STAFFING PROCEDURES AND PROBLEMS IN COMMUNIST CHINA

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: PROBLEMS
• Keywords: COMMUNIST CHINA
• Keywords: STAFFING PROCEDURES
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001489982
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 102
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2010
• Case Number: F-2008-00033
• Publication Date: May 9, 1963

APPROVED FOR RELEASE^
DATE: 21-Apr-2010
STAFFING PROCEDURES AND PROBLEN$ IN COM~[1NIST CHINA
CIA Contribution~For Subcommittee on
National Security Staffing and Operations
to the Committee on Government Operations.,
IInited States Se~aate
Nth ~C)I1~1i?f BTP-F~ C)B~~~}~~
~'O ~?~:~LA~SIFI`~C"9~i
~E~UIRES CC)RR~l~FtREf~CE ~?~~?:
CON~DENTIAL
. A"~.
~'i~;
9 Ntay 1963.
When this cover sheet is remmved the
paper is unclassified. CIA should not
` be identified as the author.
O[~C~~C~~~~ l ~~~ ~~p1~
~t~~ G3~~~~1 >>G~3 ~!~ ~~ J~0
CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
ilJGt.7 : aZ~~`~~V ~dG . ~~ ~ I
 9 May 1963
STAFFING PROCEDURES AND PROBLEMS IN COMMUNIST CHINA
 STAFFING PROCEDURES AND PROBLEMS IN COMMUNIST CHINA
Page
I . INTRODUCTION .
1
II. STAFFING THE PARTY . . .
3
Staffing Requirements at Senior Levels
3
The Politburo and Secretariat .
?
The Second Level . .
8
The Next Generation .
9
The Party .and the State
10
The Structure for Staffing Party Organ-
izations . . r
11
The Leading Bodies .
11
The Central Departments .
14
The Control Commission . .
l5
Regional, Provincial and County Posts
1.8
Party Personnel Administration
20
Admission . .
20
Appraisal and Promotion .
22
Party Education .
23
Party Incentives . .
26
III. STAFFING THE GOVERNMENT .
28
Staffing Requirements for Senior Posts
28
Structure .for Staffing Government
0 ices . . .
30
The State Council . . .
30
The Second Level . ~
31
Specialized Personnel . .
33
Ministries and Commissions
35
 Page
Government Personnel Administration 36
Recruitment and Assignment ,::,. . 36
Transfer and Promotion . . 39
Veteran-' Preference . . . . 40
In-~ser'V1.c G' Tra7.n].ng . . . . . ~ . ? . . 41
Government Incentives . . 42
IV. THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT . 45
The Military Affairs Committee . 45
The General Political Department 4?
The Ministry of National Defense 48
Overstaffing . . . . . . 50
Training . 50
V. MANPOWER AND EDUCATION . 54
The Labor Force . . . 54
The Education System 55
Graduate Work- . . . . 58
USe Of SOViet SChOO1S s . . r 59
Scientific Manpower . 60
IV. THE COMMUNICATION OF IDEAS . . . 62
Classified Channels . ? . 62
The Party Press . 63
Meeta.ngS e . s . . ? 63
VII. AN APPRAISAL OF THE SYSTEM . 68
 STAFFING PROCEDIJR,ES AID PROT~~MS IN COMA~NIST CHINA
I . I NTRODtJCT I ON
This is a study of the theor~,$ and practice of
personnel management in Commun~.s~~ China .? It endeavors
to draw together information on how Chinese skilled
manpower and talent are selected, motivated, advanced
and organized in the pursuit of national goals. It
begins with a consideration of personnel requirements
at the senior levels of the party, surveying the broad
functions performed and sketching out the background
and character of the incumbents. It then takes a look
at the mechanics for staffing ~rarious echelons of-the
party.- This is followed by an examination of how the
party actually handles its personnel.
These chapters are followed by a discussion, ar-
ranged along similar lines, of the requirements for
top government executives, the system of government
personnel administration and how it operates in prac-
tice. A special chapter is devoted to the armed forces.
Later chapters take up in turn the educational
system and the means used by the leaders to communi-
cate with lower levels of the administrative apparatus
and the Chinese people. The concluding section is a
general assessment. of the strengths and weaknesses
of the whole system.
Several characteristics of the Chinese Commun-
ists' approach to this problem are, we think, deserv-
ing of special mention.
1. A striking feature of the Chinese -system,
even in comparison with its Soviet counterpart, is
the pervasiveness of party control and manipulation.
Positions of real authority anywhere in China are
without exception held by party members. In fact,
no level of government, no military, scientific,
economic or educational organization, no activity
of any moment is without its part^yAgroup, the mem-
tiers of which effectively run the unit. Advance-
ment is unlikely if the party does not approve.
2. .Stability in the highest reaches of the
party has been unusual for a system which in other
 places has bred frequent change.. Sao Tae-tong has
been the dominant figure for nearly three .decades.
He has kept around him a group of associates he
trusts. Today, these men are old and overworked.
They present an all but immovable roadblock against
aspirants to high office. And it has also proven
a difficult matter to insinuate new concepts, es-
pecially in technical fields,.into the policy making
process. The leaders tend to turn for advice to
party figures wha share the experiences and prej-
udices of the leaders.
3. Personnel management is highly centralized.
The system allows the men who determine national
security programs to commit available talent to these
programs in complete freedom.- There is no outside
competition for talent.
4. China is, however, very short of top-flight
talent--administrators, managers, scientific research-
ers,~tutors for graduate students, technicians, etc.
Still the Chinese leaders misuse what they do have by
a dogmatic refusal to trust fully those educated a~
broad, whether in the USSR or the hest, and by forc-
ing everyone to spend much time in political indoc-
trination.
5. These political indoctrination programs and
the absolute control of all media of communication
permit the leaders to disseminate only such informam
tion as they think fitting. This .has contributed
to a unity of purpose throughout the system and a
willingness to work hard at tasks set by the leaders,
though the degree of dedication today is not what it
was several years ago.
 National security policy in Communist China is
directed to building China over-the shortest histori-
cal span possible into a strongg modern leader of na-
tions with all the paraphernalia of power that implies.
The goal is a China respected for its military and pow
litical power, honored for its culture, turned to for
its principled interpretation of Communist doctrine;
in short, a China restored to its rightful leading
role in the world. The present leaders are dedicated
to the proposition that this can only be done through
the development of an authoritarian, Communist system
of government in China.
The Chinese Communist Party, in power throughout
mainland China since 1949, is still in the early phases
of a big construction effort. -The attempts of the lead-
ers in 1958-1960 to accelerate the process through '-'leap
forward" practices were a dismal failure, The country
is groping its way out of the rubble of that disaster.
It did not, however, shake the leadership out of the
conviction that its cause and course are correct. Nor
has it shaken the present leaders-from their dominant
positions.
Staffing Requirements at Senior Levels
Ultimate power,. in the Chinese Communist system,
rests in one man, whose qualities determine in great
measure how the whole will operate. That man now is
Mao Tse-tong, father figure of the Chinese Communist
movement. The guiding principles and the programs
by which the nation operates are in the final analysis
his responsibility. Many issues can, of course, be
settled short of Mao, but he is the final arbiter.
During the nearly three decades of Mao's steward-
ship, the Chinese party has been transformed from a
small, hunted band of revolutionaries fleeing to the
barren hills of northwestern China into the ruling
element of the largest single group of people on the
face of the globe. This record of success has made,
and continues to mak?, effective challenge of Mao a
very difficult proposition.
To the Chinese party, Mao is the ';greatest revolu-
tionary and statesman in Chinese history', and the most
prominent communist "among all living contemporaries."
 () 1956 Rank in Party Government
Central Committee
Chairman, CCP Central Committee; Chair-
man, CCP Politburo
Honorary Chairman, CPPCC;
Deputy, NPC
(2) Liu Shao-chi
(4) Teng Hsiao-ping
(6) Chou En-lei
(7) Tung Pi-wu
(8) Chen Yun
(9) Lin Piao
(13) Li Fu-chun
(14) Lo Jung-huan
(16) Lu Ting-i
(17) Lo Jui-thing
(il) then r
(24) Li Hsien-nten
(26) Nieh Jung-then
Member, Standing Committee, CCP Polit-
buro
Member, Standing Committee, CCP Polit-
buro; Ranking Member, CCP Secretariat;
Secretary General, Central Committee
Member, Standing Committee, CCP Polit-
buro
Member, CCP Politburo; Secretary, Central
Committee Control Commission
Member, Standing Committee, CCP Politburo;
Member, Military Affairs Commission of the
Central Committee
Member, CCP Politburo; Member, CCP
Secretariat
Member, CCP Politburo; Member, Military
Affairs Commission of the Central Committee
Alternate Member, CCP Politburo; Member,
CCP Secretariat; Director, CCP Propaganda Dept.
Member, CCP Central Committee; Member, CCP
Secretariat
Member CCP Politburo; Member, CCP
Secretariat
Member, CCP Central Committee; Member, CCP
Secretariat; Member, Military Affairs Comm-
ission of the Central Committee
Member, CCP Politburo; Member, CCP
Secretariat; First Secretary, Peiping
Municipal CCP Committee
Chairman, People's Republic of China;
Chairman, National Defense Council;
Deputy, NPC; Member, CPPCC
Vice Premier, State Council; Vice
Chairman, National Defense Council;
Deputy, NPC
Premier, State Council; Chairman,
CPPCC; Deputy, NPC
Vice Chairman, People's Republic of
China; Deputy, NPC
Vice Premier, State Council; Member,
State Planning Commission; Deputy,
NPC
Vice Premier, State Council; Minister
of National Defense; Vice Chairman,
National Defense Council; Deputy, NPC
Vice Premier, State Council; Chairman,
State Planning Commission; Deputy, NPC
Vice Chairman, National Defense Council;
Vice Chairman, NPC
Vice Premier, State Council; Vice
Minister of National Defense; Chief
of Staff, PLA; Member, National
Defense Council; Vice Chairman, NPC
Vice Premier, State Council; Minister
of Foreign Affairs; Director, Foreign
Affairs Staff Office, State Council;
Vice Chairman, National Defense
Council; Deputy, NPC; Vice Chairman,
CPPCC
Vice Premier, State Council; Director,
Staff Office for Finance and Trade,
State Council; Minister of Finance;
Vice Chairman, State Pianning Comer
fission; Member, National Defense
Council; Deputy, NPC
Vice Premier, State Council; Chairman
Science and Technology Commission,
State Council; Vice Chairman, National
Defense Council;. Deputy, NPC
Secretary General, NPC; Vice Chairman,
CPPCC; Chairman, Peiping Municipal
People's Government
 Public speeches by Mao's foremost associates bristle
with fulsome tributes to Mao's insights, wisdom and
knowledge. Practicing. experts in virtually any
field--ideological,-economic, military, literary,
scientific--are advised to improve themselves by
studying Mao's wox?ks. Chinese policies in all these
fields are presen?~ed as owing much to the master.
Mao Tse-tong, bo~~r~ the son of a rich peasant,
has been a member of the Chinese Communist Party
since it was formed in Z9~1, and has been its
leader since 1935. He is a man of supreme self-
confidence. For years he has shown an ability
to adapt Marxist~JLeninist formulas to suit his
own purpases as well as a certain talent for mak-
ing the right derision at the right time.
This talent may laerhaps be diminishing; at
least, his more r~:c:en~~ initiatives have not been
notably successf~.Yl. The great leap forward, the
commune movement and ?~he challenge to the Soviets
have all prayed singularly inappropriate to China's
needs at this stage of its development.
Mao is w~.deZy read in the literature of Marxism-
Leninism. He wri~~es will, frequently in a breezy
style full of pitl:~y la~;r~,guage which appeals to Chi-
nese. He his been able to attract and hold com-
petent subordina~:es, and has shown an ability to
balance them off, one against the other.
He has been outside China only twice, in 195?
and 195, both times to the Soviet Union. His knowl-
edge and understanding of the outside world are lim-
ited. His grasp of internal Chinese conditions may
be slipping. Humo:~?s have 'been trickling out of
China for the past se~~era,l years that Mao's health
has been declining. ~7hatever the state of his
powers, Mao's speeches and writings have diminished
quite remarkably since about 195?. 1n recent years,
he has spent a good deal of time in various vaca-
tions spots away from the levers of power in Peiping.
Standing just behind Mao in the power structure
are his six colleagues on the Standing Committee of
the Politburo. This inner circle of advisors joins
Mao in developing, formulating and coordinating
China's domestic, foreign and defense policies.
 Considerable figures in their own right, they
are widely experienced in party, state and military
affairs. They are expected to look at issues which
come before them in a comprehensive, overall .way.
They must watch the whole chessboard, not just one
of the pieces. Each of them, however, does appear
to have a broad area of specialization. Liu Shao-
chi and Teng xsiao-ping seem to give the greater
measure of their attention the theoretical and
practical concerns of the party. Chou En-lai's
chief concern is the government and its foreign
relations. Lin Piao concentrates on military af-
fairs. Chu Teh, generally. inactive, sometimes
serves as a spokesman for Mao. Chen Yun spends
most of his time on economic matters, though he
has been out of the public eye for some time now.
These are men with a long history of devotion
to the hierarch, men who have thrived on decades
of the vicious in-fighting which characterizes
the system, men who are tough and ruthless, men
who speak a common language and hold common views.
They are men who have been conditioned by many
years of party work to understand the time for
debate and the limits placed thereon. The effec-
tive operation of the entire structure requires
that the men at this Level be tightly knit. They
must know how and when to submerge differences
and show a common purpose to the other layers
of the party and to the people at large.
The continuity of this group is remarkable
for a system which in other countries and parties
has bred frequent bloody change. Turnover has
been limited. The five men who were on the party
Secretariat in 1945 are still formally in the
inner circle today.
Ranking next to Mao is Liu Shao-chi.: To some,
he appears a classic example of the faithful serv-
ant. They point to his .speeches with their many
sycophantic passages, and speculate that he will
not long outlast Mao. However, Liu does wield
great power in the party organization. Mao has
complete confidence in Liu's abilities and has..
made Liu his heir apparent. The party presents
him as its leading theoretician, next to Mao.
xis 1939 work, How to be a-Good Communist, was
recently're-issued and nade~e subject of a
special party study campaign.
 Liu is a somber and a somewhat colorless indi-
vidual. After he was selected to succeed Sao as
head of government in 1959, an .attempt was made
by the party's propaganda organs to paint a more
engaging public picture of him. The campaign
seems to have died away with doubtful results.
Liu's closest collaborator in party matters
is Teng Hsiaomping, one of the youngest members
of the inner circle. Teng has risen rapidly in
favor and prestige since the mid-fifties. In
recent years he has been the party's chosen spokes-
man on a number of key issues, and in 196U played
a large part in the Moscow.eonference of commun-
ist parties.
A short, bullet-headed. man, Teng is said. to
be hard-driving and aggressive. The party obvi-
ously regards him as a good organizer and sound
administrator. His several strategic positions
in the central apparatus give him. powerful levers
over party matters.
Chou En-lai, the only premier the Chinese
Communist government has ever had, is perhaps
the best known of the Chinese Communists in the
West. Handsome and urbane, Chou for years was
the principal face which the Chinese Communists
turned to the world. He has travelled more than
his colleagues in the inner circle and he may,
as a result, have a more sophisticated view of
the outer world. He is by all accounts a skilled
and resourceful negotiator. He showed at the
Bandung Conference in 1955 and in an early. visit
to India that he is quite expert at building up
an aura of Chinese goodwill.
What should not be lost sight of is that
Chou is also a veteran communist, a high-rank-
ing member of the party for at least four decades.
He was once ranked ahead of Sao and has shown
a remarkable agility in getting along with who-
ever happens to be in power. Chows wife is
the number two woman in the party.
The other active member of the inner circle
is Lin Piao. He is the youngest. A military man
for his entire career, Lin had apparently been
 ailing for a number of years. die leapt back into
prominence following the disgrace of Peng Teh-huai
in 1959. Lin was one of the most successful generals
produced by the Chinese Communists in their fight
against the Chinese Nationalists. His return coin-
cided with a renewed emphasis on the supremacy of
the party over the military.
Standing just outside this inner circle are
the remaining full (voting) members of the Polit-
buro. This-body has considerable importance as
an advisory board, a discussion group and, some-
times, as a voting body. Decisions taken by the
Standing Committee have the full force of a Polit-
buro decision, but Politburo sanction may well be
sought for major policy shifts. A~eaningful voting
in the Politburo is probably restricted to issues
on which Mao and his inner circle have not staked
out a definite position.
The advice of Politburo members is likely to
be sought prior to decision on a matter in which
the individual member is expert. A11 nineteen of
the voting members are men with a record of thirty
to forty years of faithful service to the party.
They represent a variety of backgrounds and are
capable of providing advice in many fields. Here
appear the top specialists in various aspects of
party work: Peng Chen has long been in party
organizational work and has represented the party
at important communist meetings abroad. Tung Pi-wn
is engaged in supervisory work, Tan Chen-lin is
concentrating on agricultural matters, Lo Jung-
huan is a senior figure in party control work in
the armed forces. Chen Xi, Li Fu-shun and Li
Hsien-Wien are the party's top. specialists, re-
spectively, in the government's foreign, economic
planning and financial affairs. Ko Ching-shih and
Li Ching-?chuan are the top leaders in East and
Southwest China and may bring regional points of
view into the Politburo.
No additions to the Politburo have been an-
nounced since 1958. Good bets for election to
the next Politburo are Tao Chu and Sung Jen-ctxiung,
heads of the Central-South and Nart.heast patty bu-
reaus, respectively.
~ :~.
 Since Mao took over in 1955, only three men of
Politburo rank can confidently be said to have been
purged; Chang Kuo-too shortly afterwards, Kao Kang
in 1954 and Peng Teh-huai in 1959. Several have
been demoted, others have died, but seven members of
tae present Politburo were on the 11-man body elected
in 1945.
The presence of a number of party elders in
these key groups should not be misconstrued. .Though
they are relatively inactive, they do serve a definite.
purpose by providing automatic support for Mao on any
matters put before them.
Another key top level body is the Secretariat,
the executive office of the party for day-to-day
operations. It is under the direction of the Stand-
ing Committee and the Politburo, and differs from
these bodies largely in that it is, formally, a
full-time body. Although the counsel of its mem-
bets is probably sought before new policy is finali-
zed, the Secretariat's main task is to monitor the
execution of decisions taken by its parent bodies.
The Secretariat may well be the party's instrument-
ality for directing and coordinating the party's
central departments.
The ranking official on the Secretariat is
Tang Hsiao-ping. His four leading associates are
all Politburo figures--Pang Chen, Li Fu-chun, Li
Hsieh-Wien and Tan Chen-lin. Also included are
Lo Jui-eking, who is Chief of Staff of the armed
forces and a long-time security expert; Kong Shang,
an intelligence man; Lu Ning-yi and Hu Chiao-mu,
propaganda experts; Li Hsieh-fang, industrial
matters; Liu Lan-too, organizational and control
matters within the party; Wang Chia-hsiang, who
was once involved. in liaison with other parties
but has not been active lately; and, Yang Shang-
kun, who holds several top administrative posi-
tions. Lo Jui-thing, Kang Shang and Lu Ning-yi
were added to the .Secretariat by the tenth plenum
of the Central Committee in September 1962.
The Central Committee itself, nominally 97
full and 95 alternate members, has functioned under
Mao as a rubber stamp body, convened to be instructed
 concerning decisions taken by the dominant leaders.
