NORTH KOREAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE^
DATE: 02-23-2010
Norh KoreanIt ry
7777
ab lit es and Intentions
Special National Intelligence Estimate
'SAM-14-1,4`79
3 Muy 1979;
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SNIE 14.2-1-79
NORTH KOREAN MILITARY
CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS
Information available as of 15 May 1979
was used in the preparation of this Estimate
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State and Defense, and the National Security Agency.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
KEY JUDGMENTS
North Korea's overriding goal remains the reunification of the
Korean Peninsula under its control. The modernization and growth of
the North Korean armed forces over the past decade, together with an
extensive buildup of the defense industries, have greatly enhanced the
North's military capabilities and have provided Pyongyang with a
greater range of military options for reunification if it chooses to
exercise them.
North Korea, with little warning, could now attack South Korea
with a force of 25 or so infantry divisions. This is at least 20 percent
larger than the estimates by the intelligence Community two years ago.
Over the past decade, moreover, the North Korean Army has greatly
improved its overall firepower, and individual infantry divisions now
have about twice the major weapons firepower they possessed 10 years
ago.
We believe the North Korean leaders are deterred from launching
major hostilities by the US commitment to defend South Korea, by the
presence of US forces in the South, by the relative stability of the South
Korean Government, by the strength of the South Korean military
orces,__an by the desire of the Chinese and 'Soviets to maintain the
status quo.
There are developments, however, which could substantially alter
this judgment. If North Korea saw o12j 1 tunities stemming from an
erosion of the pxesent elements of deterrence, or if it became alarmed
by a reversal of the military trends that have been running in its favor
throughout the decade, it might be tempted to adopt a more aggressive
policy. We doubt that either Moscow or Beijing could veto North
Korean military action. While we do not foresee any of those
developments leading to a North Korean attack, the significant
improvement in North Korea's military capabilities and widening of
options make the situation far more sensitive and thus far more
dangerous. In particular, we believe President Kim 11-song's perception
of the US security commitment will continue to be the key factor in
determining North Korean actions.
2
JC~-~
DISCUSSION
Military Buildup
1. The North Korean armed forces have grown
dramatically over the past decade, particularly the
ground forces. In 1970, we estimated that the North
Korean Army numbered about 360,000 troops and was
organized into 24 infantry divisions and brigades and
one armor division. Today, all elements of the US
Intelligence Community are reasonably confident that
the North Korean Army numbers about 600,000 troops
and has two armor divisions and no fewer than 30
infantry divisions and five infantry brigades, or their
equivalents.' On the basis of their own analyses, the
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department
of the Army, and the Director, National Security
Agency, believe the North Korean Army consists of 41
combat divisions and infantry brigades, and the US
Army analysis further concludes that North Korean
ground force strength may approach 700,000. The
differing views as to the numbers of divisions and
brigades result chiefly from differing interpretations
of a complicated body of evidence.'
2. Not only has there been an increase in the
number of divisions and brigades, but there has been
an increase in capability and mobility. Overall ground
force firepower has been considerably upgraded
through the addition of more and better weapons and
' The North Koreans appear to apply the term "infantry brigade"
to a unit larger than a regiment but smaller than a division. Brigades
have an assessed strength ranging from 3,000 to 9,000 men, and they
lack some of the division's fire support. In most cases, infantry
brigades seem to be interim units which are in the process of being
built up to divisions.
equipment such as tanks, armored personnel carriers
(APCs), towed and self-propelled artillery, and multi-
ple rocket launchers. Each infantry division has about
twice the major weapons firepower that it had in 1970.
The formation of a second armor division and the
substantial mechanization of two infantry divisions
have given the North Korean ground forces greatly
increased mobility.
3. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army, believes that the battalion
count more accurately shows the increase in North
Korean ground combat power. Using his total of
ground forces, he calculates that between 1970 and
1978 the North Korean Army increased its number of
combat maneuver (tank, infantry, and ranger/com-
mando) battalions about 55 percent, from about 430 to
at least 670; and its firepower (field artillery and
multiple rocket launcher) battalions nearly 90 percent,
from about 175 to at least 329. The Central Intelli-
gence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency
believe the number of maneuver and firepower battal-
ions is somewhat lower.
4. During the 1970s, the North Koreans also reorga-
nized the command structure of the Army, probably
to facilitate control over the larger forces. Two new
conventional army corps evidently have been formed,
for a total of nine such corps in the country.
5. We also have evidence of a more offensive
military posture. The North Korean Army has tripled
its river-crossing equipment. This river-crossing capa-
bility is not necessary for the defense of the North. It
would, however, facilitate a major attack along the
most direct route to Seoul, where the Imjin River poses
a formidable obstacle. The North Koreans have signifi-
cantly enlarged their ranger/commando and other
elite forces. We currently estimate that these units
contain as many as 100,000 well-trained troops, an
unusually high proportion of such troops relative to
other major armies. Ranger/commando forces are
formed for offensive operations, and the North has the
capacity to insert some 5,000 troops deep into South
Korea in a one-time lift by light transports, helicopters,
and naval fast landing craft. The others could be used
in conjunction with conventional forces, Since 1971
3
at~~~
the North Koreans have been digging tunnels to
establish infiltration routes and covert avenues of
approach under the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).
Though we have exposed and neutralized three of
these tunnels-the latest exposure was in 1978-the
North Koreans continue to dig them. We regard these
tunnels as part of an offensive strategy.
We anticipate that these studies will
enhance our understanding of the organization, capa-
bilities, and interaction of the ground forces. They will
enable us to refine further our estimates of the size of
the armed forces. According to the Assistant Chief of
Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, these
studies could result in estimates of even larger forces
and greater North Korean military capabilities. CIA
and DIA believe that the listed studies will have little
effect on the key judgments made in this Estimate.
7. The North Korean Air Force has grown through-
out the decade. It has increased its jet combat aircraft
from 570 in 1970 to some 700 today, but gains in
recent years have consisted of models older and less
sophisticated than the aircraft the United States has
provided to South Korea. The NKAF has 21 fields
capable of handling these aircraft (17 occupied), and
now is constructing three new airfields. It also has 25
transport-capable airfields (seven occupied) and 17
highway strips. Since 1970, the North has tripled the
number of surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers,
quadrupled the number of antiaircraft (AA) guns,
added improved interceptors with a limited all-
weather capability, vastly improved its radar cover-
age, and developed an integrated interceptor, SAM,
and AA gun air defense system that covers virtually
the entire country. The North Koreans, however, still
lack modern, mobile battlefield air defense systems to
protect advancing ground forces.
8. North Korean naval expansion has also been
impressive. The Navy has increased the numbers of its
combatants from 120 to 360 and its landing craft by
about 100 to a total of 115. It has progressed from an
almost purely coastal defense force to one with a
capability for antishipping, amphibious raiding, and
mining operations in South Korean waters, albeit on a
limited scale. The Navy has also constructed new
bases.
9. We currently estimate the total personnel
strength of the North Korean armed forces at about
680,000. This includes some 600,000 personnel in the
Army, about 47,000 in the Air Force, and 31,000 in
the Navy. Basing his judgment on the belief that the
strength of the North Korean Army approaches
700,000, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army, puts total armed forces
strength at close to 780,000. Our higher estimate of the
size of North Korean forces-as compared with two
years ago-does not result from a recent surge in
growth, but rather reflects steady growth and more
comprehensive analysis of available data.
10. The North Koreans have increased the sophisti-
cation and scale of their military training during the
past decade. They are conducting more ground/air
and naval/air exercises. The Air Force has increased
its training in offensive bombing and strafing. The
Navy and Air Force capabilities for extended oper-
ations are enhanced by patrols of the 50-mile military
and 200-mile economic sea zones. Military training
using replicas of defensive barriers and positions, as
well as key urban areas, in South Korea has increased
in North Korea.
