NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY MONDAY 28 APRIL 1980

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005148760
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2010
• Case Number: F-2007-00460
• Publication Date: April 28, 1980

Director of
Central
Intelligence
APPROVED FOR RELEASE^
DATE: 01-20-2010
Natrona
28 April 1980
Intel igence. Daily
Monday
et
TOP See
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
CO NO 80-1 OOJX
ri `
 Situation Report
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Briefs and Comments
Venezuela: Aid Programs Increasing. . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Eastern Europe: Possible Oil Shortages. . . . . . . . . . 6
Brazil: Effects of Metalworkers' Strike . . . . . . . . . 7
Taiwan: Suppressing Dissent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
International: Developing Country Loans . . . . . . . . . 8
Special Analysis
USSR-Europe: Conference of Corrnnunist Parties. . . . . . . 9
28 April 1980
 The aborted rescue mission apparently has strengthened the
position of Iranian hardliners who are opposed to any compromise
clerical hardliners, led by Ayatollah
Beheshti, will exploit the mission's failure to strengthen
further their position and undermine President Bani-Sadr.
Beheshti's statement yesterday that Bani-Sadr should not
have agreed to the unconditional return of the commandos'
bodies indicates that Beheshti believes Bani-Sadr is
vulnerable. Beheshti's Islamic Republic Party newspaper
demanded yesterday that the bodies--currently on display
at the Embassy--be returned only in exchange for Iranian
assets blocked by the US.
Tehran radio has broadcast the purported full text
of a Khomeini message to President Bani-Sadr last night.
The Ayatollah blasts Western and UN support for "world-
devouring America" and suggests Bani-Sadr invite various
foreign groups to observe the results of the aborted US
mission. He flatly refers to "50 spies" being detained--
using "we" to describe those holding the hostages--but
contends they are being treated with "the utmost humanity."
The final paragraph admonishes Bani-Sadr to caution sub-
versive elements against dissident activity "at the crucial
moment," citing Iranian Kurds and US supporters "quite
numerous among our own so-called intelligentsia and the
youngsters who have been deceived by these groups." (U)
We have no information to confirm or deny the mili-
tants' claim that they have transferred hostages to Qom
and Tabriz, but it appears likely that at least some of
the hostages have been taken out of the compound.F_
ze
hostages' transfer significantly increases the risk that
--continued
m__ n_ e
1
28 April 1980
 some could be injured either by rival groups eager to
gain possession of some hostages or in reaction to rumors
of possible further US military moves.
EC Summit Communique
Iran appears certain to be a key topic in the EC
summit communique to be issued later today. Press back-
grounders on the initial discussions, which wound up
early today in Luxembourg, indicate it is likely to stress
solidarity with the US on the hostage issue and reiterate
the decisions announced by the EC Foreign Ministers last
Tuesday.
In its first official reaction to the rescue mission,
China expressed "regret" over the US move and strongly
implied that such an action played into the hands of the
USSR. A Chinese Foreign Ministry statement issued yes-
terday characterized US sanctions as well as the rescue
operation as a violation of Iran's sovereignty and called
on "both sides" to exercise "prudence and restraint" in
working toward a solution. According to press reports,
Vice Premier Li Xiannian made similar points today in
a meeting with a delegation of visiting US newspaper
executives. (U)
Since the beginning of the hostage situation the
Chinese have counseled restraint because they are fearful
of moves that might work to Moscow's benefit. In an
effort to add balance, the Foreign Ministry statement
also expressed the "hope" that Iran will release the
hostages as soon as possible. (U)
Japanese Prime Minister Ohira told reporters yester-
day that he will urge President Carter in their meeting
Thursday to use "only peaceful means" to solve the hostage
problem and will commit Japan to act in coordination with
Western Europe to press Iran for an early release of the
2
28 April 1980
 hostages.
USSR - East European Reactions
Soviet commentary continues to be sharply critical,
describing the rescue attempt as "new adventurism" and a
threat to peace in the Persian Gulf. To date, however,
no ranking Soviet leader has reacted publicly, with the
exception of Foreign Minister Gromyko's negative comments
at a news conference on Friday in Paris.
Reaction in Eastern Europe consists mostly of factual
reporting and sparse, but highly critical, editorial
comments, with most countries apparently following
Moscow's lead. Romania, however, has departed from its
past restraint on controversial international issues and
is giving the story extensive coverage, including a re-
port in the party daily expressing the Romanian Govern-
ment's disapproval. The unusually sharp tone of the
Romanian response undoubtedly reflects Bucharest's desire
to safeguard its newly signed oil import agreement with
Iran.