By the time it meets the needs of the top command
for expert advice have been met and the line in
all essentials has been set. It could, as has
happened in the Soviet party, emerge as an important
deliberative body if an issue arose on which the,
leaders were critically divided.
An individual's rank within the Central Com-
mittee is important as his mark of preferment.
The party's central departments provide the
staff to prepare position papers on matters coming
before the policy makers and to oversee, under the
direction of the Standing Committee and the Secre-
tariat, the party's day-to-day operations. The
men who run these departments are in charge of the
party's interests in propaganda, police, rural, in-
dustrial, finance and trade, communications, united
front, and party organization work as well as liai-
son with foreign parties. They make many of the
daily decisions on how party policies. are to be
executed within their areas of competence. They
are in a sense going through the last and highest
training course which the party offers its future
leaders.
The committees (really sub-committees) under
the Central Committee are on the same level as the
departments but differ in that they tend to meet
irregularly as the occasion or the leaders demand.
Like other committees, they probably have permanent
standing bodies. Included are the Committee for
Organs Directly Subordinate to the Central Com-
mittee, the Committee for Central State Organs
and the Women's Work Committee.
Two important commissions, the Control Com-
mission and the Military Affairs Commission, also
come just under the Central Committee on party
organization charts. They are discussed below
The top levels of the party are nicely layered
according to age and party seniority. Virtually
all of the top leaders went through the crucible
of the Long March, a 6,0?0-mile hegira in 1934-196
which transferred the party's base from Kiangsi to
 APPROXIMATE DISTRIBUTION OF PARTY MEMBERSHIP ACCORDING TO OCCUPATION IN 1956
CULTURAL AND
EDUCATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS
~4%)
FINANCIAL
-AND TRADING
ORGANIZATIONS
~5?~~)
COMMUNICATIONS
~2%)
 Shensi Province. The Long Marchers are getting on.
Mao is almost ?O and most of hip koy advisers are
over 60. .The new generation will probably be domi-
nated by another brand of Communist whose forma-
tive years in the party were in the fight against
the Japanese.
After they take over, it is possible that many
of the old Maoist ways will go. The new group will
very likely not have the remarkable measure of cohe-
siveness of Mao's group. Most of the new men, in-
cluding its leading figures, will have made their.
mark in the party apparatus. It is possible, how-
ever, that by the time the new group gets entrenched
officials who have made their mark in economic,
scientific or other specialities will begin to
exert greater influence in high policy making levels.
The Party and the State
In Communist China the party's field of direct
interest and influence extends. into every nook and
cranny of the government and military establish-
ment, of every economic or scientific installation,
of every education institution. "The party must,.,
and can, lead a11--the state organs, the armed
forces, the people's bodies," runs atypical in-
struction to party workers.
Party control is brought to bear by-the as-
signment of trusted party members to positions,
usually of authority, in all non-party orgaiaiza-
tions. Called Pleading members' groups", they
are assigned by an appropriate party committee.
The Central Committee determines the make up of
the Pleading members' groups" in central govern-
ment offices; provincial committees do the same
for the provincial governments, county committees
far the counties. These "leading members' groups"
remain under the direction of their assigning com-
mittees, not under a "leading members' group" in
a superior non-party organization.
The party has a number of full-time workers
who perform no job outside the party, but the
majority work in government offices, in the mili-
Lary, in .economic and cultural establishments,
or in people's organizations. They remain under
strict party discipline. Failure to detect and
 report without delay the slightest shortcoming,
from the party's point of view, would open them
to serious charges.
The pattern of party influence brought to
bear by party members is repeated at the working
level. Every basic level ,installation, be it
factory, mine, collective faxm, or militarq
unit, has its own party organization appointed
by an appropriate party committee. It is the
duty of the party organizations to transmi?
party policy and see to it that the policy is
understood and implemented completely. They
must adapt the policies, as necessary, to local
conditions.
The Structure far Staffing Party Organizations
The Leading Bodies
The 1956 party constitution declares that.
the National Party Congress is the 'thighest lead-
ing body" of the party, It is elected. But the
timing of its election, the number of delegates,
and the manner in which they are elected are con-
trolled by the 'tin'' group. The 'tin's" reserve to
themselves the right to run members of superior
party organizations "who need to be elected" in
local elections. They also can cancel the elec-
tion of anyone they. deem "inadequate." The present
Eighth Congress was elected in 1956 for a term of
five years. It is still in office. Its opening
session was attended by just over 1,??0 delegates.
The party's first congress, in 1921, was attended
by twelve.
A party congress provides a forum for the
airing of party policies, but its most important
task is to elect a Central Committee to act for
it when it is not in session. The importance of
this provision derives from the infrequency with
which National Party Congresses are convened.
The Eighth has met but twice, in 1956 and 1958,
despite provisions in the party constitution,
which it adopted, that it meet once a year. In
fact, during the six and one-half years it has
been in office it has met in session for a grand
total of 32 days.
 The present Central Committee, the eighth,
came to office in 1956, the result of a carefully
contrived electoral process designed by 'the party
center to bring minimal disturbance to the then
existing hierarchical arrangements. It was an
"election with leadership." The top leaders de-
cided on the number of candidates who would stand
for election, named them and arranged the elec-
toral lists in proper order of precedence.
All of this took a lot of arranging, and may
have prompted a leading party figure to warn that
'too many elections are unnecessary and may handi-
cap our work." Tlie party has generally followed
his advice.
Theoretically at least, ultimate authority
for the disposition of important personnel matters
rests in the Central Committee. The 1956 party
constitution spells this nut: the Central Com-
mittee, it states, "takes-charge of and allocates
party cadres," (The term cadre, in Chinese kanpu,
is applied by the Chinese Communists to offici~ al-s
and functionaries in both the party and the govern-
ment and is used in either an individual or a group
sense.) When the Central Committee is not in ple-
nary session, its powers and functions, including
those involving the disposition of cadres, pass to
the Politburo, its Standing Committee and the Secre-
tariat, all elected by the Central Committee The
Eighth Central Committee has met in plenary session
ten times for a total of some ?5 days s'lnce 1956.
In practice, therefore, its authority over.
cadre regulation is delegated to its continuing
bodies. The highest authority in personnel, as
in all other matters, doubtless rests with Sao
Tse-tung. It is likely that Mao s:ti11 takes an
active interest in assignments to key positions,
since any other course could carry grave dangers
for him. A number of lesser personnel actions
may ultimately be referred to him for decision.
There is bound, for example, to be serious competi-
tian among various departments of China's national
security setup for skilled manpower and managerial
talent, which axe among the nation's scarcest re-
sources.
 He is very likely assisted in his delibera-
tions on these matters by his four active assist-
ants on the Standing Committee with Liu Shao-chi.
and Teng Hsiao-ping representing the party's in-
terests, Chou En-tai the government's and Lin Piao
those of the military establishment. Communist
China is not known to have a system, as do the
Soviets, which specifies just which non-party
jobs require the stamp of approval of what party
body. The Chinese system is in general highly
centralized, and the Standing Committee may well
require that it pass on all recommendations for
appointments to key jobs in the .party central
organs, in the government's top bodies, in eco-
nomic, cultural and scientific enterprises of
national security significance, in the armed
forces and in the regions and provinces.. The
Standing Committee doubtless reserves for itself
the right to determine just what constitutes a
"key's assignment requiring its O.K.
In acting on proposals for filling "key"
jobs, Mao and the Standing Committee rely heavily
upon the Secretariat, through which related per-
sonnel records and data are channeled. As the
directing and coordinating agency for the regular
central organizations of the party, the Secretariat
can probably approve on its own appointments to a
range of positions below those on which the Stand-
ing Committee and Mao act. In any case, the princi-
pal figure on the Secretariat, Teng Hsiao-ping, is
also in Mao's inner circle, a circumstance which
doubtless gives him vast authority in the personnel
field. He is, at a minimum, the needle's eye through
which a man must pass on his way to a position of
real authoritye
Teng's assistants on the Secretariat oversee
the work of one or another of the party's central
organs and through them exert considerable influence
on central government offices. These assistants
are very likely responsible for advising Teng and
the Secretariat on those aspects of a candidate's
party standing and qualifications which fall within
the competence of their particular departments.
They can probably act directly on a certain level
of position within their own areas. Most of these
secretaries have had long experience in party organi-?
zationa~. work.
- 13 -
 The Central Departments
Neither the Standing Committee, the Politburo
nor the Secretariat is sufficiently rich in per-
sonnel to discharge in detail the constitutional
charge which devolves an them "to take charge of
and allocate cadrss.'~ The size of this job is
suggested by the fact that in 1956, the last year
for which figures are at hand, there were over
30,000 party cadres at the county committee level
a d higher. The 1963 total is surely higher. So,
again, much of the function is delegated to bodies
which the Central Committee has set up, and staffed,
to be its executive agents in its "diverse businesses."
Among these are the Organization Department, the Con-
trol Commission, the Committee for Party Organs Di-
rectly Subordinate to the Central Committee, and the
Committee for Central State Organs. Other central
departments play lesser roles.
The Organization Department, though no longer
the power it ones was, still plays a strong hand in
the administration of party cadres. Prior to 1954,
it controlled most aspects of party personnel manage-
went. It had responsibility for recruitment, train-
ing, assignment, promotion, transfer of party cadres
as well as the maintenance of party personnel records.,
the collection of party dues and the investigation
of party members'. reliability, In 1954 the party
elders discovered that the then chief of the Organi-
zation Department, Jao Shu-shah, had been attempting
to use the office to unseat them.. He was removed
forthwith, and the Organization Department was shorn
of many of its powers.
A 1959 study, written by the Research Office
of the post-Jao Organization Department for the use
of its cadres, explains the role of the Organization
Department as that of a "deputy and staff chief" to
party committees for cadre administration. The study
is studded with warnings that the Organization Depart-
ment ought not "stick its nose into the proper busi-
ness of others.'' It must, rather, keep to its "own
share" of-the administration of party cadres and
party members.
This share is not inconsiderable. The study
explains that the Organization Department remains
active in the selection., promotion and training of
patty cadres and in ''developing" party members.
 It still handles the records of party personnel. It
probably still has much to do with the placement of
party men in positions which the higher levels, the
Secretariat and the Standing Committee, do not keep
in their own hands.
The present head of the Organization Department
is An Tzu-wen, who was a deputy under Jao but defi-
nitely not his accomplice. An was once sinister of
Personnel of the Central .Government, and played a
large part in the big initial effort to staff the
new government ~1~5?-1~5~).
Some of the functions formerly given the Organi-
zation Department have probably been entrusted to the
Committee for Party Organs Directly Subordinate to
the Central Committee. Little has been said about
this unit, but its name suggests it was conceived
to supervise the party's central organs, keep them
informed on policy matters, and, perhaps, t? assist
in handling their ordinary staffing needs. It is
headed by Yang Shang-kun, who is concurrently Director
of the Central Committee's General Office and an alter-
nate secretary of the Secretariat. Like An Tzu-wen,
Yang is not a party heavyweight. He has seemed, ra-
ther, to be a trustworthy administrative functionary
who sees to the routine office tasks of the Central
Committee, handles correspondence and maintains re-
cords.
Other of the old Organization Department's func-
tions probably went to the Committee for Central State
Organs, which is believed to regulate the work of
party members who have been placed in jobs with the
central government. It is not known how big a-role
this committee plays zn the assignment, promotion
or transfer of party members in the government.
The pattern could possibly be an advisory role for
higher positions, a more assertive xole for lower
ones. The committee is headed by Kung Tzu-Jung,
who is concurrently an alternate member of the Con-
trol Commission, Yang's deputy in the General Office
and a Deputy Secretary General of the State Council.
A principal element of Jao 's power in the old
Organization Department, that of investigating the
loyalty of party members, has passed entirely to the
 Control Commission. The 1945 party constitution
had provided for the establishment of both central
and 1oca1 control commissions, but prior to 1955 they
were never set up. In their stead, a system of
discipline inspection teams was established. They
were empowered to dual with specific breaches of
party discipline only after they had occurred.
The inadequacy of these arrangements was clearly
exposed by the case C-f I~ar,~ Kang and Jao Shu--shin,
two prominent party ~~ig~ares who were expelled from
the party in 1954 fo:~ t~?ying to split the party
and usurp supreme pr~wer. 'The party conference
which expelled the paiz^ also decided to establish
strong control commiasic~ns, at both the. central
and local levels. The new commissions were given
the power to investigate a party member t~efore a
breach of discipline took place. They were cFiarged
with preventing a recurrence of so serious a case
as the "anti-party alliance" of Kao Kang and Jao
Shu-shin. Unlike the earlier discipline inspection
teams, the new commissions were specifically em-
powered by the conference to check up on party
organizations, though discipline was to be meted
out on an individual basis.
Working under the direction of party committees
at the same level, contral commissions take disci-
plinary action against party members and review
sentences meted out by lower levels, They do not
concern themselves with the minor day-to-day de~
relictions still handled by the Organization De-
partment. They are interested in major discipli-
nary problems like anti-Maoist plotting, and are
obviously immensely. important in the party security
setup. Their influence on cadre selection is
likely to be large negative, A-party member
coming under their purview is not a good candi-~
date for further advancement.
The central Control Commission is an elite
group. It is set somewhat apart from other of the
party's central departments and committees in that
its leading personnel are elected. The Commission
was "strengthened}} by the election of additional,
but unnamed, new members at the tenth plenum of
the Central Committee, September 1962. It has a
priority claim on personnel and its staff apparatus
appears to be one of the best developed of any
central party organ. It has been headed since
 its inception by Tung Pi-wu, the only original
founder of the Chinese Communist Party outside
of Mao Tse-tong still active. An aged though
not inconsiderable figure, Tung is ranked seventh
in the Central Committee and is the first Vice
Chairman of the Government. Among Tong's princi-
pal deputies is Liu Lan-tao, who combines a posi-
tion on the commission with being a member of the
powerful Secretariat. Another is a high ranking
officer in the General Political Department of
the-Army, the office charged with the political
indoctrination of .the army. A third was until
1960 Minister of Interior (previously Minister
of Supervision). The three would seem to be the
principal figures in overseeing the conduct of
members working respectively, in the party, the
military establishment and the government.
?ther central organs which play a role in
personnel management include-the Propaganda De-
partment, which handles the education and indoc-
trination of party members. This is. an immense
job on which the Chinese party lavishes time,
money and effort. The Propaganda Department is
headed by Lu Ting-yi, who is also a member of
the Secretariat. The Social Affairs Department
plays a shadowy and unexplained role in the
never-ending job of policing the party. Li Ko-
nung was the head of this organ until his death
in 1961. It may have declined in importance
since his death.
The Women's Work Committee keeps an eye on
the interests of female party members. Roughly
10 percent of party members are women, although
the percentage drops sharply as you move up in
the hierarchy. There are, for example, only
four women on the Central Committee. The ranking
female comrade, Tsai Chang (Mrs. Li Fu-Chun), is
also head of the Women's Work Committee. The
committee works to overcome 'discrimination" a-
gainst women cadres and see that they get the
same opportunities for advancement as male cadres.
"Some organizations," Tsai Chang once complained,
"tend to promote more men than women even when
choosing between persons of equal competence."
The United Front Department takes charge of the-
party's relations with cooperating organizations
and nationalities groups. It probably has some.
 say in the selection of individuals from such
organizations for various posts.
Regional, Provincial and County Posts
The constitution permits tie Central Com-
mittee of the party, as it deems necessary, to
establish bureaus covering several provinces.
Such regional bureaus existed betwsen 1949 and
1954. They were abolished after the Kao-Jao
incident and were not revived until January 1961,
when the need for a more aaordinated regional at-
tack on some of the party's problems impressed it-
self upon the leaders. The parallel government
and military bodies which existed in the 1949-1954
period have not reappeared, at least publicly. To-
day there are six regional bureaus of the Central
Committee--the Northeast., North, East, Central-
South, Southwest, and Northwest. Peiping has been
uncommonly sparing of detail concerning their re-
sponsibilities and make-up. The-post-1961 versions
appear to range across roughly the same spectrum
of interests as party.. committees at other levels.
Each of them apparently has the authority to create
such subordinate organizations as it feels are
needed. Their staffing patterns seem still to be
in the developmental stage, though many of them
have begun to staff the usual run of subordinate
departments for propaganda, rural work, finance
and the like. No regional organization departments
or control commissions have yet been identified.
The leading personnel of the regional bureaus
are selected directly by the party center. The in-
dividuals named are probably then allowed to fill
out their own staffs. The present regional bosses
are senior party officials, drawn some from Peiping
and some from the provinces. The Northeast Bureau
is headed by Sung Jen-chiung, who was in charge of
an important central government ministry. The East
China and Southwest Bureaus, on the other hand, are
headed by individuals drawn from the Shanghai munci--
pal and Szechwan provincial party apparatus, respec-
tively. Both are Politburo members.
These bureaus probably do have certain personnel
powers and. functions. They assist the party center
in assessing job performance of provincial leaders.
Since responsibilities at the regions are broader
- lg -
x~!
 than in flee provinces, the regia~nal posts may be a
proving grounds for higher posts witki the party
center.
The staffing pattern at the provincial level
is a virtual carbon copy of that in Peiping. Auto-
nomous regions and cities directly under central.
authority (.like Shanghai) are treated as provinces.
A provincial congress is elected, and elects in
turn a provincial committee to act for the congress
when it is not in session. The provincial committee
elects a standing committee to act in its stead
when it is not in session as well as a secretariat
to handle its "daily work."
These provincial posts are ir~~portant--10 of the
21 Chinese provinces have populations of between 20
and 60 million--and the party center takes no chances..
It wrote into the constitution that the Number of
members of a provincial committee will be set by the
Central Committee and that the members of a provin-
cial standing committee and secretariat must be
approved by the Central Committee.. So must party
committee members in key industrial cities and cities
with a population of over 500,000 (of which China
has some 35).
Like its counterpart in Peiping, the provincial
committee has the constitutional authority ''to take
charge of and allocate party cadres", but the Cen-
tral Committee establishes the controlling regu~.a-
tions. In practice, effective provincial responsi-
bility over cadres is most likely exercised by the
standing committee (for the higher provincial jobs)
and by the provincial departments (for lesser posts),
Provincial Committees are empowered to set up
their own departments. Most of them have an organi-
zation department, the duties of which are determined
by the provincial committees. Provincial organiza-
tion departments are involved, when .local conditions
and their instructions permit, in the assignment and
promotion of cadres coming under provincial control.
Provincial departments are under the authority of the
pravincial party committee, not under the corresponding
department at the party center. The latter has_o_raly
what Peiping terms a "guidance relationship" with
its provincial counterparts.
 CCP MEMBERSHIP (1921 - 1961)
CLASS BACKGROUND
(Selected Years)
Other
Intellectuals
Industrial workers
12,700,000
300,000 40,000
1921
1933
1937
1940
1945
Founded
Pre-Long
March
Post-Long
March
 The staffing of party organi;~ations at the county.
level is similar to the pattern cat the more exalted
levels .
Party Personnel Administration
The. party constitution says that membership in
the party is open to any Chinese, age l~ and over,
who works and does not exploit the labor of others.
The entrance process can be initiated by the individ-
ual or by the party, He must be sponsored by two
full members. In either case, the individual in-
volved must fill out a detailed application. The
most important entries involve his family and
personal background, communist works he has been
influenced by, a personal evaluation of his good
and bad points, and a statement as to why he wishes
to join the party. He must be approved by a general
membership meeting of a party branch. After being
accepted by the branch meeting, the application is
forwarded to the next higher committee for review.
