnetic anomaly de-
tection (MAD) equipment used in ASW aircraft-
is known to be in operation, but the Soviets are well
aware of a wide range of other nonacoustic tech-
niques. The USSR can be expected to improve ASW
capabilities through development of improved
acoustic and nonacoustic detection/ classification
equipment and more effective weapons for surface
ships, submarines, aircraft, and helicopters. The
Soviets probably will install improved acoustic de-
tection devices on ships and submarines and deploy
some improved fixed acoustic arrays and moored
buoys. While we are unable to predict the precise
direction of Soviet R&D in naval-associated acoustic
detection systems, their research appears to be fol-
lowing conventional avenues of US investigation.
The Soviets may be attempting to develop ad-
vanced types of detection/sonar systems, based
upon infrasonic waves, bioacoustics, and nonlinear
acoustics and possibly nonacoustic methods (MAD,
radar and laser, infrared radiometers, radioactive
detectors and others). For at least the next decade,
however, nonacoustic method robably will con-
tinue to complement acoustic de lion systems.
MILITARY ELECTRONICS
The USSR is expected to increase the use of
those devices and techniques which will lead to
more compact and reliable electronics equipment
for military applications. Soviet capabilities in the
theory of solid-state devices are good and will re-
main so; improvements are expected in their capa-
bility to produce quantities of such devices for
use In military systems. Throughout the period,
increased miniaturization, microminiaturization,
and integrated circuit applications to weapons sys-
tems electronics are expected. Based on a strong
development program and past trends, spectrum
utilization throughout the next 10 years probably
will be toward lightly used frequency bands for
numerous reasons and there will be considerable
emphasis on t:!r use of shorter wavelengths. The
trend in Soviet devices which could be applicable
to both high-power and low-power use in military
systems probably will be toward increased band
width and stability and, where applicable, toward
increased power and tunability.
In radar applications the Soviets are expected to
make increased use of advanced modulation tech-
niques, Antenna designs, while conventional for the
most part, will probably emphasize electronically
steered phased arrays for applications in which
beam agility is important. Techniques applicable
to a synthetic aperture radar using optical process-
ing are being developed, but there is no evidence
to suggest that such a radar is now operational.
Also, the Soviets are expected to continue their
over-the-horizon (OTH) developmental effort.
Future development in OTH systems may include
an OTH radar designed to look through the north-
ern auroral zone toward the US. The key problems
facing the Soviets in future OTH development are
avoidance of the high losses common in transpolar
propagation and improvement of system reliability,
Soviet communications efforts are currently di-
rected toward the establishment of a unified auto-
mated communications network. Development of
electronic and semielectronic switching equipment
will continue, but actual integrated service of such
equipment is not expected before 1980. Improve-
ments in electronic warfare capabilities, including
electronic jamming and chaff to counter US radars
and communications networks, should continue
 TOP ~,ECRET
during the next 10 years. Emphasis will be placed
on the development of advanced electronic coun-
termeasures equipment which will provide for
higher jamming power per pound, increased capa-
bility for multiple target jamming, and quicker
reaction times.
The Soviets are expected to continue to use
specially designed computers, generally selecting
the lowest order of software and hardware sophis-
tication consistent with systems needs for on-line
military systems applications. Small-scale integrated
circuits (IC) are available for design experiments,
and prototypes of large-scale IC arrays have been
employed in experimental work in military-related
areas such as signal processing. It is unlikely, how-
ever, that quantities of large-scale IC arrays will be
used in military computers before 1978 because of
insufficient amounts of quality components and the
conservatism of Soviet military systems designers.
Developers of computers for use in military systems
probably will continue to employ proven circuit
and component technology rather than depend on
the concurrent development of new components
and circuits to meet system needs.
MILITARY ELECTRO-OPTICS
A large effort is directed at developing and
producing electro-optical systems for the Soviet
armed forces. Their infrared (IR) optics technology
is good and has found wide military application.
Their laser program has expanded at a rapid rate
over the past several years. All of the more useful
types of lasers suitable for military applications
are available or under development in the USSR.
Future research is expected to focus on high energy
pulsed and continuous wave lasers for application
to new electro-optical systems for laser-induced
fusion, communications, laser discrimination systems.
and laser beam weapons.
the probable existence of a major Soviet
military R&D program involving high energy lasers.
Although a number of aspects of this program re-
main obscure,
the goal may be to
develop a laser weapon system. While the specific
application for this weapon system is not yet known,
air defense appears to constitute the earliest feasible
strategic use. The development of a laser radar
or discriminator which might be used in conjunc-
tion with a missile defense system is an additional
possibility.
Based on their laser and optical pointing and
tracking capabilities, in the near future the Soviets
apparently could deny us photosatellite coverage
of high-interest targets should they desire to place
sufficient priority on such a laser application. Such
interference with national means of verification,
however, would be in violation of the SAL agree-
ments. The Soviets probably could develop the
essential elements of a laser antisatellite weapon
system capable of damaging low-orbit satellites
through thermal means by the early to mid-1980s.
It is unlikely that the Soviets could develop a di-
rected energy kill or other laser ABM weapon sys-
tem during the next 10 years.
Soviet IR optics technology is supported by a
strong background in theoretical and applied op-
tics. Their R&D of semiconductor radiation detec-
tors has advanced considerably in the past few
years. The USSR apparently has an across-the-board
capability somewhat comparable with that of the
MILITARY MEDICINE
Soviet military medicine is steadily improving
in terms of productivity and effectiveness. The
Soviet R&D effort compares favorably with that
of the US, but the capability to apply the results
at the troop level continues to lag that of the US.
Military medical research having priority in terms
of money and manpower and which has had some
successes includes that related to nuclear sub-
marines, submersibles, and hyperbaric (deep div-
ing) medicine; study of the adverse effects of
nonionizing radiation in manned military enclos-
ures; and development of radiation drugs for pre-
and post-radiation exposure. Military pharmacolog-
ical research continues to be directed toward the
development of antihypoxic agents, antidotes for
chemical warfare agents, and antiviral chemo-
therapeutic agents for influenza.
 .oP\SECaET
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
Soviet CW research and development encom-
passes all phases from basic research to field test-
ing in the discovery and development of new agents
and munitions. We expect the Soviets to continue
during the 1970s their considerable research on the
toxicological and physiological effects of old and
candidate agents. New compounds for testing will
continue to emerge from screening natural and
synthetic toxic compounds. New types of lethal
and incapacitating agents might be developed at
any time from this work. Research to develop
improved antidotes. prophylactics, and protective
equipment will .^ontinue.
We continue to believe that a Soviet research
and development program in BW has been under
way since perhaps as early as the 1930s. There is
evidence that BW agents have been developed,
but we are unable to determine which pathogens,
if any, have been standardized for military use. We
have no reliable information to confirm an offensive
doctrine or the deployment of hardware for offen-
sive BW purposes and are unable to determine the
extent of Soviet BW testing. The recent convention
signed by the US, USSR, and other nations would
seem to negate the development and stockpiling of
bacteriological and toxic weapons by the Soviets,
but the convention lacks provisions for verifying
compliance by the signatory countries. The un-
certainties in our knowledge of Soviet BW accom-
plishments and of the scope of their R&D effort
preclude the making of valid predictions about
future capabilities.
NUCLEAR R&D
Since the signing of the Test Ban Treaty in 1963,
the USSR has continued to test underground and
undoubtedly is carrying on R&D programs in weap-
ons. The likely objectives and extent of the Soviet
program are the development of thermonuclear
warheads for new strategic systems, development
of cleaner, lighter, and more flexible warheads for
tactical applications, development of advanced war-
heads for ABM applications, and the investigation of
pure fusion techniques.
In the area of controlled thermonuclear reaction
(CTR) research, the experimental program of the
USSR is the world's largest in terms of the invest-
ment of equipment and manpower. At the outset
the Soviet program concentrated on research with
toroidal machines, with some work involving linear
machines. More recently, however, the program
has become more diversified and includes studies
of fusion induced by laser and relativistic electron
beams. In addition to the possible development
of a fusion reactor, Soviet CTR R&D could result in
such applications as the simulation of high-altitude
nuclear weapons effects.
Soviet nuclear technological development appears
to be progressing at about the same pace as in the
West. Unexpected advances leading to improved
nuclear-powered military systems could result from
the development of new materials permitting ad-
vances in such areas as the miniaturization of con-
trol systems, the design of magnets, and high-
capacity energy storage systems.
DISCUSSION
ORGANIZATION, PLANNING AND
CONTROL
In their pursuit of long-range, worldwide objec-
tives, the Soviets have placed heavy reliance on
military R&D programs aimed at developing weap-
ons systems to offset Western capabilities. For this
reason, vigorous and increasingly competent Soviet
military R&D programs are of extreme interest and
concern at the highest levels of the Soviet govern-
ment. Our knowledge of the organization and con-
trol of Soviet military research and development
programs is sketchy. Nevertheless, bits of organiza-
tional information on the party and government,
procedures used in the past, statements of need,
and general policy directives on science and tech-
nology provide some basis for deducing the prob-
able mechanisms involved. (Figure)
TO CRET
 CPSU
SECRETARIAT
TCRET
CPSU POLITBURO
CPSU
CENTRAL
COMMITTEE
DEFENSE
INDUSTRIES
? SECTORS FOR
SCIENCE AND
EDUCATIONAL
MINISTRY OF
DEFENSE
? Poor Services and Ground.
Naval, Al, Strategic Rocket,
and Air Defense Forces
? Research Institutes,
Laboratories
and Test Ranges
Medium Machine
Building
Electronics
Industry
Shipbuilding
Industry
REQUIREMENTS
AND
ACCEPTANCE
Scientific and
Technical
Committees
of the Ministries
PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY
FOR CONDUCT OF R&D
Organizations concerned with military R&D in the USSR
General Machine
Building
DEFENSE
COUNCIL
STATE {
COMMITTEE ' ? scientific,
FOR SCIENCE ? Cod ting
AND
TECHNOLOGY
 The summit of Soviet weapons R&D policy-mak-
ing appears to consist of the top-level people in
the most important organizations involved in the
weapons R&D policy process, with good representa-
tion and communication by the defense industrial
establishment and the military professionals. These
organizations include the Politburo and D. F. Usti-
nov, candidate member of the Politburo and over-
seer of military R&D and production activities; the
Defense Council-an advisory group to the Polit-
buro chaired by Brezhnev which brings together
top political and military leaders; the defense in-
dustry section of the Central Committee headed
by I. D. Serbin; and the Military-Industrial Com-
mission (Voyenno Promyshlennaya Kommissiya-
VPK), a group consisting of representatives of high
ranking defense industrial ministries and Ministry
of Defense officials chaired by L. V. Smirnov, a
deputy minister of the Council of Ministers who
reports to Ustinov.
This small and closely knit group of policy-makers
probably defers to professional military judgment
in weapon program decisions. Although the pres-
sures on limited national resources are considered
at the summit as national priorities are defined,
there is no evidence that weapon program decisions
are routinely and systematically influenced by cost-
effectiveness considerations as they are in the US.
Despite an emergent systems analysis capability
in the Soviet military establishment, it does not
seem to be focused on cost-effectiveness appraisals.
Soviet leaders are probably strongly inclined to
accept weapons programs that the military profes-
sionals say they need and that the engineers and
economists agree are feasible. The built-in bias of
the decision-making system appears to lend itself
to the expansion of military technology efforts along
lines which satisfy all or most military advocates
of new programs, subject to budgetary restraints.
Within the structure of the Council of Ministries,
the VPK provides the framework for control and
coordination at the national level of military-asso-
ciated research and development plans, programs,
and activities accomplished by the defense-indus-
trial ministries for or in support of the Ministry
of Defense. The members of the VPK appear to
represent the ministries most concerned with mili-
tary R&D including Defense, Defense Industry,
General Machine Building, Medium Machine Build-
ing, Machine Building, Aviation Industry, Radio
Industry, Electronics Industry, and Shipbuilding
Industry. These defense-industrial ministries bear
the primary administrative responsibility for carry-
ing out military R&D programs as well as produc-
tion of weapons systems and components for dis-
crete customer elements of the Ministry of Defense;
for example, Ground Forces, Navy, Air Force, Air
Defense Forces, and Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF).
These customer elements are represented by Tech-
nical Directorates which train and assign "military
representatives" to monitor all military work being
done within the civilian industries.
Long-range plans and requirements for military
systems are believed to be formulated, consolidated,
and approved by a planning directorate of the Gen-
eral Staff of the Ministry of Defense in conjunction
with the respective operational forces. Military
planning probably operates both downward and
upward. Key requirements of national importance
are probably initiated and approved from a general
standpoint at the Politburo and Council of Ministers
level, while less important requirements may be
drawn up by individual forces and submitted up-
ward for approval. Ideas from field commands are
analyzed by academies, research institutes, labora-
tories, and test centers controlled by technical direc-
torates of the individual forces, and recommenda-
tions are forwarded to higher authorities.
The Ministry of Defense is essentially a customer
for weapons and military materiel and does not itself
perform much research. Each service has a tech-
nical directorate whose responsibilities include the
definition of systems requirements and the estab-
lishment of priorities for weapons and equipment.
Each technical directorate administers a limited
number of research and test facilities, but the mis-
sion of these facilities is mainly to explore the
feasibility of new weapons, examine new projects,
test new weapons and develop techniques for their
tactical or strategic use. A directorate's main con-
tribution to military R&D is the monitoring of re-
search and development programs performed out-
side the Ministry of Defense in the defense-
industrial ministries; this is achieved by assigning
military personnel to represent the customer ele-
ments on Defense Industrial Ministry commissions
which evaluate competitive design proposals and
 approve each phase of the development program.
Military representatives are also assigned to the
R&D and production facilities of the ministries that
will provide the weapon system, as well as to facili-
ties of other ministries providing subcontracted
items.
Product responsibilities of the eight industrial
ministries most concerned with Soviet military R&D
are as follows:
Defense Industry .... Armored vehicles, artillery, rock-
ets, small arms, and aircraft
armament
General Machine Ballistic missiles; space launch
Building systems, upper stages, and non-
recoverable spacecraft
Aviation Industry .... Aircraft, aerodynamic missiles,
defensve missiles, recoverable
spacecraft
Medium Machine Nuclear weapons and nuclear
Building propulsion plants
Radio Industry ...... Communication/navigational/
guidance equipment, computers
Electronics Industry .. Electronic components
Shipbuilding Industry Naval vessels, underwater weap-
ons, fire control systems
Machine Building .... Ammunition, explosives, fuses and
projectiles, and solid propel.
lants
The defense-industrial ministries plan, initiate,
and conduct the applied research programs needed
to support military system developments. The min-
istries generally strive for self-sufficiency, but part
of their applied research programs is contracted to
supporting agencies. Research planning is based
largely on a ministry's understanding of future sys-
tems requirements and established technology. Re-
search programs of the defense-industrial ministries
usually are initiated in anticipation of future sys-
tems requirements. Only rarely is applied research
initiated in response to explicit system require-
ments. The applied research performed by the min-
istries determines their capability to respond to
specific customer requirements. The individual
services within the Ministry of Defense define the
specific requirements for weapons system develop-
ments and initiate the design development phase
through the administrative channels of the Council
of Ministers.
Within each defense-industrial ministry, actual
responsibility for research and development is gen-
erally divided between scientific research institutes
which conduct applied research programs and de-
sign bureaus which accomplish weapons system de-
sign and development. Scientific research institutes
play an important role in support of design bureaus
and specific weapons development programs by
conducting necessary applied research activities,
preparing design handbooks and specifications, con-
ducting ground environmental testing and proto-
type testing activities, and evaluating design suit-
ability during the various phases of the weapons
development cycle. The actual development of spe-
cific weapons systems, however, is the sole respon-
sibility of the chief designer who has been awarded
the development program after competition with
one or more design bureaus. Research and develop-
ment programs are financed from the operating
budget of an institute or design bureau of a min-
istry or from the State budget and occasionally by
the Ministry of Defense. Series production costs
are contracted with and paid directly by the mili-
tary forces.
Our most complete documentation of the R&D
process concerns Soviet procedures used in the de-
velopment of aircraft, cited here as an example.
Although each weapons system goes through a
similar R&D cycle, the detailed administrative pro-
cedures used in handling its evolution vary with
the type of system. During the development of a
new aircraft, it is common practice within the Min-
istry of Aviation Industry to form a commission
responsible for making recommendations on each
significant phase of the program from preliminary
design through mock-up, detail design, prototype
construction, and test. The commission normally is
chaired by a deputy minister and includes repre-
sentatives of the Ministry, the military customer,
chief designers, key scientific research institutes,
and representatives of other ministries that will pro-
vide other subsystems and components. Mock-ups
of the system are inspected by a military commis-
sion for the purpose of ascertaining suitability and
making recommendations to the industrial com-
mission. Final tests are made by the Ministry to
ensure that performance is in accordance with mili-
tary customer requirements. Service operational
tests are then conducted by military customer test
organizations for decisions about series production
and operational use. Design bureaus continue to
 remain responsible for design activities and modi-
fications during series production of a system until
it is obsolete and retired from operational service.
Effective use is being made of military-related
R&D resources as indicated by the steady succession
of new and improved weapon systems and the large,
continuing resource allocations that have been made
to military product R&D facilities. Resource invest-
ments for strengthening national-level scientific
and technical capability are not being used as ef-
ficiently as the Party and Government would like,
however. Obstacles to full use of the national R&D
potential include faulty management and planning,
imbalance between theoretical and applied re-
search, administrative barriers to the more timely
Introduction of R&D achievements into production,
security barriers, and the lack of interchange with
East European S&T personnel. As the Soviets have
become increasingly aware of the high costs of
modern R&D, much concern is being expressed
about devising ways to measure and improve the
efficiency of R&D institutions and individual scien-
tists and engineers. From the frequency with which
the military R&D industries (for example, the aero-
space industries) are identified as the "lead indus-
try" whose management techniques and efficiency
are to be emulated by other Soviet Industries, it
is concluded that high-level dissatisfaction with the
R&D effort is directed toward the general scientific
and technical community.
Some of the strengths and weaknesses of the na-
tional-level S&T community are shared by the mili-
tary-product R&D establishment; others are not.
The features of the military-product R&D estab-
lishment which set it apart from the rest of Soviet
science and technology are organizational, manage-
ment-related and motivational; other features which
foster improved efficiency are the urgency of na-
tional security demand for weaponry and the per-
sistent demands of its customer, the Ministry of
Defense, for quantitative and qualitative improve-
ments in new generations of products.
Organizational separation of R&D performers and
customers and between basic and applied science
has several beneficial aspects within each ministry.
The clear identification of responsibilities, func-
tions, and roles reduces duplication of effort; both
national- and ministry-level control and administra-
TOP 3 CRET
lion are enhanced by the resulting dispersion of
effort, and a more favorable span of control is
achieved. The relative autonomy and cohesiveness
of each industry or science area permit them to
exercise initiative in determining the direction of
R&D programs and, at the same time, result in a
high degree of self-dependency in meeting customer
demands.
The higher level of R&D effectiveness of the mili-
tary product ministries is also heavily influenced
by the favored treatment received from Party/
Government decision-makers and planners in re-
source allocations, higher wage levels, and prefer-
ential motivational inducements. These ministrie
have historically been nurtured with priority con-
siderations to insure success in achieving Party
and State military-related goals. Their effectiveness
is frequently highlighted as an example to other
ministries of the progress and capability that can
be attained. In addition, their superior capabilities
are occasionally used to satisfy critical gaps that
arise in the non-military or consumer sector.
The planning of military R&D is accomplished
separately from other national-level R&D planning.
This allows for identity and priority in planning the
scope and direction of the nation's military R&D
effort and adjustments to accommodate the highest
priority projects of the defense industries. Further-
more, the coordinative efforts of VPK and the
supervision of high-ranking Politburo members lend
the prestige and power of the Party and State to
these plans to assure effective and timely imple-
mentation.
The majority of high-level decision-makers and
managers associated with military product R&D
have technical backgrounds or training which pro-
vide some degree of technical expertise in R&D
decision making. Their selection to positions of
ministerial authority, although based in part on
political suitability, is mainly the result of tech-
nical and administrative competency and demon-
strated professional accomplishment in their re-
spective fields. Most have come up through the
ranks .-nm diversified assignments and are well
versed in the operations of their industry. There
is little rotation of high-level managers between
industries. The tenure of the ministers who bead
the military-product ministries averages 13 years.
 Tenure is enjoyed by most ministers who have been
judged successful in operating their ministry, have
met prescribed Party/Government goals, and have
met standards of effective use of allocated resources.
Similar criteria of technical administrative compe-
tency prevail for managerial personnel down to the
research institute and design bureau level. Promo-
tion from within is normal practice when replace-
ments become necessary, thus reinforcing the con-
tinuity of leadership and minimizing perturbations
in R&D programs. The frequency and diversity of
awards and recognition given for professional and
administrative accomplishments in fields allied to
areas of importance to military R&D not only illus-
trate the priority emphasis devoted to the military
versus non-military sector but also the powerful
motivational inducement given to spur future ad-
vancement and plan achievement.
Several deficiencies exist which are believed to
counterbalance the above strengths and, to a degree,
tend to constrain progress in military R&D fields.
The mechanisms for administration and program
control have tended to become highly centralized
and rigid and require meticulous and exhaustive
bureaucratic procedures in planning at all levels.
Soviet policy minimizes the use of direct R&D com-
petition as an instrument for advancement of science
and technology. Officially, duplication of effort in
S&T is generally considered a wasteful use of re-
sources, and emphasis continues on refining organi-
zational responsibilities to minimize competition
and resultant duplication between organizations.
In practice, duplication does occur between in-
dustries, science agencies, and educational insti-
tutions where similar areas are being researched
even though the end prooact or goal is different.
Since this effort is not directly competitive, it does
not effectively stimulate R&D advancement. Ad-
ministrative and bureaucratic barriers also generally
complicate communication channels and retard the
cross-fertilization and multi-application of research
effort between industries. The separation between
research, design/development, and production func-
tions within ministries also tends to retard rapid
assimilation of new technology advancements, thus
stifling innovations in R&D problem solutions. This
prevails to a greater degree in the non-military
product industries where less extensive working
relationships appear to exist between research, de-
velopment, and production elements. A concerted
effort is being made to solve these problems in
both military and non-military sectors.
Design competition is officially sanctioned as an
important element for achieving progress in the
military product industries where a dynamic tech-
nology environment prevails, new generations of
products require performance improvements over
previous ones, and competition with Western ac-
complishments are important milestones in achiev-
ing national and international prestige. Even here,
however, degrees of specialization exist which limit
the numbers and interests of competing bureaus.
