CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001239730
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: June 18, 2010
• Case Number: F-2010-00646
• Publication Date: February 21, 1963

CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY IVO. 79
OCI NO. ~~~si~~
2.~; February 196
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
APPROVED FOR
RELEASE^ DATE:
02-Jun-2010
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 February 1963
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
(Information as of 1200 EST 20 Feb)
THE SITUATION IN CUBA Page 1
effort there.
Cuba is having difficulties in meeting its trade
obligations with several bloc countries. An all-out internal
attack on-the Castro regime is said to be imminent, but such
reports may represent a new attempt by Castro to trap his
opponents. A group of six Argentines who have completed
guerrilla training in Cuba is located in Uruguay now and
is preparing to re-enter Argentina to organize a guerrilla
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS Page 3
Khrushchev's decision to withdraw "several thousand"
Soviet military personnel from Cuba probably was prompted
by his desire to remove a major irritant in US-Soviet rela-
tions which, in his view:, might cause another flare-up of
the crisis and jeopardize prospects for new negotiations on
such issues as Berlin. The decision also suggests that
the main lines of Soviet-Cuban relations in the immediate
future finally have been worked out after protracted and
difficult negotiations.
At Geneva, the USSR has continued to stall on dis-
cussing a nuclear test ban, while urging other delegations
to press the US to reduce its terms for an agreement.
Moscow is maintaining its ambivalent attitude toward
the new Iraqi Government. While Foreign Minister Gromyko
affirmed the USSR's desire for friendly relations and the
Soviet Embassy in Baghdad stated that Soviet military aid
would continue, the Soviet party centr~.l committe sharply
denounced the new re ime's su ression of Iraqi Communists.
SOVIET HEAVY BOMBERS FLY NEAR AZORES .
Soviet aerial surveillance.
In a further extension of overwater operations by
Soviet heavy bombers, two TU-95s on 13 February overflew
a US Navy Task Group southeast of the Azores. The task
group included the guided-missile frigate Bainbridge
and the aircraft carrier Enterprise. Three~mes n the
past month, US carrier unite ave een the object of
IMPACT OF ADVERSE WEATHER ON BLOC ECONOMIES
plans.
.. Page 6
Page 7
Poor weather this winter--with its potential consequences
for the economy--is causing concern throughout the Sino-
Soviet bloc. It is too early to assess the effects on farm
output for the entire year, but it seems clear that an out-
standing performance is not likely, even if favorable
weather ensues. Unusually severe weather in Eastern Europe
is also causing serious problems for industry and is al-
ready threatening fulfillment of some of the 1963 economic
 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 February 1963
MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS . . Page 8
The new regime in Iraq, having repressed both Com-
munist and Qasimist opponents, is turning to somewhat
longer range problems, such as that of negotiating with .the
Kurds. Differences within the government are likely to
become more pronounced, especially since non-Baathists are
showing resentment over the predominant role the Baathists
have taken thus far. Cairo .continues to point to the Iraqi
coup as an example to be followed in assaulting "reactionary"
sidering alternatives to the Souvanna government.
FACTIONAL TENSIONS INCREASING IN LAOS . Page 9
The rift between the Pathet Lao and the neutralist mil-
itary forces under Kong Le has deepened following the assassina-
tion of a key neutralist field commander. Kong Le has re-
grouped the bulk of his forces to improve his defense against
the Pathet Lao's superior military strength. Premier Sou-
vanna apparently feels confident enough of his own position
to continue to accompany the King on his foreign tour. Some
rightist leaders, however, are again reported to be con-
unity candidate for president.
SOUTH KOREAN CIVILIAN OPPOSITION . Page 10
Junta leader Pak Chong-huff's offer to withdraw from
politics gives civilian leaders an opportunity to take the
initiative in the transition to representative government.
However, long-standing factional disputes handicap the civil-
ian politicians. Pak may be counting on wrangling among
them to open the way far a new movement to draft him as a
be linked with steps to strengthen the EEC internally.
tive of its own toward an EEC-UK accommodation which would
COMMON MARKET DEVELOPMENTS page 11
. . . .
The diplomatic struggle over Britain's-role in Western
Europe has continued during the past week and become,. if
possible, more complicated .than before. There are still
efforts within the Common Market to devise an economic
and political alternative to Britain's full membership,
but London itself is skeptical that an acceptable formula
will be found. Within the past few days, there has been
a spate of rumors that Paris may be contemplating an initia-
 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 February 1963
THE ARGENTINE POLITICAL SCENE . Page 14
Increasing political maneuvering is further straining
Argentina's fragile stability. A key problem is the role to
be played by the Peronists, who comprise about one quarter
of the electorate, in the June general elections. This
issue has caused serious divisions among the Peronists them-
selves, as well as among other political and military groups,
some of which have resumed plotting to overthrow the govern-
ment. While the Peronists are discussing secret electoral
deals with various parties and the government, they also
are still considering revolutionary tactics.
