NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY SATURDAY 19 APRIL 1980

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005148680
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2010
• Case Number: F-2007-00460
• Publication Date: April 19, 1980

Intelligence
APPROVED FOR RELEASED
DATE: 01-20-2010
National Intelligence Daily
Saturday
19 April 1980
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Top See
D 80-093JX
19 April 1980
 Situation Reports
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Briefs and Comments
Israel-Lebanon: UN Force Under Pressure . . . . . . . . . 4
Egypt: Internal Security Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
USSR - Saudi Arabia: Examining Relations. . . . . . . . . 7
El Salvador: Government Reforms Threatened. . . . . . . . 8
Cuba: Mass Demonstrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
China-USSR: New Ambassador . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Zaire: Student Disturbances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Indonesia: Aftermath of Anti-Chinese Incidents. . . . . . 11
South Korea: Student Unrest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
USSR-Brazil: Toward Closer Relations. . . . . . . . . . . 12
Special Analysis
Pakistan: The Afghanistan Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
19 April 19 0
 19 April 1980
 2
19 ApriT-VM
 The Revolutionary Council has ordered a crackdown on poZit-
ical activity in all universities.
The Council ordered all campus political groups to
close their offices within three days. The move follows
increasing clashes at Tehran's universities between Is-
lamic groups and leftists. The regime may hope to take
advantage of the unrest to weaken two leftist groups
that traditionally have strong student followings, the
Mujahedin and Fedayeen.
Iran-Iraq
Continuing rumors of the execution in Baghdad of
Ayatollah Baqr Sadr, a senior Iraqi Shia religious leader,
are further aggravating relations between Iraq and Iran.
Baqr Sadr's death would lead to large anti-
Iraq demonstrations in Tehran.
The Kurdish Problem
Fighting between dissident Kurds and government forces
has spread to one of the larger towns in Kordestan Province.
Tehran radio has confirmed press reports of new fighting in
Saqqez, a traditional Kurdish stronghold.
Sanctions
Japanese Foreign Minister Okita is flying to Luxem-
bourg to be on hand for the EC Foreign Ministers' meeting
that opens on Monday. An aid to Ohira explained that
Tokyo wants to make its decision on new measures affect-
ing Iran in concert with the EC.
3
19 April 1980
 Continuing harassment of UN units in Lebanon by IsraeZi-
backed Lebanese Christian militia Leader Haddad has caused the
major contributors to the UN force to become increasingly critical
of the Israelis and to blame the US for failing to put pressure on
Israel.
the Israelis.
Attacks by militiamen on UN observation posts this
week and their apparent role in the murder of two Irish
soldiers yesterday will increase the anger of the coun-
tries that supply troops for the 6,000-man UN force.
Ireland and the Netherlands have already protested to
support for Haddad.
and Norway--also are increasingly upset over Israel's
Other major contributors--including France, Italy,
attacks.
The Israelis support Haddad because they believe
he supplies protection against Palestinian terrorist in-
filtrations that the UN force cannot provide. Leaders
of the UN force maintain, however, that militia harass-
ment limits their ability to guard against terrorist
the commando raid against a Palestinian
tive against the guerrillas.
base on the Lebanese coast yesterday was carried out to
preempt another planned guerrilla attack, and not in
retaliation for the attack on a settlement in northern
Israel last week. the raid--the first such Is-
raeli military action since last August--could signal a
return by the Israelis to a policy of taking the initia-
19 April 1980
 EGYPT: Internal Security Problems
The Egyptian Government apparently is greatly concerned about
signs of domestic unrest particularly dissent on university cam-
puses.
In a case pending since last August, 30 accused of
belonging to the Communist underground were indicted on
Wednesday for organizing to overthrow the government and
for distributing leaflets advocating Communism. They
allegedly received financial support from the USSR and
other Communist countries and from Libya. The fact that
they are to be tried by the state security court under-
scores the government's concern.
The government apparently is focusing on the possi-
bility of serious disturbances at the universities.
Although security on campuses is already said to be at an
unprecedented level, the government reportedly may close
nth when final examinations are held.
We have no evidence of any links between dissidents
in Egypt and the recent activity of exiled former Egyp-
tian Chief of Staff Shazli, who is visiting radical Arab
countries seeking support for Sadat's overthrow. Shazli
is attracting some Arab backing for his "national front,"
but he has virtually no political following in Egypt.
5
19 April 1980
 19 April 1980
 USSR - SAUDI ARABIA: Examining Relations
Moscow remains interested in establishing relations with
Saudi Arabia despite the Saudi reaction against the invasion of
Afghanistan.
The Soviets probably do not expect much progress in
the near term. Soviet media, in contrast to last year,
are criticizing Saudi domestic policies Saudi
support for the Afghan resistance.
the issue of Afghanistan is impeding
Soviet efforts to normalize relations with Riyadh and
that it will lead to a significant erosion of Soviet
influence in the Middle East.
Saudi Crown Prince Fahd, who has used the invasion
of Afghanistan to quash all talk of improving relations
with the USSR, would rebuff any Soviet overture at
present. If new strains should occur in US-Saudi rela-
tions over the Palestinian issue, however, or if US
determination to check the Soviets should appear to be
weakening in the eyes of the Saudis, Fahd probably
would come under new internal pressure to reverse
himself.
7
19 April 1980
 Junta efforts to broaden initial reforms remain threatened
by continuing divisions in the government and increased violence
in the countryside.