Emphasis on program plan fulfillment and goal
achievement combined with the previously dis-
cussed aspects of the Soviet environment has gen-
erally resulted in minimizing risks and tends to
foster conservatism in systems design and per-
formance.
FACILITIES
The extensive Soviet investment in military R&D
facilities during the past decade which has con-
tributed substantially to their technological achieve-
ments noted to date has also provided them with
a potential for conducting future R&D programs
on advanced weapon systems during the period
of our forecast. The growth trends in Soviet R&D
investments during the 1960s indicate that the
USSR will continue to program future system de-
velopments of high national priority and ensure mo-
mentum in the continuous process of providing
new weapon systems. Because of the time lag
between R&D resource investments and returns
on those investments in the form of new and im-
proved systems, the full impact of the Soviet in-
vestments in military R&D complexes during the
1960s has not yet been realized. As a Soviet R&D
program is completed, the resources involved in
the program are immediately recycled for use on
new design tasks. Hence, Soviet capital resource
investments to date should result in continuing
hardware improvements and new developmental
trends well into the mid- to late-1970s, even if
the capital investment trend were stopped abruptly
in the near future.
 in~sEreFi
The Soviet Ground Forces are supported by ex-
tensive RTD&E and production facilities adminis-
tered by the defense-industrial ministries, particu-
larly the Ministry of Defense Industry and the
Ministry of Machine Building, and the Ministry of
Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building. The
Ministry of Defense Industry (Ministerstoo Oboron-
noy Promyshlennosti-MOP) has the major respon-
sibility for ground force weapon systems, including
infantry weapons, artillery, and armored vehicles.
The ministry also performs supporting R&D in the
areas of fire control, optics, infrared devices, tele-
communications, radar, and metallurgy. Selected
components for related systems and materiel devel-
opment programs are provided by the facilities of
the machine building industries. Design and de-
velopment of ground force systems are responsi-
bilities of both independent design groups and
production plant teams such as the one believed
to be at Tank Plant No 183, Nizhniy Tagil. It
is believed that in certain categories of weapons
R&D, for example, small arms, ad hoc groups of
scientists and engineers are formed to do the work.
The development of a major weapon system is
always a multiministerial effort, with the Ministry
of Defense Industry having overall responsibility.
Of the approximately 30 new designs introduced
in the last 15 years, most are out of MOP, with
cooperation from the Ministries of Radio Industry
and Electronics Industry and the machine building
ministries. Testing of MOP items is accomplished
at numerous test ranges probably subordinate to
the Ministry of Defense.
Air Forces
The R&D facilities for the Soviet Ministry of
Aviation Industry (Ministerstoo Aviatsionnoy Pro-
myshlennosti-MAP) have undergone rapid growth,
particularly during the last decade, to meet the
requirements of both military and civil air fleets.
The continuing expansion of many R&D facilities
combined with probable new construction activities
in progress reflect an enhanced Soviet abilit , to
to conduct aerodynamic developmental programs
in support of systems that will become operational
during the 1970s and 1980s. Most of these facilities
are controlled by the Ministry of Aviation Industry
and supported in the areas of specialized equip-
ment and components by the R&D facilities under
other ministries, for example, the Ministry of De-
fense Industry. Subordinate to MAP are key avia-
tion research institutes, including the Central Aero-
hydrodynamics Institute; the Siberian Research
Institute for Aviation; and Institute- for Aircraft
Engine Construction, Aviation Materials, Aviation
Technology and Organization of Production, and
Flight Testing. The estimated number of S&T per-
sonnel in these institutes is about 8,000 and in-
creasing at an annual average rate of approximately
six percent. Thirteen aerodynamic-systems design
bureaus supported by nine or ten propulsion bu-
reaus and eight accessory equipment bureaus are
responsible, under MAP, for new and improved
system and subsystems developmental programs
and experimental prototype construction activities.
The design bureaus are similar in size and scope
to those of the major aircraft producers in the
US. Professional design staffs vary in size from
about 300 to 1,300 individuals, representing ap-
proximately 25 to 30 percent of the total work
force at each bureau. Design staff stability together
with the continuity of development programs and
specialization of design effort by type or class of
system has created a highly skilled, experienced
pool cf designers at each bureau who are well
qualified to undertake increasingly complex weapon
systems developmental programs. Supporting aero-
nautical R&D work is also acquired through con-
tract arrangements with educational institutes of
the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized
Education, particularly the aviation educational in-
Naval Forces
The post-World War II expansion of Soviet ship-
building research, development, and design fa-
cilities levelled off in the late 1960s. By 1971 these
facilities had attained capabilities for high-quality
research. The major facilities are located in the
Leningrad area and are subordinate to the Min-
istry of Shipbuilding Industry. The foremost of
these facilities is the Krylov Shipbuilding Research
Institute (also known as the Central Scientific
Research Institute No. 45), where research on
hydrodynamics, ship structures, marine engineer-
 ing, and shipbuilding materials is conducted. The
professional staff at Krylov consists of about 1,800
individuals; the total staff numbers about 3,600
individuals. A group of non-Soviet hydrodynamicists
was granted a rare opportunity to visit the hydro-
dynamic facilities at Krylov in 1971. It was their
judgment that, while the Soviets were lagging in
hydrodynamic research, the extensiveness and
quality of their research facilities and the high
caliber of their professional personnel have put
them in a position to make considerable gains in
the near future in the performance and quieting of
high-speed ships. The course of research in the
departments of marine engineering and ship struc-
tures is less clearly discernible, but it is evident
that there is a definite and continuing effort di-
rected toward increasing use of automation in ship
control and propulsion systems. Other research fa-
cilities in the Leningrad area subordinate to the
Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry are the Central
Scientific Research Institute of Shipbuilding Tech-
nology, which is primarily concerned with the in-
troduction to shipyard use of new techniques de-
veloped through research; and the Central Scientific
Research Institute No 48, which works on naval
metallurgical developments. A distinctive organi-
zation is the Central Design Bureau for Naval
Standards which approves new designs and ma-
terials for the entire Shipbuilding Ministry after
testing them for general use.
The Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry has cen-
tral design bureaus for the design of cruisers, sub-
marines, coastal patrol craft, minesweepers, and
other types of ships. It also has specialized design
bureaus like the submarine propulsion Special De-
sign Bureau No 143 and the Special Design Bureau
for Boilers. Naval designers inclide such Soviet
prize winners as D. Ye. Brill (naval ordnance),
Z. A. Deribin (submarine design), and G. A.
Oglobin (naval turbines). In addition to work
carried out under the Ministry of Shipbuilding
Industry, research of interest to the Soviet Navy
is done at facilities subordinate to the Ministries
of the Defense Industry, Electronics Industry, and
Aviation Industry, Radio Industry, Medium Ma-
chine Building, and General Machine Building.
Supporting R&D is also conducted by such educa-
tional institutions of the Ministry of Higher and
Secondary Specialized Education as the Leningrad
TOP S CRET
Shipbuilding Institute and the Nikolayev Ship-
building Institute. Although Soviet naval research
is concentrated in the Leningrad area, there are
several naval research facilities in Moscow, such
as the Scientific Research Institute No. 10 (fire
control and missile guidance) and the Marine
Scientific Research Institute No. 1 (electronics of
fire control). Also of particular note is the Institute
of Hydromechanics. Several prolific research
workers of the Krylov Institute have been trans-
ferred to this institute, and the new Director, G. V.
Logvinovich, came from the Central Aerohydro-
dynamics Institute in Moscow. The Institute's work
tends to be theoretical and appears to complement
the engineering-oriented efforts at Krylov. Its prin-
cipal areas of effort are boundary layer control
studies, the hydrodynamics of foils and lifting sur-
faces near a plane surface, reactive propulsion
systems, underwater rockets, and s,irface effect ve-
hicles. The Institute of Hydromechanics also par-
ticipates in an inter-institute program of hydro-
bionics.
Missiles and space
The Ministry of General Machine Building
(Ministerstvo Obskhestvennogo Mashinostroyenia-
MOM) was created in 1965 and reportedly assigned
the responsibility for the research, design, develop-
ment, test, and production of ballistic missiles and
space hardware, formerly the responsibility of the
Ministry of Defense Industry and to a limited ex-
tent the Ministry of Aviation Industry. The crea-
tion of MOM probably resulted in the transfer of
certain facilities from the Ministry of Defense In-
dustry, the Ministry of Aviation Industry, and
various defense-related ministries with the pro-
vision of continued R&D support from these min-
istries. Surface-to-air missiles and cruise missiles
are developed and produced by the Ministry of
Aviation Industry with support from the Ministry
of General Machine Building. The Ministry of De-
fense Industry develops and produces tactical and
unguided rockets. Some of the research institutes
and design bureaus under the Ministry of General
Machine Building which support the Soviet bal-
listic missile and space hardware programs have
been identified. Known facilities have experienced
a significant growth pattern in terms of physical
resource investment. Major gaps still exist in our
 knowledge of several elements of the inustry, par-
ticularly the design bureaus responsible for naval
ballistic missiles and solid-propellant missiles. About
40 major facilities for research, development, test,
and production of liquid- and solid-propellant
missile/space launch systems and their components
have been identified, however. In addition, the
Ministry of General Machine Building receives con-
siderable design support from the Ministry of Avia-
tion and other industries.
Some of the same facilities have also furnished
the basic hardware for the Soviet space explora-
tion program. The Ministry of General Machine
Building has designed and developed space launch
vehicles and space payloads, while the Tomilino
Research and Development Complex of the Min-
istry of Aviation Industry has apparently been the
focal point for the design and development of
manned space flight systems. Training facilities
include a center in the Shchelkovo-Monion area
near Moscow and the Zhukovskiy Air Military En-
gineering Academy, where the cosmonauts receive
their academic training. Adjacent to this academy
is the Air Force Scientific Research Testing In-
stitute for Aviation and Space Medicine, where
much of the basic physiological R&D of manned
space flight systems has been performed. Facilities
of the Ministry of Health have provided R&D sup-
port to the Tomilino Design Bureau and the In-
stitute for Aviation and Space Medicine.
The flight test activities under the Ministry of
General Machine iuilding occur at three test range
complexes: Kapustin Yar (vertical space probes
and up through MR/IRBM-class ballistic missiles),
Tyuratam (ICBMs and space) and Plesetsk (ICBMs
and space). The large number of test launches
that have occurred from these three complexes
suggests that there has been a continuing increase
in the number of launch sites available for flight
test developmental programs for new Soviet mis-
sile/space systems.
Supporting research
As indicated above, most of the Soviet military
R&D effort is undertaken by facilities subordinate
to defense-industrial ministries. Supporting R&D
effort of a limited, specialized nature, however, is
conducted by a number of other ministries and
agencies, including industrial ministries, the Min-
istry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Educa-
tion, and Academy of Sciences institutes having
specialized capabilities or facilities either not avail.
able within the defense-industrial ministries or con-
sidered necessary to augment or expedite existing
research projects. Although this supporting re.
search effort is well diversified and significant, it
is not extensive. Several factors limit the R&D
potential of these sources. Since the supporting
activity is acquired directly through contract ar-
rangements, it is generally of a problem-solving
or short-term nature. Communications problems
and administrative barriers to interaction limit the
direction and applicability of research programs
conducted independently by these agencies. The
tendency for the defense-industrial ministries as
well as all agencies in general to guard closely the
R&D prerogatives of their assigned charter and
maintain a posture of self-reliance is another major
impediment.
Some research conducted by the Academy of
Sciences, USSR, has been of direct value to the
armed services, and specific military-related re-
search projects have been assigned to its leading
research institutes. The academy has over 200 sub-
ordinate institutes, observatories, and laboratories,
employing over 30,000 scientists and a total staff
of nearly 70,000. The Academy of Sciences has ex-
panded in recent years with facilities being located
in remote regions. Two new science centers were
established in 1971, the Far East Science Center
and the Urals Science Center. The purpose of these
centers is to provide a focal point for the develop-
ment of the natural resources of the area in which
they are located. In addition, the republic academies
have recently begun to establish science centers.
Also the Soviets are continuing to expand their
science city program that was begun in 1958. With
18 research institutes and a university, Novosibirsk
is the most prominent of the science cities. A satel-
lite city consisting of scientific research institutes
and design bureaus has been established a short
distance from Novosibirsk. By establishing the
satellite city near the science city, the Soviets hope
to reduce the time between research and produc-
tion. The satellite city is only one of many pro-
grams undertaken by the Soviets to bridge the
gap between science and production. Another sci-
 FT
ence city which is being developed is at Krasnaya
Pakhra, near Moscow, where several institutes of
the Academy of Sciences, USSR, and a facility of
the Institute of Atomic Energy imeni Kurchatov,
are located; these organizations are known to be
engaged in military and space R&D. The center is
expected to grow to accommodate a population
of 40,000 to 50,000.
The national and republic academies of the
Academy of Sciences are undertaking more applied
research projects. This will result in a greater im-
pact of their contribution on the national economy.
Some of the areas of scientific research which fall
under the purview of the academy system and
which have military significance include geo-
magnetism, ionospheric studies, solar physics, acous-
tics, communications, ocean science, and outer
space. In many of these areas, institutes of the
academies are working on specific projects for the
Ministry of Defense.
Another source of great potential for conducting
scientific research relevant to military R&D are
the schools of higher education (Vyssheye Ucheb-
noye Zavedeniye-VUZ. A large share of the S&T
trained manpower employed in higher education
has in the past devoted its efforts primarily to
teaching rather than to conducting research. Dur-
ing the last 15 years, the Soviet Government has
stressed the need for increasing the quantity and
improving the quality of research in these schools.
They have been called upon to intensify research
on theoretical and experimental projects essential
to the development of science and industry. More
than 80 Problem Laboratories at leading VUZs
have been established. Laboratory staffs are being
increased and teaching duties lightened or re-
moved, permitting more research to be done on
selected problems in such areas as radiochemistry,
nuclear physics, electronics, transistors, and com-
puters. The facilities of most VUZ laboratories now
appear to be adequate for research needs, and a
few are equal or superior to those of most US uni-
versities. In a few cases, the best and most ad-
vanced research equipment is located at a VUZ
rather than at an Academy of Sciences institute. In
spite of the increase and improvement in VUZ
research, this source will continue to play less of
a role in the USSR than higher educational insti-
tutions do in the US.
MANPOWER
No statistics are available on the numbers of sci-
entists and engineers engaged in Soviet military
R&D. It is possible, however, to indicate the size
and the range of skills of the national scientific-
engineering manpower pool available for employ-
ment in such R&D programs. In asmuch as military
R&D receives the highest national priority, the re-
quired numbers of scientists and engineers could
be diverted from lower priority programs to man
these programs. There is no evidence that the avail-
ability of qualified professional scientific and tech-
nical manpower has constrained Soviet miiitary-
product R&D.
The best guage of the Soviet commitment to the
rapid establishment of a research and development
base for its industrial and military power is the
increasing amounts of human resources involved in
R&D. In 1950, the nation employed 714,000 blue
and white collar workers in the "Science and Science
Service" work force. This was about 1.8 percent of
the total Soviet work force. By 1972 this same force
had grown to 3,500,000 people, almost a five-fold
increase in 22 years, and accounted for 3.5 percent
of the total work force. Of this number, 635,000
full-time equivalent natural scientists and engineers
were engaged in R&D.
The USSR has given top priority to the training
of engineers. Although the nation already employs
twice as many engineers as the US, Soviet higher
schools are still graduating five engineers for every
engineer graduated in the US. In 1970, 227,000
graduating students were in fields considered to be
engineering fields in the US. The number of en-
gineering graduates was over two times greater
than in 1955 and comprised .36.0 percent of the
1969 graduating class in contrast to about 28 per-
cent of the class of 1955. In the natural sciences,
however, the US is graduating two scientists for
every natural scientist graduated in the USSR. The
total number of natural scientists and engineers
graduated annually in the Soviet Union is about
twice the number of US graduates in these fields.
Soviet planners articipate a large unsatisfied de-
mand for engineers throughout the economy and
particularly in consumer goods industries. The So-
viet emphasis on the training of engineers is ex-
TOP CRET
 Tfl0.5GfQFT
pected to strengthen further the relative industrial
and scientific potential of the Soviet Union. In the
last decade the general quality of higher educa-
tion in the USSR has been lowered somewhat, due
mainly to the increase in part-time education. Other
causes include an increase in the student-teacher
ratio (faculty growth has not kept pace with en-
rollment growth) and a trend toward lower state
expenditures per student, although increasing
amounts have been spent annually on higher edu-
cation. In addition, inadequate classroom and lab-
oratory space has affected the quality of education.
The number of persons in the USSR holding ad-
vanced degrees at the end of 1972 was over 290,000.
Of this number, about 218,000 held scientific or
technical advanced degrees:
Physics and mathematics 30,230
Chemical sciences ....................... 17,164
Biological sciences ....................... 22,340
Technical sciences ....................... 81,786
Medical and pharmaceutical sciences ........ 38,254
Total ................................ 218,029
The Soviet advantage of having such a vast body
of trained manpower has been neutralized some-
what by ineffective use of that manpower. For
example, as many as one-third of all engineers may
be engaged in positions for which engineering
training is not a necessary prerequisite. We do not
know the extent to which poor manpower utilization
affects military R&D, but we believe that utiliza-
tion of trained personnel within the military sector
is probably more effective than the utilization of
such personnel generally in the USSR. The Soviets
seek out and attract the top scientific and engineer-
ing graduates to positions within the military R&D
organizations which generally carry more prestige
than their civilian counterparts. The highly spe-
cialized training received by these graduates, who
are acquired largely from a relatively concentrated
nucleus of educational institutes having close ties
with the defense irdustrial ministries, results in
minimum retraining and expedites their utilization
upon assignment. Workers in the military R&D
organizations are provided superior laboratories and
other facilities, better opportunities for advance-
ment, and housing preferences.
MISSILE SYSTEMS
Offensive ballistic missiles
The Soviets have been conducting R&D pro-
grams on strategic missile systems for over 20 years.
During the past 10 years the
USSR has deve ope several new ICBM systems
and deployed three of these. In the late 1960s their
ICBM development generally was confined to modi-
fications of and improvements to the SS-9, SS-11,
and SS-13 systems. These have included the alter-
ing of the size and shape of reentry vehicles and
development of multiple RV systems and penetra-
The large and varied ICBM force developed by
the Soviets has been based almost exclusively on
liquid propellant technology. As did the US, they
began with liquid oxygen as an oxidizer and prog-
ressed to storable liquids to improve missile re-
action time and ease of handling. Recent ballistic
missiles using liquid propellants (the SS-9, SS-11,
SS-N-6, and SS-NX-8) are believed to employ a
nitrogen-based oxidizer with an amine fuel. This
propellant combination provides the highest energy
of all common or "conventional" storable propel-
lants. We do not know of any Soviet program to
develop more advanced propellants for ballistic
missiles, but the level of technology and state-of-
the-art in this field are sufficient to permit such
development if so desired. The most likely improve-
ment in propellant performance would result from
employing additives in conventional propellants.
The use of "exotic" propellants such as fluorine is
not expected because they greatly increase the
toxicity and handling problems associated with a
deployed missile force. Such propellants, however,
will be used in the space program.
 Soviet liquid-propellant rocket-engine designers
pioneered in two areas of technology-throttleable
engines and high-chamber pressures. The guidance
philosophy of these designers required the use of
thrust control even on early ballistic missiles, and
chamber pressures of about 1,000 psi were being
used in the USSR before such pressures were used
in the US. Evidence obtained from exhibits at the
Paris Air Show indicates that the Soviets have
stressed ease of fabrication, use of standard mate-
rials, and relatively simple and rugged design con-
cepts for reliability. For the most part, Soviet bal-
listic missile propulsion systems have proven to be
extremely reliable by the time the missile is ready
for deployment.
The Soviets will very likely continue their broad
spectrum of ballistic missile R&D for the foresee-
able future. They are likely to concentrate on those
areas of technology in which they lag the US, such
as the MIRVs.
TOP ITCRET
 Tap,sEGRET
Mmv sYSTEM-The Soviets have developed multi-
ple reentry vehicles (MRVs) for the SS-9 and SS-11.
They are not independently targetable, however,
and apparently were developed to attack ABM-
defended soft targets. The USSR probably will de-
velop multiple independently targetable reentry
vehicle (MIRV) systems for their ICBMs and pos-
sibly for future SLBMs, as well. To date no testing
of MIRVs has been identified. Some of these sys-
 tems probably will be accurate enough to provide
a capability to attack hard targets. Increasing the
number of available RVs by means of MIRVs
would also be useful for penetrating ABM defenses
and for enhancing the retaliatory capabilities of
ICBMs surviving a pre-emptive attack. There have
been various indications, some quite explicit, that
the Soviets regard this as an important area of
strategic weaponry in which they have need-for
political, as well as military reasons-to catch up
with the US.
SOLm1-PROPELLANT sxsTEMS-Their large capacity
for manufacturing solid propellants suggests that
the Soviets have intended to stress the development
of solid-propellant ballistic missiles. Moreover, sev-
eral vehicles have been displayed in Moscow pa-
rades that have been described by the Soviets as
using solid propellants. Two of these, the three-
stage SS-13 ICBM and the SS-14 MRBM (which is
made up of the upper two stages of the SS-13),
flight tested, and only a limited number of SS-13s
are deployed. Solid-propellant missiles have some
unique advantages-such as ease of handling and
simplicity of construction-but they require strin-
gent environmental controls and do not lend them-
selves to the original guidance concept used in So-
viet liquid-propellant missiles.
Why the Soviets have not pursued development
of solid-propellant ballistic missiles more inten-
sively is not known.
REENTRY vE me z..ES--The Soviet employment in
the last few years of higher ballistic coefficients
and multiple RVs shows an increased aware, e. s of
ABM penetration problems. Exoatmospheric decoys
and multiple reentry vehicles have been tested and
experiments may have been conducted with other
pen aids.
The development of decoys or
chaff is judged to be within the Soviet capabilities,
however, and could become evident in future R&D
programs.
There is no firm evidence that Soviet RVs are
hardened to withstand nuclear effects. In past test
programs the Soviets have gained considerable ex-
perience with blast and thermal effects, and harden-
ing is implied by the relatively close spacing of the
three RVs on the SS-11 Mod 3 and on the SS-9 Mod
4. Without hardening the RVs would not represent
separate targets to the present Spartan ABM. There
also is a considerable number of technical publica-
tions devoted to technology that could be applied
to RV hardening. On balance, therefore, we judge
that Soviet RVs are hardened to a few hundred
calories per cm2. Efforts to increase this hardness
are likely to continue. Also, the Soviets can be ex-
pected to develop high ballistic coefficients (1,000-
1,500 psf) on future RVs for increased penetrability
against US defenses.