PRE-INAUGURAL SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC Page `15
President-elect Bosch, just returned from a two-month
trip abroad, has attacked what he calls "vested interests"
and may be preparing action that would lead to a major
political crisis. In a press interview, described
as "disappointingly demagogic," he claimed
that he had obtained "three times as much aid" in Europe
as he had in the US. Bosch's remarks on the proposed
constitution, which he said should be "revolutionary," gave
an impression that he backs those features that appear
hostile to private property, business, and foreign in-
vestment. He is apparently already at sword's point with
members of the outgoing regime, and there is a chance that
violence or assassination attempts may occur at his --
inauguration --scheduled for 2? February.
SPECIAL ARTICLES
INDONESIA'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST MALAYSIA Page 1
Week by week Sukarno is committing Indonesia more
openly and more deeply to blocking the creation of a Malaysia
Federation out of Malaya, Singapore, and the British-con-
trolled Borneo territories. In Indonesian eyes, the pro-
posed federation appears to be part of another colonialist
scheme to prevent Indonesia from taking its rightful place
as the dominant power in southeastern Asia. At the same
time, the campaign against Malaysia serves Sukarno's domestic
political purposes by keeping the army busy with an external
problem and by taking public attention from chronic economic
iii
 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 February 2963
 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEEKLY REVIEW
Cuba's difficulties in
meeting its trade obligations
with several bloc countries
have been suggested by several
recent reports. Accordin to
a
Hungarian trade delegation
which went to Cuba last Novem-
ber was forced to return home
without accomplishing its mis-
sion because of Cuba's insist-
ence on a payment. moratorium
in connection with current
debts to.Hungary. Payments
were scheduled to begin in 1965,
but the Castro regime. reportedly
is insisting that all repayment
of Cuban debts to bloc coun-
tries be deferred until 1970.
claimed that Cuban
debts to the European bloc coun-
tries stand at more than $86
million, and
estimated the u an a to
Moscow at $250 million and
to Peiping at $175 million.
Reports that anti-Castro
forces within Cuba plan to launch
an "all-out" attack against
the regime qn the evening of
20 February may represent a
new attempt by Castro to trap
his opponents. He has used
such tactics on previous occa-
sions with considerable success.
The rumors of the impend-
ing uprising appear similar to
earlier ones that a rebellion
would occur on 28 January. In
the present version, simulta-
neous attacks against 136 Cuban
cities, communities, and in-
stallations are planned. The
rebels then would attempt to
hold whatever areas they cap-
tured fora 24-hour period
while calling for US assist-
ance.
A number of high Cuban
military officers and Cuban
exiles in the US are said to
be involved in the plans. It
is not known if there is any
connection between the present
report and that furnished by
a newly arrived Cuban refugee
on 14 February who said that
a "suicide attack" on the.
Castro regime would be launched
within the next few days.
Efforts to launch a revolt
would have little chance of
success without outside help.
In the past Castro's forces
have promptly suppressed the
slightest indications of popular
protest and in several instances
have unearthed antiregime plots
long before they matured.
There is no other avail-
able evidence that a genuine
revolt is being contemplated
at this time. .Scattered acts
21 Feb 63 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 1 of 16
 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
of sabotage and insurgent ac-
tivity has increased noticeably
since the beginning of the year,
but there is no evidence that
they represent a planned, co-
ordinated campaign aiming at
producing a general uprising.
On the other hand, the
regime's security and military
forces ev~ldently are maintain-
ing a high degree of vigilance.
which may be at least partially
attributable to the recent in-
crease in activity by anti-
Castro dissidents.
A group of six Argentines
'who have completed several
months' training in guerrilla
warfare in Cuba now is in Uru-
guay preparing to re-enter
Argentina and organize a guer-
rilla effort there,
The rgent nes are sa d to
have left for Cuba last August.
-&E6R~~
Another Argentine trained in
Cuba last year reported after
leaving .Cuba in January that.
there had been some 50 of his
countrymen undergoing guerrilla
training there at various times
during the latter half of 1962.
Other sources allege that
Castro has claimed that Argen-
tina follows Venezuela in Cuba's
program to develop revolutions
in Latin America. Toward this
end Cubans have worked closely
for some time with an extremist
faction of the Peronist move-
ment. John William Cooke,
former chief of the Peronist
party in Argentina, reportedly
spends much of his time in Cuba.
His wife, a resident of Uruguay,
has been active in recruiting
candidates for guerrilla train-
ing courses in Cuba and main-
tains close contact with the
Cuban Embassy in Montevideo,
where travel arrangements for
the trainees are arranged.
21 Feb 63 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 2 of I6
 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Khrushchev's decision to
withdraw "several thousand"
Soviet military personnel from.
Cuba, which was conveyed to the
US on 18 February, probably was
prompted by his desire to re-
move a major irritant in US-
Soviet relations which, in his
view, might cause a new flare-
up of the crisis and jeopardize
prospects for resuming negotia-
tions on such issues as Berlin.
His concern to prevent further.
damage in his relations with
President Kennedy has been re-
flected in Soviet propaganda
which consistently distinguishes
between "sober voices" in the
US administration and "mad sena-
tors" who are ready to risk
World War III.
The Soviet premier had in-
formed President Kennedy on 20
November that Soviet ground com-
bat units in Cuba would be with-
drawn "in due course." The
three-month delay in carrying
out this commitment probably
was due partly to Moscow's wish
to avoid any appearance of a
further hasty retreat under US
pressure following the removal
of the strategic missiles and
the IL-28 jet bombers. Khru-
shchev probably felt also that
a further substantial reduction
in the Soviet military presence
in Cuba would seriously aggra-
vate the USSR's already strained
relations with the Castro regime.