This committee assigns a functionary to examine
carefully the candidate's anplicatior~ form and
to interview liim in detail.-
After approval by the committee, the appli-
cant becomes a probationary member of the party.
He stays in this status for one year, during which
he is subjected to an "elementary party education"
and to the close observation of the party branch,
When the test year is over, his. case again comes
before the branch meeting. His party age is com-
puted from the day he is accepted by the branch
as a full member, though he must still go through
the formality of being approved by the next higher
committee. At any point in this process a strong
objection by any one involved can kill the appli-
cant's chances.
Admission into the Chinese Communist Party is
achieved more easily ~;n the periods when the party
runs drives to add new members; for example, there
was a big upswing in admissions durin~? the commune
and "leap forward" movements in 1953-1959, These.
are followed by periods of consolidation when
.entrance requirements are more strenuously applied.
 Since 1956 there no longer have been different
procedures prescribed for applicants of different
class backgrounds. But it is, nevertheless, rela-
tively easy for a Chinese with a "clean" class
background--parents who were workers or peasants--
to get into the party. Such an individual would be
more likely be asked to apply, and he might even
find his probationary period shortenedo 0n the
other hand,, it is not unknown for an applicant
with an "unclean" background to be met with delay-
ing tactics which might last several years. In-
deed a bad background-~a~ parent who was in the
Kuomintang, for example--could in practice preclude
admission.
Members in good standing of the Youth League,
a sort of junior party organization, are accepted
almost automatically.- Another rich source of
party material is in the ranks of the non-party
"activist.' This is one of the very best ways for
an outsider to come to the favorable notice of
a local party boss. An "activist" serves the
party by leading the less active masses at study
meetings and during production drives,
The qualities which the party wants in its
members include an u~-questioning zeal, a strong
measure of asceticatsm, and a dash, no mor?, of
individuality. The-party wants a man who .will
place the interests of the party above his own,
a man with no aims or ambitions, indeed no life,
outside the party. He must demonstrate instan-
taneous abedienee to party discipline. It is
his "h0ly,dutyt' to carry out party policy without
reservation even if he disagrees with it, though
at the same time he is eApeeted to~be skilled in
adapting the policy to local peculiarities. He
must in all things be an exemplar to the masses,
while sharing their 'gobs and sorrows, their hard
and frugal life.'t He should display leadership
potential.`
Of course not all Chinese Communist Party
members measure up to these high-flown standards.
What_the party gets in practice is considerably
more limited, especially at the basic levels.
Here the party is apt to settle for obedience and
political reliabilitg.
 Appraisal and Promotion
The basic party organisation, the branch,
makes periodic appraisals of each of its members.
The appraisal process begins with the individual's
own analysis of himself. This is then discussed
by his branch colleagues who have been observing
him and forming views as to his suitability. The
"self-criticisms and .criticisms" thus collected
are supplemented by regular personal. interviews
between the individual member and one of his party
betters. Another higher official may collate and
sum up all of this material. Branch appraisals
are supposed to take into account the member's per-
sonal history and work. record, his merits and de-
merits, his capabilities and limitations. They
become a part of a member's permanent party re-
cord.
Over a period of time these appraisals enable
the party apparatus to make judgments of a member's
particular worth and identify those who are ready
to be moved to positions of higher responsibility.
Although there have been hints that a sort of rough
grading system does exist within the party, it is
not apparently as firm and well-developed a system
as exists in the Chinese government and military.
An individual's rank in the party seems largely to
be determined by the level of the apparatus at
which he works and his duties at that level. There
are references, for example, to party secretaries
at the county level which suggest that the party
regards this as equivalent to a grade designation.
According to party instructions, the selection
of cadres for promotion and transfer should proceed
on the basis of a systematic plan and on a "unified''
--that is, controlled by the higher levels--basis.
The entire history and work of the member being con-
sidered for reassignment is to be taken into account.
His party record, likely to be a voluminous file
for any but the. newest recruit, will be studied,
and the opinions of his superiors, his equals and
his subordinates sought. He may be brought in for
a personal interview by a ranking member of the
office for which he is being considered. Even if
he is not selected, the party argues that this sort
of screening is good. The individual gains a better
understanding of his strengths and weaknesses, while
- ~~ -
 the party is enabled to place hi.r:~ in his proper
spot.
''i?~ our fundamental evaluations of a member's
work,! Mao has said,"we must establish whether his
achievements amount to 30 percent and his mistakes.
to 70 percent, or vice versa, If his achievements
amount to 70 percent, then his work should in the
main be approved.?? P~Iost of the criteria advocated
by the party to guide the selection process axe,
however, highly subjective (e.g., a high degree of
communist conciousness) and leave the selectors with-
out much meaningful guidance. Hence, much to the
party's professed anngnance:,~ great emphasis i.s put
in practice on seniority anti personal relationships.
~`, former party member has recalled that the prime
requirement for most any post was to have served a
certain length of time in~.the party. The more re-
sponsible the post, the longer the period. Others
have testified that the prejudices of the higher
cadres constituted a most important factor.
Party writings make it very clear that the
leaders want advancement. based an Dther criteria.
Guidelines from the ?rganization Department to
party workers involved in the assignment and promo-
tion process stipulate that they should resolutely
avoid the practice of assigning and promoting solely
on the basis of seniority, Teng Hsiao-pizxg has called
this reliance the most serious defect in the party's
cadre policy.
The party says it wants advancement to be based
both on the member's i4virtue,'f meaning his ideologi-
cal reliability., and ''ability,'t me~x-zxnrg ,his tech--:-
nical qualifications. As the party's role has
broadened over the years, and especially since it
took over the Chinese mainland,. the emphasis put
on the second part of the equation lzas increased.
t'l recent party work, for example, declared that pre-
ferment in the Party will increasingly depend on
how well the member improves his technical skill.-
Fut the party has not, and probably never wi11, per-
mit the latter to outweigh the former.
Party education
Great emphasis :3,s placed by the ~pa~ty leaders
on their "education" programs. Indeed, a cadre's
attitude toward and aptitude for study will be duly
~3 ~'
 entered on his appraisal forms. '~To be lazy about
study shows a defective sense of responsibility
toward the party,*' runs a party injunction, which
adds that all cadres, old and new, in leading posi-
tions or on the lower levels, must study.
Indeed, the need is deep. The Chinese party
is the largest in the world. The general educational
level of its members~.is low. At its. lower levels,.
literacy is limited. And the problem is c?mplicated
by the fact that members with compaxatively good edu-
cational backgrounds are not truscted as fully as the
"good-hearted" elements with a sound class background
but a poor education.
Cadre training programs are basically of two
kinds, ideological and technical. The aim is to
educate the loyal and convert the educated. The
ideological part is the better developed. It is
constant, pervasive, repetitious, in all party
organs, in schools, in offices, in the armed
forces. Wherever a party man goes, no matter
how "virtuous" he may be, he will be assigned to
a study group. He will be required to attend its
regular study meetings, which may average two a
week, to discuss approvingly the latest twists
and turns of the party line.
These meetings are, from time to time as the
party center directs, supplemented by special study.
sessions of several weeks' duration. One such series
was conducted in the oarly part. of 1962 on-the duties
and rights of party members. Members are, of course,
believers when they .join and these never-ending doses
of indoctrination are intended to prevent backslid-
ing.
The first training offered a party member out-
side the scope of his own study group is very likely
to be at a short course run by one of the basic level
organs. Members are rotated thru such schools for
one, two or three months of instruction in the basic
tenets of communism. He probably will attend such
courses a number of times during his service at
lower levels. Lecturers may be leading cadres of
the unit giving the course, or they may be individ-
uals whose only duty is to pr?vide this instruction.
 At the county level, these courses are apt La-
be given at a regular institution maintained by the
county committee. Mere leading cadres of the county
party organization receive refresher courses and
cadres earmarked for such positions receive a more
sophisticated version of the instruction at lower
levels. For the party is convinced that, the higher
a cadre rises, the broader his understanding of com-
munism needs be.
So his ideologidal education goes on, conceiv-
ably right up to his being .selected, if his future
.placement requires it, for a course of study at one
of the institutions run by the party's Central Com-
mittee, the Higher Party School or the Central Re-
search institute. These train high theoretical
cadres or give them an opportunity for research in
the field. They may-also give more generalized
courses for cadres destined for service in key posts
with departments of the Central Committee.-
The .Central Committee's Propaganda Department
plays a big role in all of this ideological train-
ing. It prov?_des the study materials, from basic
texts by Marx, Engels, Lenin, to collections of
Mao's works and the rel~~~rant party documents. Tt
is in direct control of the key party publications,
the newspaper People's Daily and the magazine Red
Flag. It may help by providing guidance on party
scfooling to the lower levels.
However pressing the need for all of this ide-
ological training, the party. also recognizes that
party members must be given the opportunity to at-
tain a measure of expertness. in the work to which
they are assigned. In order fully to deserve the
trust placed in them, the party says, members must
have more than a talent to "chatter away on politi-
cal subjects." If a cadre is assigned to work with
the peasants, he is expected to study farm tech-
nique; if sent to an economic installation, he is
expected to learn something of its processes; if
sent to oversee scientific research, he is expected
to sop up some scientific knowledge,.
In order to do this, he may be entered in a
regular educational institution such as a middle
school, university, or a technical, trade or voca-
tional institute, either as a full or part time
 student. One of the wide variety of short courses,
offering highly specialized and concentrated instruc-
tion in a narrow circulum, may be the party's choice
far him. He may be left to learn as much as he can
on the job by picking the brains of the experts work-
ing there. He may merely be strongly urged to attend
spare-time classes ar devote himself to off-duty study.
Opportunities for technical training in today's China
are limited, but whatever is available is at the party's
beck and call.
As an individual moves up in the party, he is
expected to~broaden out, He will be assigned dif-
ferent duties, in accordance with the party needs,
and will probably receive re hated training? And he
may in time become one of the party's cherished"ver-
satile hands;':' a trusted party man with a variety of
posts in his background who is ready .for bigger things.
Party Incentives
The primary attraction of party membership is
probably the fact that the party runs things. This
cannot escape the notice of anyone in China. Party
membership opens doors to positions in government.,
in the military, in universities, in fact every-
where. The highest, or at least the most powerful,
positions are invariably occupied by party figures.
A young Chinese who wishes to get ahead will doubt-
less regard party membership as the indispensible
key and work for the-day of his admission. The
party leadership regards this as a base motive for
joining.
Promotion is probably-the main material in-
centive offered the. party men. There are undeniable
perquisites that go with party office. The higher
the office, the greater the perquisites. ~'Jhile direct
wages are pegged to equivalent non-party levels, ad-
vantages in housing, medical care, and recreational
facilities accrue to party officials. They are also
apt to get a break on scarce items like meat, sugar,
vegetable oil, cloth and cigarettes It would be
risky business for a restaurant to fail to pay spe-
cial attention to a party boss.
But the road to the perquisites of this type
is a long and arduous one. On the way up, he will
have to be sustained largely by less :taaterial in-
centives, like the comfort of being one of an ac-
knowledged elite which Maas a mission of doing some-
thing about building China. Beyond this psychologica l
_ 26
3.3
 balm, there is the practical authority which his
membership confers on Iiim. 'I~here is always some
individual, same group, fnr tlxe party man to "lead.''
If considerations of personal advantage over
the long pull are not sufficient to keep .the party
man. bent to the party's will, there is tl~e constant
threat of prolonged sessions of criticism and self-
criticism. These ~reducational" sessions can be
long and unbelievably tedious. It is, according
to many who have gone tY-gru such sessions, most diffi-
cult to withstand these partly mental, partly physical,.
onslaughts.. If an individual does resist, the party
can move on to disciplinary action. Punishments are:
1) warning, 2} serious warning, 3) removal from party
posts, 4) retention for observation within the party,
and 5) expulsion from .the party.
There is also the possibility of being sent down
to a production unit, usually a farm, for a period of
labor reform. In fact, the party regards this as such
a good scheme that a cadre, even a leading cadre, can
find himself assigned to one of these periods of "pro-
letarianization" without his having done a thing wrong.
Other threats, of course, Bang over the party
member. IIe can be turned over to the state super-
visory apparatus, which can, if the offense is
serious enough, mete out more extreme forms of pun-
ishment.
The dangers of running afoul of the control
apparatus are particularly great when the party
center is running one of its periodic campaign to
T~rectify~~ party members. Then they can conceivably
be charged with any one of a variety of vague, ill-
defined sins. They must beware and re-double their
efforts to satisfy their party betters. The utility
of this sort of negative incentive should not be
underestimated.
27 _
34/
 PERSONNEL RESPONSIBILITIES OF KEY GOVERNMENT OFFICES IN CHINA
OFFICES FUNCTION
CHAIRMAN Controls 60-odd top level
.................................................
PREMIER government appointments
STATE COUNCIL .........................................................Controls 2,000-odd second echelon
executive postilions
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR ................................................. Administers State welfare programs,
I veterans affairs, civiliar. labor for public
?. .works.
PERSONNEL BUREAU ............................................. .Implements welfare and wage policies,
processes and manages personnel actions
and records
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL ................................. Plans development and training
COMMISSION programs in scientific and
' technical fields
SPECIALISTS WORK BUREAU ........................................... Controls Assignment of scientists and
other highly-trained technicians`
STATE PLANNING COMM. Determines job priorities
STATE ECONOMIC COMM. among govt. agencies
BUREAU FOR THE ADMIN . ............................................. Administers Security and living
OF GOVT. OFFICES occomodations of high officials
FOREIGN EXPERTS BUREAU ............................................. Contracts for and assigns
foreign technicians
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION ............................................. Determines first job assignments
of college graduates
 III. STAFFING THE GOVERNMENT
The Chinese Communists conceive of the Govern-
ment of the People's Republic of China as the execu-
tive instrumentality for carrying ?ut policies de-
cided by the party. The task they give the govern-
ment is to help formulate and then execute plans
for the implementation of the party's general line.
This is a huge job since the government has to regu-
late not only such normal. national security functions
as defense, diplomacy and peace and order, but also
a wide range of activities taken over by the commun-
ists, from industrial production to domestic and
foreign trade, sports and even radio broadcasting..
As a result, China's bureaucratic apparatus, is
immense.
The party organization remains separate and
distinct from that of the government. The party
as an organization stays clear of actual govern-
mental administration. Party members are, however,
spotted
all
through the government, from top to
bottom.
It
is through their efforts that, in the
words of
a
veteran communist, "the administrative
agencies
of
the government are made to accept
policies
of
the party and turn them into policies
of the government,"
Staffing Requirements for Senior Posts
The nominal number-one job in the government,
the Chairman of the Republic, is largely a procedural
and ceremonial post. The Chairman is the formal
chief of state. He has no direct control, by virtue
of his government position, over the State Council
or the ministries, which together handle the real
administrative chores of the governments However,
in Communist China, the chief of state has in fact
been a figure of commanding importance by virtue of
his party position. ,The first Chairman of the Re-
public, Mao Tse-tung, resigned in 1959 and was suc-
ceeded by Liu Shao-chi.
The chief executive is the premier, the princi-
pal officer of the State Council. The post is held
by Chou En-lai. The State Council includes 16 vice
premiers (one of whom, Peng Teh-huai, is in disfavor
and inactive}, and some 34 ministers and heads of
commissions plus a secretary general. This group-has
 such authority as is given-the government to make
high-level decisions necessary for carrying out
national security policies. The premier and 12
of the 16 vice premiers are members of the Polit-
buro; the other four are high ranking Central Com-
mittee members,
Broad functional control under the State Coun-
cil is exercised by its six staff offices. These
operate as more or less permanent coordinating com-
mittees, with a varying number of related ministries
under their purview. They are the governnment coun-
terparts of the party's central .departments. Be-
sides these staff offices, the State Council's
Secretariat and the premier's office provide general
coordinative functions. The 3ecretara,at serves as
the official, link.-.between the council and provin-
cial and local administrations. The premier's of-
fice contains his personal staff performing such
functions as he directs.
What does the party center look for iri the
men it assigns to jobs on the State Council? Mao
Tse-tong and his confederates are doubtless look-
ing for individuals who; 1) have a long and spot-
less party history; 2) have a demonstrated aa~n-
petenee in the administration of complex problems
and large numbers of people; and 3) have some ac-
quaintance and experience-with the specific affairs
of the office.
The degree to which the first qualification
predominates is illustrated by the fact that ?5
percent of the State Council membership is made up
of party men. These are, for the most part, mem-
bers of the party's Central Committee and are thus,
in the party's judgment, its best career officers
and administrators. Membership on the Central Com-
mittee identifies a man who has spent virtually all
his adult life in the management of increasingly im-
portant affairs. Since 1949 this experience has,
for. some of the them, included nationwide responsibili-
ties in certain fields.
Non-communists have been appointed to head
ministries in the central government, but never to
those involving national security functions. Non-
communists head ministries which handle things like
water conservancy and postal services. Even. then,
~l
 the non-communist minister .will inevitably have a
first vice minister who is a reliable party man and
acts as a minister in everything but name. Some
ministries, such as the ministries of foreign af-
fairs,, public security, and defense do not use non-
party members in any but the most menial positions.
Party members predominate even at the second
level. Over 80 percent of the 300 vice ministers
and vice chairman of commissions are party men.
Party membership for the bureaucracy as a whole is
more difficult to determine. An Tzu-wen reported
that in 1956 one-third of the total number of cadres
working at the county. level or above were e~.ther
party or youth league members. It may be that the
proportion of party to non-party cadres cited by
An could apply to the bureaucracy as a whole: the
same proportion has been. noted in the USSR.
It might be noted that party membership accounts
for only 4 percent of the general population of over
15 years of age. The concentration of party members
grows steadily heavier as you move up in the govern-
mental machinery until it reaches 100 percent at
the level of the vice premier and above.
Structure for Staffing Government Offices
The 1954 constitution of the Chinese People's
Republic declares that the National People's Congress
is the "highest organ of state power." Its .more
than 1200 deputies are elected. Sessions of the
congress have been short, less frequent than called
for in the constitution, and confined to rubber-
stamping actions taken elsewhere. The congress
elects the Chairman of the People's. Republic of
China as well as a Standing Committee to be its
"permanent working organ" when it is not in session.
The present Standing Committee has some 00 members.
The chairman formally appoints the premier,
subject to the approval of the National People's
Congress. He appoints,. on the recommendation of
the premier, the other members of the State-Couneil
--the vice premiers, ministers, heads of commissions
and the secretary general. After the premier's
nominati,+ans have been ''decided*? by a congress (or
its Standing Committee), they are formally appointed
~3 ~'
 to their jobs by the chairman. The provisions for
congressional approval are no more than window-
dressing for decisions made at the party center.
The chairman appoints in addition a number of
other ranking officials in national security .jobs,
such as the Chief of the General. Staff, the directors
of the main departments in the Ministry of National
Defense, the president and vice presidents of the
Academy of Sciences. While 'the standing committee
is empowered to appoint and remove ambassadors and
heads of mission abroad, the chairman dispatches and
recalls these plenipotentiary representatives. Al-
though these appointments are the responsibility of
the chairman, they are likely made upon the recom-
mendation of the premier. The total number of top
posts requiring the nomination and appointment of
the chairman and premier probably numbers less than
100, roughly half of which are jobs controlling
national security programs.
