NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY THURSDAY 28 JANUARY 1982

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005065508
• Release Decision: IPPUB U
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2010
• Case Number: F-2007-00446
• Publication Date: January 28, 1982

 3
3 Nicaragua: Campaign of Repression . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
. . 5
EC: Actions on Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
. . 7
I Syria-Jordan: Increased Tension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Ireland: Government Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
El Salvador: Aircraft Destroyed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Sudan: Nimeiri Buys Some Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
. . 11
/l, USSR: Speedup of US Grain Deliveries . . . . . . . . . . . 11
. . 12
Y Colombia-Israel: Interest in Kfir Aircraft . . . . . . . . 12
. r Brazil-Cuba: Trade Prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
. . 13
17 Liberia: Student Protests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Special Analysis
11 Japan: Next Step in Defense Planning . . . . . . . . . . . 15
28 January 19V2
 NICARAGUA: Campaign of Repression
The Sandinistas have declared the eastern half of the country
a restricted military zone in an effort to conceal the extreme meas-
ures they are taking to suppress antiregime activity there. F
The government has begu
against Indians in the area.
villages.
_]the Army has attacked Indian communities,
arresting many, and is now occupying some
Entire communities apparently have been moved away
from the Nicaraguan-Honduran border and the vacated
villages burned. This has caused many of the Indians
to flee to Honduras. Travel to the area is being tightly
restricted and news reporting is blacked out.
Comment: These actions indicate extreme Sandinista
concern over raids by guerrilla forces and the increased
number of government casualties. Over the longer term,
this repression could swell the ranks of the anti-
Sandinista forces operating from Honduras as well as
aggravate the separatist sentiment and hostility of the
Indians who remain. It also could damage Nicaragua's
current effort to gain a seat on the UN Commission for
Human Rights.
4
28 January 1982
 EC: Actions on Poland
EC members hope their decision to take a few Limited measures
against Warsaw and Moscow will Lessen US and European public pres-
sure to adopt tougher restrictions.
With the exception of the Greek representative, EC
Foreign Ministers on Monday approved the EC Commission's
cancellation last week of subsidized food sales to the
Polish Government. Eight of the ministers agreed to pro-
pose that the OECD slightly increase minimum interest rates
charged the USSR under the export-credit consensus.
France deferred approval of the action after Finance
Ministry officials questioned whether the matter fell
under the competence of the EC. Paris is on record,
however, as favoring the rate hike.
The Foreign Ministers also considered monitoring
imports of Soviet luxury items and told the Commission
to investigate future economic measures the EC could
implement. They left open the possibility of asking the
Commission to examine the importance and effectiveness
/ of recent US actions against Poland and the USSR.
In addition, the ministers agreed that Western CSCE
participants should assail Polish and Soviet policy when
the meeting reopens in Madrid on 9 February. They re-
jected, however, the US position that the meeting should
adjourn immediately after the debate on Poland.
Comment: The EC remains anxious to avoid the possi-
ble economic and political consequences of more stringent
restrictions. The EC members believe that the measures
implemented by the US so far have requix~d little sacri-
fice and have been primarily symbolic.
EC members want to use the CSCE meeting to emphasize
Western determination to end martial law in Poland and to
camouflage their reluctance to go beyond rhetoric. They
oppose US efforts to recess the session shortly after it
resumes on grounds that continuing the talks will allow
the West to keep pressure on Moscow.
Although EC members do not believe progress toward
a post-Madrid security conference is possible nowt they
do not want to take responsibility for killing the idea.
Most believe that CSCE security concerns are more impor-
tant than human rights issues, Poland notwithstanding.
6
28 January 19&2
 The intensified propaganda attacks that Syria and Jordan are
exchanging reflect their continuing disagreement over regional
Jordan has accused Syria of masterminding a minor
bombing in Amman on 11 January. Syria has countered by
/ charging that the Jordanians allowed an armed band to
cross the Syrian-Jordanian border and attack a Syrian
Army patrol on 21 January.
Jordan also is at odds with Syria over the latter's
military role in Lebanon, its support of Iran in the war,
and its opposition to the Fahd peace plan.
Syria has long charged that Jordan has provided
financial and material support to Muslim Brotherhood
terrorists operating in Syria. In November 1980, Syria
sent troops to the Jordanian border in an attempt to in-
timidate Jordan and disrupt an Arab summit in Amman.