Defensive missiles
Soviet defensive missile development and testing
have been accomplished at the Kapustin Yar, Emba,
and Sary Shagan test ranges. The testing of the
prototypes for the SA-1, SA-2, and SA-3 systems
was accomplished at the Kapustin Yar range. The
Emba test range was constructed between 1960 and
1962 to support the development of tactical defen-
 sive missile systems. The systems identified to date
at that range are the SA-4 (Ganef), the SA-6
(Gainful), the SA-7 (Grail), and the SA-X-8. The
Sary Shagan Missile Test Range is the most exten-
sive of the Soviet defensive missile test ranges and
is the site of the SA-5 and ABM developments as
well as modifications to the SA-2. Construction
started at that facility between 1953 and 1950, and
it is now the most heavily instrumented test range
in the world.
ABM-Since the late 1950s, the Soviets have had
a major ABM R&D program under way at the Sary
Shagan Missile Test Center (SSMTC). The pro-
gram has consisted of the development and testing
of ABM radars and missile subsystems. R&D models
or prototypes for each of the Moscow ABM Sys-
tem components-Dog House, Chekhov and Try
Add radars and the Galosh ABM interceptor-first
appeared at Sary Shagan, as has a prototype of the
Hen House radars which provide early warning
support to the system. Current activities relate to
the development of new ABM systems as well as to
the improvement of the existing system. Under the
terms of the ABM agreement, the Soviets are al-
lowed to continue their ABM research and develop-
ment effort at Sary Shagan.
During the past nine years the Soviets have in-
stalled the Moscow ABM system and a ballistic
missile early warning system on the periphery of
Under the terms of the ABM
agreement, only 100 interceptors on launchers are
allowed, and the development of a rapid reload
capability is not permitted.
TOP
 Developmental research addressing all facets of
Vulnerability to nuclear blackout and in-
ability to discriminate RVs from penetration aids are
limitations which undoubtedly will be addressed.
Present radar technology prohibits "seeing" through
the fireball associated with a nuclear burst. Even
propagation through nearby regions, such as those
below the fireball as it rises, is distorted. Signal
paths are refracted so that tracking accuracies are
degraded and the signals themselves are attenuated.
Signal attenuation and path refraction are reduced
somewhat as operating frequencies are increased,
however. Thus, the development of radars with
capabilities similar to those associated with the
Moscow ABM system but which operate at higher
frequencies might be expected. Other approaches
which might prove equally effective include the
development of effective non-nuclear interceptor
warheads (or at least "cleaner" nuclear warheads)
or development of a firing doctrine or radar de-
ployment pattern which would minimize the pos-
sibility of a nuclear burst occurring in front of all
radars simultaneously (that is, some radars would
always be capable of "seeing" behind all sections
of the battle space).
Improved radar technology which would permit
Soviet development of a high resolution radar in
the near future could result in a capability to dis-
criminate actual reentry vehicles from accompany-
ing penetration aids. But the cost effectiveness of
such an effort is questionable. An enormous com-
puter capacity is required and only a slight modifi-
cation of existing penetration aids would nullify any
capability which might be developed. Other ap-
proaches are considered more likely. For example,
development of optical devices, lasers, and LWIR
TOP SE RET
sensors (although hampered by a necessity to oper-
ate in relatively clear air mass conditions) might
prove more fruitful. Hardware employing such tech-
nolosty has yet to be deployed
The use of nuclear weaponry or atmospheric
filtering to disperse penetration aids and, thus,
enable present radars to acquire and track a re-
entry vehicle can also be considered as a means
of providing discrimination. Employment of nu-
clear weapons, although effective, presents a nu-
clear blackout problem and, hence, probably would
not be pursued unless the vulnerability of the
system to blackout were reduced.
Atmospheric filtering probably is the simplest,
most reliable means of providing discrimination.
Because the "filtering" occurs shortly before re-
entry vehicle detonation, however, a very high
acceleration interceptor is required for this means
to be effective. Although development of such an
interceptor apparently is not under way in the
USSR, it is expected. The ABM Treaty allows for
the deployment of ABMs for defense of ICBM
silos. An ABM system for this purpose would
almost certainly employ a high acceleration in-
terceptor. In fact, during the SALT discussions,
the Soviets stated that their ICBM defense system
would be short range and employ an interceptor
like the US Sprint.
 Soviet research related to the development of
entirely different concepts which would improve
their defense against ballistic missiles can also be
expected. For example, an air or spaceborne laser
ABM system could be developed if the Soviets
could obtain laser output powers ranging from
100 to 1,000 Mw directed with pointing and track-
ing accuracies of approximately 5 microradians at
ranges of 20 to 40 km. Deployment of such systems
under the present ABM Treaty, however, would
be prohibited without prior consultation. On the
other hand, deployment of early warning sensors,
for example, synchronous satellites with sophisti-
cated sensor systems, is not prohibited and prob-
ably will be pursued.
SURFACE-To--m missn.s-The Soviet SAM R&D
program has resulted in the widely deployed PVO
Strany systems (SA-1, SA-2, SA-3, and SA-5), an
entire family of tactical SAMs (SA-4, SA-6, SA-7,
and the SA-X-8 presently under development), and
systems for naval defense (including the SA-N-1,
SA-N-3 and SA-N-4). The systems have for the
most part been designed to counter a specific
threat or a facet of an expected new threat. To
do this, the Soviets have been content to develop
and deploy as soon as possible a system of limited
capability to counter an existing threat, and more
satisfactory solutions to supplement the initial ca-
pability are developed as soon as possible. The
importance of the concept of mobility in Soviet
air defenses has also been evident. The SAMs
began with the permanent fixed sites of the SA-1,
then progressed to the road-transportable SA-2
and SA-3 systems, and finally to the cross-country
mobile SA-4 and SA-6 systems.
In the past, Soviet SAM system engineers have
shown a tendency to employ similar fundamental
concepts in the various systems. For example, the
SA-1, SA-2, SA-3 and SA-N-1 are similar in that
they are command guided and employ pulse-type
fire-control radars which use a track-while-scan
technique. More recently, however, different con-
cepts have been employed. For example, the SA-5
system uses homing-type guidance and a CW fire-
control radar, the Square Pair.
The present Soviet SAM system inventory is
quite diverse. It ;:icludes long-range, radar-guided
weapons (for example, the SA-5 missile), as well
as a man-launched, short-range weapon that uses
infrared homing (the SA-7). Also, SAMs capable
of attacking high performance aircraft flying at
both very high and very low altitudes are avail-
able. For example, the SA-2 and SA-5 systems prob-
ably can engage targets flying at altitudes of 80,000
to 90,000 feet. The SA-3, SA-8 and probably the
principal naval SAMs can engage targets at 300
feet, possibly down to 150 feet, under favorable
conditions.
To improve a system's capabilities and to en-
hance its usable life, the Soviets have undertaken
extensive modification programs. The SA-2 sys-
tem has been continually improved through field
modification and follow-on systems. Development
of the Fan Song E engagement radar and its asso-
ciated Guideline missiles has provided the SA-2
system with an improved high- and low-altitude,
high-speed intercept capability, and an increased
ECCM capability. The SA-2 system is limited, how-
ever, against high-speed (Mach 3), very high alti-
tude targets. These limitations may have been
overcome with the deployment of the SA-5 system.
The low-altitude limitations of the SA-2 system
are believed to have decreased with the develop-
ment of the SA-2F (Fan Song F, and Guideline
Mod 5 combination). This modification also pro-
vides an increased ECCM capability. The SA-3
system, designed for low-altitude intercepts, has
also undergone modifications to improve its
capability.
Soviet requirements for a mobile field force
SAM system resulted in the development of the
SA-4 and SA-6 systems. While the SA-4 provides
the increased mobility desired, its low-altitude capa-
bility is considered poor. The SA-6 is believed to
be the low-altitude complement to the SA-4. These
systems are not well known, and uncertainty exists
as to their guidance, maximum range, and altitude.
The SA-4 system has been noted in exercises where
sin
at
fe'
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fe
 simulated target destructions have been reported
at altitudes between approximately 1,300 and 41,000
feet. Target distances reported at times of destruc-
tion have varied between about 6 nm and 43 nm.
These figures represent extremes; the more preva-
lent altitude and range figures are 3,500 to 35,000
feet and 13 to 25 nm, respectively.
Soviet designers of future naval SAM missile
systems could consider two new systems having
increased range. The first would be a medium-
range replacement for the SA-N-1 system, and the
second could be a longer range system. It is be-
lieved that the Soviets could build either or both
of these types. An improved version of the SA-N-3
system possibly would meet an SA-N-1 replace-
ment requirement. The longer range SAM system
would likely be designed to operate at ranges of
50 to 100 nm and probably would use homing
guidance for the terminal portion of the missile
flight. It would appear, however, that for the pres-
ent and immediate future, providing adequate point
defense is a more achievable goal than providing
area defense for Soviet ship formations.
While the total Soviet SAM force represents a
formidable deterrent to the penetration of Soviet
air space in the vicinity of targets of strategic
importance, it has several major deficiencies. These
include long reaction times, vulnerability to elec-
tronic countermeasures (ECM) and an inability to
cope effectively with aircraft flying at very low
altitudes. The reaction time problem is expected
to be alleviated by the introduction of additional
automatic equipment to SAM batteries and more
expensive use of improved command-coordination-
The vulnerability of Soviet SAM systems to elec-
tronic countermeasures is being reduced to some
degree by the employment of straight forward tech-
niques which include the use of frequency diverse
radars, such as the SA-N-3/Head Lights, and the
addition of optical and electro-optical trackers to
the SAM system fire-control radars. More emphasis
on sophisticated electronic counter-countermeasure
techniques is expected to be reflected in the newer
SAM systems and in those to be developed.
capability probably could a provided with im-
proved acquisition and fire-control radars and im-
proved proximity fuses. These improvements will
provide far more efficient operation in a clutter-
environment. Some future Soviet low-altitude SAM
systems may employ pulse doppler radar equip-
ment which exhibits improved inherent low-altitude
tracking performance.
Other future improvements might include the
development of multipurpose radars that can per-
form all of the required SAM system radar func-
tions, that is, target acquisition, target tracking,
missile tracking and missile command, and require
computer-controlled subsystems including some
type of scan-agile antenna. In addition, we esti-
mate that most shoat-range Soviet SAM radars will
eventually include electro-optical trackers to com-
plement the primary tracker. These improvements
are predicated to a great extent upon the capa-
bility and willingness of the Soviets to devote a
significant R&D effort to the development of fun-
damental radar components and subsystems, espe-
cially in relation to the automation of systems.
 Antiship cruise missiles
The Soviets recognized the potential of antiship
cruise missiles as early as 1947 as a means of
countering Western naval strike forces. Soviet de-
velopmental programs have resulted in an impres-
sive family of cruise missile systems. Operational
systems include five air-to-surface cruise missiles
and eleven surface-to-surface cruise missiles (or
modifications) launched from major surface com-
batants, patrol craft, and submarines. The design
and development of new cruise missile systems
generally have proceeded concurrently with the
development and deployment of a new type or
class of launch platform or the modification of
an earlier design.
The driving force behind Soviet antiship cruise
missile development program may be attributed to
the relative inferiority of their surface naval forces
to those of the US. In particular, the growing
strength of the US attack carrier (CVA) force
after World War II was a serious threat to the
USSR. As the CVA threat evolved in terms of in-
creasing numbers as well as sophistication, the
Soviet ASCM development program also proceeded
in an evolutionary way. Changes in recent years
have included increased standoff range, supersonic
cruise velocity, electronic counter-countermeasure
(ECCM) features in the guidance systems, and
greater numbers of cruise missiles per launch plat-
form. The significant advance in capability rep-
resented by the SS-N-7-the use of an underwater
launch platform (C-class SSGN)-introduced the
element of possible surprise. Soviet systems reflect
sound design concepts and the use of proven tech-
nology. Their high explosives warheads have been
demonstrated under actual operating condition
Soviet ASCM research and development will con-
tinue to be directed toward correcting limitations
and improving the effectiveness of systems against
the CVA threat. Limitations inherent in present
systems include: (i) targeting that requires a for-
ward observer or trailer, or exposes the launch plat-
form; (ii) cruise missile designs that limit the
number of missiles carried by a launch platform;
(iii) current standoff range that may leave the
launch platform vulnerable to attack; (iv) non-
autonomous cruise missile guidance systems; (v)
large radar cross-sections; and (vi) ship and sub-
marine launch platforms that are not compatible
with the need for quick reaction.
TARGETING sysrEM-Presently recognized limita-
tions of the ASCM system may result in a reduction
of its effectiveness in an engagement with a CVA
task force. Targeting requirements for the SS-N-3,
which constitutes a significant fraction of the total
deployed cruise missile force, can be satisfied by
surveillance aircraft, by a tattle-tale trailing ship
or by use of a target-marking cruise missile. Sur-
veillance aircraft play a vital role in providing to
the launcher either a plan position indicator (PPI)
presentation or the coordinate location of the CVA
task force, but surveillance aircraft may serve to
alert the targeted task force, allowing protective
measures to be taken. Similarly, a tattle-tale trailing
ship could be prevented from maintaining close
proximity to the task force. Thus the necessary
targeting information could be denied to a missile
launch platform.
Targeting also could be done directly from the
launch platform, but aircraft and surface ship
launch platforms would expose themselves to the
intended target and thus become vulnerable to CVA
task force counteraction prior to cruise missile
launching. A submerged submarine using sonar
could detect a CVA task force but would have
difficulty in identifying the elements within it to
aid the cruise missile in target discrimination.
The greatest advance in targeting capability
could come from the development of a global sur-
veillance network. This network might rely on a
set of orbiting satellites with real-time read out
for providing targeting information to antiship
cruise missile launch platforms. Among the prob-
lems to be solved are those of target resolution
and timeliness of data interpretation. Such a sys-
tem, if developed and deployed, would eliminate
some of the deficiencies of the present targeting
methods. Multiple sensors covering the optical,
microwave, and IR spectrum could be employed
for an all-weather, day or night capability. Major
advances in technology would not be required for
 TO SECRET
this development. Most of the required develop-
ment has already been demonstrated in Soviet
satellite programs.
attssitzFurther research and development ad-
vances are possible in antiship cruise missile design
which would minimize current limitations. The
most serious of the latter may be the limited fire-
power of individual launch platforms, especially
that of the airborne platforms. Because of the large
size of current operational cruise missiles, the
launch platform is constrained by weight or volume
considerations to carry only a few cruise missiles.
By emphasizing high subsonic aerodynamics and
modern structural concepts the size and weight of
the ASCM could be significantly reduced without
impairing its effectiveness against CVAs. Conse.
quently, the number of missiles carried by a launch
platform could be significantly increased.
Designing for high supersonic cruise speeds does
not appear necessary (or even desirable)
High speed supersonic flight exacts a weight pen-
alty which is proportional to the square of Mach
number for a given flight time. Such a penalty
would discourage the development of small cruise
missiles for high speed supersonic flight.
Small turbojet engine development would be
required for compatibility with a reduced air-frame
size and lower drag. Such a turbojet would pro-
duce a thrust of approximately 500 lbs, weigh about
50 lbs, and project a small frontal area. Current
Soviet capability in aircraft turbojet design and
development is good by US standards. There is no
fundamental technical reason why the Soviets could
not develop a small turbojet engine for a cruise
missile.
An increase in the maximum standoff range
would be beneficial, either to reduce the pre-launch
vulnerability of the launch platform or to provide
additional flexibility to the ASCM force. In keeping
with a requirement for smaller antiship cruise mis-
siles and, hence, increased firepower of the launch
platform, normal standoff range could be increased
as much as percent by using high density hydro-
carbon fuels
h greater increase
could be o t ed by use of exotic fuels
TON.SECRET
Although development of high density hydro-
carbon fuel and its use by turbojet engines would
be neither difficult nor risky to undertake, the
development of exotic, higher energy fuels, such
and associated turbojet engines
would be much riskier. Hence, the Soviets most
likely would choose the less difficult and least risky
fuel and engine development for their next genera-
tion of antiship cruise missiles.
As the ASCM is reduced in size and weight
without a reduction in effectiveness, further bene.
fits will accrue. One such benefit is a reduction
in the radar cross-section of the cruise missile. A
smaller radar cross-section reduces the range at
which a defensive system search radar can sepa-
rate signals from clutter to classify an attacking
cruise missile. Reducing the detection range strains
the defense by requiring extremely short reaction
times to cope with the threat.
Further reduction in the frontal aspect of radar
cross-section could be obtained through the use of
radar absorbing material (RAM) on the engine
inlet surfaces and other areas where sharp contours
exist. Available evidence indicates the Soviets are
already employing RAM in their interceptor air-
craft to reduce spurious radiations in their radomes.
Through their writings they display an understand-
ing of the principles of engine inlet cross-section
reduction using RAM. Also, by utilizing non-
resonant structural design techniques, the cross-
section of an ASCM at L and S bands could be
significantly reduced.
To maintain the terminal accuracy required when
an HE warhead is used, homing guidance will con-
tinue to be preferred. Homing sensor operation at
higher radio frequencies, such as J band, will con-
tinue to be favored.
of radar seek, rs could negate the icial effects
of cross-sect.on reduction mentioned earlier. Con-
sequently, other homing sensors operating in the
optical and infrared spectrum also may be devel-
oped for future cruise missile designs. Although
these homing sensors will not permit all-weather
operation, the problem of increased radar detect-
 ability will not occur as when radar homing sensors
are employed.
To complicate further the problems of the de-
fense, a Soviet cruise missile attacking force imple-
mented with a variety of homing sensors could be
deployed. In addition to the types of sensors al-
ready mentioned, the inclusion of an anti-radiation
missile (ARM) capability in an attacking force
would further complicate the defense of a CVA
task force. Such developments are considered to be
extremely likely for the next generation of cruise
missiles.
To cope with employment of potential electronic
countermeasures (ECM) by the defense, cruise mis-
sile homing sensors could be designed to have fre-
quency agility, to home on jamming, and to track
the leading edge of a pulse. These capabilities offer
some protection against ECM, but development in
this area will be dictated strongly by the concept
of action and reaction and, hence, will be a con-
tinuing process.
As a hedge against successful ECM application
by the defense, the Soviets may develop non-homing
guidance techniques. The combination of inertial
guidance and a small nuclear warhead payload
could insure a high probability of kill against a
CVA task force. Many potential problem areas pecu-
liar to homing cruise missile development such as
susceptibility to ECM, increased radar detectabil-
ity when radar terminal homing sensors are used,
weather restrictions, high value target discrimina-
tion, and launch platform survivability simply dis-
appear from serious consideration. Technology for
the development of inertial guidance is already on
hand. Nuclear warheads compatible with the re-
quirements of the cruise missile are within the capa-
bility of Soviet development.
Evasive terminal maneuvers by the cruise missile
could reduce the effectiveness of CVA defenses.
The cruise missile could be designed to be respon-
sive to random programmed commands and have
the structural strength compatible with the imposed
aerodynamic loads. This capability poses no special
problems for Soviet development.
LAUNCH rLATFonr s-Certain developments which
would be compatible with the next generation of
cruise missile designs could be undertaken with the
objective of increasing the firepower and respon-
TOP SECRET
siveness of individual launch platforms. For air-
launched cruise missile platforms, possible modifi-
cations to current airplane platforms would permit
an increase in the number of cruise missiles carried
externally. New airplane designs could permit in-
ternal stowage as well as external stowage of cruise
missiles. Airplanes have the very desirable capabil-
ity for responding faster than any other platform
to any part of the ocean where a targeted CVA
may be located. Therefore, future development of
airplane platforms may be emphasized.
For surface ship launch platforms, attainment of
a rapid reload capability may be more effective than
increasing the number of cruise missile launch
tubes. With smaller and lighter weight cruise mis-
siles possible, some difficult problems associated
with the design of a rapid reloading missile launcher
could be avoided. For submarine launch platforms
providing an underwater launch capability, Soviet
development programs could increase either the
number of cruise missile launch tubes per sub-
marine or the number of cruise missiles per launch
tube. Another alternative would be to provide a
capability to launch a cruise missile from the tor-
pedo tubes of a submarine. The technology required
for these developments is believed to be currently
available to the Soviets, but direct evidence of
such developments is lacking.
Air-to-air missiles
The Soviets have five basic operational AAM
systems: the AA-1 beam rider; the AA-2, the AA-3,
the AA-5, and the AA-6, which were all produced
in infrared and semi-active radar guidance ver-
sions. The AA-1 and AA-2 are limited to rear hemi-
sphere attacks, while the AA-3 can be used in
either a rear hemisphere or direct head-on attack.
The AA-5 and the AA-6 are believed to have a
360-degree attack capability. The AA-6 became
operational on the Foxbat in 1970. Its maximum
launch range for head-on attack is believed to be
limited by the 25-nm semi-active guidance lock-on
capability.
 1-1c mramr-
to-air missiles
Tactical air-to-surface missiles
The first Soviet tactical ASM, the AS-7, is op-
erational. Prior to identification of the AS-7, the
only fighter-launched guided missiles used in an
air-to-ground role were the AA-1 and AA-2 air-
siles shows weapon performance tailored to the
bomber threat and matched to the airborne radar
capability of the carrier aircraft and Soviet GCI
tactics. In general there exists a family of weapons
capable of destroying targets in the medium- to
high-altitude regimes from head-on or tail attack
positions in all weather conditions. None of these
missiles have the capabilities required for low-
speed, low-altitude engagement in a ground clutter
environment.
Soviet requirements for the near f+:ture indicate
the development of a new short-range missile with
decreased minimum launch range, high maneuver-
ability and good low- to medium-altitude capability
for use against low-altitude penetrators and ma-
neuvering targets. Such a missile could probably
be developed using current state-of-the-art tech-
nology for all major components and could appear
by the mid-1970s.
If the Soviets develop the postulated advanced
long-range all weather interceptor (ALRAWI) for
the 1980 time period, there would be a need for
another missile development. A new, long-range
missile is projected for this aircraft. The missile
would be expected to incorporate improved pack-
aging techniques and be of such size that it can
be carried internally. A boost-sustain solid-propel
lant propulsion system and command midcourse
guidance with terminal homing are expected to be
used. The postulated track capability of the
ALRAWI's radar limits the head-on attack launch
range to a maximum of 45 nm.
Soviet AAM development has been consistent and
each new model introduced into service has re-
flected advances in technology. Continued develop-
ment in guidance, propulsion, and fusing is ex-
pected along with new materials having improved
thermal characteristics and new packaging tech-
niques which minimize component weight and
volume and provide increased reliability under
high-g loads and high temperatures. We would
expect future developments to be the result of
consistent and methodical R&D efforts.