11. Along with the military buildup, there has been
growth in defense industries, giving the North Koreans
greater independence from their military allies. In the
early 1970s, China and the USSR promoted the North
Korean military buildup by providing military equip-
ment and technical assistance. Both sent considerable
numbers of tanks, APCs, and aircraft to North Korea,
and the Soviets supplied large numbers of SAM sys-
tems. Notable among the several projects involving
technical aid are the tank plant built with Soviet
assistance and the submarine production yard built
with Chinese help. The North Koreans now manufac-
ture medium tanks, APCs, self-propelled and towed
field and AA artillery, multiple rocket launchers,
submarines and other naval craft, and most of their
own ammunition. North Korea must still depend on
other nations for aircraft, missiles, optics, and sophisti-
cated electronics. Since North Korea is now exporting
weapons to Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia,
we surmise that its own armed forces suffer no serious
equipment shortages-at least in the export items.
12. The North Koreans have also made a massive
effort to minimize the vulnerability of their military
forces and defense industries through hardening. They
have built underground facilities sufficient to house all
of their bomber and fighter aircraft, and a large
4
DEL
portion of their naval forces is similarly protected.
Likewise, hardening provides protection for vital com-
ponents of SAM and AA artillery systems, armor,
artillery, and other ground force elements. At least 28
industrial plants, 1.4 of which do military work, have
some underground facilities.
13. The heaviest concentration of North Korean
forces is still along the DMZ, with additional units-
including most of the newly discovered units-posi-
tioned along both coasts and around Pyongyang. Such
deployment provides defense against an attack from
the coasts or from the south, but well over half of
North Korea's major units are deployed south of the
capital and most of the rest are located along direct
lines of communication to the south. From these
positions the North Koreans could mass sufficient
forces for an offensive with little warning.
14. We now believe that North Korea could mount
and sustain a much more powerful attack against the
South than we estimated two years ago, because North
Korea has more infantry divisions or brigades, more
ranger/commando units, and more tanks, artillery
pieces, and multiple rocket launchers. Even if North
Korea chose to retain half of the newly identified
infantry divisions or brigades for strategic reserve or
rear-area security duties, there would be close to 25
infantry divisions or brigades available-an increase of
at least 20 percent over the 21 previously believed to
be available-for attack under worst case scenarios
developed by the Intelligence Community two years
ago. The North Koreans have sufficient capacity to
store enough oil to sustain military operations for
several months. Although our evidence is not conclu-
sive, we believe the North has sufficient stockpiles of
other critical supplies to sustain military operations for
at least 30 days.
15. In the late 1960s, the North Korean authorities
decided to strengthen their armed forces significantly.
This effort, undertaken with some secrecy, required
great sacrifice and was instrumental in the substantial
retardation of economic growth throughout the 1970s.
North Korea now has about 4 percent of its popula-
tion ,, in the regular armed forces and may be devoting
about 20 percent of its gross national product to
defense,
3 We have used a population figure of 19 million, the estimate of
the Foreign Demographic Division of the US Department of
Commerce.
These rates are
clearly among the highest in the world.
16. There is evidence that the quantitative expan-
sion of North Korea's ground combat forces is not yet
finished. Several units in the force lack elements found
in the standard table of organization. We judge,
however, that the growth rate has slowed.
17. North Korean defense industries show no evi-
dence of slowing the production of ground force
weapons for force modernization. Towed artillery,
self-propelled guns and antiaircraft artillery, and mul-
tiple rocket launchers continue to be turned out and
added to the forces. The North Korean plant engaged
in the series production of medium tanks recently
switched from copies of T-55s to T-62 types.