Moreover, the Syrians suspect that Jordan has formed an
anti-Syrian alliance with Iraq and Saudi Arabia to iso-
late Syria in the region and exclude it from the peace
process.
28 January 1982
 0
The unexpected defeat of Prime Minister Fitzgerald's minority
government on the budget vote uesterdau will lead to new elections,
to be held on 18 February.
country's $2 billion deficit.
issue were proposed tax increases
The defeat was brought about
several independents who switched
by the defection of
to the opposition. At
aimed at reducing the
The government's previous austerity budget, passed
last summer, has not held down inflation or unemployment,
and recent polls point to substantial disenchantment with
its economic policies. The polls also show the ruling
Fine Gael - Labor coalition slightly ahead of the opposi-
tion Fianna Fail.
Comment: The government may attempt to use the
defeat to get a majority in new elections. Fitzgerald
7 almost certainly will claim that there is no alternative
v to his policy and will hope that his prospects will be
better before new austerity measures take effect. He
will also try to take advantage of recent internal
problems within the Fianna Fail by c1araina that it has
not offered its own economic program.
Northern Ireland is unlikely to become a major cam-
paign issue, although Fitzgerald's opponents will attack
his proposals for constitutional changes to make the
Republic more attractive to Ulster Protestants. The
election also will be the first major test for the new
tactic of the Provisional Sinn Fein--the political arm
of the Provisional Irish Republican Army--to contest
parliamentary elections.
9
28 January 1982
 //l' EL SALVADOR: Aircraft Destroyed
V The sabota
e of militar
ai
g
y
rcraft--apparently by
guerrilla infiltrators or sympathizers serving on Air
Force maintenance crews--critically weakens the govern-
ment's already limited capacity to airlift supplies and
troops, react to guerrilla thrusts, and provide air
coverage to ground troops. Six of 14 UH-lH helicopters
reportedly have been destroyed or severely damaged; most
of the remaining eight are grounded awaiting repairs.
El Salvador's 15 other helicopters are primarily light
observation craft, unsuitable for airlifting troops.
Five of 11 Ouragan aircraft are totally destroyed, elim-
inating one-third of the government's fleet of aging jet
fighters. Four of eight all-purpose C-47 transport planes
also have been damaged or destroyed.
au rrilla and continuing materiel shortages.
Comment: The guerrillas have been planning wide-
spread but localized campaigns aimed at disrupting the
electoral process, seizing international headlines, and
shaking the government's confidence. Having crippled
the Air Force, at least temporarily, the insurgents may
now undertake more ambitious offensive operations. Any
general offensive is unlikely to develop momentum, how-
ever, given the apparent lack of preparations by the
(%) SUDAN: Nimeiri Buys Some Time
Khartoum remains calm, and there is no indication
that the recently purged senior Army officers or any
other elements are preparing to move a ainst President
Nimeiri. Nimeiri's removal
of First Vice President Khalil has at least de-
prived the opposition of a rallvina point.
tion.
Comment: Nimeiri's trip to Aswan for a brief meet-
ing with Egyptian President Mubarak yesterday reflects
his confidence that his hold on power is secure. His
actions this week, however, have intensified his isola-
10
28 January 1
 USSR: Speedup of US Grain Deliveries
The USSR has asked US grain firms to accelerate
shipments of about 2 million tons of US grain bought
during the fourth quarter of 1981 and originally sched-
uled for delivery through March. The grain is now to be
shipped by late February or early March.
Moscow's fear of another grain embargo
/3
prompted the request.
I the current congestion at Soviet grain ports. The USSR
,
will not return to the US market until March
bl
y
a
pro
b
grain they buy. They
may
try to purchase
another 5 mil-
lion or 6 million tons
by
30 June, the end
of the market-
ing year.
11
after all of the 12.5 million tons of US grain bought so
far has been delivered. At that time, they are likely
to insist on immediate delivery of any additional US
28 January 1982
 The Colombian Air Force is considering buying at
least eight Kfir fighter aircraft from Israel in a pack-
age deal that would include spare parts and training.
It still hopes, however, to receive more attractive bids
from US or French manufacturers.
Comment: The purchase of Kfirs would be a signifi-
cant departure from the government's priority of mainly
buying equipment used in counterinsurgency operations
and of staying within the military budget. Reports of
MIG aircraft going to Nicaragua and the proposed sale of
US F-16 fighters to Venezuela, however, have heightened
Colombian security concerns. Although Bogota and Caracas
are engaged in a border dispute over oil rights in the
Gulf of Venezuela, Colombian leaders are more concerned
now about possible threats from Nicaragua and Cuba. The
Castro regime has supplied arms to leftist guerrillas in
Colombia, and relations with Nicaragua have been strained
over Bogota's support for El Salvador's government.