The decision to withdraw
troops now suggests that the
main lines of Soviet-Cuban rela-
tions in the period immediately
ahead have finally been worked
out after a period of reassess-
ment in Moscow and difficult
negotiations with the Cubans.
The 1963 protocol to the Soviet-
Cuban trade agreement, involving
a new long-term credit to Cuba,
was signed in Moscow on 7 Feb-
ruary. Moscow and Havana also
announced on 26 January that
the USSR, at Cuba's request,
had agreed to send 400 technical
specialists to Cuba during the
following-two months.
The drumfire of Soviet
criticism of President de Gaulle
and Chancellor Adenauer continues.
Moscow is seizing on any develop-
ments which can be used to ex-
ploit differences among the
Western allies. Soviet propa-
ganda claims that Bonn has en-
dorsed US proposals for a multi-
lateral NATO nuclear force and,
at the same .time, has refused
to divert arms purchases from
the US to France. Moscow al-
leges that Bonn's position has
displeased the French and that
British arms manufacturers will
be the losers in West Germany's
maneuvering between Washington
and Paris. Moscow continues to
expand on the prospects for in-
creased Soviet-British trade.
De Gaulle is coming under
increasingly direct Soviet at-
tacks. Izvestia's authorita-
tive commenta or, N. Polyanov,
called upon the "people in the
Elysee Palace" to revise their
policies and to realize that
France's chances of attaining
a leading role in Europe will
not be enhanced by an attempt
"to restore the Carolingian
Empire which has long since
collapsed." Pravda charged on
19 February t a~De Gaulle now
has aligned himself with a class
which has always opposed an
alliance with the USSR.
The Soviet delegation at
Geneva has continued to stall
on consideration of a nuclear
21 Feb G3 WEEKLY REVIEW
Page 3 of 1G
 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
test ban and to maintain its
"take it or leave it" attitude
on Khrushchev's offer of two or
three on-site inspections a
year. These tactics are aimed
at generating concern on the
part of other delegations,
particularly the eight neutrals,
over lack of progress in the
hope that they will increase
pressure on the US to reduce
its terms for a treaty.
Chief Soviet delegate
Kuznetsov has shown no interest
is ,scheduling a meeting of the
three-power test--ban subcommittee
of the 18-nation disarmament
conference.
There have been no further
hints that a com-
prom se m g e reached on the
number of inspections. Moscow
TASS, however, reported a sug-
gestion by the UAR delegate at
Geneva that the parties should
meet each other's positions half
way and agree to "four to five"
inspections.
Iraq
Moscow is maintaining its
ambivalent attitude toward the
new regime in Baghad. On the
one hand, the Soviet party cen-
tral committee statement pub-
lished in Pravda on 17 February
condemned the regime's "mass
reprisals" against Iraqi Commu-
nists and pointed out that this
"bestial reaction" contradicts
the policies proclaimed by the
new governrr#ent. The Soviet
Embassy in Baghdad, on the other
hand., publicly denied that the
USSR had protested suppression
of the local Communists. The
embassy spokesman professed to
have "no worry about the future,"
indicated that Soviet military
aid will be continued under the
agreements signed with the (~asim
regime, and claimed that the new
government had made it clear
that it wants this aid to be
continued.
The central committee state-
ment was similar to earlier So-
viet statements protesting the
banning of the Algerian and
Tunisian Communist parties in
that it avoided any direct at-
tack on the Iraqi Government
and contained no warning that
governmental relations would be
affected. In denying that this
statement constituted Moscow's
official view, the Soviet
Embassy in Baghdad took refuge
in the old canard that ".Pravda
doesn't represent the officia
views of the Soviet Government."
The clandestine Communist
radio in East Germany is con-
tinuing its violent assaults
on the new regime as "vicious
fascist elements" and urging
the Kurds to join other anti-
regime forces in opposing the
Page 4 of 16
 government. Moscow radio felt
moved on 18 February, however,
to deny a Reuters report that
it is interfering in Traq's
internal affairs by calling
on the Kurds to rise against
the new. regime.
The Soviet leaders used
the state visit of King Savang
and Premier Souvanna Phouma of
Laos to emphasize the USSR's
constructive role in the
Laotian settlement as evidence
of its constant "striving for
peaceful coexistence." Soviet
propaganda gave extensive
coverage to the six-day visit,
and Moscow radio for the occa-
sion ran an 11-day series of
special broadcasts to South-
east Asia.
The joint communique is-
sued at the end of the visit
endorsed standard Soviet posi-
tions on general disarmament,
banning nuclear weapons and
their transfer to nonnuclea..r
powers, and liquidation of
foreign military bases. The
statement expressing hope that
the Sino-Indian border dispute
will be settled "peacefully by
talks" presumably was included
on Soviet initiative since the
Laotians have shown no previous
interest in this question.