Selection of the second echelon of government
executives is legally the prerogative of the State
Council. This second echelon .includes the directors.
of the important staff officies of the State Council,
the heads of specialized agencies of the State Coun-
cil, the deputy ministers and assistant ministers,
the commission vice chairman and members, as-well
as all chiefs and ,deputies of the divisions, bureaus,
and offices which make up the ministries. In the
military field, the appointing responsibility of
the Council extends to commanders and political
commissars at the division level (more than 300
positions). In the foreign field it includes em-
bassy counselors and consul. generals. The. State
Council appoints all key personnel in the important
financial, commercial, or industrial enterprises
administered by the 25 economic ministries. Im-
portant administrative posts in the field of higher
education are also controlled by the State Council.
Altogether the State Council probably controls a
minimum of 2,000 executive jobs in the government.
All o~ them require rei'erence to the party before
being finalized.
In addition to specific responsibilities for
appointing administrative personnel, the State Council.
~~
 is ultimately responsible for the government's
staffing policies. The State Council, for exam-
ple, as apart of each long term and annual plan
makes an allocation of manpower resources accord-
ing to nationally determined priorities and, in
effect, programs the development of new skills
needed in China's industrialization.
The Secretary General and Secretariat of the
State Council are key positions in the exercise
of these council responsibilities. The Secretary
General is Hsi Chung-hsun, a high-ranking Central
Committee member and a vice premier. Prior to
moving to Peiping, he had been an important figure
in party affairs in Northwest China. He is assisted
by ten deputies who are all party personalities.
More than half of them have concurrent responsi-
bilities in the party personnel machine. One of
them, Kung Tzu-Jung, holds the following positions
in the central departments of the party; head of
the Committee for Central State Organs, member of
the Control Commission, and deputy director of the
Party Secretariat's Staff Office. Five of the
deputies hold concurrent responsibilities in im-
portant State Council personnel offices.
The Secretariat has a special Personnel Divi-
sion which appears to be responsible for enforcing
personnel procedures, processing personnel actions,
and maintaining personnel files on the employees
working directly for the State Council. In addi-
tion, Premier Chou's own office assists him in
making personnel and policy decisions.
Government personnel administration on lower
levels is highly fragmented. The Ministry of Per-
sonnel, organized in 1950 shortly after the govern-
ment was first established, had comparatively broad
responsibilities for government personnel selection
and assignment at a time when the .new regime was
busy filling its offices. It was closely tied with
the party's Organization Department. Like the Organi-.
nation Department, the ministry has been downgraded.
In 1954 it was reduced to a specialized agency of
the State Council; and in 1959 it was placed under
the Ministry of Interal Affairs. During the period,
other, more specialized organizations were created by
the State Council to handle aspects of personnel work,
such as training, job allocation, or various special-
ized groups of personnel, such as scientists and tech-
nicians.
 Today, the General Pers?nnel Bureau of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs performs the follow-
ing functions for the government bureaucracy as
a whole:
1. It implements the wage and welfare poli-
ci?s of the State Council and performs
other personnel work assigned it by the
council.
2. It drafts personnel regulations and super-
vises the establishments of tables of organi-
nation for offices of central government.
3. It processes personnel actions, including
transfers, appointments and removals of
personnel in government offices down to the
county level.
4. It maintains personnel records.
5, It processes the transfer end job place-
ment of demobilized military personnel.
6. It maintains liaison with :and evaluates
the work of personnel offices throughout
the central government and in loeal govern-
ments at the provincial, autonomous region,
and special municipality level,
The subordination of the Personnel Bureau to
the Ministry of .Internal Affairs in 1959 served to
correlate the Bureau's general responsibility for
control of the bureaucracy with the Ministry's re-
sponsibilities for veterans affairs, the mass mobili-
zation of civilian labor crews for public works pro-
jects, and the administration of state welfare and
relief programs.. At the time of the merger, the
Director of the Personnel Bureau, Chang Yi-pai, was
made a Vice Minister of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs. Chang has been associated with high level
personnel work since government was set up.
Specialized Personae l
In 1956 the administration of government per-
sonnel was compartmentalized in an apparent effort
to improve upon the use of highly educated and
trained Chinese--especially in high priority pro-
grams. The administration of two binds of personnel
`l /
 EMPLOYMENT OF "SPECIALISTS" IN CHINA
IN 1955
Number Employed % With College. Degrees
Total 2,700,000
Teachers 1,630,000 8
A . Prof . and Lecturers 18,000 96
at Higher Ed. Inst..
II Engineering and Technical Personnel 600,000 15
A. Management Personnel 15,000 6
13. Engineers 32,000
III Medical Personnel 370,000 8
A. Chinese or Western Trained Doctors 50,000 49
IV Scientific and Research Personnel 11,000 69
A. "Researchers" or assistants 654 98
V Cultural and Artistic Personnel 88,000 10
 with critical shills--?'specialists" and visiting bloc
technicians--was divorced from the general admini-
strative system in 1956 and turned over to inde-
pendent agencies of the State Council, the Special-
ists Work Bureau and the Foreign Experts Bureau.
The Specia~.ists we~rk B~~re~au is today part of
the Scientific and Techna~logi~~?a~. Commission. It
is responsible for the assignment, promotion and
transfer of ''specialistset--defined by the Chinese
Communists as scientific workers, engineers, educa-
tors, doctors, and health technicians, as well as
important cultural and artistic workers. The bureau
may concern itself directly only with persons who
have actual work experience. The bureau may also
have been charged with carrying out a 1956 plan to
register all scientific and technological personnel,
and with keeping it up to date.
Advisory functions of the bureau include:
1. To investigate unemployed t'advanced in-
tellectuals" and place-them in the state
apparatus.
2. To investigate the assignment and working
conditions of specialists and make recom-
mendations to the State Council .for improve-
ment,
3. To investigate the implementation of poli-
Gies and laws governing-the use of special-
ists, and attempt to solve their. problems.
and promote their fullest use.
4. To work out plans with government depart-
ments for the employment of students and
specialists returning to China from non-
communist counties.
The second bureau established in 1956 by the.
State Council to handle special personnel require-
ments, the Foreign Experts Bureau, was designed speci-
fically to take-care of bloc experts. Prior to 1960
such personnel numbered in the thousands. The Soviet
specialists left China over two years ago, but a few
hundred satellite technicians have remained. The
bureau still functions. It inv?stigates the techni-
cal and scientific specialization of foreign countries
~~
 (both communist and non-communists) in the light of
China's needs. It retains responsibility for en-
gaging foreign specialists, arranging their assign-
ment in China, providing living accommodations, and,
writing letters of commendation at the termination
of their service.
AnotYzer unit at the State Council level with
important responsibilities for personnel administra-
tion is the Bureau for the Administration of Govern-
ment Offices. This agency provides living accomo-
dations and security for top level government cadres,
which probably includes the 50 officials of the State
Council and may well include other important. personnel
in the ministries, c?mmissions, and special agencies.
Each ministry and commission has limited repon-
sibilitity fox locating, training, assigning, and pro-
moting its rank and file. The ministries carry out
this responsibility through personnel bureaus, the
directors of which, like every important administra-
tive office in a ministry, are appointed by the State
Council.
Tlh~e duties of a ministerial personnel bureau
include the processing of personnel actions, main-
taining personnel records, arranginv leave and
changes of assignment. They provide general ser-
vices such as briefing newly assigned people and
arranging for their housing, clothing, and travel..
In one of the most important national security
ministries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, virtu-
ally all executive positions in Peiping (at Least
100 and perhaps as many as 200 people) as we11 as
~.^esponsible officials in the foreign service (an
additional 200 positions at a minimum) are admin-
istered by the State Council.
The ministry's personnel unit controls appoint-
ments and assignments to middle- and junior-level
posts as well as service positions, The ministry's
general services departmEnt, rather than its per-
sonnel unit negotiates with other government agencies
for people trained iza security work and assigns and
transfers- the more than 200 people working as Cour-
iers, code clerks, and physical security officers
according to needs as fixed. by the ministry.
 Government Personnel Administration
Recruitment and Assignment
Although the staffing objectives and machinery
of the US and Communist China contain many similari-
ties, placement procedures differ significantly.
In a democratic system, the government must com-
pete with other employers for an individual's ser-
vices, and personal preferences play a large part..
in placement. In Communist China professional,
semi-professional, and vocational school graduates
are given little alternative but to accept service
in a job assigned by the state.
Professionals entering the labor force from
higher educational institutions are assigned posi-
tions by the institutions on the basis of rosters
prepared by the ministry which administers the
institutions:. The Ministry of Education adminis-
ters general liberal arts schools, and the Ministry
of National Defense and economic ministries run
technical and scientific institutes.
Students earmarked for jobs. in national secu-
rity organs generally have had their course of study
sponsored by a specific organization. Or they may
have been hand picked before graduation for a spe-
cial assignment. For those not so chosen normal
placement procedure begins with the posting of a
roster of positions which the institution is re-
sponsible for filling on its bulletin board. Each
student is permitted to indicate three choices.
The institution in theory considers the student's
choice. In practice, however, the institution is
guided primarily by other considerations, such as
the state's needs, the student's class background
and his scholastic rating.
Although acceptance of state assignments is
virtually mandatory, there is little need for com-
pulsion. By the time a student graduates from an
institute of higher education in Communist China,
he has undergone a long process of~mental preparation
to put duty above personal considerations. He will
probably be either ambitious or sincere enough to
make personal sacrifices in the interest of further-
ing his career.. Even if he lacks such motivations,
 a student has no ready alternati~ye, The following.
account of a student?s attempt to refuse an assign-
ment was written by an intellectual who fled China.
"There was an actual case of
a medical student who .after gradu-
ation did not go to the frontier
area assigned to him but went home
instead to help his father keep
shop. He was free to go home, of
course: 'no one could force him
to do anything in a socialist coun-
try'.... He enjoyed several weeks
of leisure with his family which
he could financially well afford,
but one day two classmates came to
see him and, after tea and remarks
on the weather, they explained that
they thought he .should 'follow the
leadership' and go to his assigned.
work. "In socialist societi~s,~:
they told him, 'no one skioulcl call
his shill his own, because without
the society a man could not be what
he was. The Government spent so
much money on the school we studied
in. Therefore,..,' The next day
two other classmates came to persuade
him; "In socialist societtes no one
can call his skill his own...'; the
third day three others came; "In
socialist countries no one can call
his skill his own,..'; the fourth
day one of the two who came the
first day came: 'The government
spent so much on the school we
studied in ....' In any society
there are some people with excep-
tional temperaments, and the Com-
munists take care of them. This
medical student persisted in shak-
ing his head; and his classmates
persisted in coming, Every after-
noon he was subjected to a lecture
which went on for hours: "In so-
cialist societies no one can call
his skill his own....' At the end
of two months he came to think that
this. was worse than any frontier
region could be, and promised to
repoi?t to the Committee of Party
Members in the school.''
 Refusal to accept a job assigned by the state
amounts to professional sui~i~e, particularly for
a young; student ,just starting out. It results in
automatic .isolation from an employment system which
controls all significant job opportunities in the.
entire country. Although an individual may eventu-
ally find some kind oaf empAoym~nt, he has in effect
placed himself ~a.nd~r governmental "supervision",
which itself can be a serious matter. His original
refusal to accept a state assignment has become a
permanent part of his personnel record. -Even if
he relents, as the reluctant medical student did,
his future assignments, salary, and promotional
opportunities have been irreparably blighted.
Offices directly involved in national security
have the highest priority in personnel recruitment.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example, usually
has first call on students in the social sciences,
in foreign languages and in area studies. It takes
the largest part of the graduating class from the
country's basic foreign service training school.
Those selected by the ministry from other institu-
tions are generally out of the top half of their
classes. An assignment to the ministry ''must be
complied with" and is accompanied by a thorough
security check, Almost all professional employees
are believed to be members of the party or the
Youth League. The Ministry also enjoys a high
priority in filling its personnel needs from other
agencies.
The nation's scientific effort also gets
priority attention in the assignment of better
students. This effort is planned and overseen
by the 30-55 divisions, including divisions for
atomic energy and national defense, of tt~e Scienti-
fic and Technological Commission. Most of the
actual scientific work is, however, .handled by
the Academy of Sciences, in specialized academies
run by individual ministries sand in industry or
at the universities. The importance of the
Academy of Sciences in this effort is indicated
by the fact that a principal part of the nation's
research and development in such vital fields as
nuclear physics and missiles is carried out at
various institutes of the academy. The academy
ensures a supply of qualified personnel by running
its own training programs in its own schools. The
academy doubtless gets the pick of the. students
trained.
- Sg -
~,dT
 Once assigned to a critical job or agency, an
individual has almost no horizontal mobility--at
least not on his own initiative. The system which
fords him into a niche, keeps him there. Transfers,
like assignments, are arranged largely on the basis
of the state's need and to refuse a transfer initi-
ated by the state is likely to be detrimental to
one's career.
Good performance or personal contacts can bring
an individual to the attention of another agency with
a clearly higher priority, and transfers can usually
be arranged at .the instigation of such an organiza-
tion. Poor performance can result in a transfer
either to less critical agencies or to less important
responsibilities within the same agency.
There are also lateral transfers from agencies
responsible for developing particular skills. This
kind of transfer occurs frequently, in the national
security field, from military to civilian agencies.
Special police and security offices, for example,
in the governmental structure are usually staffed
by military veterans with special training in this
kind of work. Qrganizations needing personnel trained
in secure communications procedures recruit almost
exclusively from the military. t?ther specialized
agencies, such as the Bureau of National Statistics
and the Ministry of Pablic Security, train special-
ists on a continuing basis and make them available
to other government .agencies as normal placement
procedure.
Although it is not impossible to arrange one's
own transfer in Communist China, such transfers are
not common. The government does entertain requests
from individuals for reassignment, though probably
not from the national security field. The best
reason for such a request, from the government's
point of view, is that the individual's speciality
is not being used. Misplacement does occur. For
example, at one time a reported lt3 percent of the
'tadvanced intellectuals' in the employ of one minis-
try were holding down jobs which did not utilize their
specialized training.
 Promotional prospects in the governmental ser-
vice depend on much the same criteria as in~the
party. The first concern of the authorities is
in most cases likely to be political reliability.
Like his colleagues in the party, the non-party
professional has to attend regular study meetings.
Though these are generally neither. as frequent nor
as intensive as for the party man, the non-party
professional finds he must also express his opinions
on the issues under discussion. This, of course,
gives big brother in the party a chance to measure
his political attitude. Tf it is judged inadequate,
his other qualifications will have to be outstanding
before he will have a chance to be recommended for
promotion.
Still, professional excellence probably does.
count for~more here than it does in the case of
the purely party man. A man could conceivably ad-
vance quite high in an economic or scientific in-
stitution on professional merit. But he would
find, ultimately, that he was closed off from the
top posts unless or until he was accepted into
the party.
Veterans' Preference
Veterans from the armed forces. are employed in
large numbers at all levels of responsibility in
the Chinese government. Military retirement laws
dating from the mid-1950's provide that all de-
mobilized military personnel must, if they are
physically fit and. under 55 years of age, take
job assignments arranged for them. These assign-
ments, like those of civilian professionals are
virtually compulsory. High-ranking officers or
personnel with special qualifications are usually
assigned jobs before they leave the army. If an
individual has no particular skills of use to the
government or the party he is sent home. The per-
sonnel department of the government in his local
area is responsible for providing him with a job.
Some sort of employment is arranged, from a com-
fortable spot in an~.academic institution to dif-
ficult manual labor in factories or on farms.
Ex-soldiers also rEeeive special salary con-
siderations. Their military rank is converted to
a roughly equal civilian grade. The actual salary
 paid a veteran is determined by a combination of
this grade and his length of military service. A
veteran can thus draw a higher salary than a non-
veteran in the same job. One other factor contri-
butes to veteran's preference in Communist China.
The armed forces political indoctrination program
is one of the regime's most effective. It tends
to make veterans, many of whom are party members,
especially reliable. Veterans are therefore likely
to be considered for responsible positions ahead of
non-veterans.
In-service Training
Many of the ministries and commissions of the
Chinese government run in-service training courses
for their personnel, usually at specialized institu-
tions in which they have an interest. One such
institution is the Chinese Institute for Interne-
tional Relations in Peiping. Financed by the Mi~is-
try of Foreign Affairs ahd the Ministry of Education,
it is under the operational control of the party.
It provides training in international affairs,.for~gn
languages and area studies. Selection for study at
the institute is considered a maxk of disti~tbn
and the herald of higher positions to come.
Most of the Institute's 600 students are drawn
from party cadres of the low and middle levels,
foreign service officers who have alrea~~~ had a
tour abroad or employees of the ministry, and em-
ployees of other government and military offices--
all of whom receive their salary while attending
the school. It does accept some highly qualified
middle school graduates. Entrance requirements
read like the requirements for party membership--
political reliability, a family background untainted
by wealth or political ties with the Kuomintang,
and no foreign connections.
The curriculum of the Institute is organized
around a two- to three-year program for foreign
ministry officers who have already served abroad,-
and a four-~to five-year program for training langu-
age and area specialists. It is based on the study
.program of the institute's Soviet counterpart. Stud-
ies include basic academic courses (geography, history,
law), political theory courses (Marxism-Leninism, the
history of the Chinese revolutions, dialectical ma-
terialism), foreign affairs (history of international
 PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYMENT CATEGORIES IN COMMUNIST CHINA
(Approximate job classification systems in civil service,
military, industrial, and academic posts)
Civtl Service ~
Military
Industry ~
~-
~ Academic
((ob description) Grade (Officers)
Management Engineers
Admin.
Faculty
Chairman, CPR
.~
1
2
v9
g
~
e
'o
d
Staff Office Heads 3
4
Ministers 5
Col. Gen.
b
Some University
Presidents
:
~
E
~
UP
(Profe
$
~
ae
?~
ssion
}~
{
als)
7
8
9
10
11
15
16
17
lg
19
20
21
Lt. Gen.
Maj. Gen.
Sr. Col.
Lt. Colonel
Major
Sr. Captain
Captain
lsr Lr.
2nd Lt.
Managers
Office Heads
Section Heads
Dep. Sect. Heads
Sales Representatives and
Shop Foremen
Grade 1
Grade 2 ..
Grade 3
Grade 4
Grade 5
Grade 6
Technicians
Some
V. Presidents
Professors
Ast. Prof.
22
23
S
-
24
V
25
26
27
c ~
28
'~ u
29
'o ~'
30
~ v
31
~ 32
o?s 4
~-~
 politics and economic relations, international
public and private law, the history of Chinese
diplomacy), and foreign languages. (English, French,
Russian, German, Spanish, and Arabic). The major
emphasis of the institute is ?n political theory..
The major language effort is on English.
The promotional possibilities for professionals
in Communist China range from an entering grade 21
for a college graduate to an effective. ceiling at
about grade ll. A handful of top executives hold
the ten super grades. The wage differential between
grade 11 and grade Z1 in Communist China is about
the same as exists in the US civil service system
between the professional entering grade, GS-S, and
the top regular grade, GS-l5, Wage levels for pro-
fessionals in the. government have been generally
stable and promotions slow. The government wage
structure was last overhauled in 1956.
A government professional gets certain per-
quisites which determine his actual standard of
living. Emoluments in housing, food, and cloth-
ing allowances are allowed high level officials.