18. Soviet deliveries of fighter aircraft stopped in
1974, while the Chinese continue to send older-model
but newly produced fighters, bombers, and helicop-
ters. Although the North Koreans now have almost
twice as many combat aircraft as the South, few of
their fighters can match the newer US-built aircraft
now in the South's Air Force. About 40 North Korean
pilots are currently training on advanced MIG-21s in
Libya, however, and another 40 may be receiving
basic ground training on MIG-23 aircraft with Soviet
instructors. If so, the Soviets may intend ultimately to
provide North Korea with such aircraft.
19. Naval expansion appears to be slowing after
more than tripling the number of ships and craft since
1970. The number of submarines and fast landing
craft in particular increased during the 1970s through
domestic production. It now appears, however, that
the North Koreans are about to cease submarine
production and have slowed the manufacture of fast
landing craft as well as patrol, torpedo, and fire-
support ships.
20. North Korea may be reaching a point where
the economy and the population can no longer support
major increases in military forces and expenditures.
Because of the long leadtime of military programs, it is
possible that a decision to slow the military buildup
was made by about 1976. In that case, we would only
now begin to see the results of such a slowdown.
Evidence which suggests the Koreans have slowed
down includes a shift in emphasis from naval to
' We estimate the North Korean GNP to be approximately 20
billion won (a little over $11 billion) and the defense expenditures to
be about 4 billion won (a little over $2 billion). The defense estimate
was derived from the 1971 published military budget revised
upward.
5
S2'ERi=1-
merchant ship construction and less investment in new
defense industry.
North Korean Forces By 1982
21. By 1982 we expect the North Korean military
forces will be better equipped and trained, though
probably not significantly larger in manpower than
they are today.
22. In the ground forces, the North Koreans prob-
ably will flesh out incomplete infantry units and
upgrade some brigades to divisions. By 1982 they
could add about four more divisions and brigades if
they continue at their present pace of improvement.
We see little evidence pointing toward the formation
of additional armor or mechanized divisions. The
North Koreans will add T-62-type medium tanks, self-
propelled artillery, and improved multiple rocket
launchers to the forces, although these weapons may
not significantly swell inventories of the active forces
because some will be used to replace worn and
obsolete weapons.
23. The North Koreans may be able to develop
weapons such as a more advanced antitank guided
missile or a tactical surface-to-surface missile, but we
do not anticipate any technological breakthroughs to
enable them to produce sophisticated equipment such
as long-range missiles, modern electronics, or mobile
air defense missile systems. The North Koreans lack
such equipment and have had little if any success in
acquiring it from the Soviet Union or other outside
sources. In recent years, the USSR has been cautious
about providing North Korea with modern military
equipment, but we cannot be sure that this policy will
continue.
24. The Air Force will probably not be any larger
in 1982 than it is now but may improve qualitatively.
Improvements will depend largely on the USSR. Even
if the Chinese were able to fully utilize West Euro-
pean technology to modernize their military forces,
they would not be able by 1982 to match the quality
of aircraft, missiles, and associated equipment that the
United States now is supplying to the South Koreans.
In the past, the Soviets have been reluctant to provide
such equipment to the North Koreans, but if they are
supporting the North Korean training in Libya, such
support could indicate a shift in their position. The
North Korean receipt of advanced MIGs, particularly
MIG-23s, would significantly reduce South Korea's
current qualitative edge in modern aircraft and would
make the North's overall numerical advantage much
more important.
25. We believe that the North Korean Navy will
change little by 1982. The composition of the fleets
probably will remain about the same because nearly
half the units now in service are less than five years
old, and the relatively small number of vessels under
construction includes few new types.
