NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY 23 APRIL 1980

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005148713
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2010
• Case Number: F-2007-00460
• Publication Date: April 23, 1980

Director of
Central
APPROVED FOR RELEASE^
DATE: 01-20-2010
Wednesday
23 April 1980
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23 April 1980
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 Situation Report
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Briefs and Comments
EC-Iran: Decision on Sanctions . . . . .
USSR-Iraq-Iran: Soviet Concern . . . . .
Afghanistan: Possible Demonstrations . .
USSR-France: Gromyko's Visit . .
Kenya: Discontent with Moi
Honduras: Election Implications . . . . . .
Special Analysis
Egypt-Israel: Status of Military Forces
23 April 1980
 The 1panian Left has been dealt asemous setback in the
univepsity clashes this week.
stronghold of leftist influence, and in Ahvaz and Zahedan.
The situation in Tehran was quieter yesterday after
the leftist Fedayeen withdrew from the campuses.under
pressure from extremist Muslim groups. In most other
cities, calm apparently also prevailed. Tehran Radio
reports, however, that there has been serious fighting
at the university in Gilan Province, a traditional
underground.
Although the left has been damaged by the attacks,
it probably retains its arms and organizational apparatus
and may be able gradually to filter back to the campuses.
The leftists also can continue to operate effectively
trying to increase its influence.
The government did not initiate the purge of the
left and has so far shown no inclination to ban the left's
activities off the campus. The Fedayeen, however, have
been concentrating their activities among the minorities
for some time and may well now choose to take a more open
and violent antiregime line. The pro-Soviet Tudeh Party
has not been a major force in the universities and probably
will continue to support Ayatollah Khomeini1publicly while
several extremist Muslim groups associated with the
The impetus for the attack on the left came from
mus-Lim activists, many or tnem simpiy srreer
thugs, have justified the attack by pointing to Khomeini's
new year's speech on 21 March that called for a purge in
the universities. F_ -1
--continued
Top seeret
23 April 1980
 The Islamic Republic Party has now proclaimed a
"cultural revolution," and President Bani-Sadr has
endorsed it. He appears to have been caught off guard,
and is trying to identify with the campaign against the
lefts
Banff?Sadr denied in an interview broadcast yesterday
that he considered resigning after his efforts to end the
hostage crisis failed.
Iran-Iraq
Khomeini's office in Tehran said yesterday that
Iraqi Shia leader Ayatollah Baqr Sadr has been executed
by the Baghdad regime. The office decreed three days of
national mourning in Iran and called on the Iraqi armed
forces to overthrow the Baathist government. Iranian
media are claiming that a strike is already under way in
the Iraqi Shia holy city of An Najaf. (U)
Iran-USSR
The supervisor of Iran's Ministry of Economic
Affairs and Finance announced yesterday that a draft of
an economic and industrial protocol with the USSR has
been drawn up and will be signed in Moscow. The protocol
could include agreement on the expansion of the Esfahan
steel mill and other joint projects.
the talks on the supply of gas to the USSR are
still stalled.
TOO 9C t
2
23 April 1980
 The first stage of the EC program on Iran is the reduction
of West European and Iranian staffs in their respective embassies,
and in anticipation of Later economic measures-, the EC Foreign
Ministers yesterday recomme new export or service con-
tracts be signed with Iran.
The results reflect the West European belief that
economic sanctions are more provocative and should be
kept as a last resort. Although the Nine failed to in-
voke an article of the Community treaty permitting the
EC to take immediate trade actions, the ministers called
on their national legislatures to adopt laws to carry
out UN Security Council sanctions; this process will
begin immediately.
These sanctions will be imposed unless there is
"decisive progress leading to the release of the hos-
tages; The target date for such action is 17 May, the
date of another EC Foreign Ministers' session. While
"decisive progress" was not defined, British Foreign
Secretary Carrington indicated he would not be satisfied
merely by transferring control of the hostages from the
militants to the Iranian Government, The West Germans
presumably will deem yesterday?s agreement sufficient
preclude the need for unilateral moves by Bonne
We have yet to confirm press reports of an EC de-
cision to discourage purchases of Iranian crude oil; no
reference to the subject appeared in the public EC state-
ment. This step may be controversial since some of the
EC countries reportedly have difficulty reconciling it
with prior contractual obligations.