Lesser officials in certain kids of work, such as
personnel whose jobs bring them into frequent con-
tact with foreigners receive better living allowances
than the average employee of the same grade. Wel-
fare benefits in the form of medical services and
schools for dependents also are linked to profes-
sional status and grade.
Housing is at a premium in China. The higher
one's grade the better the chance of being able to
live with one's family, to obtain attractive accom-
modations, privacy, and enough equipment for rela-
tive comfort. For the many government employees
whose jobs do not permit them to live with their
families, the regime has a leave system which al-
lows an individual to spend two to three. weeks a .
year, or four to five weeks every two years with
his family.
On top of this., persons employed by organi2a-
tions responsible for national security reportedly
receive special attention in the allocation of daily
necessities. The armed forces receive excellent
treatment in comparison with the population at
 large, and the relatively high standard of living of
employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs compared
to other government functionaries has been noted by
visitors to Peiping.
The Chinese Communist regime employs to advan-
tage certain n?n-material incentives. It offers,
for example, idealistic young people a chance to
participate in the vital and challenging job of
modernizing China. This factor is known to have
played a large part in the return of hundreds of
educated Chinese from the US' and Europe in the
early 1950's: It is a factor heavily emphasized
in university-level indoctrination programs.
A second non-material incentive is access to
literature that has not been pre-masticated .by the
regime's propaganda apparatus.
The government's awards system seems designed
more to promote loyalty to the regime. than improve-
ments in efficiency and performance. This system
now in use provides. for the granting of.commenda-
tions, prizes, cash, grade raises and .promotions on
the following grounds: 1) loyalty to the job; 2)
superior or model performance. of duties; 3) ob-
servance of discipline; 4) suggestions, innovations,
and inventions which contribute to the national wel-
fare; 5) actions protecting government-property or
preventing loss to the government; and 6) fighting
illegal activity. Four out of the six are reflec-
tions of political reliability rather than Outstand-
ing professional achievement.
There are also regulations on the books which
are specifically designed to reward outstanding pro-
fessional achievement. Under these, original con-
tributions in both natural and social science are
afforded national recognition and cash awards. The
only publicized use of these awards occurred nearly
six years ago.
Of course, there is the other side of the in-
centive coin. The government civil servant can
fall afoul of the government's supervisory ap-
paratus quite as easily as a party man can be en-
meshed in his, and for equally capricious reasons.
There is no legal code in Communist China. There
is a system of courts in China, but the courts are
 not independent; they are only another arm of the
executive. There is also a system of public prose-
cutors, whose chief task it is to cheek on govern-
ment offices and employees to see that state regu-
lations are observed by all administrative agencies,
officials and the public at large,
The major responsibility for maintaining public
order and policing the governmental apparatus, how-
ever, rests in the Ministry of Interior and the
Ministry of public Security. Interior is belie ved
to take care~of administrative cases involving govern-
ment agencies and officials, to investigate how govern-
ment decisions are being implemented, and to detect
neglect of duty or violations of regulations. The
Ministry of Public Security performs the general
police function vis-a-vis the public, It has the
largest and best trained investigative force, which
is apparently used from time to time by other super-
visory organs of party and government. These organs,
primed to act at the whim of the central authorities,
provide an important, if negative, slice of any govern-
ment employee's incentive.
~~
 IV. THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
The present leaders of the Chinese Communist
Party clearly recognize that the county's armed
forces, the largest single component of national
security personnel in China, constitute the key-
stone of their past and future power. .They take.
elaborate measures to assure the tightest possible
party control over the military. They regard the
proper staffing of the military establishment as
a vitally important vehicle of this control. As
Mao has remarked, "the principle is far the party
to direct the gun and not for the gun to direct
the party."
The final say in party policy toE~vard the
armed farces rests with R7ao and his cmlleagues on
the Standing Committee.. Tike formulation of general
military policy for the party is, :however, en-
trusted to the Military Affairs Committee, one
of the most potent of the party's central organs.
Key members of the committee hold the top posts in
the Ministry of National Defense, which stands at
the apex of the purely military chain of command.
Trusted party men hold all. top military posts.
The party has provided itself with two fur-
ther checkreins over the armed forces at all
levels. The first is the extension of party com-
mittees, sim3liar to those in civilian organs,
to the military, The second is the system of
political officers under the General Political
Department in the armed forces, Every military
unit, at least as far dawn as the company level,
has both a party committee and a political officer.
This provides the party with both horizontal con-
trol, from civilian to military party committees
on the same level, and vertical control, through
the General Political Department's political offi-
cer system.
The Military Affairs Committee
On this body Mao Tse~tung has gathered his
most trusted old line military leaders and politi-
cal officers still active in the armed forces. It
is likely that the marshals who helped Mao to his
successes in the revolution are all on the committee.
The names are a roster of old revolutionary heroes;
~,,,~-
 Lin Piao, Liu Po-cheng, Lo Jung-huan, Ho Lung, Nieh
Jung-then, Hsu Hsiang-Chien, Yeh Chien-ying. Mao
probably sits in on the more important. committee
sessions; Lin Piao is probably the effective oper-
ating chieftan.
Over the years this group of men scored many
victories by following the accepted Maoist precepts
of party primacy. They still tend to look first
and foremost to ideological purity and political
dependability in determining individual qualifica-
tions for military posts, and can be expected to
try to keep a firm lid. on creeping professionalism
in the armed forces.
In at least one instance, however, the question
of an individual's political reliability crept right
into the ranks of the committee. Between 195? and
1959 Peng Teh-huai, Minister of National Defense
and a leading figure on the committee, spearheaded
a group which attempted to "regularize" the armed
forces, i.e., to emphasize professionalism in the
officer corps in part at the expense of political
subservience, The party, considering this a "purely
military point of view", sacked Peng and his sup-
porters. Peng's reported attempt to elicit Soviet
support contributed to his downfall.
Remnants of Peng's ideas continue to annoy
the more orthodox leaders. Some officers have ap-
parently continued to argue that the "suddenness
and complexity" of modern warfare render the party
committee system in the armed forces dangerously
cumbersome and inefficient. Mao's supporters re-
spond that officers holding such views "estrange
themselves from politics...and regard the army as
a thing above class and. above politics." Even
in the present era of military dependence on tech-
nology,. Mao and his supporters say it is possible
for all military plans to be fulfilled by depending
on the traditional Communist officer's "courage,
self-confidence, fighting ability, esprit de.
corps." They conclude that t?day's officer must
still be a "militant revolu~Yonary" who subordi-
nates himself to the party and relies fox inspira-
tion and practical guidance on the military doc-
trines expounded in Mao's works.
~'G
 In an effort to strengthen the approved char-
acteristics in the officer corps, Peiping holds up
as exemplars the present members of the Military
Affairs Committee. Peiping has specifically ex-
cluded them along with all senior generals, from
mandatory retirement regulations. officers at all
levels are encouraged to study the memoirs of these
leaders, and are given to understand that they
should model themselves and pattern their careers
on the example of these old heroes.
As attrition begins to remove these aging
committeemen from the scene, their replacements
will doubtless be judged first on political alle-
giance to the present party leaders, and secondly
on military qualifications.
Some observers have noted that apparently able
Chinese Communist military officers fail to advance
in grade and position as rapidly as would normally be
expected. There can be no doubt that a failure to
impress the party leaders who make the promotions
with a proper revolutionary spirit has in many
cases been responsible. Testifying to the impor-
tance of party-oriented thinking in advancement to
.the top military echelons is the fact that more
than half of the present members of the Military
Affairs Committee were once political officers in
the armed forces. One of them, Lin Piao, who is
also the current Minister of National Defense, pos-
sesses a brilliant combat record but is also exten-
sively experienced in political work in the army;-
another, Lo Jui-Ching, who is also the present
Chief of Staff, is a man who made his reputation
in security work.
The General Political Department
The other major organization through which the
party exercises control and surveillance is the
General Political Department of the armed forces.
Wliile organizationally under the Ministry of De-
fence, the General Political Department in practice
enjoys a rather special position. As the senior
party agency within the .armed forces, it has its
own separate channels of command and administration.
It is the only organization on its level to which
the party constitution devotes a separate article.
This article states that the General Political De-
partment will, under the direct leadership of the CeAztral
 Committee, "take charge of the ideological and or-
ganizational work of the party in the army." In
fulfilling this role, the General,Political.Depart-
ment is responsible for all propaganda, education
and cultural activities within the armed forces..
It also has a controlling say in personnel matters.
The political officers which it assigns to
each unit of the armed forces are responsible only
to the political department, not to any military
commander. Except in the most extreme combat emer-
gency, the political officer must approve an opera-
tional order before it-can be implemented.
One of the major ways in which the department
effects the party's will is through its powers in
controlling promotions, transfers, leave, and effi-
ciency reports. It also is in charge of the indoc-
trination of military personnel, a more through-
going program than is inflicted on other government
workers.
The man 3ast noted as head of the department,
Tan Cheng, has been out of favor for several years.
Though not formally removed, he is doubtless no
longer trusted to administer the department's deli-
cate and vital functions. it is more likely that
one of the senior figures of the Military Affairs
Committee does this. Either Lo Jung-huan, who has
.zad many years of loyal service as top political
~~ai in the military, or Hsiao Hua, who is nominally
the deputy director of the department, probably nQw
exercises real departmental authority.
The Ministry of National Defense
Operating the defense establishment under the
direction of these party bodies are the Ministry of
National Defense and the central departments--the
General Staff Department, the General Rear Services
Department, the General Training Department and the
General Cadres (personnel) Department. The top
jobs in all of these organs are controlled by Mao
and the party center, and the incumbents are trusted
party men..
Professional military qualifications, however,
begin to play a slightly more important role at the
second level in the ministry. There is, for example,
a rough balance between men with preponderant mili-
tary experience and men with preponderant political
s`~
 backgrounds among the vice ministers of national
defense and the deputy chiefs of staff. It is at
this level that the special representatives of the
air force and the navy begin to be heard..
No premium is put on formal academic education
in the ministry:. indeed, the average is quite low,
The rise of better schooled officers, now at more
junior levels, will inevitably alter the situation
in the future.
Below the deputy level in the centa~al~~depart-
rnents of the ministry, changes in personnel and in-
fusion of new blood since 1950 have been sufficient
to give a clearer picture of overall Chinese Com-
munist military staffing. policies. Most of the
officers. now holding posts at this level are long-
time specialists in their fields--armor, artillery,
training, logistics, etc. Still top party leaders,
possibly acting on the recommendations of party
branch committees in the Peiping headquarters, al-
most certainly pass judgment on appointments at this
level. Regulations provide for the command of mili-
tary regions, districts, and armies by officers of
lieutenant general grade or above. Divisions are
commanded by major generals. They are appointed
by the State Council with the approval of the top
party leadership which naturally wishes to assure
that the selections work against the development
of "independent kingdoms" reminiscent of the pre-
communist warlord period.
Regiments and battalions are commanded by
colonels, and companies by captains. The appoint-
ment and transfer of all field grade officers is
officially the duty of the ministry. Its selec-
tions are probably reviewed,. prior to being for-
malized, by the general political department and/or
the unit party committees. Staffing at the com-
pany level is the .responsibility of the regional
military commander, or the chief of the appropriate
branch of the service, and is probably checked
through the party apparatus.
Peiping keeps a full book on the training,
experience, and qualifications of officers which
is used along with political criteria as the basis
for promotion at field and company level, The re-
gime has said little about personal qualities de-
sirable in an officer. It is clear, however, that
~ `~
 emphasis is put on men of action who have an ability
to act independently in a military situation and
carry through actions once started. Emphasis on
these factors may be motivated in part by the prob-
ability that insistence on political acceptability
among officers has caused many of them to adopt a
play-it-safe attitude which in some cases tends to sap
needed military initiative.
Seniority is a factor of great importance in
field and company grade promotions. Advancement
to the rank of senior colonel requires a certain
period of service in the next ~Iower grade. A lesser
period is required for advancement to lower ranks.
Time-in-service stipulations are not immutable, how-
ever, and may be waived for especially meritorious
officers.
Overstaffing
Top-heavy staffs are a burden to both Chinese
Communist field and headquarters military units.
The problem was made acute in 1955-1956 when the
regime introduced some Soviet staffing practices
alongside the existing .Chinese structure, Although
wholesale cutbacks were made in 1957 and in 1960,
the process amounted basically to a reshuffling
and reassignment of personnel and probably only a
token number of officers were actually retired or
placed in~reserve status. The Peiping regime re-
tains a high number of general officers in pro-
portion to total strength. The present ratio--some
2,000 generals to a total strength of 2,600,000--is
considerably higher than the current average in
the better Western armies.
Training
In the old days when the Chinese Communist
army was still largely a guerrilla force, military
training was left almost entirely to the whims of
the individual commander. As a result it was piece-
meal and haphazard. By contrast, regular politi-
cal indoctrination schools have been a feature of
the military scene since earliest days. in 1950,
Peiping set about to establish a centralized mili-
tary training system modeled for the most part on
Soviet counterparts. It also expanded political
schooling. Judged by Western standards, the pro-
gram is still sketchy, elementary, and heavily
political.
l~
 The closest equivalent to awestern command
and staff college is the Nanking Military Institute.
Here facilities for officer training operated by
the Chinese Nationalists have been taken over and
expanded. Promising upper rank field officers whom
the regime considers good prospects for advancement
to general officer status apparently form the main
bulk of the student body. Both political courses
and military science subjects are taught, Courses
run from eighteen months to four years.
Several establishments in Peiping, the People's
Liberation Army Political Academy and the Academy
of Military Sciences, appear to constitute a very,
rough approximation of our own war college system.
The former is perhaps the top institution for politi-
~~l instruction connected with the armed forces.
Some formal academic training is included in the
curriculum, and regular classes are. graduated. Both
senior political and military officers, including
some general officers, receive advanced training.
at the Institute.
The Acadezn,y of Military Science was set up in
1958 and charged with bringing the latest scientific
and technical developments into the study of mils-
tart' science in the Chinese armed forces. -Its found-
ing was an obvious effoxt by the regime to try to
prepare the Chinese Communist armed forces to cope
with the demands of modern technological waxfare,
even if they were not yet equipped to fight such a
war. It probably supervises research into advanced
weaponry and doctrine on its use, and lectures senior
military officers on these topics.
Another organization apparently involved in
this field is the Military Engineering Academy which
reportedly teaches a curriculum heavily weighted
with advanced technical subjects.
Each of the main branches of the army, such
as the artillery and the armored forces, has a
separate system of schools. The air force and the
navy also have training set-ups which include
academies for the .schooling of young officers simi-
lar to US academies. Qualifications for acceptance
at such schools are determined in part b~ competi-
hive examinations.
~C
 Throughout the armed forces school system, both
political and military courses are offered. Politi-
cal training is in the hands of the political offi-
cers at the training establishments and takes up
almo~~t half of a student's- study time.
In so far as regular in-service training is
concerned, it was decreed in 1961 that the total
amount of study time for officers was nvt to be
over 500 hours per year for officers above divi-
sign level, and 300 to 400 hours per year for offi-
cers below this level. Sixty percent of this time
was to be spent on professional military subjects.
The balance was to be spent on political studies
and on formal academic training. Specialized tech-
nical units were permitted to spend up to 70 per-
cent of their time. on professional sub3ects.
From time to time, the regime has inaugurated
"back to the ranks" movements, the military .counter-
part of the civilian "down-to-the-farm" drives.. In
these movements officers of all grades are required
to serve short tours of from two weeks to a month
as enlisted men in order to familiarize themselves
with the problems and conditions at basic levels.
Although the emphasis on this program varies from
time to time, such tours are frequent enough to
be considered a standard and time-consuming Chinese
Communist technique.
To provide new material for its ground force
officer corps, the regime operates a number of basic
officer training schools. Non-commissioned .officers
selected by competitive examination receive up to
three years training at these institutions before
obtaining their cornmissionse In-lieu of attending
basic officer institutes, highly qualified non-toms
may sometimes obtain commissions by passing a spe-
cial examination.
Peiping has begun to look increasingly during
the past few years to graduates of civilian college-
level institutions as a source for officer material.
As early as 1955, a law provided for the establish-
ment of a system similar to~thc US ROTC program to
train reserve officers in the universities. After
graduation, persons who had been trained under the
system would, if needed, be directly commissioned
and plated on active duty. In this manner, and in
the operation of the normal graduate placement pro-
cess, the armed forces draw perhaps 3 to 5 percent
of an annual graduating class.
~~
 Low academic standards in the Chinese Communist
officer corps have been somewhat alleviated recently
as a result of tougher regime standards on schooling
prior to induction. Today the typical officer up
to the rank of captain probably has the equivalent
of a high school education. Ina bid to raise over-
all armed force academic standards, Peiping announced
a ten-year plan in 1959 to bring all officers up to
college level. Like other gradiose schemes intro-
duced in the leap forward period, little has been
heard of the program subsequently.. It may have been
discarded in the general training cutbacks announced
in 1960 by Defense Minister Lin Piao.
Enlisted men are schooled as non-corns through
a pattern of special battalions scattered through
selected divisions. Promising enlisted men are
sent to thse battalions for courses lasting several
months., They return qualified as squad leaders or
for higher non-commissioned ranks. Candidates must
have demonstrated their political acceptability as
well as military aptitude before enrollment.
Since 1960 the Chinese Communists have started
to shy away from their near exclusive dependence
on Soviet military training manuals, a development
doubtless spurred by the widening political breach
between Peiping and Moscow. The regime clearly
continues to recognize the value of foreign mill-
tary techniques, however. For example, some US
doctrine has been disguised as Chinese and written
into Communist training manuals.
~~
 V. MANPOWER AND EDUCATION
.One-quarter of the world's population lives in
Communist China. The rate of growth of this immense
population showed a tendency to rise during the early
period of Chinese Communist rule, reaching a peak of
2.5 percent per year in 1958. It probably dell there-
after to 1.5 to 2.0 percent as food shortages contri-
buted to a rise in the death rate..
Estimated Po elation of Communist China
By ge and Sex
(in millions at mid-year)
1953
1962
Age
Both Sexes
Male
Female-
Both Sexes
Male
Female
Total
583
29?
286
?06
359
347
0-14
231
117
114
296
150
146
15-59
321
165
156
372
191
181
60~-
31
15
16
38
18
20
The Chinese Communist made hesitant and inef-
fective efforts in 1956-195? to encourage birth con-
trol. Thereafter the effort slowed, and at present
publicity on "family planning" is moderate and limi-
ted in scope. It is directed almost solely towards
the urban `population. The rural population makes
up over 80 percent of the total in China, and rural.
birthsmest be severely curtailed if a Chinese birth
control campaign is ever to be effective. Even if
the, regime were energetically to prosecute a program.
for limiting births, a mimimum period of at least
five years would probably be required before the
program would begin to reduce the national birth
rate .
The total labor force in Communist China grew
from some 274 million persons in 1953 to about 316
million persons in 1962. Civilian employment
2/
 EMPLOYMENT OF
MANAIGERIAL AND PROfE5S10NAL PERSONNEL
IN CaMMUN1ST CHINA
(ESTIMATED FOR 1957)
MANAGERIAL PERSONNEL
In state organs and their subdivisions
1 600 000
In the communist, non-communist
political parties, trade unions,
women's and youth organizations
1 200 000
In economic enterprises
3,500 000
In education and health
750,000
SUB-TOTAL
7, 050, 000
PROFESSIONAL PERSONNEL
Engineers
50,000
Technicians
450,000
Agro-technicians
80, 000
Teachers at all levels
1,900,000
Doctors, interns, nurses
(excluding midwives and
practitioners of Chinese medicine).