21 Feb 63 WEEKLY REVIEW
Page 5 of 16
 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Soviet heavy bombers con-
tinue to extend their area of
overwater operations. On 13
February, two TU-95 (Bear) four-
engine turboprop bombers over-
flew a US Navy Task Group south-
east of the Azores which includ-
ed the guided-missile frigate
Bainbridge and aircraft carrier
Enterprise.
This is the first time that
Soviet bombers are known to have
flown south of Iceland and the
flight may have been the longest.
ever made over water by such
Soviet aircraft--a round-trip
distance of about 6,100 nauti -
cal miles (n.m.)frora the north-
western USSR. Heretofore, So-
viet interest in the movement of
US carrier task forces has been
most evident ixi the North Pacif is
The Soviets appear to be
heightening their interest in
the movements of US carrier
units. For the third time in
a month carrier units have been
the object of aerial surveillance
--the Kitty Hawk in the North
Pacif ic`~rom~January to 3
February, the Enterprise in the
South Atlantic on 12/13 February,
and the Princeton in the North
Pacific from 13 through 16
February.
21 Feb 63 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 6 of 16
 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
IMPACT OF ADVERSE WEATHER ON BLOC ECONOMIES
Poor weather this winter--
with its potential consequences
for ~~ne economy--is causing
concern throughout the Sino-So-
viet bloc, It is too early to
assess the likely effects on
farm output for the entire year,
but it seems clear that an out-
standing performance, is not.
likely, even if favorable weather
ensues. In addition to agricul-
tural problems, unusually severe
weather in Eastern Europe is
causing serious problems for
industry and is already threat-
ening fulfillment of same of
the 1963 economic plans.
Extreme cold and heavy
snowfall in Eastern Europe have
increased the requirements for
fuel and power in industrial
plants and homes at a time when
rail and water transport of fuel
have become more difficult.
Water supplies have been reduced,
some power lines have broken,
and coal mining has been slowed.
Some factories have been forced
tos,hut down or to curtail pro-
duction, and some schools and
other institutions have been
closed.
Restrictions have been
imposed on the use of electricity
in factories, households, and
other establishments, and measures
have been taken to ensure the
movement of coal and other pri-
ority freight by rail. Con-
struction and transport workers
and troops have been used to
clear roads and rails.
Severe cold in the sat-
ellites has made the distribution
of already short fodder more
acute, and there are some reports
that livestock have frozen to
death. Although the heavy snow
cover may have protected winter
grain from freezing, a sudden
thaw could result in substantia l
flood damage.
Weather conditions this
past fall and winter have also
been unfavorable in the USSR,
particularly for the important.
winter grain crop--about 30
percent of the annual total.
In some of the principal winter
grain areas, drought and low
temperatures during the fall
months combined with sudden
thaws and. heavy rains later
in the winter to cause damage
which might prove substantial.
Considerable reseeding is likely
to be required this spring.
The livestock sector may
also be suffering setbacks.
Severe cold is complicating
the task of stretching already
inadequate feed supplies to
cover record numbers of live-
stock, a condition that could
lead to distress slaughtering.
In the Far East, both Com-
munist China and North Vietnam
have complained of worsening
drought conditions this winter.
Peiping has characterized the
drought in North China as "the
worst in 40 years" and has said
that it is getting "worse with
each passing day." Kwangtung
Province, in South China, is
also suffering from abnormally
dry conditions, according to
Peiping, and cultivation of
the early crops is already run-
ning into difficulties.
The main threat to the wheat
crop in North China will come
in about two months when the
wheat emerges from its dormancy,
but rice and miscellaneous grain
crops in South China are in
more immediate danger because
they mature earliex. Weather
observations
substantiate the Chinese reports
of unusually dry weather and
indicate that rainfall in
Kwangtung during December was
only about six .percent of normal
for that month.
Authorities in North Viet-
nam have admitted that the
worsening drought is causing
"major difficulties" in wide-
spread areas. Hanoi has further
revealed that peasants "in a
number of areas" have become so
discouraged over persistent
drought conditions that they have
.given up the struggle and left
the farms for other employment.
With the 1963 crop year off to
a poor start, Hanoi faces a
continuing tight food supply
after three consecutive years
of mediocre harvests.
21 Feb 63 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 7 of 16
 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The new Iraqi regime,
having repressed Communist and
Qasimist opponents, fads a
number of .other, somewhat longer
range problems which require
immediate attention. Among
the most important of these is
its relations with Mulla Mustafa
al-Barzani's rebellious Kurds,
A settlement of Kurdish relation
with the Iraqi state is likely
to be difficult, since the
country's new rulers must con-
tinue to pose as Arab nationalists
who will not sacrifice Arab
"interests."
The regime has taken pains
to pull a blanket of "positive
neutralism" over its naked re-
pression of local Communists.
Foreign Minister Shabib and
Minister of State Hazim Jawad
in press conferences have
stressed the country's excellent
relations with the USSR and
alleged that the quarrel with
local Communists is that they
were Qasim supporters. The
regime has ignored broadcasts
by the clandestine Peyk-e Iran
radio in Leipzig. This radio,
operated by the Iranian Com-
munists, has called for a con-
tinued Kurdish rebellion and
has characterized the Iraqi re-
gime as "an oppressive, blood-
thirsty, and atrocio~is enemy"
brought to power by a "black
fascist coup."