3
23 April 1980
 c~ nt
USSR-IRAQ-IRAN: Soviet Concern
The Soviets apparently are trying to discourage a major military
confrontation between Iran and Iraq by arguing that only the US
would benefit.
The Soviets do not want to alienate Tehran or
Baghdad by giving either strong support. They reportedly
feel that the dispute is particularly inopportune because
it diverts attention from the crisis in US-Iranian rela-
tions. The Soviets also are concerned that the situation
might provide the US with a pretext to intervene in Iran.
Soviet media have favored Iran slightly, but the
Soviets have refused Tehran's request to stop arms de-
liveries to Iraq.
Tee Seeret
4
23 April 1980
 Soviet and Afghan forces are preparing for possible demon-
strations in Kabul and other major cities on Sunday during,ceZebra-
tions of the second anniversary of the Marxist revolution.
Several incidents have occurred recently in Kabul,
which had been quiet since the week-long general strike
in late February. At a ceremony on Monday, students des-
ecrated the new national flag and rushed Soviet troops,
who fired into the crowd killing two students. In other
incidents, demonstrators attacked official vehicles, and
a bomb exploded at a military school.
Soviet MI-24 helicopters have been patrolling each
day over the city, and Soviet and Afghan armored vehicles
are expected to begin more frequent patrols later this
week.
The organized opposition, perhaps chastened by the
Soviet suppression of the general strike, may not be
ready for another test of strength. In view of the emo-
tions likely to be aroused by the unpopular Marxist
celebrations, however, the chances are good for at least
isolated small-scale protests.
The possibility of violence is higher in cities out-
side the capital--such as Herat, Qandahar, and Jalalabad--
where unrest continues and there are fewer Soviet and
Afghan forces.
5
23 April 1980
 USSR?FRANTCE e Gromyko ? s Visit
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko arrives in Paris today amid
growing French concern tWest relations are getting danger-
ously out of hand.
Gromyko will hold lengthy discussions with Foreign
Minister Francois-Poncet and is likely to meet with Pres-
ident Giscard. Both sides see the visit as a positive
development but neither expects it to lead to a substan-
tial improvement in relations.
This is the first trip to Western Europe by a high-
ranking Soviet official since the invasion of Afghanistan,
and Moscow welcomes the opportunity to publicize its
ability to maintain a dialogue with the West Europeans.
The French, on the other hand, are concerned that the
trip will stir up criticism in the US and would prefer
to see the visit proceed quietly.
Although the meetings fall within the framework of
a protocol of 1970 that provides for semiannual exchanges
between foreign ministers, the timing of the visit has
caused some surprise. Only three weeks ago Francois-
Poncet hinted that the visit might be postponed indefi-
nitely because of tensions in. East-West relations.
The Soviets would prefer to concentrate on arms
control and the coming session in Madrid of the Confer-
ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The French
insist, however, that Afghanistan must be the focus of
the talks, and they will tell Gromyko that detente cannot
go forward until the USSR withdraws its troops.
Gromyko probably will echo remarks made last week
by the Soviet Ambassador to Paris, who criticized the
US for pushing ahead with nuclear force modernization
and for stimulating Western reactions on Afghanistan.
Although the Ambassador went on to assert that the
"special" Franco-Soviet relationship can make a major
contribution to the reestablishment of detente, the
overall tone of the speech conveyed a firm nonnegotiable
Soviet position on Afghanistan and disarmament. If, as
expected, Gromyko is not prepared to go beyond this, the
French see little prospect for a successful dialogue
during the visit.
 23 April 1980
 An initially favorable Western response to Prime Minister
Mugabe's request for economic assistance is improving the chances
of getting the new government e~ta~,14,17ad but Salisbury is still
short of its foreign aid goal.