12
28 January 1982
 BRAZIL-CUBA: Trade Prospects
A private Brazilian commercial delegation visited
Cuba recently to talk to senior Cuban trade officials
about sales opportunities for a wide range of Brazilian
products. President Castro expressed a desire to re-
establish economic ties, which were severed in 1964, and
offered preferential treatment for Brazilian exports.
Brazilian official spokesmen were aware of the trip, but
denied authorizing the discussions. Diplomatic relations
remain suspended and Brazil continues to prohibit direct
exports to Cuba.
resuming trade or diplomatic relations with Cuba.
direct trade precludes use of government commercial
insurance and export financing facilities. The
limited opportunity for trade over the near term prob-
ably will reinforce the strong opposition in Brazil to
Comment: Brazil's economic pragmatism, which has
already led to increased trade with the Soviets and
East Europeans, probably is the primary motivation
/ behind the recent contacts. Trial sales are likely--
perhaps through a third country such as Panama--to
reopen commercial ties without breaking Brazilian law.
Weak sugar prices, however, will curb Cuba's ability
to pay for imports. The Brazilian prohibition against
 Security forces yesterday dispersed several hundred
student protesters, the first such incident since Head
of State Doe took power in 1980. The demonstrators, who
apparently had planned to march to the US Embassy, were
protesting the regime's arrest and trial last week of
six leftist student leaders accused of criticizing and
violatina the ban on liti s.
28 January 1982
 JAPAN: Next Step in Defense Planning
The defense planning process getting under way in Tokyo will
have an important influence on Japan's military capabilities by the
end of the decade. There are signs that party leaders disagree on
how to proceed.
Now that the cabinet has approved the defense budget
for this year, the government is turning its attention to
establishing goals for the FY 1983-87 period. The rela-
tively large increase for FY 1982 resulted primarily from
the leadership's concern about an adverse US reaction if
Tokyo failed to honor the pledge Prime Minister Suzuki
made last May to President Reagan that Japan would make
greater efforts in defense.
lower equipment targets and spending estimates.
quent negotiations with other ministries are likely to
The Japanese still see their armed forces less as a
deterrent against Soviet aggression than as a means of
placating the US. Tokyo's reading of the intensity of
` 3 Washington's interest thus will be a ke factor in formu-
!/ lating the five-year plan.
The Midterm Operations Estimate
The estimate will specify the kinds and amounts of
military equipment to be acquired over the next five
years. This month the three services are scheduled to
submit their individual plans to the Defense Agency,
which will present a combined proposal to the cabinet's
National Defense Council in March. This probably will
be the most ambitious version of the plan because subse-
Suzuki and other party leaders are likely to approve
the final version in July. The estimate will remain in
effect until the next defense planning exercise in 1985.
28 January 1982
 The Political Climate
Although the Prime Minister's fiscal austerity pro-
gram is coming under fire, he is still pursuing it and
would prefer that the estimate entail only a moderate
increase in defense spending. He also has suggested to
the Defense Agency that defense expenditures should be
kept under 1 percent of GNP.
The 1-percent ceiling was established in 1976 to
head off protests from opposition parties against the
government's allegedly "limitless" rearmament program
and has since become an important political restraint
on defense spending. Even a moderate acceleration in
defense spending increases probably would exceed the
ceiling by 1986.
GNP was "undeniably inadequate."
Although it is still politically risky for a Japa-
nese politician to advocate a dramatic increase in the
defense effort, there are a few signs that public oppo-
sition to an incremental military buildup is beginning
to erode. Despite heavy press criticism of the defense
budget for this year, ruling Liberal Democrats at their
annual convention last week passed a resolution that
declared that a defense budget limited to 1 percent of
This contradiction of Suzuki's personal preference
indicates that party pressure was instrumental in deter-
mining defense spending for 1982 and that Suzuki is a
follower rather than a leader on the issue in his own
party. The resolution also may presage a significant
debate among party leaders over the pace of defense
spending. Even the cautious Suzuki recently noted that
Japan may not be able to adhere to the 1-percent ceiling
much beyond 1987.
28 January 198-2-