Non-Baathist elements have
expressed some resentment over
the Baathist predominance in the
government, and sharp disagree-
ment within the regime is likely
once its component groups begin
to discuss longer range aims and
policies. The fear of a recur
gence of the Communists will
tend to keep Baathist and non-
Baathist nationalists from a
complete falling out, however.
Publicly, Cairo continues
to cite the Iraqi coup as an ex-
ample to be followed by people
under the remaining "
regimes in the area..
In Syria, meanwhile, demon-
strations for "unity" with Iraq
have-been held in the wake of
Syrian Foreign Minister Mahasin's
15 February declaration in favor
of "federation" with Iraq. The
Syrian press has also reacted
favorably.. The Iraqis ~:re ap-
parently embarrassed by the Syrian
overture and have limited themselves
to expre$sions relating to general
Arab unity and protestations of
their high regard for Nasir's UAR.
Leaders of Syria's feuding
Baathist factions are attempting
to establish close ties with their
Iraqi brethren. Michel Aflaq's
group, which follows a moderately
pro-Nasir line, is likely to be
favored by the Iraqis over Akram
al-Hawrani"s strongly anti-Nasir
faction.
e zn~~~_
21 Feb 63 WEEKLY REVIEW
Page 8 of 16
 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
FACTIONAL TENSIONS INCREASING IN LAOS
O Airfield
Road --- Track or trail
,~,,.,,~a,., Province boundary
STATUTE M1LE6 100
121 FEBRUARY 1989
action connected with Ketsana's
death would be delayed pending
the. return in mid-March of King
Savang and his party from their
tour of countries which signed
the Geneva agreements on Laos.
Premier Souvanna contemplated
returning to Laos immediately
after he learned of the assassi-
nation, but he apparently now
feels sufficiently reassured
to accompany the King throughout
the remainder of the tour.
However, the Fathet Lao's
'.continuing effort. to undermine
neutralist military strength, and
Souvanna's failure to resist
Communist political pressures,
reportedly are again leading
rightist leaders to discuss
ways of replacing the shaky
coalition. Prince Boun Oum,
former premier and conservative
leader in southern Laos, once
again is pushing his plan to
form a new government which
-would exclude the Pathet Lao
and control the Mekong plains
of western Laos. Colonel Siho
Lanphouthacoul, an ,aggressive
leader whose command over
three security battalions gives
him an independent military
potential, has also expressed
his dissatisfaction with the
current situation.
General Phoumi Nosavan,
however, appears to retain effec-
tive control over the right-wi~xg
military, and would be likely
to oppose such moves unless he
f e It ~onf ident of Western support .
He probably feels that such
support would be forthcoming only
in reaction to a severe Communist
provocation, such as a major
military thrust or an attempted..
coup.
sEG~~~~
The rift between neutralist
and Pathet Lao forces in Laos
has deepened and become more
open since the assassination on
12 February of Kong Le's field
commander in the Plaine des
Jarres, Colonel Ketsana, Neu-
tralist spokesmen have publicly
accused the Pathet Lao of the
killing, although the reaction
of Kong Le, the neutralist mili-
tary leader, thus far has been
generally restrained.
The Pathet Lao's military
position is considerably stronger
than Kong Le's and for better
defense he has concentrated his
troops in the northern and west-
ern portions of the Plaine des
Jarres. Token neutralist forces
remain as far east as Ban Ban,
but Kong Le probably controls
only the area extending from
the Plaine des Jarres airfield
west to Muong Souion Route 7.
Neither Kong Le nor the
Pathet Lao leaders appear to
be planning major military
moves at this time, although
the heightened tensions between
them could precipitate a clash.
Neutralist Minister of the
Interior Pheng Phongsavan has
indicated that any punitive
Page 9 of 16
 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Junta leader Pak Chong-huff's
offer of 18 February to with-
draw from politics in order to
stabilize the political situation
in South Korea gives civilian
leaders an opportunity to take
the initiative to assure a peace-
ful transition to representative
government.
In return for this with-
drawal, General Pak has demanded
assurances from all leading
civilian politicians that they
agree to uphold the principles
of the revolution and that the
.participants in the military
government be safeguarded
against retaliation. Pak would
continue to head the government
until elections are held, later.
this year and has pledged that
he would carry out impartially
the return to civilian rule.
Pak's terms are likely
to be acceptable. Until the
old-lirBpoliticians now re-
entering political life sort
themselves out, however, they
will have difficulty taking
advantage of the offer. The
.civilian leaders are divided by
long-standingfactional dif-.
ferences and personal distrust..
Their initial efforts to organize
a unified opposition party have
faltered over the problem of
choosing a party leadership.
Each group fears that it would
be shut out of real influence
unless its man secured the top
post. None of the major groups,
however, has closed the door
to further negotiations.
Ho Chong appears to be the
most likely figure around whom
the politicians might coalesce.
He is a former Rhee lieutenant
who broke with the ex-president
after serving as acting prime
minister in 1951-52. As mayor
of Seoul in 1957-59 Ho gained
considerable popular prestige
for his honesty and ability.
His performance as head of the
provisional government that
took over after Rhee's ouster
in 1960 further enhanced his
stature.