Buoyed by Mugabe?s early moderation, the UK, West
Germany, the US, the Netherlands, Denmark, and the
European Community have pledged a total of $140 million
in assistance for this year. Other Western donors are
likely to contribute, especially if the political situa-
tion remains stable.
South Africa, Salisbury's leading creditor during
the 14 years of UN sanctions, reportedly also plans to
resume the discreet financial assistance that was sus-
pended in March. Pretoria evidently has been reassured
by the new government?s promises to honor all foreign
debts contracted by previous regimes and not to provide
bases for South African liberation groups. In any event,
near-term aid from South Africa will be far short of the
annual peak of some $500 million reached during the war.
Foreign private interest in Zimbabwe is being re-
kindled by the government?s pledge not to nationalize
foreign-owned businesses. South African, British, Japa-
nese, West German, and American exporters and construction
firms are already competing for tenders on over $3 billion
in capital investment projects planned between now and
1984.
Recent Western aid pledges are a first step toward
encouraging Mugabe to forego revolutionary change once
he consolidates his power. Up to $1.5 billion in foreign
official and private funds will be needed over the next
five years to rebuild the economy and to finance land
resettlement and expanded social services for the black
population.
23 April 1980
 KENYA: Discontent With Moi
Growing numbers of Kenyans are questioning President Moi's
Zeadershipo
Symptomatic of Moi's problems is his inability to
put an end to the power struggle between Charles Njonjo,
his closest adviser, and Vice President Kibaki. Njonjo
appears to be trying to force the issue by resigning as
Attorney General in order to run in a by-election for
Parliament.
Njonjo probably wants to use an election victory as
a springboard to a higher office for which a seat in Par-
liament is necessary. He may hope to replace Kibaki as
t or to assume a new post as Prime Minister.
Kibaki is a member of the politically dominant
Kikuyu tribe, which views Njonjo as a threat. Ethnic
tension also is increasing within the usually apolitical
military, where members of other tribes are grumbling
that Moi's fellow tribesmen are being promoted unfairly.
Moi's reputation also suffers from a growing sense
among Kenyans that the economy is out of control. Dis-
content has been aggravated by severe shortages of food
and by power outages that have spread to urban areas.
Reports of government mismanagement and corruption among
Moi and other senior officials are widely believed.
There appears to be no organized opposition as yet,
and Moi may still have time to make policy and personnel
changes that could alleviate some of Kenya's problems.
The country's pro-Western orientation and expanding mili-
tary relationship with the US still seem to enjoy broad
public support. The US has become closely identified
with the Moi government, however, and could become a
focus for discontent if conditions deteriorate more
dramatically.
10
 HONDURAS: Election Implications
The Liberal Party's upset win last Sunday in the
constituent assembly elections may lead to disagreements
with the military. Just before the elections the mili-
tary had pushed for an interim government headed by
current junta leader General Paz and for a subsequent
direct presidential election. The Liberals had hoped
that a victory in the constituent assembly elections
would allow them to elect indirectly a president from
within their own ranks.
The substantial voter turnout gave the Liberals
a plausible mandate that could strengthen their argument
for an indirect presidential election. Military support
for a direct presidential election is partly the result
of US interest in open contests, but the Liberals may
worry that collusion between the military and the
Nationalist Party--a strong second in the elections--
could undermine their victory.
T p '1 ret
13
23 April 1980
 Uoundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
Alexandria
9y p Y
*Cairo
 EGYPT-ISRAEL: Status of Military Forces
14
23 April 1980
 Neither Egypt nor Israel has reduced the overall
size of its armed forces as a result of the peace treaty.
The Israelis, citing the contingency threat to their
"eastern front," have made clear that they do not plan
any military reductions--at least over the next five
years. Any eventual Israeli cutbacks will be influenced
by the scope of Egypt's reductions and force improvements
as well as by Cairo's continued adherence to the treaty,
President Sadat hopes at some point to scale down
the Army as part of the country's "peace dividend." The
pace of this process will be determined by uncertainties
about Libyan intentions and by concerns about the ability
of the Egyptian economy to absorb discharged soldiers.
15 Fret
23 April 1980