TOPECRETI
although attacks in dives up to 45 degrees are con-
sidered possible. The maximum launch range is
about 6 nm with the normal operational launch
ranges being 2 to 4 nm. With the beam-rider guid-
ance system, the pilot is required to track the
target in the dive until missile impact.
Tactical ASMs bad been recognized as a Soviet
uirement for many Years. Detection of the AS-7
re
q
the development of such a missile. In addition to
the AS-7, there is evidence of a new tactical ASM
under development. Additional weapons will be
developed and will probably use laser, passive
electro-optical, and infrared guidance systems.
MILITARY SPACE
The USSR continues to emphasize military uses
of space. During 1970-71 sixty percent of all Soviet
space launches had military objectives, mainly re-
connaissance, and another 25 percent were for
combined military and civil purposes (communi-
cations, navigation, and meteorology). The Soviet
space effort contains active R&D programs intended
to meet military requirements. The Soviets appear
to be developing an orbiting interceptor for the
purpose of engaging satellites and have the poten-
tial to develop a multiple orbit bombardment sys-
tem (MOBS). The Soviets may research and de-
velop the MOBS concept over the next few years.
Improvements over current space systems, for ex-
 ample, a reliable, secure command link and guid-
ance package, would be required, but the tech-
noloyv is believed to be available in the USSR.
The
limited military utility of MOBS makes it unlikely,
however, that it would be deployed in space in de-
fian-,?e of existing international agreements.
The SAL agreement probably has generated a
Soviet requirement ? to upgrade R&D for military
space programs. For such reasons as well as for
crisis management and surveillance of China, the
Soviets probably have a requirement to upgrade
their satellite reconnaissance systems. Because of
the lead times required to develop and perfect
these complex spacecraft, the USSR may already
have begun related R&D.
Boosters and propulsion
There is an active propulsion system R&D pro-
gram aimed at augmenting Soviet proven space
boosters. With the SL-12, a maximum of 50,000
pounds can be placed in low-earth orbit and about
7,000 pounds, in geostationary orbit. The J-vehicle
(TT-05), the only other launch vehicle developed
solely for the space program, will be capable of
placing about 275,000 pounds in low-earth orbit
if development is successful. A vehicle of this size
and capability would enable the Soviets to carry
out a wide variety of manned or unmanned missions
which require very large payloads. The direction
of follow-on work for the next several years would
appear to be additions of new or modified stages
to the proven boosters to provide cost effective de-
livery of heavier payloads into varied orbits. To
develop reusable launch systems, the Soviets would
be required to make advances in the technologies
associated with high temperature structures, light-
weight heat protection, and hypersonic aero-
dynamics.
Both the SL-12 and the TT-05 have suffered
from reliability problems during their early flight
test programs. The SL-12 has improved to the
point where it is now fairly reliable. In the early
phase of the flight test program, the vehicle evi-
denced failures in all stages. The high failure rate
is believed to have been caused by inadequate
checkout procedures and poor quality control. The
problems encountered probably were compounded
by the Soviet use of relatively low data rate telem-
etry systems. The TT-05 has failed in its three tests.
The first two failures occurred during first stage
operation. It is believed that the troubles are anal-
ogous to those that affected the SL-12. The third
test failed when the second stage failed to ignite.
Although not yet flight tested, hydrogen-fueled
engines may have reached tL.- acceptance testing
stage. In the future, hydrogen could be used as a
fuel for the upper stages of the SL-12 and the
TT-05. It is also possible that fluorine or fluoride
oxidizers will appear in upper-stage applications
in the 1980s, although the Soviets admit to severe
problems with fluorine. The Soviets may use solid
propellant technology for space booster applica-
tions. They are currently testing large segmented
solid motors that may ultimately be used as strap-
ons similar to those on the US Titan III-C. In the
long term the Soviets could develop reusable launch
systems, should the launch rate demand them. The
problems posed in this technology are very diffi-
cult and may prove a barrier to early realization of
such a system.
Nuclear power and propulsion
Nuclear energy sources suitable for aerospace
applications include both radioisotopic generators
and compact nuclear reactors. Various energy con-
version processes may be employed to convert the
heat from the above sources to auxiliary electric
power: thermoelectrics, thermionics, magnetohydro-
dynamics (MHD), and various heat engine cycles
employing turbogenerators.
To date the Soviets have relied almost exclusively
on solar cells and batteries for electric power for
their space missions. Nuclear radioisotopic power
sources have been used rather sparingly in space.
Most spectacular to date has been the use of a one-
kilowatt polonium-210 isotopic heat source for the
Lunokhod-1 vehicle. Soviet work on plutonium-238
sources is increasing, and it is expected that this
source will receive more extensive use in the next
few years. The level of Soviet technology is about
on a par with that of the US, and more extensive
use could be made of radioisotopic power sources
with either thermoelectric or thermionic conver-
sion if they choose to do so.
 The Soviets have not launched a nuclear reactor
into space and probably will not do so until at
least the late 1970s. They have operated two re-
actor prototypes which could lead to space power
sources. The first reactor, the Romashka, was a
thermoelectric type of reactor that was operated in
1964. No further development of this type of re-
actor seems to be taking place. The second was
the Topaz thermionic reactor.
An aggressive thermionic reactor program with
about 300 people inyolved appears to be centered at
the Obninsk Physics-Energetics Institute, and a sec-
ond program is being carried out at the Kurchatov
Institute of Atomic Energy. For the past two years,
the Obninsk Institute has been operating the Topaz
thermionic reactor which generates 5-10 kilowatts
Soviets could have a thermionic power source wit
a power rating between 10 kilowatts and 100 kilo-
watts available for space use in the last half of
this decade.
The Soviets have an intensive Closed-cycle MHD
program which, if successful, would provide an
extremely large (that is, megawatt) source of
power for use in space. Studies which were initiated
in 1969 are directed at coupling a nuclear reactor
to a MHD generator. A major technical problem
which must be overcome is the achievement of a
sufficiently high temperature in the working fluid
to attain the necessary Ionization and, at the same
time, to match the operating pressure level of the
reactor with that of the generator. The use of a
nuclear reactor MHD power source in space by the
Soviets is not expected until the early 1980s.
There is no convincing evidence that the Soviets
plan to use heat cycles employing turbogenerators
in space. In fact, several Sovicts have said definitely
that they will not. The requisite technologies, how-
TOP
ever, have been under continuous development
since the early 1960s.
Soviet work on electric propulsion engines has
been in evidence since the late 1950s. Electric
thrusters have been tested on selected space vehi-
cles since 1964, were most recently used to main-
tain a Meteor satellite in the prescribed orbit
(1971), and will find increased application on both
orbital and deep space probes as new electric power
sources become available during the late 1970s.
The USSR may have an active research and
development program leading toward a nuclear
space rocket propulsion capability, but we have no
There is a concerted Soviet theoretical effort
in progress which seems to be directed at the de-
velopment of gas core reactors. There is no evidence
that this effort has reached the hardware stage.
We do not expect a nuclear gas core rocket engine
to be developed before the mid-1980s.
Subsystem support and technology
Advances in reconnaissance, surveillance, and
meteorological satellites and certain aspects of space
defense are predicated on advanced sensor develop-
ment. It is believed that Soviet technology will
support straightforward development in these areas.
We are not aware of any limitations of Soivet mili-
tary research laboratories that would hamper such
development. Multi-spectral observations of the
earth are continuing in support of civilian research.
The relationship of this work to military applica.
tions is unknown. The missile-launch observation
experiments conducted with Soyuz 6 and the Salyut
station were probably using a sensor in the in-
frared region.
Soviet space power technology is adequate to
support military missions over the next 10 years.
The requirements for military space system guid-
ance and attitude control over the next 10 years,
including accuracy of weapon delivery to a point
in space, accuracy of sensor pointing, and stability
We believe that t e
 of sensor platforms, could also be met with cur-
rent Soviet technology. For low-cost, reliable earth
orientation, the Soviets have begun to use the
gravity gradient principle. This approach will find
increasing use in long-life systems.
Antisatellite
The Soviet antisatellite capability includes a net-
work of detection and tracking radars and an
orbiting interceptor. The radars are operational and
give the Soviets a capability for detecting and
tracking all satellites up to about 900 nm. With
assistance from early warning Hen House radars,
this network could detect satellites up to a 2,000 nm
altitude. Using their optical detection and tracking
network the Soviets probably can detect high-
altitude satellites over the Eastern Hemisphere
(such as the geostationary corridor) within a few
days following injection. To avoid optical detection,
satellites would have to be dimmer than the 14th-
15th magnitude.
The Soviets could use any of several ICBM,
IRBM, or ABM boosters to achieve a nuclear kill
of satellites. They could also develop terminal hom-
ing for an ABM interceptor and achieve a non-
nuclear kill against low-orbit satellites. The tech-
nogloy is available within the USSR, but there is
no evidence that such a system is being developed.
The Soviets have developed a satellite interceptor
that is launched by the SL-11 booster from the
Tyuratam Missile Test Center
weapon will be employed on the operational sys-
tem. At this time the Soviet system can probably
engage all US satellites that pass over the USSR
at an altitude less than 2,000 nm. Only a single
kill attempt can be made by one interceptor in the
present mode of attack. By 1975, the Soviets could
develop an effective non-nuclear intercept system
against geostationary targets with existing tech-
nology. During the late 1970s the Soviets could
enhance a high-orbit interceptor with inspection
sensors and a multiple target kill capability. This
possibility could be met with existing technology.
Applied satellites
RECONNAISSANCE-The Soviets currently have two
photographic reconnaissance systems-a low-resolu-
tion (10-20 ft) system for general search and a
high-resolution (3-5 ft) system for technical intel.
ligence. Significant performance improvements for
the present systems are unlikely due to the space.
craft size and configuration. Soviet technology,
however, can provide improvements in ground
resolution through the use of better films, incorpora.
tion of an improved attitude control system, in-
corporation of yaw programming, or the use of
lower altitude orbits.
We believe the Soviets have long devoted sub-
stantial resources to the research and development
of technologies pertinent to photographic recon-
naissance. Using current technology, the Soviets
could within the next two to five years introduce
a system which is capable of resolutions on the
order of 1 foot; contains multiple film recovery
capsules; has a longer duration mission life; and
has significantly improved targeting flexibility. By
the late 1970s, the Soviets could have the tech-
nology to develop a system to relay collected data
to ground stations on a near-real-time basis.
 TOPS RET
Sensors other than photographic and Elint have
the potential for providing useful reconnaissance
information from space. The Soviets are believed
to be conducting research on such sensors as in-
frared (IR), ultraviolet (UV), and radar. The
longer wavelengths of IR and radar sensors make
them amenable to the low-resolution requirements
of search reconnaissance, night reconnaissance, and
camouflage detection and discrimination. The So-
viets are actively investigating the development and
application of these types of sensors, particularly in
their earth resources programs, and probably have
flown individual experimental sensors. We believe
that the Soviets are probably investigating the use-
fulness of and techniques for integrating the results
of individual sensors. The Soviet technology is prob-
ably adequate to support the launch of such an
experimental satellite at any time.
SURVEILLANCE-The Soviets probably have a re-
quirement to develop space surveillance capa-
bilities. They have conducted activities which are
indicative of an intent to develop and test the
technologies applicable to this mission area; for
example, early warning (missile launch detection
experiments on the Soyuz and Salyut manned space
missions). The Cosmos "scientific" satellites have
been used to obtain the space environmental back-
ground data needed for system development. It
is likely that sensor tests have been carried out
in this program. We believe the Soviets could at
any time launch systems capable of detecting nu-
clear detonations in space or in the upper atmos-
phere. Within two to five years the Soviets could
orbit sensor systems
capable of detecting missile launches from high
The Soviets prob-
ably
cannot
develop
operational sensor systems
using this technology during the 1970s. The recon-
naissance sensors technology that the Soviets could
develop may also be used for military surveillance
by the late 1970s.
HEAVY MANEUVEBABLES-The Soviets have a
heavy maneuverable satellite development program
which began in 1965. The program has included
Cosmos 198, 209, 367, 402, 469, 516 and two which
failed to attain orbit. The mission for the heavy
maneuverable satellites appears to be at least in
part for coastline and ocean reconnaissance/sur-
veillance purposes.
Since Cosmos 198, when the SL-11 was first
used as the booster for this program, all heavy
maieuverables have followed the same general pro-
file. Each has been launched from Tyuratam into
a ballistic trajectory with an apogee of about
150 nm. At apogee each satellite has used an on-
board propulsion system to inject itself into a
nomina' 150 nm circular orbit. The satellites have
remained in this orbit from one to 32 days at which
time each satellite separated into at least three
pieces with one of the pieces transferring to a
500 nm circular orbit. Once this major orbit ma-
neuver was completed, each satellite is assessed
TO RET L
 TOp,i;ECRET
NAVIGATION-The USSR has developed a navi-
gation satellite system using the doppler ranging
technique. Analysis indicates a potential capability
for a position fix accuracy of 0.05 urn for slow
moving targets with a single satellite pass. For
aircraft, the horizontal position uncertainty would
be an order of magnitude larger. The Soviets will
probably continue to use doppler navigation satel-
lites for the next several years. During this same
time period, they may also investigate the use of
other concepts, such as direct ranging, for improved
navigational capability. Eventual deployment of
spacecraft at high altitude may occur and provide
position accuracy to a few hundred feet in three
dimensions and velocity to a few feet/second.
Slower moving users could obtain position accu-
racies on the order of a hundred feet.
mcmRC't oclr-The Soviets currently use mete-
orological satellites at nominal altitudes of 350-
500 nm. One sensor is a TV camera which scans
across a 600 nm swath with a resolution of about
0.5 nm. Various UV-optical IR sensors view the
earth in the 0.3-30 micrometer band with resolu.
tion from 8 to 54 nm. These sensors (or slight mod-
ifications thereof) will have utility for the next
few years. We believe that the Soviets will attempt
to improve sensor resolution and sensitivity. They
have stated, for example, that they intend to use
an IR spectrometer to improve wavelength reso-
lution. Automatic picture transmission, with re-
ception possible on inexpensive equipment, became
available in 1972. Satellites probably will be placed
in higher orbits to allow weather update every
several hours. By the late 1970s, systems might
be introduced into the geostationary and/or Mol-
niya orbits for weather information with a resolu-
tion of a mile or less in near real time. Lower alti-
tude satellites with improved sensors may be used
for detailed studies both of conditions of the atmos-
phere at various altitude layers and of surface
conditions.
Tracking
During the past few years the USSR has
developed two extensive tracking networks. The
first consists of installations deployed within
the USSR which track and control cooperative
spacecraft. These tracking sites are under the con-
trol of the Soviet Rocket Forces (SRF). The other
network, consisting primarily of the Hen House
and Dog House radars, is used in a defensive role.
One function of these radars is the detecting and
tracking of foreign space objects. The network
is believed to be under the control of the Air
Defense Force.
coopmtAIIVE sATELLrrEs-The SRF space track-
ing network has been greatly expanded in recent
years. It consists of range and angle tracking sys-
tems, a doppler tracking system, and an inter-
ferometer tracking system. The higher orbit satel-
lites, the lunar and the planetary probes, use a.
range and range rate system. These tracking sys-
tems are adequate for both current and near-term
programs. We do not believe that technical capa-
bility will limit Soviet development of future track-
ing systems.
A major constraint of the Soviet space tracking
network has been its geographic limitations. The
Soviets have chosen not to expand their land-based
 r GFfRFT
active tracking network beyond the limits of the
USSR. In order to overcome this deficiency to some
extent, the Soviets now have three large tracking
and monitoring ships (Gagarin, Korolev and Koma-
roo). These ships are capable of tracking space-
craft to lunar distances. Their support of military
spacecraft could be expanded to the Western
Hemisphere.
NON-COOPERATIVE SATELLITES--The Soviet net-
work for detecting, tracking, and predicting the
orbits of non-cooperative satellites consists of radars
built for space operations and ballistic missile and
space defense. The major components of this net-
work are the Hen House, Dog House and Chekov
radars; there are a total of 31 faces. Seventeen of
these radars are in operation, and three more have
begun transmitting but are not operational. In
addition, eight radars are externally complete but
not transmitting, and three more are in various
stages of construction. Those that are externally
complete could begin transmitting at any time.
The portion of the network now in operation pro-
vides almost complete tracking coverage for low-
altitude satellites which pass over the USSR.
The radars appear more than capable of pro-
viding accurate orbit prediction after a number of
orbits. For example, a typical single pass of it low-
altitude satellite through a Hen House sector pro-
vides data which allow a determination of the
satellite's position with an error no greater than
about 1 nm. These same data can be used to predict
the satellite's position-at the end of the next revo-
lution-with an error no greater than about 30 nm.
A single-pass tracking by the Dog House radar
allows the prediction of the position of the satellite
to be made-for one revolution ahead-with an
error of no greater than about 2 to 5 nm. Com-
parable accuracy also can be achieved by Hgn
House radars, but tracking data from two orbital
passes are required, with prediction made about
position at the end of the third revolution. In
a similar way, If a satellite in a typical inclina-
tion were tracked by the network on six consecu-
tive revolutions, the prediction accuracy for the
seventh revolution would be about 0.2 nm.
Reliability
During the past few years a continuing high
reliability in some areas of Soviet military-related
space hardware has been demonstrated. For ex-
ample, the Soviet reconnaissance program has main-
tained a high degree of reliability both in the space-
craft and the SL-4 launch vehicle. Two areas of
technology appear to account for most of the Soviet
space missions that have failed: attitude control
systems and zero gravity propulsion starts. Soviet
failures indicate that inadequate check-out pro-
cedures may be the primary Soviet reliability prob-
lem. It is anticipated that over the next several
years there will be a continuing increase in relia-
bility in Soviet military-related spacecraft. Large
Soviet launch vehicles have suffered from relia-
bility problems during the first few years of their
use. The SL-12 which was plagued by problems
in all stages has now become somewhat more
reliable. The new J-vehicle, as noted above, has
failed on all launch attempts. Soviet efforts to im-
prove spacecraft reliability are believed to be
directed toward increased environmental ground
testing, improved checkout procedures, and the use
of improved technology.
Bioastronautics
Soviet space medicine R&D is mainly applications
oriented toward the care and maintenance problems
of long-term space station crews. Primary emphasis
is on adaptation to and recovery from the weight-
less state, potential chronic irradiation effects, de-
velopment and testing of advanced biomedical
monitoring and life support technology, crew re-
liability and performance evaluation methodology,
and habitability factors.
The superoxide chemical gas exchange environ-
mental control system (ECS) has been used suc-
cessfully with continuous refinement on all Soviet
manned spaceflights. The system proved to be ade-
quate for the Salyut station but not without some
recurrent cabin atmosphere problems with CO2 and
relative humidity. The Soviets have developed a
method which utilizes modular packaging for re-
placement of superoxide chemical supplies by
means of suitably sized canisters which can be
ferried by the Soyuz, transferred to a Salyut sta-
tion, and stored aboard in quantity. Soviet ground-
test data have demonstrated that three men could
be maintained in a closed cabin for a six-month
period, using this superoxide system for the most
part and utilizing urine and atmospheric conden-
 sation water recovery systems to provide nominal
water requirements. The superoxide ECS/atmos-
pheric condensation system approach is the opti-
mum Soviet life support system for an SL-12 pay-
load station such as the 40,000- to 45,000-pound
Salyut class and will probably be used as the
primary life support system for space stations
launched within the next three to five years.
Soviet development of physical chemical par-
tially regenerative life support hardware is largely
derived from similar US technology. This equip-
ment has been used for a three-man, six-month, con-
tinuous ground trial of a partially regenerative com-
bination of catalytic hydrogenation of CO2 and
water electrolysis. The fixed weight and power
penalties of the Soviet test system make it of margi-
nal use for the Salyut station. It probably is most
applicable to long-duration multi-manned stations
weighing 100,000 pounds or more and having very
high power supply capabilities on board. This sys-
tem may not be operational for at least 7 to 10
years.
The USSR has life support technology and crew
support and monitoring capabilities which have
allowed the Soviets to plan manned earth orbital
missions of up to six months or longer. But a number
of man-related problems argue for a conservative
Soviet approach beyond increments of one month
at a time. Post-flight readaptation problems ex-
perienced by Soviet cosmonauts following the 18-
day, Soyuz-9 flight require resolution. The fire
hazard, crew safety, and cabin integrity problems
experienced during the tragic Soyuz 1I/Salyut sta-
tion mission are additional major concerns. An un-
precedented Soviet year-long confinement and life
support ground trial identified significant medical,
psychological, and nutritional problems which must
be resolved before the USSR can keep the same
crew in orbit beyond one month. Nevertheless, the
USSR apparently intends to orbit two or more
manned stations by 1975 based on the Salyut tech-
nology and even larger stations by 1980.
After the first Apollo moon landing, the Soviets
put all manned space priorities on the space station
program. Manned lunar landing missions have been
delayed for at least several years. From the bio-
medical and life support standpoint, there are no
constraints on a Soviet attempt to perform a manned
lunar landing. Soviet ground-based bioastronautic
studies and biotechnological development are com-
patible with support of both earth orbital stations
and manned lunar landing missions. Furthermore,
the Soviets appear to have developed an operational
liquid-cooling system for space suits and a self-
contained back-pack life support system which
would be useful for brief lunar excursions.
Aerodynamics
The USSR is vigorously pursuing a broad, con-
tinuous program in practically all areas of aero-
dynamic R&D. Research is highly centralized, with
the Central Aerohydrodynamics Institute imeni
Zhukovskiy as the directing agency for virtually
all important work. The programs of that institute
are supported by the Moscow Physico-Technical
Institute in its work on the chemical and physical
aspects of problems, the Computer Center of the
Academy of Sciences in the development of ana-
lytical and numerical solutions, and the Moscow
State University in work on almost all significant
aerodynamic problems.
The Soviets have increasingly emphasized use
of their experimental capabilities to support an al-
ready existing high-quality analytical and numerical
capability. New subsonic wind tunnels with a low
turbulence level, either recently completed or being
planned, should greatly enhance the Soviet R&D
capability in subsonic aerodynamics. Soviet re-
searchers have demonstrated the technical capa-
bility to produce a subsonic laminar flow control
aircraft using suction; its development is dependent
upon mission requirements and operational con-
siderations. Further development of mathematical
models for direct lift and vectored thrust V/STOL
aerodynamics and correlation with flight-test data
should provide them with an outstanding capability
for V/STOL design. Soviet capability for handling
transonic flow problems, including design of tran-
sonic airfoils, is equal to that of the US. Current
Soviet R&D in rotary-wing aerodynamics probably
is directed toward the development of a rigid rotor
system and synchronous advancing blade rotors,
further flight tests and refinement of Homer (MI-
12) prototypes in preparation for series production,
and continuation of Mil's heavy-lift developmental
trend.