340,000
Cultural and artistic personnel
125,000
Journalists and lawyers
30,000
Veterinarians (trained in modern medicine)
10,000
Meteorologists
15, 000
Scientists and researchers
15,000
3,015,000
TOTAL 10, 065,000
 increased from an estimated 271 million persons to
about 313 persons.
More than 85 percent of the civilian force
was employed in agriculture. Nonagricultural em-
ployment at the end of 1962 is estimated to have
been roughly 4 million persons higher than at
the end of 1953.
This does not, however, reflect the signifi-
cant changes which occurred~in nonagricultural
employment under the communists. Prior to 195? the
creation of new job opportunities in the. nonagri-
cultural sectors of the economy lagged behind the
growth of the population. In 1958, the ''leap for-
ward"' brought an enormous expansion in nonagricul-
tural employment. The figure went up by more. than
15 million persons during a single year, bringing
the total to 55 million. In the ensuing economic
debacle, nonagricultural employment declined by
1962 to roughly 43 million persons.
although Communist China has an abundant sup-
ply of unskilled labor, it has always been faced
with very serious shortages of technical and skilled
labor, shortages that were partially eased by Soviet
technicians until they were abruptly withdrawn in
mid-1960. The Chinese Communists have attempted to
expand the number and quality of technicians and
skilled workers at all levels. The increase in
the number of trained people and the accumulation
of on-the-job experience during the past decade
alleviated some, but certainly not all, of these
shortages.
The Educational System
Great stress has been laid on various types of
education by the Chinese Communists. Schools were
built in all parts of the country. Large educational
complexes made up of a number of technical colleges
were established. Such universities as Peiping,
Tsinghua and Chiaotung, well-known before the Com-
munist takeover, were expanded. In the leap forward
period of 1958-1960 the number of institutions for
which college status was claimed rose so sharply
that educational standards suffered badly. The term
college was bastardized to the point where several
years later it remains difficult to establish how
~~
 many institutions of higher learning are operating
in China. Institutions maintaining standards in
any way comparable to higher educational levels
elsewhere may not be much above the figure of 236
existing at the beginning of the leap forward.
Included were the follow3:ng types:
Comprehensive 1?
Polytechnical 10
Specialized
Engineering 40
Agric. & Forestry 31
Medical (public health) 3?
Economics 5
Law & Politics 5
Language 8
Fine Arts 17
Physical Education 6
Teachers 57
Others (field not known) 3
Tl
Total enrollment in institutions of higher edu-
cation rose from 155,000 in 1947-1948 to around
900,000 iri 1960-1961. Enrollment fell thereafter
and by the fall of 1962 probably was less than 800,000.
There are four genexal types of universities
and colleges operating in China--comprehensive,. poly-
technical, specialized technical, and teachers colleges.
Comprehensive universities in China are comparable to
a faculty of arts-and sciences at an Aimerican aniver-
sity. They train scientists and college teachers in
-56-
~~
 basic disciplines such as physics, astronomy, biology,
the humanities, etc. Peiping, Futan, and Nankai Uni-
versities fall into this category, Polytechnical uni-
versities are made up of several .departments, the num-
ber of fields .covered varying in different schools.
Basic engineering principles are emp~iasized. Ex-
amples are Tsinghua, Chiaotung, and Harbin Industrial.
Universities. The specialized colleges train per-
sonnel for specific assignments in the iron and
steel or the aeronautical industry, in surveying,
in trade and finance, etc. The teachers colleges
are intended primarily to provide teachers .for mid-
dle schools. Teachers for higher educational institu-
tions are ,trained by the universities and colleges
themselves.
The number of graduates from these institutions
from~l949 through 1962 is estimated to be 950,000
distributed as follows:
Engineering
290,000
- 31~
Science
56,000
- 6%
Agriculture
?0,000
- 7?,6
Medicine and Public-
Health
95,000
- 10?~
Teacher Training
2?6,000
- 29?jo
Others
163, 000
- 1??~,
A high quality education was received by a small
proportion of these graduates. Most did not obtain
an education equivalent to that commonly. received
from accredited colleges in the United States, A
shortage of competent teachers was the major limita-
tion. Also eontribnting was the regime's idea that
students should participate in labor and receive a
liberal amount of political education. In addition,
almost all were allowed to graduate irrespective of
academic achievement, many after only two or three
years of course work.
The choice of quantity over quality was eon-
seiously made.. It was probably useful in serving
China's short-term needs. Narrow training in spe-
cialized fields did turn out graduates fit to meet
~~
 immediate needs in industrial, mining, construction,
and other activities. The particular specialties
of these narrowly trained men were not, however,
always responsive to the demands of the moment a
An attempt to meet the need for higher. quality
in education, recognized as necessary for the long
pu11, was. made in the better universities and poly-
technical institutes. Curricula, length of courses,
and availability of competent professors suggest that
some graduates of these schools were relatively well-
trained. Even in these schools there was some sacri-
fice of quality. Most students were required to take
part in physical work and time-consuming political
indoctrination meetings. Teachers were overloaded.
Effectiveness of the better professors was further
reduced by burdensome responsibilities for planning
and organizing, turning their talents to practical
problems in industry and other activities, parrying
disruptive directions of party authorities, and trying
to carry out their work in a general atmosphere of
frantic urgency to meet ill-defined. and changing goals.
Chinese universities have failed to produce the
needed numbers of qualified people prepared to go for-
ward into graduate work. The Academy of Sciences in
1955 and 1956 tried to recruit candidates for a four-
year program of graduate training. The selection was
to have commenced in August 1955 but only 65 qualified
students had been selected by March 1956. In the
fall of 1956 the academy found only 268 out of 1,470
applicants qualified for its program. Part of the
problem was that many universities were retaining
students for their own graduate programs started at
about the same time. The situation was so bad that
in 1958 the academy set up its own University of
Science and Technology to prepare students for later
work at the graduate level.
The graduate programs that got under way six years
ago have not flourished. Apparently no new graduate
students were taken into the program after 1956 until
the fa11 of 1962 when the academy enrolled 213 and
the universities about 1,600. None was reported to
have completed his work until the fall.: of 1962, six
years after the program started. The academy re-
ported in February 1963 that 99 had completed their
 work and that over 400 were in training.. Current
graduate enrollment in the universities. may. be in
the order of 2,000. The number is not adequate
for China's needs.
Limitations on enrollments in the graduate pr?-
gram ~-ppear to rest in large part on the shortage of
scholars capable of and available for service as
tutors. In 1956 only some 200 persons in the academy
were named tutors; only about 130. were .named in the
universities.
Use of Soviet Sehools
Education of Chinese students in Soviet bloc
countries has contributed to the supply of new
scientific and technical personnel in China. Chi-
nese have been trained both in Soviet universities
and colleges and in research insitutes of the Soviet
Academy of Sciences and other academies. Practically
all Chinese students sent to the Soviet Union after
1956 were graduate students. Previously large num-
bers of undergraduates had been sent with numbers
reaching nearly 2,000 per .year in 1955 and 1956.
After 1960 few new students of any level were sent,
but a majority of those already enrolled continued
their studies. The total number sent in all years
is about 7,500 of which about 2,500 were probably
graduate students. About 1,100 have completed work
for the .Soviet kandidat degree. Less than 1,000,
probably considers y ess, are currently in train-
ing at advanced levels in the Soviet Union.
Chinese students in the Soviet Union pursued
their studies in many fields of basic and applied
science and engineering, judging by the titles of
dissertations they have published in Soviet journals.
Emphasis was clearly on bread-and-butter. subjects
applicable to China's immediate needs. Subjects
supporting agriculture and public health were the
most numerous. Other fields were water conservancy,
transportation, electric power, mineral exploita-
tion, chemical and metallurgical industries, and
machine building processes. The dissertations re-
vealed no effoxt to concentrate on complex new tech-
nology associated with such fields as nuclear power,
computers, modern aircraft, or missiles.
- 59 -
 Chinese have taken part, however, in the acti-
vities at the Joint Institute of Nuclear Research
at Dubna, outside Moscow. This institution trains
personnel from all Soviet Bloc countries in nuclear
physics, but not in nuclear weapons technology.
The work at Dubna is apparently not in the nature
of formal study leading to dissertation and degree.
Chinese stu""dents returning from graduate study
in the Soviet Union probably make up a large majority
of the better. trained new researchers in China. Al-
though reasonably well trained in a formal sense,they
are inexperienced.- The best probably are assigned to
research institutes of the Academy of Sciences and
other academies ar to the universities.
Scientific Manpower
The leaders of Communist China appreciate the
importance of the contribution made by science and
technology to national security. They want effec-
tively planned and directed research in well-equipped
and staffed laboratories. Chinese capabilities in
this direction have been greatly strengthened over
the past decade. Pr?gress, however, has been less
than might have been expected from their resources
and furious activity. Several factors helped stunt
the full flowering of Chinese science.
First of all, many well-trained scientists
in China were educated in the western non-communist
world. The regime regards their political relic-
bility as doubtful. The .leaders cannot risk plac-
ing such men in policy-making roles. They are even
hesitant about placing such men in positions of
lower level authority without the constant and
overriding presence of a politically proven party
stalwart.
Secondly, the Chinese Communists' passion for
quick success led them to use special methods which
frequently were not as productive as more tradi-
tional means. Research work projects were started,
then stopped, under misconceived plans.. Available
research technicians were misused. Large numbers
of poorly trained researchers were thrown into pro-
jects as though quantity would substitute for quality,
The initiatives of experienced researchers were
frustrated all too often by party cadres attempting
to manage researchers as though they were machines
with on-and-off buttons.
~/
 Thirdly, planning for the training of tech-
nical personnel has failed in many cases to balance
supply and need. The attempt to fix the numbers
needed in a narrow technical speciality three to
five years ahead has seemed beyond Chinese capa-
bilities. By the time students complete their
three- to five-year programs of higher education,
needs in many cases have changed. For example,
the regime trained so many Russian interpreters
and translators. that they were in excess long be-
fore relations with the Soviets began to cool,
The major staffing problem in China's scienti-
fic organizations is, of course, to find Enough
competent scientists and teachers. At the present
time, they have in general a few qualified men backed
by a large body of poorly trained and inexperienced
personnel. They lack the large group of medium
quality, experienced researchers of the kind that
make up the main body of the scientific community
in a technologically advanced society.
China has a few well-trained and competent
scientists in nearly every area of technology.
Therefore, useful progress can be made in almost
any scientific or engineering project of suffi-
ciently high priority. However, there are not.
enough first-rate people around to make progress
in more than a limited number of advanced projects
at any one time. The rate of progress on a priority
project can be stepped up only by a process of
bleeding other projects.
The training of scientists and technologists
appears lately to have been put on a more promising
track, but the principal resource for advancement,
the well-trained and experienced tutor, remains in
short supply. There is no crash program that can
solve the problem.
~~
 VI. COMMUNICATIONS OF IDEAS
The dissemination of news and opinion in Com-
munist China is managed virtually in its entirety..
The voice of dissent is infrequently raised. The
leaders in Peiping see their problem in this area
largely o.ne of mobilising the party, the govern-
ment and the population behind their programs.
Principal communications media are used almost
exclusively to instruct and oad.
The party rank and file and the people are
told only what the leaders feel is necessary for...
the purpose of carrying out instructions. Rarely
does a hint creep out of policy disagreement dis-
agreements within the privileged circle. The
party does not regard the spread of dissenting
views expressed within this circle as at all helpful,
and they are rigorously supressed.
Classified Channels
The principal means used by the leaders to
propagate the party line are classified communi-
cations, the open press and radio, and study meet-
ings. Classified publications and documents flow.
out of the party center by secure telecommunica-
tions, by post, and by hand or word of mouth.
Leading party figures travel a good deal bringing,
the latest word from Peiping. Lesser leaders from.
the outlying areas are brought to Peiping for the
same purpose.
The Chinese Communists are intensely suspicious
and their security practices .a re stringent. In fact,
they incline to overload the system and hold tightly
a range of information openly available in other
countries,
Many party and government organs produce re-
stricted publications. These go to a selected
clientele, usually officials who have reached a
designated level of responsibility or who occupy
posts affected by a new turn in the line. The con-
tents are used by such officials as a guide to their
day-to-day activities and as background for lectures
to subordinates. One such publication is Reference
News, a daily bulletin which does little more than
rye ash foreign news dispatches.. The fact that such
 a publication is distributed only to officials whose
duties are judged to require it testifies to the
Chinese Communists' security mania. Open technical
publications from abroad are handled in a similar
fashion.
The Party Press
Despite this preoccupation with seen city, a re-
liable key to Peiping thinking can be-found in the
pages of party publications like People's Daily and
Red Flag. They are carefully studieid, for a reader
3s`aware that he may be called upon for a personal
elucidation of passages at the next meeting of his
study group. The Chinese party press, with its cap-
tive audience, is surely among the dullest reading
matter offered on a daily basis anywhere in the
world.
Articles in-the top Peiping publications re-
garded as especially important get broad and timely
dissemination. They are broadcast to-both domestic
and foreign listeners. Materials so handled are
speeches by important regime figures, communiques
from Central Committee sessions, vital editorials
and a host of lesser items. This material frequently
appears verbatim in ,papers outside the capital the
same or the following day. Collections of pertinent
articles on a common theme are sometimes gathered
into a pamphlet and distributed at home and wherever
possible abroad.
Meetings
The meeting is a third channel which supple-
ments and fills out the other two. Meetings and
conferences seem to be a necessary part of life in
all societies, but in few places do they absorb
so much of the person's time and energies as in
Communist China. The Chinese Communists have
raised the meeting almost to a governing tech-
nique. From national conferences held in Peiping
with great magnificence to the neighborhood study
meeting in a humble dwelling down the block, group
discussions are a prominent feature of the Chinese
i me llectua 1 1a ndscape .
Meetings can be strictly party affairs, or
they can involve a mix of party and non-party types
in which the party element is always dominant.
The objective is to communicate decisions reached
 by constituted authority, to explain these deci-
sions, to persuade those in attendance as to the
wisdom of the course chosen and to point out to
them their part in carrying out the decision.
Even plenary sessions of the pa~?ty's Central
Committee can be viewed in this light. They pro-
vide the opportunity for an airing of policy lines
which have been hammered out in earlier, more re-
stricted sessions. Regional and. local party con-
ferences follow to "pass along the spirit" of the
Ce~ntral..Committee's deliberations.
The same is true of sessions of the National
People's Congress, the China People's Political Con-
sultative Conference, and the Supreme State Con-
ference. Led by top party men, they are essentially
meetings of citizens, whose counsels may at times
be genuinely valued but who are normally brought
together to hear party leaders expound party policy.
An effort is made at such meetings to try and im-
part to the non-party delegates a sense of partici-
pation in the process of ruling .China.
There are also specialized conferences like a
statistical work conference ox a conference on politi-
cal work in the armed forces. These bring together
a group of important officials involved in a common
undertaking. Some may precede a party decision on
a given subject and may thus represent an opportunity
for the expression of individual opinion. But most
publicized meetings are convened for the leadership
to display its interest in a given topic and expose
its views thereon.
Some conferences are used, at least partially,
as incentives. For example,-the party sponsors
periodic conferences of labor heroes, activists and
other "advanced elements." Individuals are brought
to Peiping at public expense. Some are a~Orded the
honor of .meeting key figures, including at times Mao
Tse-tung himself. An invitation to such a conference
doubtless confers considerable status locally on
the recipient.
By far the most prevalent meetings are the
regular sessions of one's local study group, Stim-
ulated and directed by party cadres, these small
groups of 10-30 persons meet regularly throughout
 China. The leaders plainly attach much importance
to them since they are willing to accept the signi-
ficant losses in productive time which they entail.
These meetings may take up no-more than a few hours
a week or they may occupy half a day or more every
day over an extended period..
Attendance at the meetings, like-many other acti-
vities in Communist China, is ostensibly voluntary.
Social and other pressures are, however, exerted
against absenteeism. Anyane so bold as to cut the
meetings cou3d expect visits from local party cadres,
friends and colleagues which would be continued until
he relented. In the view of one ex-resident of the
mainland, attendance is "like going to church. in an
orphanage."
The topics of these meetings are usually current
affairs as seen through the eyes of the party leaders.
The Sino-Soviet dispute and Khrushchev's many short-
comings were popular subjects during 1962. The lead-
er, normally a party member, opens a meeting by outlin-
ing the party's thought on, the selected topic. Every-
one joins in the subsequent discussion. Failure to
speak out is regarded as suspicious. Persistent re-
fusal to play the game would probably result in a re-
quest for a written explanation. This paper would
then form the subject matter of a subsequent meet-
ing. Members of the group would subject the explana-
tion to a searching critique for completeness and
sincerity, both highly valued. in a self-criticism
of this sort.
Meetings are sometimes used to persuade an in-
dividual or a group of individuals to accept some
new task. At the height of the down-to-the-farm
movement in 1959-1962, meetings to persuade those
earmarked for movement were common. Not many city
dwellers were anxious to go out and Live and. work
with the peasants, but there were few recorded in-
stances of refusal after a few persuasion sessions.
The earnestness of the group's persuadors was doubt-
less stimulated by a realization that a lack of
all-out effoxt on their part would only single them
as likely candidates for the next batch.
The Chinese Communists have no fixed way of
dealing with offenders. One method is to expose
an individual to public humiliation and ridicule
at a "struggle" meeting. Struggle meetings were
 more common during the land reform movement in the
early 1950's than they are now. They are still used,
however, to deal with persons charged, for example,
with counter-revolutionary activities.. The meetings
are not meant to be public trials. Izidividuals
brought before them have already been .judged guilty.
Tl~~e objective is to provide a salutory example for
the people.
Such a meeting might be opened by a recitation
by the presiding cadre of the political crimes com-
mitted, the heresies written, spoken or thought.
Comments are invited from the audience, an inv~.ta-
tion scarcely to be ignored since silence .contains
the suggestion of similar infection. The meeting
may accept a sniveling confession from the person
being "struggled" with or move directly to sentenc-
ing, usually either execution on the spot or an
open-ended sentence at labor reform. Those who have
attended become active agents of regime retribution,
Just how effective are these various methods
of spreading the word? .The system appears to operate
very well when it comes to disseminating regime policy
downward. It is in fact one of the mast effective
things the Chinese Communists do. The system operates
less well in other direction. It has been used too
frequently by the leadership to smell out real or
potential, dissent. As a result it has become a
sluggish instrumentality for conveying suggestions
to the leaders or for informing them of real condi-
tions in the country.
This difficulty in upward communications bothers
the leaders at the party center. They have launched
periodic campaigns to stimulate discussion and even
criticism, and to insist on veracity in reports made
to them. They are doubtless sincere, but such ef-
forts encounter formidible obstacles. For one thing
an individual can never be quite sure where the
boundaries of permissible debate are at a given time.
The boundaries shift, and what seems permissible
today may turn out to be the rankest sort of devia-
tion tomorrow. Chinese have before them the lesson
of aftermath of the liberalization effort of early
1957 when the party promised free debate--to "let
one hundred flowers bloom, let all schools of thought
contend." Many of the flowers turned into poisonous
weeds in a short period of time, and a number of
careers were blighted. Recollection of this makes
for caution in accepting present Party encourage-
ment to speak out.
- 66 -
 Nevertheless, genuine intellectual debate does
take place. In 1962, for example, economic publica-
tions printed articles which advanced suggestions
on how resources could be used more effectively.