North Korean Intentions
26. A complex set of factors, domestic as well as
foreign, almost certainly contributed to North Korea's
decision to expand its ground forces. President Kim 11-
song and other North Korean leaders regard the
Army-apart from its military mission-as a political
instrument to promote domestic stability and eco-
nomic development. The interests of the military thus
receive high priority. The proximity of large opposing
forces along the DMZ places a premium on military
preparedness as well-a theme North Korean propa-
ganda has perennially reinforced by citing the dangers
from the South. Moreover, Kim has repeatedly stressed
the need for the country to defend itself without
outside assistance. Even so, these factors, while un-
questionably important, are not sufficient to explain
the magnitude of North Korea's defense program.
27. Rather North Korea's military buildup is con-
sistent with an overall reunification strategy which
President Kim II-song has outlined publicly in major
policy addresses over the years. Kim has called for a
three-pronged approach by strengthening the North as
a revolutionary base for reunification, promoting the
1growth of revolutionary forces in South Korea, and
working to gain support from other revolutionary
forces around the world. Kim II-song has effectively
subordinated all of North Korea's domestic and for-
eign policies to the overriding goal of national reunifi-
cation under North Korean control.
28, North Korea has adopted various tactics to
reach this goal. The major initiatives were the com-
mando raids against the South in the late 1960s, the
political dialogue with Seoul in the early 1970s, and
the North's diplomatic offensives in the mid-1970s,
which aimed at marshaling support for Pyongyang's
reunification formula among the nonaligned countries
and within the United Nations.
29. The government of Kim II-song has pursued
goals other than reunification over the years, including
consolidating and maintaining its political authority
within North Korea, striving for greater freedom of
6
S T
action from Beijing and Moscow, and promoting eco-
nomic development. There have been some signs in
the past year or so that the goal of economic growth in
the North may be taking on a higher priority than in
the past. The North has recently shown a less hostile
public posture and has engaged in a brief round of
talks with South Korea. These developments at least
raise the possibility that Pyongyang is considering a
shift to a longer term and more moderate approach to
reunification.
30. We believe, however, that North Korea's re-
cent, more moderate behavior is designed at least in
part to facilitate the withdrawal of US troops and help
correct economic shortcomings. Pyongyang made
similar demonstrations of flexibility in the early 1970s,
at the same time that it was engaged in its military
buildup. Indeed, the large cost of the North's buildup,
which has been undertaken at the expense of Pyong-
yang's economic and social programs, strongly suggests
that reunification has remained its overriding national
goal in the 1970s.
31. Several factors may have contributed to the
North Koreans' desire to build up their forces and
increase their options during the 1970s. On the one
hand, the enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine in 1969
and the announcement of the start of US troop
withdrawals in 1970 may have caused the North
Koreans to conclude that the United States would have
completed a ground force withdrawal by the middle
of the decade. At the same time, however, the US
pledge to provide large-scale assistance to build up and
modernize South Korea's armed forces may have
suggested to the North Koreans that they faced the
possibility of falling behind the South militarily. Finally,
Pyongyang's major allies were moving into closer
relationships with the United States, a fact which may
have persuaded the North Koreans that they could no
longer rely on their allies for full support.
32. North Korea's enhanced capabilities have pro-
vided it with a greater range of military options.
Among these options are a major offensive aimed at
the rapid seizure of the Seoul area or of all of South
Korea. We see little evidence, however, that North
Korea is preparing to exercise a military option against
the South in the near term. We believe the North
Koreans are restrained by several considerations.
These are the US defense commitment, the presence
of US forces in South Korea, South Korean military
capabilities, political conditions in the South, and the
attitude of the other major powers in the area.
33. We believe the US security commitment and
presence of US military forces in South Korea weigh
most heavily in North Korean calculations. Kim prob-
ably has not made any lasting judgment about the US
security commitment; rather he is more likely to assess
that question in light of future developments. North
Korea reacted favorably, albeit cautiously, to Wash-
ington's decision in early 1977 to withdraw US ground
combat forces from South Korea. Over the years, one
of Pyongyang's key objectives has been to end the
entire US military presence in Korea. Despite its
growing doubts that the United States will withdraw,
North Korea has avoided any confrontation that might
delay withdrawal.