 TOP MFCRET
Soviet work on hypersonic nonaxisymmetric lift-
ing bodies Involves those with high lift/drag such
as the waveriders and the more blunt bodies with a
medium lift/drag such as the blunted half-cones.
Soviet development of a slender, high-lift/drag
body would be applicable to cruise, launch, or re-
entry configurations. A hypersonic aircraft probably
will not reach the final design stage before 1980.
Use of a slender, high-lift/drag body as a launch
or reentry vehicle probably will not occur before
the 1975-80 period-the timing depending largely
upon the mission of such vehicles. With a concen-
trated effort, the Soviets could possibly have a
final design of a blunt, medium-lift/drag body as
a reentry vehicle by the 1973-75 period.
For the past 10 years the Soviets have investigated
the star bodies. Their analytical and experimental
studies have shown that the total .drag of the star
bodies at hypersonic velocities is as low as one-third
to one-half of that for an equivalent cone. This
program Implies the availability of such bodies in
the near future for use on low-drag vehicles. The
Soviets have sufficient aerodynamic technology for
design of a supersonic cruise vehicle of about Mach
3 to 5 if the need such a vehicle arises. Actual
development of aircraft with speeds in excess of
Mach 3 is not expected before 1980.
Propulsion
The Soviets have continually emphasized the
development of airbreathing propulsion systems.
Throughout the 1960s, their facility for the study of
mass air flow capacity at the Central Scientific
Research Institute for Aviation Motor Construction
was recognized as the world's leading test facility
of its type. Soviet flight simulation capabilities for
full-scale engine testing were further improved
in 1971 through expansion of this facility. A most
significant technical Innovation in the design and
construction of the expanded test facility provided
for high bypass turbofan engine testing at sea-level
and to structural limits. The opportunity to obtain
structural integrity data during development is a
major stride In reducing the risk and time for air-
breathing engine development. The flight simula-
tion facilities at the Kuznetsov, Tumanskiy, and
Lotarev propulsion design bureaus provide for the
testing of components in a simulated flight environ-
ment and the logging of empirical improvements
tailored to individual designs. Such capabilities
presage advances in system reliability and main-
tenance. As in the West, the individual Soviet gas
turbine engine design bureaus show considerable
variance in deli techniques and in general level
competence
the Soviet designers to a highly Individualistic
breed. They are obviously permitted much latitude
in their design selections. It is equally evident,
however, that the Soviet designer is guided by a
strict set of general design objectives and design
constraints relating to such factors as ease of manu-
facture, mechanical simplicity, selection of ma-
terials, and operational requirements.
Based on intensive research of basic aerothermo-
dynamics, the Soviets developed an inlet concept
that provides excellent stability. In general, the
propulsion cross sections and volumes were held
to minimum levels, particularly for fighter-inter-
ceptor propulsion systems. Integration of the nozzle
with the airframe relied mainly on matching the
airframe base area and the nozzle maximum area.
Ejectors have been used to improve the nozzle-
to-airframe match and the nozzle thrust coefficients.
Soviet designers indicate that for specific applica-
tions at speeds above Mach 8, the entire vehicle
forebody will function as an inlet and the vehicle
afterbody will function as a nozzle. Research studies
are probably in progress to integrate propulsion
with the star-shaped vehicle configurations for
Mach 12-25 flights.
Fuel system technology has Improved rapidly in
recent years. Improved insulation methods and re.
generative cooling techniques have been developed.
Cruise propulsion at speeds above Mach 4 probably
will use fuel-cooled engine components and at
higher speeds probably will use fuel cooling of the
airframe.
To accommodate the high fuel temperatures and
more difficult fuel pumping conditions, the Soviets
probably used after about 1962 special positive ex-
pulsion tanks with screen fuel-orientation valves.
In the US, these special devices are usually re-
stricted to spacecraft. Centrifugal pumps have also
been used in Soviet air-breathing propulsion systems
with remote electrical drives, local hydraulic (fuel)
 '--op SECRET
drives, and engine-mounted pneumatic (compres-
sor tapoff) pump drives. Higher feed system pres-
sures and improved fuel will provide the Soviets
a capability to use hydrocarbon fuels for cruise
at about Mach 4.5 and dash to about Mach 6. Hy-
drogen and methane will be used for the higher
speed ranges beginning around Mach 4 and are the
most probable fuels for cruise flight speeds above
Mach 5.
Soviet efforts to develop turboprop engines were
reduced when low-bypass-ratio turbofans came into
use in 1959. The development of small turboprop
and turboshaft engines is expected to continue
for future small transport and helicopter applica-
tions. Turbofans with "bypass-ratios" on the order
of 5, however, are expected to reach flight qualifi-
cation status by 1974 for use on large subsonic
cruiser transport aircraft.
Compressor design prowess has been the van-
guard of the Soviet aircraft turbine engine indus-
try. Although the various Soviet engine design bu-
reaus display varying levels of competence, the
general level of demonstrated compressor. and fan
technology has been excellent. During the early
1950s the Soviets elected to pursue vigorously tran-
sonic compressor aerodynamics and aggressively
applied this technology to developmental engines.
Soviet compressors and fans usually are charac-
terized by their low frontal area, compactness, and
light weight which results from high stage work
and flow capacity. This is particularly true m
Although
the technology is representative of e maximum
Soviet capability of over a decade ago (R-37F was
production-qualified in 1957/58), it is highly sig-
nificant because the high pressure ratio per stage
combined with a very high air flow capacity (for
its diameter and good efficiency) makes the R-37F
compressor technologically advanced by even 1969
Western standards.
Appropriate improvements of injectors, aerody-
namic combustion stabilizers and fuels have been
accomplished by the Soviets. Combustion tempera-
tures to 3,200?F probably will be available by
1975 and possibly 3,500?F m be reached by 1980.
TOP SMEET
The Soviets historically have operated their tur-
bines at relatively modest temperature levels. Since
higher engine cycle temperatures permit greater
thrust per pound of airflow (specific thrust), lower
engine weight, and lower specific fuel consumption
during supersonic flight, the Soviets obviously have
not purposely elected to restrict their turbine inlet
temperature (TIT). Their modest temperature
levels are a direct measure of their capability to
manufacture turbine components. Soviet and West-
ern nickel-base turbine materials have, in general,
been of similar alloy composition. However, the
quality of metallurgical processing in the turbine
components of the USSR and the West differs sub-
continue to be "dirty" with inclusions and high
porosity. These parts do not meet Western stand-
ards of quality and certainly must have poor
thermal fatigue properties. This is considered a
principal reason for the short life exhibited by
Soviet turbine engines.
This shortcoming is recognized and development
is continuing to improve this deficiency. Various
cooling schemes for turbine components have been
evaluated which would permit application of airfoils
at higher temperatures and with smaller thermal
gradients than is possible from actual hardware
available for analysis to date. Processing is also
improving, as indicated by the directionally solidi-
fied turbine buckets exhibited at the 1971 Paris Air
Show. Research work has been published which in-
dicates a capability to produce single crystal blades,
at least on a laboratory scale. The most recent effort
has been directed at a metallic composite based on
the nickel-tungsten (Ni-W) system for use as a
turbine vane material. The tungsten filament is
embedded in a ZhS6-K matrix which produces a
composite having marked improvement in high
temperature strength (up to 1,900?F) over con-
ventionally cast alloys. This effort is still experi-
mental, however.
The current maximum Soviet TIT for production
engines is 2,060.2,080?F, as demonstrated by the
D-30KU and D-30KP turbofans. This is 300?F lower
espi a use
 TOP 'SECRET
than current US production engines, such as the
JT9D turbofan. The NK-144 SST powerplant is
believed to have a cruise TIT of 2,060?F. It is esti-
mated that the R-266 Foxbat turbojet has a maxi-
mum TIT of 2,000?F.
Soviet engine designers have in the past been
successful in developing engines of low weight and
volt' nc despite moderate TIT levels. Excellence
in aerodynamic and mechanical design has largely
offset the turbine temperature deficiencies. How-
ever, overcoming deficiencies will become increas-
ingly more difficult in the future. Although the
Soviet turbine temperature picture does not appear
bright, it must be cautioned that in the past Soviet
reaction to a recognized deficiency has led to very
vigorous and successful corrective action.
Afterburners and ram burners are thoroughly
integrated with the turbine diffuser cone and air-
frame. Oxygen augmentation of altitude ignition
is customary. The Soviets preferred integral injee-
tor-flameholders through 1969, but unique low-
drag flameholders have been researched for spe-
cialized applications. Initially, Soviet nozzles were
covergent-interleaved units that were actuated by
pressure differentials. By 1962, positive hydraulic-
ally actuated nozzles were in use in combination
with ejectors. Since 1962, convergent-divergent
regulated nozzles have been available. Blow-in-
door ejectors may be used after 1972 although
mechanical convergent-divergent nozzles might be
used if improvements in existing units are required.
Short engine life has historically been a major
shortcoming of the Soviet aircraft gas turbine in-
dustry. Although the Soviets have made excellent
progress since 1962 in increasing the time between
overhaul (TBO) of their commercial engines, a
similar occurrence has not been observed with the
military powerplants. In the past the Soviets have
been satisfied with TBOs of less than 300 hours
for their fighter engines. Although indeed a short
time span, the TBOs are perhaps not as bad as they
appear since there are indications that the Soviet
standards of reliability upon which TBO is estab-
lished are considerably more stringent than those
used in the West. As a result, the number of pre-
mature overhauls for Soviet engines is believed to
be exceptionally small. The Soviet concept of very
limited field maintenance is reflected in their engine
designs. Maintenance in the field is generally
limited to the replacement of externally mounted
items only, such as controls, accessories and oil
lines. Repair or replacement of internal engine
components are accomplished at the engine produc-
tion facilities.
Soviet work on ramjet engines has covered a span
of over 40 years. The first theoretical work was
reported by B. S. Steehkin in 1929 and the first
military-oriented experimental work was conducted
in late 1933. Continued effort resulted in the flight
test of an extreme-range cruise missile in the early
1960s. Design conditions were an altitude of 80,000
feet and a speed of about Mach 3. This effort was
terminated due to the superior reliability of ballis-
tic rockets. The technology from these ramjet pro-
grams resulted in the development of the Ganef
(SA-4), which was displayed in a 1964 parade, and
the Gainful (SA-6), which was displayed in a 1967
parade. Both missiles have a flight speed of about
Mach 2.5 to 3.
Since 1960 the Soviets have developed the tech-
nology needed for aft-mounted inlets, including
external and mixed compression types ranging from
axisymmetric to two-dimensional. The aft-mounted
inlets improve the propulsion airframe integration
by reducing the front cross-section and by smooth-
ing the axial profile. Advances in materials, tempera-
ture capability, cooling techniques, and coatings
have made it possible to reduce further the engine
diameters. Research and development are also con-
tinuing on injectors, combustors, and afterburners,
and associated disciplines such as cooling tech-
niques. The technology is available for upstream
injectors for engines to the Mach 4 range and down-
ward-facing injectors for ramjet engines operating
in the supersonic combustions mode (scramjet ).
Analytical combustion models have been developed
for homogeneous mixtures in the Mach 5-6 regimes,
and detonated-controlled combustion research is
under way for hypersonic flight in the Mach 9-20
range.
much of the Soviet ramjet researc or u e de-
velopments will be used in combined cycle (rocket-
ramjet) engines. In this concept the rocket acts
as an ejector when the vehicle is at low-flight
velocities. As the flight velocity increases, the
rocket engine acts as a compressor. The exhaust
products of the rocket are fuel rich and burned
 TSECRET
with air in the ?nain combustor. The Soviets have
identified several modes for the rocket-ramjet cycle
including the first stage of a reusable launch ve-
hicle, hypersonic cruising/booster aircraft, and
supersonic cruise missiles. The two primary modes
of the rocket-ramjet engine for supersonic missiles
are terminal maneuvering for AAMs and low-level
run-in for ASMs.
Structural mechanics
The Soviet Union, one of the world leaders in
structural mechanics, has since the mid-1950s con-
tinued a broad and ever-increasing effort in R&D
applicable to aerospace structures. Recent advances
have been in the development of new fundamental
methods of analysis for stress concentration and
shell stability, and in theories for predicting the
load-carrying capability of composite materials and
structural components. Although few new related
results have emerged, it is likely that in the next
few years new developments of engineering value
will result from these theories.
There is strong Soviet emphasis on the develop-
ment of strength criteria for polymerics, fiber glass-
reinforced plastic, and filament-wound composite
structures. Recent Soviet contributions to the funda-
mentals of mathematical theory of thin shells have
been heavily pointed in the direction of expanding
earlier theories to encompass situations which in-
clude both plain and reinforced polymeric ma-
terials. Effects of anisotropy, inhomogeneity, creep,
and bimodularity have been studied in detail. Ad-
vances in thermoel:usticity have been of value in
the analysis of filament-reinforced plastics and
layered plates where the layers are of different
materials. Elasto-plastic analysis of structures has
been directed toward the development of design
criteria for filament-wound composite structures,
and strength criteria for predicting the behavior of
plates made of composite materials have been pre-
sented in simplified form attractive to designers.
The Soviets have placed considerable emphasis on
digital computer solutions of thin shells, turbine
components, and dynamic problems in general. The
recently introduced analysis methods for shells of
arbitrary curvature with many stress concentration
holes are well suited to digital computer solutions.
The computer solution techniques are not new,
however, to Western designers.
Since 1967, the Soviets have exhibited increased
interest in the design of multilayered sandwich
shells indicative of the probable use of such shells
in aircraft and missiles. The Soviets are placing
more emphasis on optimal design than previously,
but their achievements are still considerably less
than those in the West. Efforts in this area have
considered plates and shells under aircraft and
missile loading. Specific boundary value problems
have been treated for minimum-weight cylindrical
tanks subject to internal pressure, minimum weight
of rib-stiffened plates, and minimum weight of a
variable thickness plate bent to a cylindrical con-
figuration. The Kazan Aviation Institute recently
exhibited concern for minimum weight design of
structures subject to random loadings comparable
with some 1962 US design work.
Materials
The mechanical behavior of materials is receiving
considerable attention in the USSR. There is cur-
rently a concerted effort on metal fatigue of alloys
known to be used in the airframes and engines
of their operational aircraft. Thermal fatigue re-
search has been concerned primarily with material
properties and processing effects aimed at improv-
ing the life of engine components. Refractory re-
search has included strength and endurance testing
to 3,000? and 2,500?C, respectively.
The Soviets have a strong capability in both
weldable and nonweldable light metal alloys gen-
erally applicable to aircraft structures. A wide
range of titanium compositions is available in the
USSR which should satisfy the requirements for
most applications requiring corrosion resistance,
low-temperature ductility and toughness, and high-
temperature strength. Of particular interest is the
Soviet effort to develop alloys for increasingly
higher temperature capability, undoubtedly for use
in the compressor section of jet engines. In this
area, the ST series of alloys appear to be favored.
The Soviet effort reflects a chief concern with beat
resistance, while the US effort is directed at a
combined beat resistance-stability goal. Present
capability is probably in the 540? to 600?C range.
Soviet magnesium alloys have essentially the same
capability as those used in the West and in many
cases are direct copies. Research is continuing on
the Mg-Li system and has recently included the
 effects of thermal mechanical treatment. Investiga-
tions are also under way on Mg.Y-Zn and Mg-Y-Mn
systems, apparently to replace the high-tempera-
ture Mg-Th alloys. The beryllium effort in the
USSR has been very small compared to that of the
US. Although little has been published on this
effort, the work has apparently continued, as evi-
denced by the beryllium items exhibited at the
1971 Paris Air Show. Work is also continuing on
Be-Al alloys, but the results are similar to those
seen in the original US counterpart, Lockalloy.
The most significant effort in high-strength low-
alloy steels is the selection of materials for thin-
wall (0.060-0.080 inch) missile casing. The available
data indicate the Soviets are attempting to satisfy
an immediate requirement for thin-walled casings
at a strength level of 260,000-270,000 psi. The So-
viets also have a significant effort in the research
and development of another class of steels, the
maraging steels; these are the materials of the
future and may be in limited use now. Maraging
steels are being evaluated with yield strengths rang-
ing from 250,000-350,000 psi. There has been little
significant Soviet research in stainless steels in
recent years. The Soviets have a large number of
austenitic, martensitic, and precipitation hardenable
(PH) stainless steels for high-temperature (480?-
760?C) and/or corrosion-resistant applications.
Little effort other than processing improvements is
expected since titanium- and nickel-base alloys have
largely replaced stainless steels outside of the tem-
perature range noted.
Concerning superalloys, the Soviets continue to
concentrate on nickel-base alloys to the virtual ex-
clusion of cobalt which is in short supply. The cast
and wrought alloys available for propulsion systems
generally have the same temperature capability as
This situation, however, is
changing, as indicated by the Soviet display of
directionally solidified buckets and vanes at the
1971 Paris Air Show. The blades apparently were
of excellent quality and should go far in reducing
or eliminating premature failure induced by thermal
fatigue.
The Soviets are conducting research on thermal
stress in an arbitrary shell with consideration to
coupled thermo-elasticity involving extremely rapid
applications of thermal fluxes to structures. Possible
application of this research would be the response
of a thin shell to a laser pulse. The extensive re-
search being conducted in the area of thermal
fatigue, stress concentration, and vibration damping
of turbine engine blades and disks could be indica-
tive of engine failure problems. Fatigue research
of aluminum alloys used on current Soviet aircraft
is being emphasized.
Soviet materials research through 1975 will con-
tinue to focus on the optimal design of lightweight
composite structure for aerodynamically heated air-
craft in the Much 4 regime. Proven Soviet capa-
bility in theoretical and applied mechanics and
current research on the mechanical behavior of
materials at temperatures to 3,000?C portend the
development of hypersonic cruise vehicle struc-
tures by 1985.
Studies devoted to niobium and molybdenum
alloys outnumber by far those devoted to the other
refractory metal alloys. Much of the effort on
molybdenum and niobium appears to be in sup-
port of aerospace interests, while the tungsten and
tantalum effort is in support of the electronics in-
dustry. A comparison of Soviet alloys with Western
counterparts indicates that a similar capability
exists at least with respect to high-temperature
strength. However, strength improvements are of
little value unless satisfactory coating systems are
developed. The Soviets have developed coatings
for niobium alloys that will provide oxidation pro-
tection for short periods (30 hours) up to 1,100?C.
For molybdenum alloys, the trend is toward devel-
oping complex silicide coatings for temperatures
above 1,200?C and a chromium and/or boron-base
coating for applications below 1,200?C. Of interest
is a recent Soviet investigation which evaluated
an MoSi2+HfO2 coating on TsM-5 molybdenum
alloy. The coating appeared to offer good protection
up to 2,130?C for 300 seconds, which may be suf-
ficient time for some weapon requirements. Recent
tantalum, tungsten, vanadium, and chromium re-
search has been of little aerospace significance. The
Soviet tantalum and vanadium work is still in its
infancy, and the tungsten alloys available are
similar to those in the West, with little originality
 shown. In chromium alloy development, the Soviets
have not done any original work in recent years
but have followed promising US leads in dispersion
strengthening.
The Soviets have glass-reinforced materials which
have been used to fabricate such rocket and missile
components as heat shields, leading edges, skirts,
motor cases, nozzles, and pressure bottles. Although
limited material development continues, most of
the current effort is concerned with improving the
aohesion between binders and reinforcing materials.
Tho Soviets are also interested in glass filament-
wound structures and filament winding techniques.
In addition, they have an-
nounced ';a new a esive, designated V-23, which
produces vacuum tight (10'6 mm) seams in the
-196? to 300?C range. Within 10 years, the Soviets
may have stable polymeric adhesives capable of
650?C application for long periods. Polymethyl-
methacrylatir (PMMA) is used widely in aircraft
in the USSR. Where hig`i Mach conditions are main-
tained, the Soviets use high-strength, stress-relieved
plate glass or- glass laminated by polymer c inter-
layers bonded by adhesives. In addition, special
heat-resistant zinc-borosilicate glasses have been
developed.
The Soviets appear to be approaching the West
in the growth and handling of whiskers, but in the
production of continuous filaments, they are prob-
ably two years behind the West, particularly with
respect to mass production of high-quality filament.
The availability of both carbon and boron filaments
has been noted. Based on available information, the
Soviet effort on metal matrices might be categorized
as exploratory; selected Western experiments are
being repeated and some original work is being
done, but there is no concentrated effort along
a particular material line, Tungsten fibers in both
copper and nickel matrices have been evaluated,
but the effort is of a basic nature, though both ma-
terials have long-range potential for aerospace hard-
ware. Powder metallurgy, diffusion bonding, in-
filtration with molten matrix, and explosive bonding
have been evaluated as methods of preparing com-
posites. The Soviets are keeping a close watch on
Western developments in this area so as not to fall
behind. The Soviet efforts on nonmetallic composites
include polymeric composites reinforced by nylon,
carbon cloth, metallic wire, hollow glass fibers, as-
bestos, and organic textiles. The Soviet prepregging
capability is currently adequate to produce tape
and broad goods of the graphite/resin and boron/
resin variety. The Soviets apparently can produce
continuous carbon filaments, but whether this is an
industrial production capability is not known. Work
has been reported on graphitization of cellulose and
of polyacrylonitrile fibers.
Production technology
Production technology development has paral-
leled that of materials and design, and the processes
necessary to build future operational systems of
advanced performance levels are now available. The
appearance of integral structures in both high- and
low-performance aircraft indicates common usage.
This usage, together with the continuing expansion
of Soviet heavy press resources, indicate that future
Soviet aircraft systems will make more use of
integral structures (for example, panels, spars,
frames, and carrythrough structures).
Evidence of bonded honeycomb and foamed fill-
ers in low-performance aircraft for secondary struc-
tural applications indicates that the Soviets are
easing into the use of sandwich construction. Their
continuous research program in high-temperature
adhesives, diffusion bonding, brazing, welding, and
application of high-temperature materials indicates
that limited applications of sandwich construction
for primary structural application will be found
in future high-performance vehicle systems. Pre-
cipitation-hardened stainless steel sandwich or high-
strength titanium sandwich are now believed to be
available for aerodynamic systems. This applies pri-
marily to large aerodynamic vehicles where sig-
nificant weight advantages accrue. Initial applica-
tions will probably be limited to simple curvature
or flat panels and be broadened later to include
more complex, three-dimensional, contoured shapes.
The use of refractory materials for either airframe
or propulsion design is not expected until the late
 IO~ECBQ
1970s and will depend to a large degree on the suc-
cess of Soviet developmental work in fabrication
techniques.
The Soviets are using all types of welding. A com-
bination of spot welding and adhesive bonding,
called glue welding, has been accepted by a number
of design bureaus, and the process is now employed
in the production of several aircraft. Development
of both diffusion bonding and adhesive bonding
processes continues, and more composite structure
is expected on future designs.