Others discussed in fairly frank terms the prob-
lems of economic management in a socialist state.
One even offered the argument that profits had a
role to play in a socialist economy. The airing
of such ideas was clearly not an attempt by the
leaders, who would probably regard the last argu
ment as perilously close to heresy, to propagate
a new party line. It seems rather to have been
part of an attempt to extend somewhat the bounda-
ries of permissible intellectual discussion.
 VII. A1?d APPRAISAL OF T~~ SYSTEM
The guiding principles of Chizaese Communist per-
. sonnel management were formulated in the less com-
plicated world of the Chinese revolution and do
not appear to have been markedly cY=an;~d since.
They include: 1) tlse absolute supremacy of the
party, 2) a highly centralized management tech-
nique, and 3) a remarkable continuity and uzaity
of purpose at the top echelons. They have pro-
duced a disciplined and dedicated elite, but at
some cost in flexibility and individual initiative.
Mao Tse-tung and leis closest associated are
strong personalities, the result of rigourous Chi-
nese Communist selection processes. The leading
group has displayed high organizational administra-
five capabilities. It has been able to move with
dispatch on some issues confronting China. Its
approach to others has been halting. It moved
very quickly to exploit to Chinese advantage Soviet
c~:isconafiture as a result of the Cuban crisis in
tl:e fall of 1962. Communes were set up almost
overnight in 1958, but the three-year retreat
from these ill-conceived units-has, on the other
hand., been slaw and painful.
Party personnel processes have brought to the
secozad level of authority devoted, loyal men who
share the aims and convictions of the top leaders
and speak the same language. They are men who have
had many years of administrative experience, men
who have proven themselves to be tough and ruth-
less. Only true believers get this far in the
system. As a group they are more likely to be
versed in Marxism--Leninism and the teaching of
Mao than in a technical specialty.
Itlany middle and lower Ievel officials appear
able, but there does seem to be a shortage of good
administrators and managers. These lesser officials
operate in a system which constantly preaches dis-
cipline, Naturally, many fail to develop an apti-
tude for vigorous, independent action. They become
adept buck-passers, bureaucrats who cl~ecli too many
things with Peiping. This further overloads the
top command in which key figures already hold severe 1
concurrent jabs. These officials can give less than
full time and energy to any one of their posts.
These men, whether in high party position or low,
 are in a sense the end product of Chinese Commun-
i~:t political indoctrination. Tl~.is striking pro-
gram has to a great extent created and maintained
a unity of approach unthinkable in a democratic.
state. No real opposition is countenanced and no
alternative courses are offered, There is tale-~
Lively little wheel-spinning over objective or
method.
The framework for recruitment, transfer and
promotion focusses a great, deal of power and re-
sponsibility in a few hands. The dominant leaders
identify national security priorities and commit
talent to favored programs in complete freedom.
People selected for jobs have no real individual
safeguards such. as exist in this or western nations.
Most Chinese accept this sort of treatment, go where
they are told to go by the authorities and do what
they are told to do. There is no outside competi-
tion for talent. Recruitment and assignment of
personnel pxesent no problems; undesirable turnover
is rare.
The system permits the authorities to channel
the country's best talent, insofar as it is avail-
able, into key areas of national security. Great
efforts are made to stimulate work in approved
scientific, technological and economic fields,
especially those related to the martial arts.
This work is supported and directed lay the party.
FIowever, the system does try, all too fre-
quently, to force round pegs into square holes.
The overall record of the assigning authorities
might be termed fair to good.
Pax?sons who have visited Communist China testify
that the average Chinese Communist functionary is a
hard worker. This is partly the result of the ex-
isting personnel system. Competition is fierce,
and the individual must make his way within the
mold in which the system has cast liim. There is
no opportunity to shift jobs, or even to resign.
Advancement depends entirely upon pleasing the
authorities above. The asceticism preached by the
party helps produce individuals willing to devote
themselves fully to their work. The sense of dedi-
cation today may not be what it was in the earlier
years, but enough remains so that it is a signifi-
cant strength of the Chinese Communist system.
 Material incentives .are present and important
in keeping tkae Chinese functionary bent to his task.
lzis perquisites are small, but valued amidst the
general poverty of China. These functionaries also
work under the stimulus of a system of retribution
which operates on abstract and shifting principles.
Overstaffing is a problem in today's China.
awollen staffs can be attributed in part to the
Chinese Communist practice of giving on-the-job
training to people who will be moved to staff other
offices or factories when they are finished. A
lack of mechanical aids means that many office and
factory tasks, done elsewhere by machine, are done
by hand in China. But the most telling reason is
simply China"s tremendous population.
Skilled manpower in China is strictly limited,
yet the present leaders fail to make full use of
what. they have. They seem quite willing to fritter
away some of the talent they do dispose.
Students who have been educated abroad are
regarded, almost without exception, with suspicion
when they return to China. They are viewed as
having been infected by foreign ideas. It is up
to them to prove otherwise, and over the long
haul. Many returned students, even those afire
with the desire to help-build up a new China, fiiad
it hard to break through this shell of suspicion.
They find that the party will not make full 'use of
their hard-won slciils.
The leaders in fact find it hard to rely fully
on technically trained people, no matter where their
education was won. There are in China competent
scientists and economists who could contribute more
than they do to the development of plans and practices.
These people axe, under the operation of the present
personnel system, rigidly excluded from policy-making
roles. The dominant figures--dogmatic, poorly edu-
cated and distrustful men--prefer to rely for advice-
on long-term associates who share the leaders' back-
ground, prejudices and shortcomings..
Talent is also wasted in the party's obsessive
drive for political conformity. Countless man-hours
are devoted to political indoctrination and loss to
production or the search for. technical know how'. The
authorities are willing to pay the price.
 The personnel situation in Communist China to-
day is in some ways like that in tlYe Soviet-Union
during Stalin's dying days. The top strata, over-
worked, old and tired, forms an impenetrable road-
bloc for those below. The bureaucracy is stagnating.
Advancement, even of ably and trusted people, is
generally slow and. ponderous. Party seniority and
personal relationships are still major factors in
selection for responsible positions. What remains
to be seen is whether the departure of the present
le~dears will rejuvenate the system.
- 71 -
 9 naay 1963
OCI No. 1652/63
Copy No.
STAFFING PROCEDURES AND PROBLEMS IN COMMUNIST CHINA
ANNEX$S
CIA Contribution For Subcommittee on
National Security Staffing and Operations
to the Committee on Govergment Operations,
United States Senate
THIS MATERIAL-CONTAINS
AFFECTING TAE NATION
TAE Ui~ITED STATES
ING OF TAE ESPI
is, usc, s$cT
TRANSMISSIO
IN ANY
PERSON
NFORMATION
DEFENSE OF
THIN TAE MEAN-
AGE LAWS TITLE
?~3 AND X94, TAE
OR REVELATION OF WAICH
NER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED
GROUP i
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
g3
 -
Page
ANNEX ~.
ANNEX II.
STAFFING A C$IN83E CO~UNIST MISSION
ABROA-D
THE STAFFING OF AN INTERNAL SECURITY
1
AGENCY
12
ANNE$ III.
STAFFING AN INDUSTRIAL PLANT
17
 S T
ANNER I
STAFFING A CHINSST COMMUNIST MISSION ABROAD
The ~,ode1 staffing pattern of a Chinese Communist em-
bassy offered in the following paragraphs is an amalgam
of excellent covert reports on several Chinese Communist
missions abroad. Not all Chinese installations abroad
will do all of the things discussed or do them in the
same way, but the general pattern probably holds.
General Principles
The Chinese Communist Party controls all overseas in-
stallations whatever their function. The unit through which
this control is achieved is the installation's party com-
mittee. Formation in the mid-1950's of such committees
was in fact described as a "big step forward for the party
in its leadership of diplomatic work." At our model in-
stallation, the committee is headed by the ambassador
and includes the second ranking embassy official, the
military attache and commercial attache. It meets at
least every other day and makes all decisions with re-
spect to the operation of the mission, from whether the
ambassador will accept a luncheon invitation to the tone
of his conversational remarks if he goes.
It oversees the indoctrination, training, and disci-
Aline of all personnel. It organizes the same kinds of
campaigns among mission personnel that the party is em-
phasizing at home. It runs the basic foreign ministry
study programs designed to train personnel in embassy
duties. These study programs are needed because many
officers are sent abroad with little formal training
in diplomacy.
The committee also organizes the 1~asic party groups
at the mission and oversees the semi--weekly indoctrination
meetings which are compulsory for all embassy personnel.
Minutes are kept of these meetings and are sent back to
the Organization Department in Peiping. Directives on
party matters generally. come to the mission's party com-
mittee from the Organization Department.
The party committee serves as the basic field coordi-
nating unit for foreign operations run by a variety of
Chinese Communist agencies. Sach of the functional sec-
tions at the mission reports back to its counterpart in
~,~'
 S~~ET
Peiping. Regular mission personnel report to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, the military attache to the Defense
Ministry, the commercial attache to the Foreign Trade Minis-
try, and the intelligence representative to the Party's
Investigation Department. These people get their assign-
ment, direction, salary and operating expense from their
parent organizations. They all, however, ire subordinate
to the party committee of the mission.
In case of conflict which cannot be resolved satis-
factorily by the local party committee, the parties to
the dispute report the problem to their respective home
offices in Peiping.. If the matter can't be resolved at
this level it is referred to one of the Central Committee
departments or the Central Committee itself.
Personnel from the Investigation Department operate
with a greater measure of autonomy than the others. The
practice seems to be keep the Ambassador .and the party
committee informed on some intelligence operations, but
not by any means on all. These people can send reports
to Peiping without getting the Ambassador's O.K.
In the interest of using assigned personnel effec-
tively, the ambassador has the authority to organize the
mission as he sees fit. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
is frequently consulted and does make suggestions. Travel-
ling inspectors from the Ministry call periodically to
chick on mission organization and operations. .Across the
board economy measures are sometimes ordered by the Minis-
try. The chief ~of mission has some latitude in deciding
how the cuts will be absorbed.
Mission Personnel
Our model mission, which is in a non-communist coun-
try, has some 30 employees. This is 20 fewer than it had
before the last big austerity. cut in early 1962. Although
some Chinese Communist installations abroad employ local
help, all 30 were sent out from China. They can generally
be classified into three groups; regular diplomats, profes-
sional specialists and service personnel. Practically all
are party members.
The Chinese Communist diplamatie service has a nucleus
of career officers who are shifted from post to post abroad
with an occasional tour in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
in Peiping. The ambassador, the first secretary and several
of the younger officers are~sueh men. The bulk of the
Embassy staff, however, had no background of any kind in
8~
 foreign affairs when they arriv~sl. Few had even travelled
abroad. They were selected from the government at large.
Some had been surprised at their selection. Not all were
delighted.
Only half a dozen of the mission's staff members can
speak or read the language of the host country. And only
two of these are truly fluent. They are valued and have
been longer at the post than anyone else. It is expected
that this situation will gradually improve since .the foreign
ministry is running intensive language courses back in Pei-
ping, and the students there h~r~te been assured by Foreign
Minister Chen Yi that it is not a deviation to become ex-
pert in a foreign tongue. Chen is said to have been dis-
appointed in the quality of linguists produced and to have
demanded that more and better ones be trained. Language
study is usually available at the overseas installation.
The ambassador, a man in his late fifites, has been
a Chinese Communist Party member since he was a student.
Prior to his present assignment, he worked in the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs in Peiping. His only actual foreign.
experience was an earlier assignment as a staff member at
an embassy in a Soviet bloc country.
.The ambassador does not fill the popular image of
a suave diplomat. He is regarded by his subordinates.
as capable and efficient. in-`his work, cold and methodi-
cal in his personnel relations. He is married, and has
several children.
His wife, but not his children, accompanied him
to his present post. She works at the embassy. He is
fond of Chinese cooking and eats the food prepared by
the embassy cook. He smokes a great deal, but drinks
only moderately. Extremely hard working, he spends most
of his day at the office.
The number two man is the counselor, who is about
50 years old. He is a normal school graduate and has
been a party member since World War II. He has held a
series of party positions, but,- prior to being assigned
to his present post, he had no previous experience either
at the foreign ministry or at other missions.
As in the case of the ambassador, the counselor's
wife, but not his children,'~~l~~s accompanied him. His
wife also works in the embassy. The counselor, a bluff,
outgoing man, is relatively free with his opinions. He
is well liked and considered competent by his subordinates.
 The third ranking man at the mission is the first
secretary. A man in his late forties, he has a college
education and is the most fluent linguist at the embassy.
A party member, he has, been with the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs since the early 195U's, and has been at his pre-
sent post for six years., He has considerable administra-
tive responsibilities within the embassy. He also over-
sees the Embassy's Country Section which works on monitor-
ing local publications and takes a leading role in local
embassy reporting. He is not married.
The military attache, a lieutenant colonel, is about
45. He is a long-time member of the Chinese Communist
party. His entire adult career has been spent in the
military service. He has only a secondary school educa-
tion. .Prior to his present assignment he had a tour
of duty at another mission as an assistant military at-
tache.
In his present position, he represents all branches.
of the Chinese Communist armed forces. He is a bluff,
straightforward man, completely loyal to the party. He
is married, but his wife is in China.
The embassy commercial attache is a man in his late
forties. A long time member of the Chinese party;- he
has only a grade school education... Both his commercial
and foreign service experience is scant. He was once
employed by a department store in a major Chinese city.
He was a member of a trade delegation to a Soviet bloc
country in the mid 1950's. This was his only connec-
Lion with his present work, except for a brief tour to
various parts of China designed to familiarize him with
Chinese export products. His wife originally accom-
panied him to his present post but was forced to re-
turn in an earlier economy drive.
The cultural attache, a man of 5U years, is a lsv a
long time party worker. After graduating from a techni-
cal school, he turned his hand to journalism and worked
for the New China News Agency for several years. This is
his first overseas assignment. His wife is with him and
works as his assistant at the embassy.
The nominal head of the General Affairs Section, who
is about 35 years old, is actually the chief of the em-
bassy's Investigation Department unit. As such he is the
only officer at the embassy besides the ambassador per--
mitted to leave the embassy compound along. His wife is
with him and works as one of his assistants. Both are
very experienced in intelligence work, and both are long
time party members.
- 4 -
S~6~ET
 One of the employees of the Country Section was re-
cently sent back to China, He was a man of around 35, who
had come from a good family and had served in various
foreign posts since the early 1950's. He did not, how-
ever, get along with the ambassador, who, he felt, dis-
criminated against him. He was subjected to several
long rounds of ~~criticism and self-criticisms' at the
embassy, and, when he failed to display a proper atti-
tude, and was sent back to China for an indeterminate
period of corrective physical Labor.
The Operation of-the Mission
The business of the mission is to serve as the eyes
and ears of Communist China in the country concerned and
to do what it can locally to implement Chinese Communist
foreign policy. The ambassador once told the staff that
he considered the main tasks of the mission were: to in-
fluence local public opinion in favor of the Chinese Com-
munists; to turn the country from its pro-western stance;
and to help overthrow the government. There was not a
great deal of optimism at the installation that these
aims were at all feasible. It was recognized that the
embassy was hampered by lack of money and qualified people,
and by the:party's insistence on regarding the mission as
a beleaguered castle in the heart of enemy country.
The main effort is of course to collect .information
on the country in which the embassy is locatedb This is
accomplished in three principal ways: by close attention
to the local press and radio, by open contacts with the
local populace, and by covert operations. The mission's
linguists regularly read the leading local newspapers
and magazines. articles judged to be of interest to Pei-
ping are translated. Those which comment on China are
commonly included, though there is a tendency to soften
some of the more critical material.
Items which contradict an official Chinese Communist
interpretation of a situation are often altered or ignored.
The translation are airmailed to other posts in the area
and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This service forms
the bulk of the embassy's day-to-day reporting.
Reporting from the post does not draw heavily on in-
formed local opinion. This is probably due to the-fact
that the embasy does not expend great efforts to estab-
lish and maintain close .contacts either in local official
or non official circles. Some staff members, including
SF
 the ambassador, tend to regard contacts with non--communists
as generally worthless and potentially dangerous.
They may have in mind the fate of an earlier officer
who was forced to undergo a lengthy session of self-criti-
cism both at the embassy and back in Peiping fo-r.havng
had too wade and free contacts with the local population,
In addition, the military attache probably recalls his en-
tirely unsuccessful attempts to visit local military estab-
lishments,
Even contacts with the local communist party. are none
too free. In the first place the leadership of .the local
party has shown a tendency to lean toward the- Soviet side
in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The ambassador and the coun-
selor have on several occasions expressed their disgust
with them, suggesting that their consuming interest in
personal comfort was no way to get a revolution going.
There are, however, several local communist's who are
viewed' with favor, probably for their more militant .stands.
These are cultivated by the top people at the embassy who
have them in for talks and accept invitations to visit
their homes or offices. Other than this, the embassy's
contacts with the local party are limited to attempts to
place articles favorable to the .Chinese Communist posi-
tion in local communist outlets. The principal objective
in dealing with the local party is to influence rather
than to learn. No attempt is known to be made to tap
the local apparatus for information and insights on the
local scene. The views which appear in the local commun-
ist papers are included in the material airmailed back
to Peiping, but the ambassador rejected an idea that
wider contacts would. be useful on the grounds that he
knew more of what was going on in the country than the
local party did.
The embassy, along with a number of other~Chinese
Communist missions abroad, has come undex fire recently
for failing to understand conditions in the countries
to which they are attached.. The embassies were ci?iticized
for their failure to get and rep?rt t~inside information'
and for their superficial anmlys.is of such information
as was: collected.
The main reportorial effort goes into the semi-
annual policy and progress review. This is written by
the ambassador using contributions from each of the em-
bassy's functional components. It covers the objectives
pursued by the embassy in the past six months, the progress
made toward reaching them,t;he`>problems encountered and
 a statement of what remains to be done. Such summaries
are apparently called for in the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fair's reporting schedule. They probably are used in com-
piling the Ministry's own periodic progress reviews.
These perio die studies supplement and summarize regular
classified pouch and cable messages in which the embassy
sets forth its observations on the local scene. These are
neither particularly voluminous nor frequent. Added in-
formation is provided by the local representatives of the
Investigation Department.
In the first half of the 1950's, the Chinese shifted
the intelligence gathering function among different party,
government and military agencies, Beginning in 1956 it
was gradually brought under more centralized control...
The function came to rest in the party's Investigation
Department under Tsou Ta-peng. The department is not
listed in any unclassified official government or party
documents and can be considered a completely clandestine
organization. This organization sends its awn people
abroad under the cover of government agencies which have
legitimate overseas connections.
Personnel sent abroad under foreign ministry cover
conform to the general standards for diplomatic personnel.
Both length of tour and conditions of service are similar
to those of the ministry,. Wives of intelligence officers
are frequently sent abroad. There seems to be a decided
preference .for husband-wife teams in Chinese intelligence
work. Wives not only do secretarial work, but in many
cases serve as couriers or agent handlers.
Generally, but not invariably, intelligence personnel
are placed in the middle range of foreign service assign-
ments. Whatever the cover position, the individual is
accorded treatment inside the embassy in keeping with his
party status. Persons whose cover position is of a lower
grade than his real position with the Investigation De-
partment are paid the salary of the cover position9 the
difference is credited to his bank account in Peiping.