Saudi Reaction
The Saudi Government in an official statement last
night expressed "great concern and much regret" about
the US rescue mission, which it characterized as "going
beyond" the "acceptable limits of international behavior."
Riyadh urged both the US and Iran to exercise "self.-
restraint" and work for the release of the hostages. (U)
The little media coverage of the incident in Saudi
Arabia has been largely negative, in keeping with the
Saudi position as a primary proponent of Islamic soli-
darity. Editorial comment has ranged from calls for
restraint to condemnation of the US action. Reactions
from other Persian Gulf states have centered on the pos-
sible effects the operation might have on the stability
of the area.
--continued
3
28 April 1990
 TAR qppl-pi~
Iran-Iraq
Iraq appears to be planning sabotage operations in
Iran The and nd again
IrGoveanian facilities
announced in Kuwait
yesterday that it
shot down an Iraqi helicopter and chased off three others
trying to rescue the survivors.
Tee 9.@- ref
4
28 April 1980
 VENEZUELA: Aid Programs Increasing
President Herrera is increasing Venezuela's bilateral aid pro-
grams in Central America and in the Caribbean to ease the impact of
recent oil price increases and to offset Cuban political and
economic influence.
When Herrera took office last year, he intended to
continue existing aid programs but to restrict new com-
mitments because of the increase in Venezuela's current
account deficit. His change in policy was influenced
particularly by Venezuela's shift to a current account
surplus and by expanding political instability in the
region.
The Herrera administration's bilateral aid exten-
sions in Central America are already outpacing those of
its predecessor. Nicaragua received a $20 million
reconstruction credit as well as a reported $80 million
in commitments for development aid. Additional assistance,
including a $60 million oil facility, may follow. Hon-
duras obtained a $55 million loan for a hydroelectric
project; F1 Ca1-smHmr received a $20 million oil import
credit.
Venezuela also is developing a program for the Carib-
bean Islands, particularly Jamaica, in hopes of neutraliz-
ing growing Cuban influence. Earlier this year the govern-
ment allowed Jamaica to defer oil payments an additional
month due to Kingston's financial difficulties. Plans
have been suspended, however, for a new $144 million oil-
import facility because of Jamaica's financial and politi-
cal problems.
Venezuela is considering further increases in assist-
ance to the region including a program of grants and loans
to offset up to 44 percent of the countries' oil bills.
The program, which involves as much as $500 million in
commitments this year, probably will be approved by Con-
gress. Total commitments from this facility could reach
$1.5 to $2.5 billion from 1980 to 1985.
Top sec~re t!
5
28 April 1980
 EASTERN EUROPE: Possible Oil Shortages
Recent actions by East Germany and Bulgaria suggest that the
USSR, which recently reduced domestic allocations of fuels, may be
planning, or making similar cuts in exports of crude oil to Eastern
Europe.
Rising Soviet oil prices--reflecting increasing
world oil prices--may also have influenced the East Ger-
man and Bulgarian steps. Both countries depend heavily
upon the USSR for crude oil.
Trucking companies are particularly hard hit. Some
reports indicate they must close down operations when
their monthly fuel allocations are exhausted. Gasoline
currently is rationed to all businesses, and there are
rumors in East Germany that rationing will soon be ex-
tended to include private use.
6
28 April 1980
 The nearly month-long metalworkers' strike in Sao
Paulo could further complicate the government's relations
with hardline military commanders and is creating tension
between the regime and the Church that is not likely to
dissipate uickly.
The government has sought Churc support to
end the strike but has been rebuffed by the Archbishop
of Sao Paulo. Figueiredo has publicly criticized the
Church for supporting the strike and has accused the
Archbishop of inciting workers.
Top SeeFet
7
 TAIWAN: Suppressing Dissent
The authorities have widened their drive against
critics of the regime by detaining the Secretary General
of the Presbyterian Church on Taiwan, Kao Chun-ming.
Kao is suspected of involvement in the unsuccessful
escape attempt last December of one of the "Kaohsiung
eight" who were recently convicted of sedition in con-
nection with the antigovernment riot there last year.
The Presbyterian Church membership of some of those in-
volved in the escape attempt has afforded hardliners in
the security services a long-awaited opportunity to crack
down on the Church, which has publicly called for Taiwan's
independence. The regime has not been deterred by the
longstanding ties between the Taiwan Presbyterian Church
and coreligionists in the US.
INTERNATIONAL: Developing Country Loans
A sharp drop in private international borrowing by
the non-OPEC developing countries in the first quarter
probably will be reversed but not enough for many of them
to offset slowed economic growth during the rest of 1980.