Soviet efforts in metal forming, forging, casting,
and extruding, with particular emphasis on titanium,
have kept abreast of requirements. Metal removal
has received considerable attention, but numerical
control machine technology and its use lag the
West. Chemical milling is being used, and laser
machining is under development.
Trends in Soviet production technology develop-
ments for the past two years reflect continuing re-
search in materials and manufacturing. Perhaps
most pronounced has been the improvement and
commitment to production of some of the processes
that have been developed previously. Titanium in
numerous extruded shapes, including steppedex-
trusion, is available and being used in production
aircraft. Casting of complex shapes in titanium and
nickel-base alloys has been vastly improved. Weld-
ing process reliability in production has improved
to the point where designers are beginning to use
more welding in high-strength structural parts.
Forging techniques have permitted sophisticated
aluminum forgings and titanium forgings that were
not possible several years ago. In short, the Soviets
are now making parts that result in reduction of
manufacturing costs and, in addition, are making
parts for aircraft that operate in the high-tempera-
ture regimes.
Interceptor aircraft
In the last six years the Soviets have introduced
new interceptors into the Air Defense Force. These
have been the large, long-range Fiddler (1966),
the Mach 2.5 dash Flagon A (1967), and the super-
sonic cruise Foxbat (1970). In addition, the Soviets
have introduced improved variants of existing de-
signs, such as the Fishpot C and Firebar B. Present
soviet operational interceptors, with the exception
of the Foxbat, have speeds of about Mach 2 to 2.3.
Speeds of about Mach 3.0 have occasionally been
noted for Foxbat; however, most of its flights have
been in the Mach 2.3 to 2.6 regime. Foxbat carries
externally four new, large AAMs which are dt:sig-
nated AA-6.
The Flagon A carries the IR and semi-active
homing Anab (AA-3) missile and uses a version of
the Firebar/Skip Spin radar. This interceptor is
powered by two Type 37 engines that are also used
for the Fishbed (MiG-21). The Flagon is assessed
as basically a Mach 2.3 interceptor, although it is
credited with a maximum capability to Mach 2.5.
The normal operating radius of Flagon is estimated
to be 370 nm. The data link system is estimated
to be interconnected to the autopilot for automatic
ground-controlled intercepts. There is some evi-
dence that the Soviets are interested in improving
the low-altitude intercept capability of Flagon A.
The development of Flagon was undertaken to
improve on the relatively limited radar and missile
capability of the Fishpot B, which was limited to
rear-hemisphere attacks with beam-rider missiles.
The Fiddler aircraft is the largest fighter ever
produced by the Soviets. The aircraft progressed
from that observed in the 1961 Tushino Airshow,
configured with two missiles, to the present configu-
ration with four externally mounted AA-5 missiles,
usually carried in mixed loads of IR and semi-active
radar-guided versions. The Fiddler has frequently
operated in conjunction with the Moss (airborne
warning and control) aircraft. The Fiddler s air-
gives it the best capability of the Soviet _ ters
(with the possible exception of the Foxbat) to find
targets without good height-finding information.
With a radius of action of 865 nm, Fiddler was
developed as the first Soviet long-range intercep-
tor; interceptors developed earlier have a radius
of about one-third to one-half that of the Fiddler.
A large, twin-engine subsonic cruise, supersonic
(Mach 2.0-2.5) interceptor of Sukhoy design, desig-
nated the Ram E, is under development and could
be operational by 1975. Its engines are believed to
be of the same type as those used on the Flogger.
Development of air intercept capabilities at low
 and medium altitudes, regions where the Soviet
probably desire improvements, probably is being
emphasized; such capabilities for current Soviet
aircraft are best represented in the Firebar. The
Ram E's size will allow it to use the new fire-
control technology of the Foxbat and the new AA-6
missile carried on that aircraft. Another more likely
possibility, however, is a new AAM believed to be
in flight test for use against penetrators flying at
low and medium altitudes.
Although there, is no firm evidence that the So-
viets are developing a supersonic cruise interceptor
with a radius of about 1,000 nm, a definite trend
toward developing aircraft with greater speed, alti-
tude, and weapon system capabilities is indicated.
The Soviets may possibly have a requirement for
such a system during the next 10 years. Also indi?
cated are subsystem developments and R&D efforts
in materials, propulsion, and electronics which in-
dicate technical interest in more advanced high-
speed aircraft. Vigorous efforts in design techniques
and materials would be required to achieve the low
specific fuel consumption necessary, but this ob-
jective could be realized, technically, by the So-
viets before 1980.
Tactical fighters
Most Soviet advances in tactical air weaponry
have been a byproduct of developmental work
aimed at improving strategic air defense capability.
In tactical weaponry, the Soviets have stressed re-
liability, mobility, and strength through numbers
rather than sophistication. Emphasis has been on
modification of existing systems to meet tactical
requirements rather than on designing new systems
to perform tactical missions. The introduction of
Fishbeds J and K into Soviet tactical air units and
the initial production of both the Mikoyan-designed
variable-geometry wing Flogger and Sukhoy's vari-
able-geometry wing Fitter B indicate increased
Soviet interest in improving their tactical warfare
capability. The trend evident in the evolution of the
various MiG-21 models is toward increased com-
plexity in electronics and armament with a resultant
increase in capability.
The Flogger entered Soviet tactical air units in
1970. With its improved combat radius and all-
weather intercept capability, this system is expected
to increase the effectiveness of the Soviet Tactical
Air Forces. With its variable-geometry wings, the
Flogger should be capable of operating from secon-
dary and unimproved forward airfields. The installs.
tiou of variable-geometry wings on the older Fitter
may have been primarily to improve its known poor
low-speed flying characteristics.
There is evidence that the Soviets are departing
from their past practice of basing tactical fighter
designs on defensive requirements. Flight tests were
started in early 1970 of an advanced variable-
geometry wing fighter. This aircraft is more like
a fighter-bomber because its estimated gross takeoff
weight is approximately twice that of the Flogger.
Weapons testing has emphasized activities asso-
ciated with ASM launches at low and medium alti-
tudes, which suggest interdiction and close support
roles. Development has progressed to the point
where an IOC of about 1974-75 can be predicted
with reasonable confidence. Future Soviet efforts
in tactical aircraft probably will include the devel-
opment of designs specifically for an air superiority
mission. Additional resources probably will be ex-
panded toward improved avionics, air-to-air mis-
siles, and guided air-to-surface missiles.
V/STOL aircraft
Soviet interest in decreasing takeoff and landing
distances was evident from the number and types
of aircraft at the 1967 Moscow Air Show. The ap-
pearance of three STOL fighters equipped with lift
engines-the Flagon B, Faithless, and Fishbed G-
and two variable-geometry wing aircraft and the
VTOL aircraft, the Freehand, represents signifi-
cant Soviet V/STOL developmental trends. Work
on the first Soviet vertical takeoff and landing air-
craft is estimated to have started in the mid-1950s.
These efforts resulted in the development of the
Yakovlev-designed Freehand which is believed to
have been built for the purpose of investigating
the engineering problems of vertical takeoff and
landing, using deflected thrust principles. The first
flight of this vehicle is estimated to have occurred
in 1964, but its testing activity ceased in 1967. There
is some evidence that the program may have been
reactivated in late 1970. None of the V/STOL de-
signs observed in 1967 resulted in an operationally
suitable design, apparently because Soviet pro-
 pulsion technology was not sufficiently advanced
to permit the design of an aircraft with suitable
radius/payload capability.
Another VTOL fighter-type aircraft of Yakovlev
design, the Ram C, appeared at Ramenskoye during
1971. We do not know whether the expected im-
provements in the Ram G over the older Freehand
have been incorporated. We believe that Yakovlev
is developing a dual-propulsion system which in-
dudes one or two direct lift engines in addition to
one or two deflected-thrust cruise engines. This
system cannot be related to a propulsion system on
any known aircraft at this time. Despite the high
level of past and present Soviet activity in the
development and testing of STOL and VTOL fight-
ers, little definitive information on the details of
their powerplants has been obtained.
Soviet interest in the STOL and VTOL fighter
concept will continue to grow as propulsion tech-
nology advances. The efforts in the next few years
are expected t- be concentrated primarily on com-
binations of pure lift engines and lift/cruise-type
engines for VTOL aircraft. A satisfactory lift or lift/
cruise powerplant for a VTOL aircraft must have
a very high thrust-to-weight ratio, probably on the
order of 22 for the direct lift engine and 10 for the
lift/cruise type. The Soviets are not expected to
reach this capability with production-qualified en-
gines before 1975. A Soviet VTOL fighter is not
expected to become operational prior to 1977.
Bombers
Soviet bomber design philosophy over the past
20 years has been based on an evolutionary ap-
proach to weapon system development. The prac-
tical effect has been that secondary mission objec-
tives did not dictate design-rather, existing
designs were modified, or "tailored," to suit subse-
quint mission objectives. This practice; together
with the appearance of a new prototype on the
average every 2 years during the past 20 years,
reflects an established long-range policy of con-
tinually upgrading overall bomber capability by
incorporating subsystem technological advances as
they occur. The Soviets have been very successful
in denying intelligence on new designs at least until
prototype rollout. Therefore, the fact that no pro-
totypes beyond Ram-H have been detected is not
TAP-. ECRET
to say that none are in design and development.
If past practice continues, it is most likely that
undetected designs are presently in development
and should appear within 2 years.
The Backfire has been in flight test at the Ramen-
skoye Flight Test Center in excess of 3 years and
in weapons compatibility testing at Vladimirovka
for about 1% years. There are four instrumented
prototypes at Ramenskoye, and the program ap-
pears to be progressing well. Backfire is a variable-
geometry wing, Tupolev-designed aircraft weighing
about 270,000 pounds. It will probably be intro.
duced both as a bomber and ASM carrier and be
operational by 1974. The maximum unrefueled
range of Backfire is estimated to be 5,600 nm, and
it can reach speeds of Mach 2.0 with its wings
swept.
The Soviets also continue to express interest in
sustained supersonic cruise aircraft. A large
(300,000 lb takeoff gross weight) double-delta
winged prototype designated Ram-H has been ob-
served at Ramenskoye. This aircraft is probably
either a bomber/reconnaissance prototype or a re-
search vehicle and may be of high temperature alloy
construction. If it is of aluminum construction it
could have an unrefueled combat range of 3,000 nm
cruising at Mach 2.2. If Ram-H is constructed of
high temperature materials, it could have a unre-
fueled combat range of about 2,600 nm cruising at
Mach 3.0.
The Backfire and Ram-H developments are not,
in themselves, reliably indicative of future develop-
ments. Innovations in aeronautical design, at least
within the next 10 years, will most likely consist
of developments in lightweight structures, lighter,
more efficient turbine engines; and improved avion-
ics. The only aerodynamic innovation we foresee is
the incorporation of supercritical wing technology.
This range-enhancing development could be ex-
pected to appear in a transport design.
Aerodynamic development such as that discussed
above could be expected to appear in a replacement
for the TU-95/Bear bomber. Such a design could
feature a high aspect ratio wing and power pro-
vided by four high bypass-ratio turbofan engines.
The appearance of such a replacement aircraft
 within the next 10 years is questionable in view
of the Soviet's continued reliance on the eminently
successful Bear airframe. Approximately 20 Bear F
aircraft have now been produced. This aircraft in-
corporates so many departures from the original
design that the Soviets may plan to employ the
newer design for many years to come.
The Backfire development removes any doubt
about Soviet capability to design and build a larger
variable-geometry wing aircraft or extend this type
of wing design to a four-engine bomber with greater.
payload and range than the Backfire.
A Soviet strategic bomber with supersonic pene-
tration capability at low altitude is not expected
within 10 years. Innovations in low-altitude oper-
ation will most likely consist of developments in
terrain-following radar, gust-response technology,
low-level launch, low-level cruise ASMs, and super-
critical wing technology.
The Brewer tactical bomber, due to its limited
range and payload capability, is a likely candi-
date for replacement. A good possibility is a vari-
able-geometry wing aircraft in the 60,000-pound
category. The Ram-F could easily be the basis of
such a design, just as the Firebar was the basis of
the Brewer design. Ram-F has superior range and
payload capability and is capable of Mach 1.2 op-
eration at sea level.
The Ram-H, if it is a Mach 2.2 design, merely
reflects Charger technology and has no clear im-
plication for future bomber development. If the
aircraft is a Mach 3.0 design, it incorporates the
high-speed technology characterized by Foxbat but
in a much larger aircraft and is, in this sense, an
extension of existing technology. Again however,
implications for future long-range bomber develop-
ment are negative-the low lift-to-drag ratio and
high specific fuel consumption of a supersonic
cruise vehicle continue to severely limit range ca-
pability. The vulnerability of a high-altitude pene-
tration mission at speeds less than hypersonic can
be expected to be substantially greater than that of
a low-level, subsonic penetration mission. Neverthe-
less, there may be an application of a Mach 3.0
design as a limited-range bomber.
Transports
The Charger (TU-144) is the only supersonic
cruise transport known to be under development in
the Soviet Union. Design objectives claimed,for the
Charger are Mach 2.35 cruise with 121 passengers
over a 3,500-nm range. It is powered by four NK-
144 turbofan engines rated at 38,600 lbs thrust
with afterburning. On 31 December 1968, Charger
became the first supersonic transport to fly when
it completed a 38-minute maiden flight. By the end
of 1971, it had accumulated more than 100 hours of
flight tests. Sporadic interruptions throughout the
flight program including three lengthy periods of
inactivity indicate modifications, repairs, and equip-
ment changes probably took place. Based on a com-
parison with the Concorde SST, the prototype
Charger is estimated to weigh considerably more
than is claimed by the Soviets, and it is doubtful
that it could meet the original range objective at
a cruise speed of Mach 2.2.
This aircraft had a longer fuselage, larger
wing, and apparently some modification to the en-
gine nacelles. The TU-144 could begin limited oper-
ational service on internal routes in late 1973. The
Soviets are not expected to develop another SST
design in the near future; however, a Mach 3.0
cruise SST is a long-term possibility.
The Soviets are currently flight testing the Candid
(IL-76), which was exhibited at the 1971 Paris Air
Show. This new transport resembles the C-141 and
is the first Soviet turbojet heavy transport. The air-
craft has been noted para-dropping personnel and
equipment and is expected to have a military appli-
cation. Future efforts in transports are expected
to be directed toward the development of a high-
capacity subsonic "jumbo jet" and vertical and
short takeoff and landing designs.
Helicopters
The Mil Design Bureau and the Kamov Design
Bureau have the primary responsibility for heli-
copter design and development in the Soviet Union.
In addition to its successful development of con-
ventional piston-powered and turbine-powered heli-
copters in the light- and medium-weight categories,
the Mil Design Bureau has designed and developed
 the world's largest heavy-lift helicopter. In the
medium-weight category, Mil's most recent heli-
copter development Is the Hind A, which com-
pares favorably in size and weight with the French
Puma (SA-330). This new helicopter, probably to
be used as a tactical assault and transport heli-
copter, reflects the first significant Soviet develop-
ment of rotary wing aircraft for specific use in a
combat environment. In the heavy-lift category, the
Hook (MI-6) and the Harke (MI-10) are opera-
tional, and the Homer (MI-12) is currently in the
flight-test stage. The Homer is basically a conven-
tional-winged helicopter. As with previous Soviet
rotary-wing aircraft, the development of Homer
indicates no major state-of-the-art developments or
breakthroughs. The impressive capabilities of So-
viet helicopters are the result of administrative pro-
gramming and design optimization rather than sig-
nificant aerodynamic research. The first factor is the
administrative trend of specialization, that is, de-
signing a vehicle for specific operations without
considering secondary or alternate mission roles.
The second factor is close attention to minor aero-
dynamic detail and fundamentals and optimization
of existing state-of-the-art, using off-the-shelf com-
ponents with minor modifications. Sophisticated
analytical procedures are being developed to opti-
mize existing hardware. Of significance in the de-
velopment of the Homer was the extensive, high-
priority computerized simulation of the vehicle in
various flight modes. It is speculated that the So-
viets have developed the capability for modeling
unsteady flow fields to a high degree of accuracy.
As a result of this capability, simulators have been
developed primarily for analytical design work. This
enables Soviet engineers to simulate all flight modes,
including autorotation which has typically been a
difficult area to model
According to leading Soviet heli-
copter designers, the Homer reflects solutions to
problems the US will not encounter for another 10
to 15 years.
The Kamov Design Bureau has historically been
associated with helicopter coaxial designs. Current
design activity centers around the continued devel-
opment of the Hormone (KA-25), which is In serv-
ice with Soviet Naval Forces, and the Hoodlum
(KA-26), which is oriented to civil uses. Both heli-
copters are unique because of their coaxial rotor
system, although design techniques and materials
are conventional when compared with the present
state-of-the-art in helicopter design.
Future Soviet research and development in rotary
wing aerodynamics will probably be directed to-
ward the development of a rigid rotor system and
synchronous advancing blade rotors, further weight
tests, refinement of Homer prototypes in prepara-
tion for series production, and continuation of Mil's
heavy-lift development trend. If the established
heavy-lift helicopter trend continues, significant de-
partures from existing designs can be expected.
Analysis of TIP jet propulsive systems could receive
extensive support in the interest of developing a
craft larger than the Homer. Such a project would
probably involve the development of a 400,000-lb
craft which could appear during the 1980-86 time
period. Further refinement and development of the
Hind A assault helicopter will also continue during
the 1972-80 period. Because of Kamov's expertise
in the coaxial rotor field, his design bureau is most
probably cor,: ucting studies and analysis of the
advancing blade concept (ABC), as developed by
Sikorsky, for incorporation into their designs. Kamov
is particularly well suited to this development and
could possibly have a prototype developed before
Sikorsky. A possible Kamov development of an en-
tirely new helicopter design for an integrated weap-
ons platform employing rigid or semirigid ABC
rotors and forward thrust engines could be realized
by 1975-80.
Ground effect machines
The major air cushion vehicle (ACV) develop-
mental work in the USSR is probably conducted
at the Central Aerohydrodynamics Institute, Mos-
cow, and at about five other research institutes
and shipyards. While no single agency is known
to direct this work, I. Khanzhonkov probably is
the leading Soviet researcher in the ACV field; he
is associated with the Central Aerohydrodynmics
Institute.
The Soviets still lag the West in applied ACV
developments but are improving as the result of
an intensified and expanding program. Their past
R&D in this field has encountered major problems
in skirt and air distribution design, power train,
and fan design. During the 1970s their design
 efforts will be directed toward the development
of improved skirt design and related materials
and overall simplification of construction materials
for a stronger and more desirable structure. Any
resulting machines that may appear in the 1980s
will probably be designed as high-speed (50 to
70 knots) patrol craft with light missile armament
and larger over-the-beach logistic craft. The im-
portance of arctic use of ACVs has not been ignored
in the USSR, and related developmental work prob-
ably will be emphasized in the 1975-80 period. If
the Soviets can maintain their current R&D mo-
mentum in this field, which seems likely, they will
match the West in conventional ACV technology
within five years. The USSR may already be far
ahead of the US in the development of unconven-
tional hybrid ground effect technology, such as
that reflected in the ram wing vehicles.
Unique vehicles
An extremely large aerohydrodynamic vehicle,
first known as the Caspian Sea Monster but now
The precise purpose of these craft is not known.
A recent hypothesis, to which engineering studies
and wind tunnel tests lend credence, suggests that
the Monster 300 may be a considerably more ca-
pable and flexible logistics carrier or platform
than first estimated. If it is postulated that eight
of its ten turbofan engines are used to direct engine
exhaust under the wing/flap sy^tem, the vehicle
appears capable of hovering and accelerating to
reasonably efficient ground effect vehicle condi-
tions as an augmented ram wing; if the exhaust is
directed over the wings, it can cruise highly effi-
ciently at altitude. Speeds in excess of 300 knots
and ranges exceeding 2,000 nm are estimated.
Under these conditions, the Monster 300 appears
to be capable of C-5A-like payload capacity but
with the advantage of short take off and landing
on calm water or ice.
Soviet fighter aircraft began to appear in about
1960 with two definite types of armament con-
figurations. One type is strictly an interceptor with
only missile armament and fire-control equipment
consisting of a data link, airborne intercept radar,
and missile-launch computers. The other is more
of the air superiority type of fighter; some aircraft
of this type have missiles as prime armament while
others have both missile and gun armament. The
second type of fighter uses as its fire-control equip-
ment, radars (either range-only or airborne inter-
cept), missile-release computers, and optical sights.
Both types can carry and deliver other ordnance
such as rockets and bombs.
 No basic changes are expected in the armament
configuration of future Soviet fighters employed
strictly as interceptors. Missiles will remain as the
only armament. Improvements in existing missiles
as well as the possible introduction of new missiles
can be expected. Increased use of infrared search/
track sets and improvements in detection range
can be expected as the Soviets make advancements
in interceptor fire-control systems.
The trend of armament configurations for the
air superiority fighters is toward a reduction in
the use of guns with total reliance on missiles to
perform air intercepts; however, the recent intro-
duction of the Fishbed J with a permanent new
gun installation and the possible use. of gun pods
on the gunless Fishbed Ds and Fs reflect a re-
versal in this trend. New tactical or air superiority
fighters introduced by the Soviets in the next 10
years are expected to have both missiles and guns.
In addition, these new fighters will have optical
sights and be capable of carrying ordnance for
air-to-ground delivery to support a secondary
ground support role.
Any new Soviet guns would most likely retain
the Soviet preference for large caliber and exhibit
increased muzzle velocity over their existing aircraft
cannons. The Soviets have four types of unguided
rockets in their operational inventory, and future
rocket developments are expected to be modest.
As in the past the Soviets will continue to improve
the design of their bombs. Improvements are ex-
pected in bomb ballistics and fuzing. In addition,
a retardation system will probably be developed
to permit low-level delivery of bombs. To improve
a limited store carriage capability, the Soviets may
well develop multiple ejection racks (MERs). The
MERs would probably be designed to carry two
or three bombs each. This could increase the num-
ber of stores carried and may also increase the
total-per-station load capacity of Soviet fighters
by as much as 300 percent.
When delivering munitions against ground tar-
gets, Soviet tactical fighters use a simple fixed-
collimating sight, a gyroscopic-lead computing gun-
sight, or a gyroscopic-lead computing gunsight
mated with an automatic bomb release computer.
Some tactical fighters have the capability to release
munitions either manually or automatically. Soviet
tactical fighters still rely mainly on the dive tech-
nique for attacking ground targets with cannon,
rockets, or bombs. Cannon and rocket attacks are
performed from a dive. Bombing is performed from
dive or low-level flight. Low-level bombing is em-
ployed during low cloud base conditions or when
target antiaircraft defenses are heavy. The loft and
toss bomb methods are also used to deliver bombs.