Ho has made some efforts
to unite the elements opposed
to the military regime, and he
recently called for another
attempt to form a coalition
party. His efforts probably
are being undercut by former
president Yun Po-sun, who
reportedly wants to lead any
coalition himself. As a com-
promise, the major contending
groups may remain independent
but settle on a joint candidate,
possibly Ho, for this spring's
presidential elections. Such
a development would appreciably
improve prospects for a peace-
ful transition to the new
government.
At the same time, however,
there is a possibility that
Pak's offer is less than sincere
and that he expects the civilian
leaders to fail in their attempts
to organize. He may be3ieve that
in such a situation he would
be the only acceptable choice
to head the new government.
Pak's withdrawal will k~e
a severe blow to the regime-
sponsored Democratic-Republican
Party, which now lacks any
other potential candidate of
comparable stature.. Party leader
Kim Chong-pil is attemtping
to preserve his organization
and his position in it by
placing his supporters in key
posts but his own future iS
in doubt.. The party could be
counted on to lead a move to
draft Pak if a favorable oppor-
tunity arose.
21 Feb 63 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 10 of 16
 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The diplomatic struggle
over Britain's role in Western
Europe has continued during the
past week and become--if possi-
ble--more complicated than be-
fore. There are still efforts
within the Common Market to de-
vise an economic and: political
alternative to Britain's full
membership, but London itself
is skeptical that an acceptable
formula will be found.
math. West German officials
have recently said that the
interim UK EEC economic ties
under consideration are in the
nature of frees-trade-area ar-
rangements. These the US has
always opposed as a form of
tariff discrimination.
Within
the
past few days,
'there has been
a
spate of rumors
that Paris may
be
contemplating
an initiative
of
its own toward
an EEC-UK accommodation which
would be linked. with steps to
strengthen the EEC internally.
Despite the strong lead
taken by Bonn and Brussels and
the basic similarity of their
proposals for effecting an in-
terim arrangement for Britain,
anything like an agreed position
among the "friendly five" has
yet to emerge. Belgian and,
Dutch officials have held several
meetings in order to reconcile
their differences, but there
has been no coordination with
Bonn. London is maintaining
its bilateral contacts with both
endeavors, but has been disap-
pointed by the results so far.
Plans for any early meet-
ing of the Sim and Britain in
the Western European Union (WEU)
framework have reportedly been
dimmed. by French insistence that
Paris would be represented at
such a meeting only on condition
there be no discussion of the
Brussels talks or their after-
21 Feb G3 WEEKLY REVIE'~'V Page 11 of 16
 S~6R~
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Paris
e eves "financial arrangements"
would have to be the first part
of any agreement with Britain.
Although "the problem of the
sterling area" was never serious-
ly considered in the Brussels
talks, the
French ve seems o regar this
issue as a reserve "trump card"
to prevent a UK-EFC agreement.
It is also conceivable,
however, that the French are
floating such rumors for more
immediate tactical reasons.
The French press has quoted
"authorized official sources"
as saying any association
agreement with Britain would
kfiave to be preceded by EEC
ratification of the African
association convention and
settlement of outstanding prob-
lems regarding the EEC's common
agricultural policy.
At the 18-19 February meet-
ing of the Outer Seven ministers,
Austria announced its intention
to pursue its bid for associa-
tion with the EEC, despite the
resolve of the other members to
resume talks with the Common Mar-
ket only when France-gives guar-
antees of good faith. Vienna
has-.long been convinced of De
Gaulle's special sympathy for
Austria--a sympathy he has also
managed to convey to Copenhagen.
Denmark's economic need for a tie
with the Common Market is scarce-
ly less pressing than Austria's.
WEk'KLY REVIEW
Page 12 of 16
 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21~ Feb 63 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 13 of 16
 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
THE ARGENTINE POLITICAL SCENE
Increasing political ma-
neuveringis further straining
Argentina's fragile stability.
A key problem is the role to
be played by the Peronists, who
comprise about one quarter of
the electorate, in the June gen-
eral elections. This issue has
caused serious divisions among
the Peronists themselves, as
well as among other political
and military grou s
Various non-Peronist
political parties are compet-
ing for Peronist support in a
national front, counting on the
government to keep the Peron-
ists from presenting candidates
for top government posts. To
curry Peronist favor, represent-
atives of seven political
parties demanded in late January
that the government remove the
legal ban against open Peronist
political activity. These par-
ties correctly anticipated that
the government would maintain
the ban, which, if lifted, would
jeopardize their own fortunes.
The Peronists are exploiting
this opportunistic gambit, and
are claiming that 80 percent
of the electorate support their
demands to campaign on an open-
ly pro-Peron ticket.
Peronist political parties..
They also fear that Interior
Minister Martinez' strategy
based on splitting the Peronist
vote will be just as unsuccess-
ful as that of Frondizi, who
was ousted after the Peronist
victories in March 1962.
The Peronists most
impressive victories last March
were on the UP ticket in the
Buenos Aires metropolitan area.
It is unlikely that Peron
would feel bound by any commit-
ment of this-kind. A spokes-
man for Peron in Madrid has
denied that Peron agreed to any
electoral deal, and indicated
that instead Peronists would
follow a strategy of "contin-
gency planning" until the elec-
tions. This apparently could
involve recourse to revolution-
ary action if it a geared likely
to succeed.