Foreign lenders attribute the recent falloff to concern
over the high levels of developing country external debt,
the danger of overextension on the part of several of the
larger lenders, and the frequent lack of progress on
economic stabilization programs throughout the Third
World. Major borrowers, however, state that they are
mainly holding out against present high interest rates
and are still digesting large loans taken in late 1979.
Borrowing should increase in the remainder of 1980
as market conditions settle and some of the large OPEC
surpluses are made available. Terms, however, probably
will continue to stiffen for less creditworthy developing
countries, while remaining favorable for stronger perform-
ers. Non-OPEC developing countries as a group are likely
to borrow slightly more through 1980 than last year, but
those with larger oil import bills may have to scale
down both their borrowing and growth plans.
Top Sccrct
-r
8 F_
28 April 1980
 Soviet Union Romania
Poland Yugoslavia
Hungary Albania
Bulgaria Italy
Czechoslovakia Spain
East Germany Great Britain
West Germany Netherlands
West Berlin San Marino
Austria Swedish Left Party-Communist
Cyprus
Portugal
Swedish Workers' Party
Switzerland
 The Soviet-inspired Conference of European Communist Parties
that opens today in Paris under French and Polish sponsorship is
intended, in part, to demonstrate broad Communist support in Europe
for disarmament and East-West detente despite the setback of
Afghanistan. The success of the conference is already in doubt,
however, because several major West and East European parties have
refused to participate. Although Moscow may have hoped the confer-
ence would put pressure on some dissident parties to conform, the
meeting probably will onlu underline and intensify the disunity among
European Communists.
The Soviets first broached the idea of such a meet-
ing last June as a means of stimulating support in West
Europe for the SALT II Treaty and future SALT III negotia-
tions. The NATO decision in December on theater nuclear
forces gave it considerable added impetus.
The invasion of Afghanistan and the opposition it
engendered from Western countries and independent Com-
munist parties upset conference plans at the beginning
of this year.
The Soviets apparently also hoped that the confer-
ence would improve the position of the French Communist
Party while isolating the Italian party. The Soviets
have been pleased by the outspoken support of Secretary
General Marchais for their actions in Afghanistan.
9 P
28 April 1980
 Moscow's opposition to the Italian Communists' inde-
pendent stance had been intensified by party leader
Berlinguer's criticism of the invasion of Afghanistan
and by what the Soviets regarded as the Italian party's
weak opposition to TNF. The Italians, in turn, have
said that they will not attend the conference because
it is "wrong in method, timing, and theme."
The Communist parties of the UK, the Netherlands,
and San Marino, as well as the Swedish Left Party, also
will boycott the session. The Belgian Communist Party
will attend only as an observer.
East European Parties
If things go as the Soviets plan, the conference
will mark the first endorsement by high-level Warsaw
Pact country officials--albeit without the Romanians--
of Moscow's policy in Afghanistan.
Nonetheless, some of the East European parties that
are attending probably have reservations about the con-
ference.
The Hungarians and the Poles may not be enthusiastic
about publicly endorsing Soviet policy on Afghanistan in
such a forum, but they will go along. They will be
concerned, however, over any attempt to isolate the
28 April 1
 Italian, Spanish, and Yugoslav parties. Polish and Hun-
garian delegates probably will attempt to tone down any
criticism directed at the absent parties.
The Poles probably were happy to cosponsor the
conference when it was first proposed last year by the
Soviets in a disarmament context.
The Yugoslav and Romanian boycotts stem from a
belief that Moscow will use the gathering not only to
obtain an across-the-board endorsement of its policies
but will also attempt to reestablish its domination of
the international Communist movement. Both countries
oppose the invasion of Afghanistan and maintain close
ties with the Italian and Spanish parties.
Belgrade and Bucharest also object to the abrupt
manner in which the agenda and declaration of the con-
ference were drawn up by the Soviets without prior con-
sultation. Belgrade has even criticized this tactic as
a violation of the agreements reached at the conference
of European Communist parties in East Berlin in 1976.
Romania's decision not to attend was particularly
difficult because of its Warsaw Pact membership. If
the other independent Communist parties had gone, the
Romanians also would have participated and complained
about objectionable resolutions--as they did in 1976.
After waiting for almost all parties to declare whether
they would attend, however, Bucharest decided that it
did not want to be the lone dissenting voice.
Prospects
The absence of the independent European Communist
parties from Paris all but assures Moscow of a unanimous
endorsement of its policies on disarmament, Afghanistan,
and the international Communist movement. But the costs
in attaining this bogus "unity" will be high. Rather
than isolating the Italian and Spanish parties and
improving the position of the French, the reverse is
likely to be the result. Moreover, the failure of the
Yugoslav and Romanian parties to attend will pub
strains on their relationships with Moscow.
11 =
 on-srcret