These two methods of delivery are used to deliver
large conventional or tactical nuclear bombs. Loft
bombing is performed from a 106? pull-up angle
and toss is performed from a 45? pull-up angle. In
all three methods (level, toss, and loft), bombs can
be released manually or automatically. The Soviets
have not yet employed an automatic release com-
puter which receives range to target inputs. But,
a system of this type is necessary and will prob-
ably be developed in the next 5 years.
possibly using radiation homing guidance is being
developed for probable use on the Ram F by 1974-
75. Launches would be just above the radar line-of-
sight with maximum launch ranges out to 20-30 nrn.
In the past several years, the Soviets have de-
ployed aircraft fitted with an abundance of radomes.
The electronics associated with these aircraft are
mostly passive and hence are probably used for
Sigint collection and DF purposes. One particular
configuration is the 8-GHz-band radar believed to
be fitted under the 25-foot belly radome of the
naval Bear D aircraft. While its exact function is
not yet known, the radar appears to have at least
a good long-range surface search capability. It
transmits at times on two RFs (within the same
band) simultaneously, a technique which the So-
viets have used for lobe pattern control but which
in highly advanced systems could be used for clut-
ter suppression. This radar has also been tentatively
associated with the Hook helicopter.
 RET
There is no evidence to indicate that the Soviets
possess a side-looking radar for military reconnais-
sance use; however, a side-looking radar on an
AN-24 has been used for ice-field reconnaissance
in the Arctic.
It is believed that future development of Soviet
electronic reconnaissance equipment will be di-
rected toward battlefield support as well as naval
surveillance and target spotting. The equipment
will in all probability use the 14-GHz-band portion
of the spectrum as well as the 9-GHz-band areas.
GROUND WARFARE
The Soviet ground forces are supported by exten-
sive development, design, and test facilities. Ex-
cluding CBR, the number of known major ground
weapons R&D facilities exceeds 60. These facilities
have successfully designed and developed approxi-
mately three generations of ground force equip-
ment since World War II, and the recent models
emerging appear quite improved in design and per-
formance. Changes in equipment to be developed
over the next five years, at least, probably will not
be drastic, but will be mostly evolutionary. Prod-
ucts now in blueprint probably include a new me-
dium tank, a new amphibious armored personnel
carrier, antitank guided missiles with improved
guidance, close support artillery and associated am-
munition, and mobile SAMs.
Soviet ground force materiel is based on sound
design principles, and needs are derived from re-
quirements as determined by Soviet army planners.
In many respects, the materiel lacks the refinement
of comparable Western developments; and of the
three major general purpose forces, Soviet ground
force equipment best exemplifies an adherence to
the philosophy of "The better is the enemy of the
good." This has resulted in the identification of
fairly well defined patterns of constraint in weapons
and equipment development, albeit, not without
meeting the basic Soviet requirements of tactical
firepower, over-the-ground mobility, and command
and control. The most notable shortcomings appear
to be in some types of logistical support equipment
and in the lagging development of suitable fixed
and rotary wing aircraft for effective ground force
air mobility.
Armored vehicles
Soviet medium tank design work is directed to.
ward the development of more mobile and flexible
combat vehicles with improved main armament and
fire-control equipment. Design concepts essentially
reflect a future main battle tank approach of prod-
uct modification of existing tanks. The medium
tank will continue to be the Soviet main battle tank.
It is believed that a new Soviet tank (tentatively
designated Medium Tank M-1970) is currently in
production and will be added to the inventory. This
tank is similar in appearance to the T-62, having
the same low silhouette and weighing perhaps
slightly more than 40 tons. The main armament
probably consists of the same or somewhat im.
proved 115-mm smoothbore gun. A noticeable dif-
ference is the suspension system which features
smaller road wheels and flat track system than used
on previous Soviet medium tanks.
The most probable advance in Soviet main battle
tank development anticipated within the next 10
years is the fielding of a follow-on to the Medium
Tank M-1970, possibly equipped with a combina-
tion gun and missile system which would retain
the advantages of the high-velocity smoothbore gun
for short ranges and provide a high-velocity guided
missile capability at extended ranges.
Current Soviet preference for smoothbore guns,
especially for direct fire roles (that is, tank and
antitank), is expected to continue during most of
the 1970s because of their advantages. Such weap-
ons are devoid of rifling and projectile velocities
for hypervelocity armor-piercing (HVAP) rounds
are higher than for comparable rifled versions since
there are no engraving and torque forces to over-
come. Likewise, the gun design permits the use of
non-spin high-explosive antitank (HEAT) ammuni-
tion, resulting in more efficient terminal ballistics.
Further development of smoothbore weapons for
firing rocket-assisted and guided projectiles may
be expected by the end of the forecast period.
attenuation liners
for the interior of tank turrets have appeared. Pre-
liminary estimates indicate that these liners are
of limited effectiveness against radiation, but exact
details are lacking. The Soviets have the techno-
logical capability to develop devices and features
which would provide a higher degree of protec-
 on for tank crews In contaminated areas. The
most likely achievements expected in the next few
years are the use of collective protector filtration
And over-pressurization for defense against chemi-
cal and biological attack, as well as protection
from alpha and beta particulates.
Since tank mobility adds to protection, improved
speed and cruising range of the medium tank are
anticipated. By the end of the 1970s, the cruising
range with on-board fuel may be extended to 500
miles through higher horsepower-to-weight ratios,
the use of improved suspension systems, and im-
proved power conversion devices. The Soviets are
expected to continue efforts to increase off-road
speeds with an objective of as much as 30 mph
for favorable terrain.
Armored personnel carriers (APCs), armored re-
connaissance vehicles, and armored amphibious
infantry combat vehicles (AAICVs) are found in
Soviet inventories. These include a full-tracked,
wheeled 'APC in three versions; 4 x 4-wheeled
armored amphibious reconnaissance vehicle in two
versions, plus a modified version to act as the
carrier for three different antitank guided missiles
(ATGM) systems; and a full-tracked armored am-
phibious infantry combat vehicle. In addition, two
older nonamphibious wheeled APCs are still in
service.
In late 1967, the appearance of a new vehicle,
the BMP, marked a major departure in armament
and interior layout design from earlier Soviet
armored carriers. This full-tracked vehicle features
a turret-mounted 76-mm smoothbore gun with a
7.62-mm coaxial machinegun and a superposed
Sagger ATGM launcher over the gun. The BMP
has a crew of three-driver, commander, and
gunner. The squad seen mounted in this vehicle
consists of eight men armed with a RPG-7, RPK-
type machinegun and 6 AKMs. The 76-mm smooth-
bore gun combined with the Sagger ATGM repre-
sents a new Soviet concept in armored vehicle arma-
ment and is indicative of the direction of related
future Soviet developments. The BMP Is the first
Soviet APC to have the troop entrance-exit doors
In the rear, thus providing more protection than
previous APCs which had hatches on the sides or
tops of the vehicles.
Current Soviet wheeled APCs and reconnais-
sance vehicles mounting 14.5-mm machineguns will
be retained for many years. Two types of armored
personnel carriers will continue to be required-an
APC vehicle with a large caliber machinegun and
an infantry combat vehicle which can fight in close
proximity to main battle tanks and is armed with
a weapons system for engaging tanks. Product-
improved or new versions of current vehicles prob-
ably will be fielded prior to the end of the decade.
Improvements probably will include better pro-
tective features, more effective gun ammunition,
and a newer model antitank guided missile sys-
tem. During the latter part of the forecast period
a replacement vehicle, either wheeled or tracked,
is expected to appear. This vehicle probably will
have a combination gun and missile system in one
version and an automatic weapon in a second ver-
sion, a minimum of one-inch equivalent armor pro-
tection over the frontal arc, and CBR collective
protection for the crew.
Artillery
Towed light, medium, and heavy antiaircraft
guns produced since the end of World War II have
demonstrated a continued effort by the Soviets in
the development of air defense weapons. Although
only antiaircraft heavy machineguns and light AA
artillery are currently considered to be standard,
quantities of larger caliber. weapons through
130 mm are available in reserve stocks. The S-60
57-mm AA gun system has been modified over
the years, with the latest known improvement being
the gradual replacement of the radar/director by
an updated/modernized integrated fire-control sys-
tem. Exploitation reports indicate that the current
Soviet D-130 howitzer is perhaps the best weapon
of its class in existence. The introduction of the
ZSU-23-4 quad 23-mm self-propelled antiaircraft
gun system into the Soviet inventory in the mid-
1960s dearly indicates an effort devoted toward
increased capability in air defense. With an on-
board integrated fire-control system (radar-optical-
director), this weapon system is considered a major
threat to attacking aircraft. The Soviets are ex-
pected to retain antiaircraft artillery weapons in
active use by field forces and to continue to im-
prove their weapons, ammunition, and fire-control
equipment.
 The Soviets have also made significant strides
within the ipast decade in tube field artillery
weapons. the latest Soviet tube
artillery about 1963 showed excellent design and
engineering, and performance that is on a par with
that of comparable artillery of any nation. The
Soviets have also developed and produced in the
last decade a series of smoothbore weapons (anti-
tank artillery, tank armament, and infantry weap-
ons) that, from the standpoint of production state-
of-the-art and technology and possibly engineering
and design, may have surpassed related weapons
of Free World nations. Recent information indi-
cates that the Soviets are experimenting with high-
speed rotary forging and electro-slag remelt steel
processing for the production of artillery and tank
gun barrels.
Artillery rockets
The Soviets have developed and used multiple-
and single-launch, free-flight rocket systems to pro-
vide fire support for their ground forces. They have
been innovative and for some systems have made
a minimum application of technology with good re-
sults; for example, in the design of aerodynamic
baffle-type devices to shape the rocket trajectory.
They have mounted a crane on a rocket launcher
vehicle which has eliminated the requirement for a
separate crane truck. Most evident is their philos-
ophy of adopting a basic rocket system, then up-
grading the performance and reliability through a
series of product improvements.
Infantry weapons
There exists a Soviet family of small-arms that
are simple in design, extremely reliable, sufficiently
accurate at combat ranges. and easily manufactured.
All contemporary Soviet small arms (except pistols)
are designed around the Kalashnikov rotary-bolt
system mechanism and use one of two cartridges-
either the 7.62 x 39 M43 or the 7.62 x 54 rimmed
cartridge. Squad-level weapons use the low-recoil
M43 round; sniper rifles and machineguns use the
more powerful 7.62 x 54 cartridge. The Soviets ap-
pear content with their current weapons and for
the next few years, until 1980 at least, only minor
product improvements are expected to evolve. So-
viet troops now have second-generation infantry
antitank weapons employing rocket-assisted projec-
tiles. These consist of the squad 40/85-mm recoiless
grenade launcher, the RPG.7; the battalion 73-mm
recoiless gun; and possibly a new squad antitank
weapon, the RPG-15. The Soviets are well advanced
in this field and have introduced a number of sig-
nificant features such as in-bore spinning of projec-
tiles that will function in both closed- and open-
breech smoothbore weapons, thus meeting a re-
quirement for uniform thrust alignment of rocket-
assisted projectile; wave-shaping techniques that
have reportedly achieved six-cone diameter pene-
tration; and simple but high-quality optical sights
that enhance hit probability.
Ammunition
The Soviets are expected to continue their con-
siderable research effort in improving ammunition
effectiveness. Although new items to be developed
will be greater casualty producers, they will be
the result of evolution, and no major breakthrough
in design technology is anticipated within the next
five years. The USSR is at present slightly ahead
of the US in the penetration capability of armor-
piercing ammunition, but Soviet state-of-the-art for
fuses and antipersonnel ammunition is well behind
that pf the US. It can be expected that the Soviet
R&D effort will be accelerated to close these gaps.
Mine detection equipment
Soviet mine detection equipment has received
continued attention. The Soviet Ground Forces are
equipped with electronic detectors capable of de-
tecting metallic mines. Ongoing R&D is directed
toward providing a reliable means of detecting non-
metallic mines. Infrared and trace gas analysis tech-
niques under investigation may result in the intro-
duction of a nonmetallic mine detector into the
Ground Forces within the next five years. Soviet
mine field-breaching equipment consists principally
of mine rollers, plows, and rigid explosive line
charges. These devices are expected to remain in
the Ground Forces inventory and may be aug-
mented by fuel-air explosives if current R&D ef-
forts in this field produce promising results.
Transport vehicles
Soviet transport vehicle RDT&E is under the
direction of the Scientific Research Automotive and
Engine Institute. Current efforts are aimed at con-
 TO ECRET
tinued Improvements of vehicle configurations, per-
formance, and mobility. These goals are being at-
tained by concentrating design efforts on the de-
velopment of such improved components as propul-
sion, suspension, braking, steering, and electrical
systems for both wheeled and tracked vehicles. The
Soviets have also evaluated the prototypes of such
special purpose vehicles as the Archimedian screw,
marginal terrain (air-roll), wheeled 5- and 15-ton
amphibians for ship-to-shore operation, and electric-
powered vehicles. Additionally, a highly mobile,
tracked, self-propelled field kitchen designed to
support armored and mechanized units has been
developed and field tested.
A new family of cab-over-engine, diesel-powered
vehicles in the payload category of 8 tons and over
are currently undergoing prototype evaluation. The
vehicles are intended for future production (1975-
80) at the new Kama River Plant which is now
under construction. Additionally, the Scientific Re-
search Automotive and Engine Institute is currently
evaluating two high-performance diesel engine pro-
totypes of 75 and 125 hp. The successful develop-
ment of these prototypes coupled with the produc-
tion of larger diesel engines for the future Kama
vehicles will provide the Soviet Union with the
capability of converting all military vehicles to
diesel power, if so desired.
Development of 8 x 8 vehicles in the payload
category of 10 tons and over will continue. A re-
designed version of the ZIL-135 (8 x 8) and a
replacement vehicle for the one-half ton CAZ-69
(4 x 4) possibly incorporating diesel engines are
anticipated in the 1975-80 period. A prototype ve-
hicle incorporating the Archimedian screw principle
with a 4 x 4-wheeled vehicle may appear in the
early 1980s. Concepts of this design have been re-
cently published.
By the mid-1970s, improved PMP-type ponton
bridge equipment probably will make its appear-
ance along with helicopter-emplacement short-gap
bridging. Development of a multiple-span, scissors-
type, tank-launched assault bridge is likely in the
1975-80 period. By 1985, Soviet multipurpose am-
phibious bridges will be available to supplement
or replace the PMP-type equipment.
Reconnaissance drones
There has been a conspicuous lack of informa-
tion on Soviet activities and thinking on this sub-
ject; however, four Soviet drone developments have
become known. Two, the LA-17 radio-controlled
ramjet target drone launched from aircraft inflight
and the LA-17M ground-launched reconnaissance
drone, are subsonic. The third, which appeared as
a sketch in an East German publication, is a recon-
naissance drone mounted on a launching rack on
top of an eight-wheeled amphibious vehicle. The
caption stated that the drone has a piston engine
and carries cameras. The fourth drone, known as
the Luggage, is about 84 feet in length, pilotless,
and believed to be a surfaced-launched tactical
reconnaissance aircraft.
The concept of employing small pilotless aircraft
for battlefield surveillance and reconnaissance, par-
ticularly in nuclear warfare, has distinct advantages.
Fabrication and deployment of large numbers of
such drone aircraft are entirely within the Soviet
capability with respect to airframe, powerplant, and
sensor components. Consequently, a steady advance
of the Soviet drone program may be expected dur-
ing the 1972-80 period. Such aircraft would be rela-
tively unsophisticated, reflecting current military
requirements and state-of-the-art for this period. By
1980 the Soviet drone program might be in full
stride, and by this time a number of special-purpose,
high-performance (probably supersonic) aircraft
could be in operation.
Nuclear power supply
The Soviets are making a concerted effort to de-
velop nuclear power supplies for military use on
land as well as in space. Small nuclear reactor power
plants were begun to be developed before 1956;
however, by 1963 only two types of nuclear plants
had entered the testing stage. These were the TES-3,
a water-cooled reactor, and the Arbus, an organic
liquid-cooled reactor. Because of problems asso-
ciated with fouling of the fuel element heat transfer
surfaces, development of the Arbus was discon-
tinued in 1969. The follow-on to the TES-3 is the
Sever, which is an air-transportable plant that gen-
erates 1500 We and can operate for four years
between refuelings.
 NAVAL WARFARE
Organizations within the staff of the Naval Head-
quarters in Moscow appear to have overall supervi-
sion of Soviet naval research and development. The
Deputy Commander-in-Chief for Shipbuilding and
Armaments and subordinate directorates probably
have the largest share of this responsibility. The
most significant of these directorates are the Direc-
torate of Shipbuilding, the Mine and Torpedo Di-
rectorate, and the Rocket and Artillery Directorate.
One other naval directorate known only as the
Fifth Directorate is important in Soviet naval re-
search and development but may not be subordi-
nate to the Deputy Commander-in-Chief for Ship-
building and Armament. The Fifth Directorate is
clearly concerned with naval electronics, particu-
larly fire-control electronics and electronics for sub-
marine detection including sonar. Coordination of
the research activities of the various directorates is
probably accomplished through the Naval Scien-
tific and Technical Committee, of which the Deputy
Commander-in-Chief for Shipbuilding and Arma-
ment is chairman.
In addition to the naval R&D and design facilities
noted earlier in the Facilities section, including re-
search organizations subordinate to the Ministry of
Shipbuilding Industry and other military-industrial
ministries, direct support work for naval R&D in
the fields of hydroacoustics and radio wave propa-
gation has also been identified in the Academy of
Sciences. Hydroacoustics R&D support work for the
Navy has been conducted at the Acoustics Institute,
and the radio wave propagation work has been con-
ducted at the Institute of Terrestrial Magnetism,
the' Ionosphere and Radio Wave Propagation
(IZMIRAN), Krasnaya Pakhra. In addition, some
unidentified research in the field of terrestrial mag-
netism is currently being carried out for an uniden-
tified naval organization by personnel of the Mag-
netic Measurements Laboratory of IZMIRAN. Other
unidentified research possibly related to subma-
rine detection is being carried out for the Fifth
Directorate of the Navy by a group within the De-
partment of Plasma Energetics at Krasnaya Pakhra
which is subordinate to the Kurchatov Institute
of Atomic Energy in Moscow.
Surface ships
A substantial number of the major Soviet surface
combatants which have appeared in the past 5 years
have Russian designations which indicate a main
mission of antisubmarine warfare. The Kresta-I,
Kresta-II, Kanin, and probably the Krivak classes
of ships are designated Bolshoy Protivolodochnyy
Korabl =BPK (large antisubmarine ships), the
Moskva is designated Protivolodochnyy Kreyser-
PKR (for antisubmarine cruiser), and the Grisha is
designated Maliy Protivolodochnyy Korabl'-MPK
(small antisubmarine ship). The one exception to
this pattern is the Nanuchka class which is desig-
nated Raketnyy Korabl' Maliy-.RKM (small rock-
et ship). This designation is similar to that for
the older Kildin and Krupnyy classes which were
designated RKB (large rocket ship) but are now
being converted to BPKs. While the new com-
batant types are apparently oriented toward anti-
submarine warfare, their surface-to-surface missile
armament renders them formidable threats in ship-
to-ship combat. In this respect there is some evi-
dence to suggest that the SAM systems on some of
these ships-Kresta-I and -II, Moskva, and Kanin-
may have a surface-to-surface capability.
The continuing Soviet capability to design and
construct good-quality surface ships armed with a
variety of missile systems is demonstrated by the
new Kara-class CLGM. This ship is larger than the
Kresta-I and -II. It has surface-to-surface and
surface-to-air missiles and appears to be the first
Soviet combatant equipped with both short- and
long-range SAMs. The precise missile systems on
this ship are not yet clearly defined, but they ap-
pear to be the SS-N-10, SA-N-3, and SA-N-4. The
multilayer air defense capabilities associated with
this ship suggest it may be intended as a task force
command cruiser, but it could also be a new and
larger ASW ship (BPK).
The large ship under construction at Nikolayev,
designated the 444B, was launched in December
1972. This ship may represent a new direction in
Soviet surface combatants. It is about 890 feet long
and has a waterline beam of about 110 feet. An
angled flight deck some 600 feet long, 84 feet wide,
and angled about 4? to port has been installed.
The widest part of the ship is about 155 feet. An
island type of superstructure is under construction
 T(I~0.5ECRET
amidships on the starboard side. Weapons or elec-
tronic positions occupy an area just beyond the for-
ward edge of the flight deck, probably restricting
flight operations to the angled deck.
Most likely connected with this ship is the de-
velopment program of the Ram-G V/STOL aircraft.
The guided-missile helicopter ship Moskva is be-
lieved to have conducted flight operations with the
Ram-C on 18 November 1972. These tests probably
were to determine relative wind conditions over the
flight deck for launch and recovery operations while
It is expected that
the Ram-C will continue its test program aboard
the Moskva and eventually be deployed aboard
the 444B when it is completed.
The 444B with its embarked V/STOL aircraft
probably will be used to provide air support to
amphibious forces or air defense for surface task
forces. It may also have an ASW or amphibious
assault mission if helicopters are embarked.
It is estimated that the 444B will begin operating
in early 1975. There are indications that construc-
tion of a second unit commenced in January 1973.
No large new amphibious support ships have
appeared in the past five years. The most signifi-
cant new craft for amphibious forces are the ACVs
of the Gus and Aist classes. The 30-ton Gus class
appears to be in limited series production. The
120- to 180-ton Aist class is temporarily, at least,
the largest military air cushion vehicle (ACV) in
the world, though it is roughly comparable in size
to the British SRN-4 passenger and vehicle ferry.
Further Soviet accomplishments in amphibious
ACVs are suggested by the fact that in the past
five years new shipyard facilities have been built
in Leningrad apparently dedicated largely to ACV
construction.
A significant new naval auxiliary, the Boris
Chilikin-a large under way replenishment ship-
appeared in 1971. It appears to be the first Soviet
auxiliary to be equipped with modern gear for
the efficient and rapid transfer of liquids and dry
stores to warships under way at sea. Only one
unit exists at present; however, others may be built
later. Such ships will increase the effectiveness
of fleet operations in the Mediterranean Sea and
other areas far from Soviet bases.
Submarines
Shortly after the Cuban missile crisis, the pro-
duction of a Soviet strategic counterpart to the
UIO Polaris force was authorized. The very limited
capability of the first generation of Soviet ballistic
missile submarines (H-class SSBN, G-class SSB,
and Z-conversion SSB), taken together with Soviet
statements avowing their rejection of an inferior
posture in the strength of SLBM forces, made it
virtually certain that a submarine like the new
Y-class with its 1,300-nm SS-N-6 missile would
appear. Construction on the first of these 16-tube
submarines began at Severodvinsk in 1964. This
lead unit was launched in 1966. In 1969 the first
Y-class submarine was launched at a second yard-
Komsomolsk-in the Soviet Far East. While this
class of submarine was predictable, we were sur-
prised at the intensity and speed of construction
of these enormously complex and expensive ships.