The armed forces have
made clear that they will not 4
accept return of the Peron dic-
tatorship, but will agree to
the Peronists' campaigning on
a basis of Peronism without
Peron. Some military officers,
especially those retired last
year, believe that even this
strategy is too risky, given
the present disarray of the non-
21 Feb 63 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 14 of 16
 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PRE-INAUGURAL SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
President-elect Bosch of
the Doriiinican Republic, just
.returned from a two-month trip
abroad, has attacked what he
calls "vested interests" and
may be preparing action that
would lead to a major political
crisis. In a press interview
on 17 Februarv. described
"disappoint-
ingly demagogic," he claimed
that he had obtained "three
times as much aid" in Europe
as in the US.
Bosch's remarks on the;pro-
posed constitution, which he
said should be "revolutionary,"
gave an impression that he backs
those features that appear hos-
tile to private property, busi-
ness, and foreign investment.
He is apparently already at
sword's point with members of
the outgoing regime, and there
is a chance that violence or
assassination attempts may oc-
cur at his inauguration--sched-
uled for 27 February.
Bosch's comments on the consti-
tution "can only have succeed-
ed in frightening the business
and propertied classes." In
general, his remarks appeared
to clash with, and may damage
the fruits of, his own efforts
in the US and Europe to get de-
velopment aid for the Dominican
Republic.
The majority of Dominicans
favor, or have become reconciled
to, the need for social and eco-
nomic reform. Members- of the
propertied classes and conserv-
ative-minded leaders of the
outgoing administration, how-
ever, were deeply alarmed over
the new constitution draft's
lack of specific guarantees for
property rights and over its
broad framework--which if fully
used would amount to a radical
reform.
Officers of the armed forces
~ almost unanimously .expressed
~ their apprehensions that the
;proposed constitution would
discourage foreign investments
.necessary to the country's eco-
nomic progress, and many of the
military termed it a "Communist
document." The armed forces,
although they still appeared
disposed to support the incom-
ing government at the time of
Bosch's return, have been put
on their guard and will be alert
to any trend they consider like-
lv to lead to the left.
Military leaders also are
expressing increased concern
over the role of Brigadier Gen-
eral Antonio Imbert and Luis
Amiama--the two survivors of
the group which assassinated
dictator Trujillo--in the rapid
growth of the national police
force and over the force's ef-
forts to acquire weapons of a
variety more properly associated
with the mission of the armed
forces. The military officer
corps objects to the large ex-
penditures by the police, which
in turn reduce budget alloca-
tions needed by the armed farces
to complete their transformation
into small but well-equipped
and trained units.
Despite the complaints of
the military, which they will
probably raise with Bosch when
he takes office, Imbert espe-
cially does not appear ready
to relinquish the power that he
has gained as a member of the
outgoing regime. Imbert already
has indicated his intention to
use the police to oust Bosch
if he feels it is necessary to
do so.
21 Feb 63 WEEKLY REVIEW Page l5 of 16
 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Bosch's unstable tempera-
~ent has already caused compli-
~'a'tions in pre-inaugural plan-
ning. Upon his election last
December, he apparently had few
plans worked out in detail for
taking control of the govern-
ment. One of the purposes of
his trip abroad appears to have
been to gain time to formulate
policies for his administration.
With the Dominican military
relegated to the background,
security preparations for the
inauguration have proved diffi-
cult to arrange. These prepa-
rations are further complicated
by the fact that Bosch and sev-
eral of his guests, especially
Venezuelan President Betancourt,
are likely targets of possible
pro-Castro or extreme rightist
assassination attempts.
WEEKLY REVIEW
Page 16 of 16
 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SPECIAL AR'~ICLES
INDONESIA'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST MALAYSIA
j As the fifth largest coun~
tx~y in the world and with
strength unequaled in Southeast
Asia, Indonesia appears to be
increasingly ob~es~ed by the
'idea of great-power status.
'resident Sukarno and other
Indonesian leaders regard~as
inimical any development which
might retard Indonesian expan-
sion. Such a development is
the proposed Federation of Ma -
laysia, which is to be composed
of Malaya, Singapore, and the
British terrtor~.es of Sarawak,
Brunei, and North Borneo, and
is scheduled to be formed by
this August.
Indonesia's Motivation
The territorial expansion
of Indonesia is reported to be
an objective generally accepted.
by palace advisers and the in-
timates of Sukarno. Indonesia's
grandeur and evolution as a
great power is said to be a fre-
quent topic of discussion among
,them. Sukarno, who sees himself
as a divinely inspired leader
who will lead "his people" to
national unity, apparently is
also dreaming of presiding over
a new Indonesian empire. His
favorite character in the Hindu
epic drama, to which he is
devoted, is the "warrior king."
A significant factor in
expansionist thinking apparently
is the belief that Indonesia
ultimately will have to defend
itself and the surrounding area
against Chinese Communist in-
fluence or.' even attack.