34. North Korean leaders are almost certainly
aware of their military advantages over the South.
Although we do not know the calculus by which they
would determine the ratio of forces necessary for a
successful attack, we believe that they would overesti-
mate their needs rather than risk underestimating
them. The North Korean leaders are equally aware of
major force improvements being carried out or
planned by Seoul, but probably believe that the South
cannot redress the imbalance in the next few years.
35. To unify the peninsula, Kim II-song has consist-
ently stressed the need for the creation of a revolution-
ary situation in the South, but he probably recognizes
that he has little ability to influence events there from
within. Moreover, Pyongyang probably views the
South Korean Government as generally stable and
believes that massive unrest is unlikely in the near
future.
36
I
h
Ch
d
h
.
n t
e past,
ina an
t
e USSR have demon-
strated little enthusiasm for Kim 11-song's efforts to
reunify the Korean Peninsula. For reasons of their
own, both the Chinese and the Soviets have had an
important stake in maintaining the Korean status quo.
A war in Korea could create serious complications in
their relations with the United States, could stimulate
major changes in Japanese security policy, and could
even affect the overall power balance in East Asia.
37. Still, the extent to which China or the Soviet
Union can restrain North Korea is limited. North
Korea's growing military self-sufficiency has reduced
its need to seek outside military assistance before
initiating action and during the early days of combat.
If President Kim became convinced that conditions
were favorable for a quick military victory, we doubt
that either Moscow or Beijing could veto the venture.
Both would be loath to support a war on the peninsula,
7
but they could be drawn in, particularly if the North
Korean regime appeared to be losing. President Kim
might assume that his security agreement with both
countries would ensure their entry into a conflict if
North Korea were endangered, because neither of his
allies wants to see a pro-Western government replac-
ing the Communist regime in Pyongyang.
38. So long as the North Koreans see that events on
the peninsula are moving in the direction of reducing
the US military presence in South Korea, they are
likely to press their case through diplomatic and
political means. There are, however, developments
which could substantially alter the North Koreans'
perception.
39. As we have seen, relations between the major
powers have special significance in Korea. A notable
increase in friction between the United States and
either the Soviet Union or China could encourage
North Korea to become more adventurous. Similarly, a
deepening of competition between the USSR and
China could induce either country to increase its
support for the Kim II-song regime, and this develop-
ment, too, could cause the North Korean Government
to become more adventurous.
40. Kim 11-song may already have calculated that
his military advantages will erode as South Korea more
fully translates its economic strength into an improved
military capability, thereby reversing the military
trends that have run in North Korea's favor through-
out much of this decade. Kim II-song may thus
conclude that time is running out and that the only
realistic alternative to a permanently divided Korea is
forceful reunification.
41. The emergence of political instability in the
South-with or without the presence of US forces-
would prompt a basic review of policy in Pyongyang.
President Kim has publicly declared that the North
would not "stand by with folded arms" in such an
event. Further, the North would find most tempting
political instability stemming from frictions in US-
1-1South Korean relations. Such instability-should it
I~affect the North's perception of the US security
guarantee-would be the single most dangerous devel-
pment in terms of inducing a North Korean attack.
42. In summary, we see a North Korean military
buildup that exceeds defensive requirements. The rate
of the buildup has slowed substantially over the past
two years? but we expect qualitative improvements to
continue. Although we have little direct insight into
North Korean intentions, we believe the purpose of the
buildup has been to give North Korean leaders the
capability to unify the peninsula through force. North
Korea is now deterred from using military force, but
developments encouraging a more aggressive policy
may emerge. In particular, we believe President Kim's
perception of the US security commitment will con-
tinue to be the key factor in determining North Korea
actions. While we do not now foresee any of these
developments leading to a North Korean attack, the
significant improvement in North Korea's military
capabilities and the widening of options make the
situation far more sensitive and thus far more
dangerous.
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