At the beginning of 1972, evidence was avail-
able on the development of four new Soviet bal-
listic missile submarines. Three of these-the H-III,
the 402M, and 402K-are modifications of existing
ballistic missile types. The oldest, the H-III, has
been observed since 1967 and is the test platform
for the SS-NX-8, the new 4,150-nm naval missile.
The 402M is a lengthened G-class diesel-powered
ballistic missile submarine whose modification re-
sembles that of the H-III. The reason for the 402M
modification is unknown. It could be the beginning
of a program to modify the remaining Golf-I sub-
marines to carry the SS-NX-8 missile, or it could
represent a test platform for a new, as yet un-
identified, missile. The program to convert 15 G-I
class units (which carry the 350-nm SS-N-4 missile)
to G-IIs (which carry the 750-nm SS-N-5 missile),
however, appears to be continuing, and only eight
G-I class units remain to be converted.
The third modification involves another modi-
fied G-I, designated the 402K. This also is a length-
ened G class but is of quite different configura-
tion from the 402M and H-III. The original length
of the sail on the 402K has been retained but made
narrower, and its original missile tubes appear to
have been removed. Aft of the old sail a low "turtle
back" containing four missile-launch tubes has been
added, and the overall length of the ship is 58 feet
greater than the original G class. There is no
 E
logical explanation for the retention of the same
length of sail without missile tubes, but this fact
suggests that the 402K is an experimental effort.
In December 1969 a new missile, designated the
KY-9, was0 at the Kapustin Yar Missile
Test Range. There is tenuous evidence that it may
be a naval missile and that the missile transporters
and support equipment are similar to those used
for the SS-N-6 missile carried by the Y class. This
suggests that KY-9 may have dimensions close to
those of the SS-N-6. It is estimated that the tubes
in the low "turtle back" on the 402K submarine
could probably accommodate a missile of about
the same length as the SS-N-6, and this leads to
speculation that the 402K may be a test platform
for the KY-9.
In addition to the foregoing three modifications
of existing ballistic missile submarines, a new, large
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, desig-
nated the D class, has appeared. This ship is similar
to but longer than the Y class and is fitted with
12 instead of 16 missile tubes. It seems virtually
certain that this submarine is the long sought plat-
form on which the SS-NX-8 missile will be de-
ployed. The D class is 24 to 26 feet longer than
the Y class. Its speed is unknown but presumably
will be comparable with that of the Y class and
possibly will incorporate improved sound quieting
features over those of the Y class.
In the torpedo attack class submarines we had
anticipated during the past 5 years a follow-on,
quieter submarine than the N-class SSN. The new
V-class SSN, as predicted, is quieter in many re-
spects than the older N class but not nearly as
quiet at comparable speeds as the quietest US
nuclear submarines. One of the reasons why the
V-class (and the other second-generation Soviet
nuclear submarines) is not as quiet as US sub-
mar'nes apparently is because the Soviets delib-
erately chose to give it a very high speed (32 knots)
capability. This evidently led to the omission, to
any significant degree, of sound isolation mounting
of machinery in order to pack a large amount of
power into the limited hull volume. The quieting
that was accomplished appears to be related pri-
marily to improved hydrodynamic design of the
hull and the use of larger, slower turning propellers.
This insistence on high speed at the expense of
quietness is a significant peculiarity of Soviet sub-
marine design philosophy. There is little indica.
tion at present that speed will be sacrificed for
quietness.
Also appearing during the past few years was
the B-class, diesel-powered submarine. While not
unexpected, it is not considered a significant threat
as a combatant. Only four of these were built, and
they are widely dispersed in the Pacific, Northern
and Black Sea fleets. It is speculated that they
are intended as very quiet target submarines for
use in ASW exercises and development. If this is
correct, the B-class represents another Soviet R&D
effort to improve ASW capabilities.
The A-class SSN, the third new Soviet torpedo
attack submarine appearing in the past few years,
is unique in that it is the smallest Soviet nuclear-
powered submarine and has had nearly a 3-year
period of fitting out and shipyard availability fol-
lowing its launching in 1969. The long delay in
its becoming operational suggests there is some-
thing special about it. Possible explanations of this
based on very tenuous evidence are:
a. Difficulties with a new type of nuclear propulsion
plant, possibly incorporating more advanced noise control
features;
b. Difficulties with a new type of "rocket torpedo"
weapon system or a counter to such a system;
c. Difficulties entailed in the possible first use on this
submarine of a substantial quantity of hull or machinery
components made of advanced new materials such as
titanium alloys.
d. Some combination of the above.
Concerning Soviet cruise missile submarine de-
velopments, the C-class SSGN with its revolu-
tionary, short-range, submerged-launched, antiship-
dence of Soviet interest in and tenuous evidence
of the possible testing of a submerged-launched
cruise missile of unidentified characteristics in 1966.
The evidence, however, was judged insufficient as
a basis for predicting the early appearance of such
a weapon system. The C-class submarine and its
weapon system is a startling example of the Soviet
capability to conceive and execute unique new
weapons in virtually complete secrecy.
 Tn;\ Spt FT
Like the A-class torpedo attack submarine, the
P-class SSCN (which also appeared in 1969) was
thought to be in series production. The conspicuous
absence after nearly 3 years of any additional units,
however, suggests that the P class is also a de-
velopmental prototype. The P class appears to have
become operational, but little is known about its
weapon systems. It appears to have 10 or 12 missile
tubes in its bow in an arrangement similar to that
in the C class. This suggests that it also is intended
to launch cruise missiles from a submerged posi-
tion. On the other hand, the P class is much larger
than the C class and has twin rather than single
screw propulsion. Also, there is some evidence that
the A-class submarine launches a missile having
a greater range than that of C class by a factor of
3 to 5. There is no evidence to explain how target
acquisition and fire-control data could be obtained
for the submerged launching of a missile having
this great range.
Of particular note in Soviet submarine-related
R&D during the past 5 years have been develop-
ments in navigation and communications systems
and the appearance of a "submersible" project. De-
velopments bearing on the navigation of ballistic
missile submarines include the appearance of radio-
metric sextants (Cod Eye) on the H- and Y-class
submarines. The navigation satellite system may
have become operational only in early 1972. Under-
water communications equipment has been firmly
identified in Soviet submarines and surface ships,
and it is highly probable that the Soviets have been
developing improved underwater communications
systems. Such systems can greatly facilitate joint
submarine and surface ship ASW operations..
During the past 15 years Soviet open literature
has-revealed a significant interest on the part of the
shipbuilding industry in titanium alloys. Two
known applications of titanium alloys by the ship-
building industry have been in the manufacture of
some components of torpedoes and in the manu-
facture of sonar domes. Some aspects of the open
literature after 1965, however, have suggested that
the Soviets may be about to introduce titanium as
a hull structural material. There were indications in
1970 of Soviet use of titanium at a submarine ship-
yard, but this evidence does not permit a deter-
mination of how and for what purpose the material
was used. Although titanium alloys are generally
expensive and difficult to weld, these disadvantages
are rapidly being overcome and the high strength-
to-weight ratio of these materials can have very
significant effects on the capabilities of surface
ships or submarines where they are used extensively
in the hull structure. It should not be a surprise if
 some Soviet shipbuilding use of titanium alloys in
the hull structure of surface ships or submarines is
identified in the next few years.
Soviet literature also has revealed continuing re-
search activity related to industrial noise control
leading to improved understanding of vibrations,
with particular applications to marine structures.
The quantitative evaluation of actual Soviet prog-
ress in noise reduction, however, must await obser-
vation of ships and submarines at sea. In this re-
spect, as previously mentioned, the new A-class
submarine is of particular interest.
anti-sonar coatings have previously been identified
on Soviet submarines, and this new thicker coating
indicates continued Soviet development in this field.
It is considered most likely that a coating of this
thickness is intended to reduce the reflected energy
of sonar signals from torpedoes with active acoustic
homing systems. The thicker coating also would
probably be more effective than the earlier thin
coating against the lower frequency active sonars on
the more modern surface ASW ships. There is some
possibility that the coating could be designed to
reduce the radiated noise of the submarine at some
of the higher radiated noise frequencies, but this is
considered a less likely intended purpose.
Aircraft
The Soviets have continued to emphasize devel-
opment of naval airborne systems. During the past
5 years the Bear D (TU-95R) reconnaissance ver-
sion of the Bear aircraft, equipped with the Dram-
buie target acquisition data link and serving anti-
ship cruise missile launching ships and submarines
of the various fleets, has appeared in the Soviet
Naval Air Force. In addition, the Hormone B heli-
copter equipped with Drambuie has appeared on
the Kresta-I class ship. Three new ASW aircraft also
made their appearance: the May (IL-38), which
is a land-based turboprop equipped with sono-
buoys, a J-band surface-search radar (Wet Eye),
magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) gear, and
ASW weapons; an ASW version of the Bear
(TU-142), apparently equipped similarly to the
May but without a MAD boom; and the Hormone
TOP- CRET
A helicopter, equipped with dipping sonar and de-
ployed on the Moskva and Leningrad ASW heli-
copter carriers.
Another development has been the appearance
of the LRAF Blinder B aircraft equipped with the
AS-4 in naval exercises. The missile on the Blinder B
has probably been modified and provided with a
homing capability and conventional warhead. Par-
ticipation of this aircraft in naval exercises probably
will continue.
The appearance of the new swing-wing super-
sonic bomber, the Backfire, in a naval context is
estimated. There is no evidence of its intended de-
ployment in the navy, but past experience (as with
the Blinder B, Bear, and the Badger) shows that
aircraft apparently developed for the LRAF even-
tually are used in a naval role, either within the
naval air force or in joint operations in support of
the navy. Another development, referred to above,
is that the Soviet V/STOL aircraft, the Ram C, has
been observed on the Moskva helicopter carrier.
Soviet naval missiles which became operational in
the past 5 years include one ballistic, four antiship
cruise, two surface-to-air, and two air-to-surface
weapons. A third air-to-surface missile, the AS-4,
is the one carried by Blinder 3, but its naval role is
not firmly identified. Of particular note is the pre-
ponderance of new Soviet antishipping missile de-
velopments during the past 5 years; four of the
weapons are ship or submarine launched and two
are aircraft launched. The chief significance of the
new antishipping weapons lies more in diversity
added to the antiship cruise missile threat than in
an across-the-board improvement in any particular
aspect of performance. Nevertheless, there is much
that is new in these systems. Probably the most im-
portant single development has been the sub-
merged-launched capability of the SS-N-7 with its
introduction of the element of surprise. Also of im-
portance is the fact that the AS-6 has twice the
speed of previous air-to-surface missiles (except for
the AS-4), and other new systems have higher
speeds and probably improved homing systems.
Among the new missiles known or suspected to
be under development during 1972, only one is
firmly identified as an antiship cruise missile,
 ~gsecaFx
Available information on the KY-9 missile as-
sociates it with the Soviet Navy. If intended for
naval use, it could, be an unusual new type of
ASW weapons
Perhaps the most significant new Soviet ASW
weapon identified in the past 5 years is the rocket-
assisted probable antisubmarine nuclear depth
charge designated FRAS-1 (free flight antisub-
marine rocket), which is launched from the
SUW-N-1 launcher. To date this weapon has been
identified only on the Moskva-class antisubmarine
helicopter carriers. The SUW-N-1 launcher has
been sighted on one unit of the Petya class destroyer
escort in the Black Sea, but no further installations
have been noted. No data on the actual range and
payload of FRAS-1 have been obtained. Its esti-
mated maximum range is 32,000 yards.
Several new air-dropped weapons were identified
during the past few years. The E45-70A is a new
18-inch acoustic homing antisubmarine torpedo.
Two aviation depth bomb weapons, called PLAB
by the Soviets, have been identified. One is a small
aviation depth bomb intended to be dropped in
clusters of 5 to 20 and the other, the PLAB-50, is a
250-pound high-explosive bomb that is dropped
singly.
Two new antisubmarine mines)
Called rising mines, one of these apparently is laid
from surface ships and submarines and the other,
laid from aircraft. These weapons, which are in-
tended to be anchored in water having depths to
2,000 feet, float at depths from 150 to 1,150 feet at
the end of a cable. Upon receipt of an acoustic
signal in a specific frequency range, the mine is
released and rises toward the target. The air-
dropped version incorporates a rocket that propels
the mine up toward the target. These weapons in-
coporate features which prevent them from attack-
ing surface ships. No evidence of widespread de-
ployment of such mines has appeared, but this is as
would be expected in peace-time. Mines such as
these could be stockpiled without our knowledge.
Because it has been so long since the Soviet intro-
duction (in 1960) of its latest known acoustic
homing antisubmarine torpedo intended to be
launched from submarines and surface ships, it is
estimated that a new improved torpedo of this
Am -,ng the types of torpedoes under development
was what was called a
"rocket torpedo." This was a weapon that could
be launched from surface ships and submarines and
propelled through the air by a rocket to a point
where it would enter the water. A "rocket torpedo"
or a countermeasure to such a weapon may be in
In addition to firing the FRAS-1, the SUW-N-1
launcher on the single Petya unit and on Moskva-
class helicopter carriers could also fire this kind of
 rSECaEi
It is thought that the weapon pay-
may be the E45-70A air-
dropped acoustic antisubmarine torpedo. This tor-
pedo has been seen on the Moskva class and could
be delivered either by the Hormone A helicopter
or an Ikara-like weapon. Finally, although the
Kresta-II is currently thought to carry the SS-N-10
antishipping cruise missile, the absence on this ship
of clearly identifiable guidance radar for the
SS-N-10 misfile suggests that its missile launchers
are possibly for an ASW weapon like the Ikara.
ASW detection systems
With the expansion of the Soviet Navy over the
years, there has also been a marked increase in
Soviet ASW activity, most of which has depended
upon acoustic detection of submarines. The Soviets
are known to have in operation only one non-
acoustic system-MAD equipment in their ASW
aircraft-but are fully aware of a wide range of
other nonacoustic techniques.
New Soviet active sonars and ASW radar identi-
fied during the past 5 years and the ships on which
they are deployed where known are as follows:
3 kHz sonar (submarines)
3 and 4.5 kHz sonar (Moskva)
Possible 4 kHz sonar (Krivak)
8 kHz bull-mounted sonar (Karin and Brenta-11)
14-16 kHz dipping sonar
11-18 kHz sonar (Petya)
BM-1 sonobuoy
Moored acoustic buoy
Ingul device
J-band ASW radar
These new, lower frequency sonars are deployed
mainly in the newer Soviet ships and submarines,
whereas the majority of the fleet is equipped with
sonars operating in the 15 to 30 kHz frequency
range, characteristic of technology between World
War II and 1955. The identification of the lower
frequency sets, however, clearly illustrates Soviet
efforts to increase the range of sonar systems. Back-
fitting of older ships with new lower frequency
sonars continues slowly.'
In addition to using the lower sonar frequencies,
the Soviets also first used dipping sonar and
variable depth sonar (VDS) during the past five
years. The dipping sonar is used mainly by the
Hormone helicopters on the Moskva- and Lenin-
grad-class ships, but it also has been noted in a
few Mirka- and Petya-class ships and on at least
one hydrographic ship. The Hormone sonar is an
active-passive type with active frequencies in the
14-18 kHz range. There are as yet insufficient data
to estimate with confidence the initial detection
A reasonable
initial detection range of the Moskva VDS under
good conditions with the transducer and target on
the same side of the layer would be between 4,500
and 7,500 yards. The use of dipping sonar by sur-
face ships is not particularly significant since the
ship must be practically at rest in the water before
it can be used, but it does provide a type of "quick-
and-dirty" variable depth capability useful in some
special situations. Towed VDSs have appeared on
the Moskva and Leningrad, the Krivak class, one
unit of the Petya class, and there is some evidence
that it is to be back-fitted in units of the Kashin
class.
In general it appears that the Soviets are "push-
ing" their designers of acoustic antisubmarine de-
tection devices. There is some evidence that the
Moskva and Leningrad helicopter antisubmarine
ships were possibly intended to be able to make use
of the theoretically high search rates provided by
bistatic operations; however, there is little evidence
of use of this method, possibly because of difficul-
ties with the complex signal processing techniques
required by such a system. It is anticipated that the
Soviets may pursue this development, however,
with an eventual measure of success.
New Soviet ASW detection systems for aircraft
have included an improved sonobuoy, designated
BM-1; a high-resolution radar, designated Wet Eye;
and possibly an improved magnetic anomaly de-
tector. These new systems do not significantly
extend detection ranges of ASW aircraft, but they
improve the probability of accurate localization of
a submarine contact. The Wet Eye ASW radar and
the BM-1 sonobuoy are part of the new ASW de-
tection system of the IL-38 and Tu-142. Wet Eye is
 77e SECRET
a J-band search radar with a range of up to 75
miles against a surfaced submarine. In addition,
Wet Eye can transmit coded pulses to interrogate a
BM-1 buoy. The BM-1 is the first Soviet sonobuoy
to use an FM radio carrier. It is a passive, omni-
directional buoy, but several buoys together ap-
parently can provide target bearing. An unusual
feature of the BM-1 is its restricted audio range of
6 to 7.5 kHz, a narrower bandwidth than any other
Soviet accomplishments in fixed submarine detec-
tion systems generally have been unspectacular, and
there is no evidence that they are anywhere near an
effective ocean surveillance system. Soviet devel-
opment of fixed (shore-based) hydroacoustic sys-
tems has continued during the past 5 years with
the installation of a second limited range, acoustic
device, designated the Ingul device and the intro-
duction of a moored hydroacoustic buoy, designated
Cluster Sand by the US. The medium-range Ingul
device has been under development since at least
1963. Two of these devices are known to exist, both
in the Pacific. The Ingul device is a large cylinder,
65 feet in diameter, probably bottom moored in the
deep sound channel which could probably provide
detection ranges of less than 100 miles when fully
operational against a modern submarine.
intended for surveillance of the Kamchatka basin
to augment other defenses. It probably would not
be effective in most Soviet coastal waters where
geographic factors, coupled with limitations in
Soviet cable technology, preclude the exploitation
of the deep sound channel. Since the spring of 1970,
several Cluster Sand buoys have been recovered in
widely separate locations in the Barents/ Norwegian
Sea area. The buoys are strong, well-made, expen-
sive devices that are capable of being moored at
considerable depth (to about 4,000 feet) for a long
period. a
preliminary estimate is that detection ranges against
a 'modern nuclear submarine would be less than
10 miles in most areas. Thus, the Cluster Sand
system would probably have little effectiveness
against SSBNs, unless it was to monitor choke points
or other restricted areas. Other uses of the Cluster
Sand might be for defense of the sea approaches to
the USSR and as delouse points for transiting Soviet
submarines.
Because of the requirements to protect their own
forces and coastal areas from submarine intruders
as well as the existence of US Polaris/ Poseidon
ballistic missile submarines, it is virtually certain
that the Soviets will vigorously pursue research on
acoustic and nonacoustic submarine detection sys-
tems. For the long term, the Soviet may be at-
tempting to develop a revolutionary type of detec-
tion/sonar system based upon infrasonic waves, bio-
acoustics, or nonlinear acoustics. The Soviets
possess a vigorous program for the in situ study of
physics of sound in the sea. This type of investiga-
tion is costly and tedious but, in the long term is
fundamental to prediction of the acoustic environ-
ment. Soviet research in array design and signal
processing is more or less evolutionary in nature.
Progress in array design is suggested by the
chap es in the sonar domes appearing on naval
chins.
For over a decade the Soviets have carried out
research and development in a number of areas
either directly applicable to or related to the non-
acoustic detection of submarines. The full potential
of nonacoustic techniques for submarine detection
is not yet generally understood, and there is no
indication that the Soviets have made greater
progress than any other country in developing these
techniques. While there is no evidence of a com-
prehensive, coordinated R&D program in the USSR
for the overall problem of nonacoustic submarine
detection, some pertinent research activities are
undoubtedly receiving military support and direc-
tion. The Soviets have been investigating a number
of technologies which have potential application to
submarine detection. These include work in such
fields as electro-o tics and nuclear and magnetic
detection devices
 EGRET
an infrared submarine detection device is being
developed. None of these have been developed suf-
ficiently for deployment in an ocean surveillance
system. Very little evidence of R&D in this and
other nonacoustic areas, however, is available.
MILITARY ELECTRONICS
Communications
Soviet communications efforts are currently di-
rected toward the creation of a unified automated
communications network with the majority of the
stated goals of the 1971-75 Five Year Plan having
this as their end. Electronic and semi-electronic
switching equipment will continue to be developed
with actual service not contemplated before 1980.
When the problems in developing and producing
quality multiplexing equipment are solved, the
Soviets can be expected to make full use of the
recently developed Voskhod and Druzhba high-
capacity radio relay systems. These systems will
replace the medium-capacity R-60/120 and R-600
systems In main trunk routes with such new equip-
ment as the R-300 and fully transistorized low-
capacity links being used on branches and in rural
systems. Development of these systems in quantity
should not materialize until 1975. Frequency di-
vision multiplexing will continue to be heavily used
with the emphasis on reliability, miniaturization,
and better filter techniques. By 1975, pulse ampli-
tude and pulse width modulation will be possible
in voice communications. Multichannel laser com-
munications have been tested and could come into
operational military use in the next few years.
Waveguides also have been tested, but the prob-
lems inherent in installing and maintaining such a
system make its use doubtful. Troposcatter systems
will continue to be widely deployed, mainly across
inaccessible and rugged terrain. Increased use can
be expected of mountain diffraction and passive
relay systems for microwave communications
beyond the horizon.
The USSR has been using buried antennas
operating in the lower portion of the HF spectrum
since about 1961. These antennas have a high
degree of survivability and probably will be used
to assure the availability of strategic communica-
tions In the period after a nuclear attack. Communi-
cations blackout in a nuclear environment would
probably exist for an unknown period of time, al-
though there is evidence to indicate that the Soviets
consider this blackout to be less disruptive and to
last for a shorter period of time than predicted in
the US. Such antennas were first deployed within
the USSR, but they are now appearing in East
Germany, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, with
the total number exceeding 370 antennas at some
150 facilities.
Most of the antennas are 16-element arrays of
two basic sizes which are usually deployed in pairs
on the same azimuth to broaden the frequency
range. The gain of the array is about 10 db below
that of an aboveground vertical monopole. Even
though these antennas launch surface waves that
are usable at very short distances (