Indonesian interest~in the
Borneo territories as a logical
area of expansion is stimulated
by geographic contiguity, his-
tonic claims, and ethnic ties
with two of the area's princi-
pal groups--the Malays and the
21 Feb 63 SPECIAL ARTICr.Fs
 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The Indonesians' emotions
on the Borneo issue are the
more intense because the revolu-
tionary philosophy and emotional
bias of most of Indonesia's'
leaders and of much of the In-
donesian public are almost dia-
metrically opposed to the out-
look of Malaya's leaders. In-
donesian foreign policy, although
off icially nonaligned, has strong
anti-Western undertones. Malaya
still associates itself closely
with the West, and the backers
of the Malaysia concept intend
that the federation adopt a ,
similar posture. Malayan Prime
Minister Rahman in particular
appears to Djakarta to be a
tool of the British..
Domestically, the ant i
Malaysian campaign serves
Sukarno much as did the campaign
to take over West New Guinea.
Perhaps most important, it
channels the. energies of the
anti-Communist army and the
Communist Party toward a common
goal. Sukarno retains .his pre-
eminent position in great part,.
by balancing off these two major
internal power factors, and he
has long insisted that in the
interests of national unity
he wants them to work in the
same direction rather than
counter to each other. An anti-
Communist army. which is not pre-
occupied with external military
operations apparently poses in
Sukarno's mind. a threat to his
personal position, to national
unity, and to his political
aspirations.
At the same time Sukarno
almost certainly believes that"
by pursuing an anti-Malaysia
policy he is keeping ahead of
the local Communists, who have
been pressing the issue them-
selves through propaganda in
Indonesia and through agents of
their own in Borneo.
Moreover, Indonesia's
massive purchases of arms,
chiefly from the Soviet Union,
made it possible for Sukarno
to.settle the West New Guinea
dispute in his favor and have
enabled him to strike his pres-
ent attitude toward Malaya.
Indonesia may well cite its
anti-imperialist policy on
Malaysia as an argument to per-
suade the USSR to reschedule
and extend payments on Djakarta's
$650~million debt for arms
purchases.
An ever-present motivation
for all Sukarno's external ad-
ventures is the need to divert
attention from Indonesia's
chronic economic problems--
problems for which he has little
taste and less talent.
Indonesia's Timing
The timing of Indonesia's
moves and the change in Indo-
nesia's policy from the vaguely
stated and generalized opposition
to Malaysia last fall to intense
hostility in mid-January seems
to have resulted from a series
of factors. Foremost would
C~ Ti !~'D Ti T
21 Feb 63 SPECIAL ARTICLES
Page 2 of 8
 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUA~IARY
appear to be the abortive Brunei
rebellion of last December.
of 1958 and Malayan expansionist.
designs on Sumatra at that time.
He added that Rahman's hostility
toward Indonesia indicated that
he might be "a tool of interns-
tional conspiracy" against
Indonesia.
Sukarno stated in a l2
February speech that Indonesia
considers Malaysia as "encircle-
ment of the Indonesian Republic
...the product of the brains
and efforts of neocolonialism"
meant to protect the economic
investments of the imperialists.
He reiterated Indonesia's sym-
pathy with the "struggle of the
people of North Borneo.T'
Indonesian Military Moves
Such a policy appears
to have been initiated almost
immediately after 3 January,
when Indonesia rejected a UK
note regarding the Brunei
revolt
On 20
January, Subandrio announced
Indonesia's policy of "con-
frontation'-' against Malaya--
all opposition short of war.
At that time he denounced
Malaya as an accomplice of the
neo-colonialists and imperial-
ists and accused the Malayan
Government of hostility toward
Indonesia.
Since then the-level of
vituperation has risen almost
daily. Subandrio warned on
11 February that incidents and
even war with Malaya-might
follow the establishment of
the Malaysia Federation. He
catalogued a series of un-
friendly acts by Prime Minister
Rahman which included active
support df Indonesian rebels
in the provincial rebellion
In mid-January both Subandrio
and National Security Minister
Nasution
that if 'zn epen.ence see ers
in the North Borneo territories
'request` military training,.
21 Feb 63 SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 3 of 8
 ~~
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY' SUMMARY
Indonesia would comply. Indo-
nesian ground 'forces in Indo-
nesian Borneo consist of eight
infantry battalions, one of
which is a commando unit.
On 30 January Indonesia
announced that it was carrying.
out air and naval patrols of
'its sea borders with Malaya,
and its land boundaries with
British Borneo.
Whether Malaysia is es-
tablished or not, Indonesian
strategy over the next few
years appears from a number of
reports to be first to foster
and support an indigenous
independence movement in
non-Indonesian Borneo; later
either to establish there
pupped Mates subservient to
Indonesia or~~a absorb the
area directly; and eventually
to topple"the liberal godern-
ment of Prime Minister Abdul
Rahman in Malaya itself in
favor of a "progressive"
leftist government sympathetic
and probably subservient to
Indonesia.
az+n~ z~m
SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 4 of 8
 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 Feb 63 SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 5 of 8
 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE tiVEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 6 of .8
 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 Feb 63 SPECIAL ARTICLES Page ? of 8
 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE .WEEKLY SUMMARY
['rf~/4lf LET
~_ ~__~ .
21 Feb 63 .SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 8 of 8