The embassy's intelligence people draw heavily on
the local Chinese community for agent personnel. Major
intelligence targets include political, economic, seenti-~
fic, industrial and military developments in the country.
where the embassy is located as well as in nearby nations.
Regional groupings, the impact of US economic and military
aid and the extent of the US influence are other subjects
of interest.
9>
 The embassy is also ir?astructed9 from tame to times
to try to promote culturaY and commercial exchangese
The commercial attaches fo~? example, a~~turned from a
recent home lave to push more aggress~.vely the sale of
Ckainese products in an attempt to earn amore foreign ex~
changes Previously trade ksad been seen ~.argely as a
device to influence local peoples On his return he
set up an exkaibi?t of Chinese products and visited a num~
ber of firms in axa effort to stimulate their interest
in Chinese products, He was not highly successful but
dice ~;et a few nibbles o
'1`k1e cultural attache brie s to see tkaa:~ Communist
C7aa.na r;~ts a good press locallyo Ike ?~akes charge of
ct~stributing tl~ae New China News Agency's daily news ~xaa~al~-
letinss and responds eagerly to requests for informa?~ion
on ~;oananurti:;t ~: bins o Ile supplements the press clipping ef?
forts o:x the embassy's research staff by sending extracts
of local press stories and editorial opinion back to the
New Chirac News Agency in Peipingo On occasion he has gone
to nearby corz.ntries to cover special events for the agencyo
Money is :~ big factor in communications between the
em'c~assy and Peipingo Telegraphic traffics compared to US
standards, is m9,nisculeo Three to four telegrams a day
ar.e sent in verb heavy periodsa At other times only one
telegram is sent every three or foux c~.aysn The embassy
probably averages around one to two a days There is a
full time code clerk to handle .classified traffics ands
altYaougr~ the volume of incoming traffic is no?~ knowns he
certainly is not overworked, A diplomatic pouch is packed
up by a pair of the ministry's forty couriei?s about-once
a moratho These couriers incidentlys are among the most
highly indoctrinated of Chinese Comma~.nistso The product
of a accost painstaking clearance process, they get a threem
anontl~ ~ full time reindoctri.nation coux?se every year o Yet
they almost. always travel i.n pairso The bulk of the class-
fied exchanges between Peiping and the embassy go by these
poucheso The open mail is used for some normal b~usinesss
sLack7 as the tx?ansraission of the daily press 'translations e
As it does within Ckainas the party rela.es heavily
upon personal briefings to keep abreast oa": what its over?
sets installations'~ac~ up to and to keep the ~.nstallations
appraised of the latest policy developments in Peipingo
Area conferences for ambassadors are held periodicallyo
At times the ambassadors are called back to Peiping .for
c.orasultations a At least ~1 arbassadors s more than half
tk:xe total9 were brought back to be briefed after the Central
 SE~Y~ET
Committee's tenth plenum ~.z~ ~~:ptember 1~~~. 4Vk3en the am-
bassadors return to their posts, tl~e~Y pass along to key
members of their staffs the substance of the information
received. Embassies occasionally are visited by touring
officials from Peiping, who usually brief the embassy
staff. .
As a general rule, the members of the mission feel
isolated from Peipin and have been at tinges embarrassed
by the lacy of specific policy guidazace. Many Chinese
foreign service personnel,- for example, were not able to
interpret either the commune program or the Chinese posi-
tions in tine amino-soviet dispute to Peiping's satisfac-
tion. In some cases even the ambassadors were not filled
in well enough to discuss important matters with members
of their own staffs.
Tlae embassy Yias found .that its quickest and most
direct contact with the party line is Radio Peiping. The
ambassador has made it compulsory for all personnel to
listen to two one-hour programs every days He feels
that this contributes to the embassy's understanding
of what is going on in Peiping and provides useful ma-
terial for the regular study sessions. The ambassador
himself gets an airmail copy of the People's Daily, which
generally arrives three days after printing. The daily
bulletin of the New Claina News Agency are also received
by airmail. All party men at the embassy subscribe to
the elite theoretical journal Red Flag, but it reaches
them by surface mail about a m~h~~er publication.
Difficulties in communication are particularly
irritating to embassy Officials since they must con-
stantly refer even seemingly trivial matters to Peiping
for decision. All requests for visas, for example, have
to be checked with Peiping, as do such matters as who
is to be asked to the annual observation of National
Day.
Life Abroad
~Hembers of the embassy lead a highly insular existence.
Not only are they cut off from home by distance and poor
communications but the party's approach to the problem of
runni:~g an embassy in a capitalist country cuts them off
from rewarding personal relationship's with local in-
habitants. Life at the embassy is viewed as a constant
struggle against the "corrupting influence of the capital-
ist world.Tt .The ambassador regards tl~e struggle as parti--
culaa^ly acute in his embassy since all personnel are daily
 confronted with the palpable difference between what the party
has taught them about a capitalist country and the reality
around them.
The .party's answer is to try to recreate the living
and working conditions of Peiping at the embassy. The
ministry, for example, lzas gone to the trouble and ex-
pense of sending a Chinese cook to the embassy. Everyone
eats Chinese food prepared by him. They eat well by Chi-
nese standards, but not lavishly. Most staff members
wear the plain style of trousers and jacket popularized
by the Chinese Communist leaders, although the top people
sometimes don western-style clothes when leaving the em-
bassy precincts. Only the highest ranking men, or Investi-
gation Department personnel, can leave. the embassy alone.
A11 others must leave in pairs. Even so, the ambassador
recently instituted a requirement that those leaving had
to sign out, stating where they were going, and why, and
when they would be back.
Except for the ambassador and his wife, all staff
members eat in the embassy mess hall and sleep in embassy
quarters. Both are in the same building with. the embassy
offices. The ambassador and his wife live in a separate
house, and while he sometimes joins the staff for a meal
he usually eats in his office with his wife or another
colleague.
The embassy is open for business from 8:30am to 6:OOpm.
Recreation is planned in advanced and taken in groups. It
generally involves short trips to nearby places. At other
times reading, 1'istening to the radio, watching televi-
sion or an infrequent movie sent out from China are the
chief forms of relaxation. Such moves were more common
prior .to the big 1962 austerity movement than they are
now. A dinner will sometimes. be sponsored by the embassy
at a local Chinese restaurant, say, to celebrate Chinese
New Year's or the anniversary of the founding of the Chi-
nese Communist government.. Hoa~ever, invitations to diplo-
matic functions even from embassies of the socialist bloc,
are closely monitored by the party committee and not in-
frequently rejected, Some are accepted and then ignored.
The atmosphere inside the embassy building is one of
mutual suspicion. Petty admonitions are common. The more
progressive elements are constantly on the-alert for sug-
gestions of deviationist tendencies. For example a simple
act like turning on the embassy television set might `open
one to charges of being attracted to the bourgeosie life.
~C~2ET
 Such a charge, once made, can easily develop into an ex-
tended and uncomfortable period of self-criticism at the
embassy's regular study groups.
Homesickness is common. Tours of duty-are long and
only senior officers have their wives with them. The
younger~gfficers serve without their wives, who are left
behind in China with the children. For such officers
the news of hardships at home for the past few years has
been particularly upsetting.
Bachelors fare little better. They are warned against
fraternizixig with local girls and can under no circumstan-
ces marry one. There are no female employees except for
the wives of higher-ranking officers. -One bachelor at the
embassy had been engaged to a girl back in China. She mar-
ried someone else when he could not get leave to return
to China.
There are, however, saving elements in the situation.
The officer abroad gets a clothing allowance and free
medical service. His food and lodging are provided at
nominal charges. Most of them are able to build up their
savings, and some officers at the embassy deposit up to
50 percent of their salaries in their accounts in Peiping.
Need for local currency is limited, but the officers do
like to purchase and send back to relatives items such
as clothing which are hard to come by in China. One of
the ranking officers has. taken advantage of his ,present
assignment to pick up a number of luxury items for him-
self'. He has bought a radio, a television set, a Germa n
camera, a Swiss watch, a record player and new clothes
for himself and wife.
It is likely that, despite the restrictive aspects
of his life abroad, the average employee of the embassy
considers himself better off than if he had remained in
China. As one of them once remarked, f'If I had not joined
the party, I would probably still be an insignificant
school teacher back in Chinas`
SF~RET
 S ~ ET
ANNEX II
THE STAFFING OF AN INTERNAL SECURITY AGENCY
The Chinese Communist regime must maintain public.
order over a territory of 3.7 million square miles-and a
population of almost 730 million people. Although ,the
Chinese regime places great emphasis on persuasive meas-
ures to achieve political stability, the coercive aspects
of this national security goal are also extensive.
The Ministry of Public Security represents. the
coercive arm of the go.~rernment. The Canton Public Secu-
ity Bureau one of the Ministry's geographical subdivi-
sions, is an important part of the security system. Can-
ton in Kwangtung province is the fifth largest city in
the country and is located in part of China which has
extensive foreign contacts. Many Overseas Chinese come
from Kwangtung. Canton is close to the free world .border
at Hong Kong. Daily social and business traffic between
the two cities is substantial. Canton is a natural head-
quarters both for external intelligence operations and
for operations designed to counter foreign penetration
attempts.
Comparatively detailed information on the staffing
policies of the Canton Bureau have provided by a
man who worked in the Economic Security Department of
this Bureau for about four years. Prior to his defec-
tion in 1958, he was charged with investigating the poli-
tical reliability of the employees of government economic
agencies such as industrial plants, banks, and commercial
units. The personnel of the Economic Security Department
were essentially plainclothes investigators. One of
their functions was to screen employees of economic.
agencies. By 1958, the Economic Security Department
had investigated and maintained files on more than
80,000 persons, almost four percent of the city's
population.
The Canton Public Security Bureau employed about
7,000 persons, of which some 2,000 were professional per-
sonnel. The professionals represented a fairly homo-
geneous group with respect to age, social origins,
and political status. .
9G
 CRET
The employees of the Bureau were all. young. With the
exception of the head of the Bureau who was in his late
forties, almost all full-time professional personnel were
under 30.
Most members mf the bureau staff were not natives
Af Kwangtung. They were recruited largely Pram n?rthern
China and thus had few personal ties with the local popu?
lation. The family background of employees was closely
checked. loo family connections with either substantial
wealth or anti-communist political movements were.permis-
sible. The individuals themselves could have had no af-
filiation with a political movement other than the Chi-
nese Communist Party. Mo foreign associations were per-
witted, either travel abroad or relatives residing over-
seas.
All 2,000 professional employees of the bureau were.
party members, and many others on the staff were Youth
League members. The senior people represented a hard
core of experienced personnel. Each of the top five
had had more than 20 years of experience in Chinese Com-
munist intelligence work. Together they prabably made
up the bureau's party committee.
All other professional personnel had been recruited
from one of the four following groups: 1) young men in
party or Youth League work, recommended by the party
officials in charge of these groups as being particularly
"progressive" and promising; 2) exceptionally bright high
school graduates, recommended by school authorities and
selected by the bureau on the basis of competitive ex-
amination; 3) former police or intelligence operatives
of the Kuomintang, employed as agents for specific pro-
jects because of their special knowledge of either tech-
nique or locality. (use of such individuals was more com-
mon in the early 1950's than in 1958); and, 4) wives of
bureau employees. In 1958 there were about 500 women
employed in the bureau.
With the exception of the third category, most em-
ployees had virtually no experience in police work when
taken into the bureau. Recruits entering on duty. were
given a basic training course in public security opera-
tions at the bureau's training center, the Canton Insti-
tute of Public Security. This was followed by a six-
months probationary assignment. Successful completion
of this pair of programs resulted in the recruit's full
integration into the public security force.
SE~`~ET
~~
 Thereafter personnel of the bureau were trained em-
pirically on the job. Formal instruction was offered
after hours in. general investigation and surveillance
techniques. zany availed themselves of this opportunity..
Few members of the bureau were sent out of Canton for
further training. At higher levels of the public secu-
rity system, study for as long as two years at the Na-
tional Public Security Institute in Peiping was manda-
tory. Such a course of study was a prerequiste for
promotion to .the section chief level in a provincial
public security bureau.
The Canton municipal and Kwangtung provincial public
security organizations each had. their own schools. These
specialized in part-time training courses, offering poli-
tical as well as technical courses.
Day-to-day political indoctrination at the bureau
was the responsibility of the party committee. Sessions
were both frequent and thorough. Besides attendance at
the usual sessions of his political study group the
party member had to present himself at meetings c?n-
ducted quite often by the bureau's party committee which
contained a large measure of political instruction.
There were no overall educational standards for
employment in the bureau. Self-improvement was encour-
aged in all walks of life in Communist China and any de-
sire for schooling was encouraged.. The staff did not
appearto be under any strong pressures, however, to
improve its educational level.
Promotion in the bureau was based on a combination
of the individual's ide?logical sturdiness and his pro-
fessional ability. Below the level of section chief
at the bureau, the departmental party committee could
recommend promotion to the political department of the
bureau. The actual promotion action was taken by the
political department.. For promotion to section chief, the
departmental recommendations was reviewed by the party
committees at both the Canton and the Kwangtung Public
Security Bureau. It was then submitted to the Canton
Party Committee for final action. Department-heads
at the bureau were appointed by the Canton Party Com-~
mittee with the approval of the State Council.
Transfers were fairly frequent within the public
security system. The former bureau employee worked
for four years.>as an investigator in the Hunan Pro-_
vincial Pub lie Security Bureau before being transf~~red
r~
 to Canton. His transfer was also a promotion. then he
got to Canton, he wau assigned administrative responsi-
bilities for the first. time and was appointed deputy sec-
tian chief in an organization doing the same type of
investigation work that he had done in Honan. Trans-
fers also occur to Gobs which require security training
outside the public security agencies. The Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, for example, gets it security person-
nel from these agencies. Special training necessary
for a new assignment--such as the complicated physical
security measures needed to protect an embassy in foreign
territory, or the use and detection of electronic de-
vices--is provided by the security agencies prior to
transfer.
The grade and classification system used in the
Canton bureau in 1958 was still provisional, although
other civilian .and military ranking systems had been
fixed by about 1955. A rank classification committee
had been established in Peiping of representatives
from the Ministry of Public .Security, the Central Com?
mittee of the Party, the State Council, and the General
Political Department of the armed forces. The committee
was set up to study the Soviet public security organiza-
tion and to formulate standards for classification and
the assignment of Chinese public security personnel. As
far as the former employee knew, it had never .issued its
findings.
Public security employees enjoyed a relatively high
standard of living and a measure of prestige. The pro-
fessionals as a group were extremely young. Their edu-
cation was no better than moderate. Yet they held re-
sponsible positions in an organization which exercised
a considerable measure of control over the general popu-
lation.
Living standards for public security personnel at
the professional level appeared to approach the levels
enjoyed by officers of the armed forces. Only single
men were required to live in barracks. In 1955 only
about 1,000 out of ?,000 employees did so. The em-
ployees were well uniformed and enjoyed both food and-
drink on a scale not granted to the average Chinese.
Salary payments were considered adequat?.~ And it was
possible to incur operational and entertainment expenses
in the line of duty if they were substantiated by authors-:~-
~a~d receipts.
SE ET
99
 Discipline within the public security force was
largely a party responsibility, since almost ail em-
ployees were members. Punishment depended, of course,
on the nature and severity of-the offense, but it al-
ways included a crawling session of self-criticism be-
fore the relevant party committee. If the misdeameanor
was serious enough, self-criticism could be followed by
removal from position, demotion in either grade or
salary, dismissal, or .actual criminal prosecution. Dis-
ciplinary action could be taken for reasons that extended
well beyond job-related misconduct into an individual's
private life. The former employee was once disciplined
by the party after his wife, herself a party member,
reported that he struck her. More damaging, however,
was her second charge that he frequently criticized
party meetings in private for being .dull and time-con-
suming.
 STAFFING AN INDUSTRIAL PLANT
A basic policy of the Chinese Communists is that the
key positions in state-owned enterprises must be filled
by trusted party officials, regardless of their tech-
nical qualifications. This rule has been relaxed slightly,
but only slightly, since 1960 when the party decided re-
luctantly that it would have to begin giving greater re-
spect to technicians. Trained persons are being given
more authority over actual production processes, but the
chief of a plant is still invariably a long-time party
official. Most of his key deputies still come from the
party organization rather than up from the ranks of tech-
nicians. Exceptions exist mainly in very tiny enter-
prises or those employing especially complex processes.
In such .cases the deputy will probably turn out to be
a non-party technician. In general, however, non-party
persons can aspire to reach only the third echelon, be-
low the manager and his deputies.
The party further insures control by providing
the officials that staff the plant's Party Committee.
This committee is a sort of board of directors supply-
ing policy guidance and overseeing operations. Full-
time of~f3cials on the committee. rank with senior manage-
ment. Friction between party and managem~;nt oca.si~~~xa~1~-r?-`r~--
1y occurs, but the party generally is able to-keep it in
check. It is not uncommon to have the same person serve
concurrently as plant Manager and as 'secretary of the
Party Committee. ,,
Information on current staffing practices in Chi-
nese Communist enterprises can be obtained from the
large number of refugees who are constantly leaving
the mainland of China for Hong Kong. Probably a typi-
cal staffing pattern is the one that exists in the
Peiping Machine Tool Plant Number Two. A man who worked
at this plant until 1962 says it is average in size
and level of technology. It employed 3,500 workers
in 1960, a total that was cut to 2,400 during the na-
tionwide industrial retrenchment of 1961-1962. Its
products are metal-cutting machine tools (two models
of a grinding machine, a shaper, and a boring machine)
which it sells for the equivalent of $1,300 to $20,000
each. Its quality standards are high, and it managed
to export 50 shapers in 1962.
~.?
1>
 The manager of the Macriine Tool Plant has three de-
puties, who run the production, supply and administra-
tion, and personnel departments. Like most Chinese
enterprises, this plant is organized on three levels of
administration: departments, sections, and basic-level
units (such as workshops and warehouses).
Senior personnel at the plant were described by the
refugee. The chief, 45 years old,-had participated in
the Long March of the 193~'s. He has a ninth-grade
education, is married, and has three children. His
wife works in the Personnel Section.
The first deputy, 55, runs the Production Depart-
meet. He has the title of Chief Engineer although he
has no technical knowledge and must rely on the Chief
of his Technical Section for technical guidance. A
good political organizer, he has only a sixth-grade
education. The second deputy, 55, is in charge of
supply and administration. Also a veteran of the Long
.March, he has a junior middle school (ninth-grade)
level of education. The deputy for personnel, 55,and
a veteran of the Long March, boasts that he fought in
the civil war through the Hainan Island campaign of
January 1950.
The Chief of the Technical Section, 50, is a na-
tive of Peiping. He is a college graduate and the most
highly quahified technical man in the factory. He
actually does the Chief Engineer's work. The Chief
of the Plant Maintenance Section, 55, also~is a college
graduate. The Inspection Section, which has the vital.
responsibility of controlling the quality of produc-
tion, is headed by a female, age 27, who is a Party
member.
The Chief: of the Security Section, 55, is a veteran
party member who transferred to this job directly from
the armed forces. The Personnel Section is headed by
a 55-year-old femme who was a lieutant colonel in the
army. In the Chinese Communist syste~, army officers
receive full pay when they transfer to a civilian
post;, the Personnel Section Chief therefore. receives
salary of 16~ yuan per month, which makes her`the
highest-paid employee in the plant. In fact, ex-army
people are prominent in plants throughout China in
the vital personnel and seeuritp functions.