The junta has abandoned its earlier reluctance and
intends to announce a new phase of land redistribution
that will benefit 150,000 sharecroppers. Nonetheless,
lack of consensus, administrative snarls, and leftist
actions could neutralize reform efforts. This week
Labor Minister Samayoa publicly attacked the junta for
delaying labor reform.
Some liberal military officers also remain disil-
lusioned, although they lack essential support for a
successful coup. Colonel Majano, the junta member most
closely linked to younger officers, is standing aloof
from junta proceedings. His departure probably would
result in other military and civilian resignations and
give leftist forces a propaganda windfall.
Because agrarian reform is the key to government
efforts to win public support, leftist groups are shift-
ing much of their effort to rural areas. The major in-
surgent organization murdered 25 peasants suspected of
progovernment sympathies in a single day last week.
To help halt the bloodshed, the Church last week
began talks with the junta and leftist leaders. The
roadblocks to mediation were reflected in one moderate
left leader's rejection of any dialogue. His party--
which participated in the first junta--is now working
toward a terrorist-allied government-in-exile.
Negotiations to establish a shadow cabinet likely
will take several months, but increased international
criticism of the junta--typified in recent strong at-
tacks by Nicaraguan leaders--holds out the possibility
of formal recognition. In the meantime, the radical
left is likely to follow a dual track--pursuing contacts
with the Church to broaden its, legitimacy while attempt-
ing to increase rural unrest.
8
19 April 1980
 Fidel Castro's attempt to supervise personally all
aspects of the refugee situation at the Peruvian Embassy
in Havana underscores Cuba's concern over international
criticism. Havana is defending its position with a
massive propaganda counteroffensive portraying Cuba as
the victim of a US-Peruvian-Venezuelan conspiracy. The
effort will be led by government-instigated demonstra-
tions today at the Peruvian and Venezuelan Embassies.
Although the potential for violence exists, Havana
probably will exercise tight control over the anticipated
1 million marchers.
In a declaration issued Wednesday, First Vice Pres-
ident Raul Castro noted that the Cuban people "calmly
and firmly" reject the actions of the refugees--words
previously used by the government to curb emotional be-
havior during demonstrations. In a related development,
the airlift of Cubans to Costa Rica has been suspended,
apparently because Havana wants the refugees
directly to the countries accepting them.
China's new Ambassador to the USSR, Yang Shouzheng,
is scheduled to arrive in Moscow tomorrow. Yang's party
and diplomatic rank appear to reflect Beijing's interest
in correct but sterile relations. Yang has long service
in Africa, and we have no evidence that he ever special-
ized on Soviet issues. He may use his initial calls
on senior Soviet officials to convey China's formal
response to the proposal made by the USSR in early April
for political or border negotiations. Vice Premier Deng
Xiaoping's recent comments to the mess indicate that
Beijing will put Moscow off.
19 April 1980
 Government troops have ended student disturbances
in Kinshasa, but President Mobutu remains concerned
about the possibility of further unrest. Following dis-
plays of violence by the students and their calls for
Mobutu's resignation, Zairian troops occupied the
Kinshasa campus on Thursday, arrested some student
leaders, and forced the rest to leave. Mobutu has put
military units on alert and ordered the Army to disperse
any student groups.
tied politicians are manipulating the students, and he
hopes that the show of force will maintain calm. He
will resist making major economic concessions to the
students for fear of encouraging other groups, including
teachers now on strike for hi her pay to make additional
demands.
The President believes that unidenti-
10 19 April 1980
 Indonesian security authorities believe that the
anti-Chinese rioting in the city of Udjung Pandang in
eastern Indonesia on 10 and 11 April was caused by Muslim
extremists trying to exploit anti-Chinese sentiment to
attack President Suharto's government. They have warned
student leaders--the traditional instigators of urban
violence--against trying to play on the disorders in
Udjung Pandang and two other cities to incite trouble in
Jakarta. The officials told the student leaders to
bring their anti-Chinese grievances directly to Army
headquarters and threatened that any looters of Chinese
shops will be "shot on sight." The recently announced
government program to accelerate naturalization of In-
donesian Chinese probably focused attention on this
group again and also aroused latent resentment among the
Indonesian public. The security officials worry that
government opponents will try to build on these feelings
and translate racial discontent into antigovernment
violence.
Student demonstrations in Seoul and other major
cities can gain new impetus this weekend, the 20th anni-
versary of the student uprising that led to the over-
throw of the Syngman Rhee government. Although recent
protests have been small and nonviolent, normal univer-
sity functions have been paralyzed on a score of campuses,
and President Choi Kyu Hah has appealed for student
restraint. Army strongman Chun Doo Hwan believes that
recent student opposition to compulsory military train-
ing gives comfort to North Korea and endangers national
security. If university authorities appear unable to
resolve the issue, the government might abandon its
hands-off policy and threaten to draft dissenters or
deny diplomas to student who lack the required military
credits.
19 April 1980
 USSR-BRAZIL: Toward Closer Relations
Eduard Shevardnadze, a candidate member of the
Soviet Politburo, arrived in Brazil this week as the
head of a parliamentary delegation. His inclusion
on what otherwise could have been a routine delegation
is a significant gesture to the Brazilians. He invited
President Figueiredo to visit Moscow, probably next
year.
The Soviets probably want to
exploit Brazil's belief that it must not appear subservi-
ent to the US, particularly in the wake of Brasilia's
uncommitted stand on the US grain embargo.
12
19 April 1980
 PAKISTAN: The Afghanistan Debate
Pakistan continues to insist that the withdrawal of Soviet
troops from Afghanistan is a precondition for any improvement in
its relations with either country. Islamabad's position is under
constant review, however, and President Zia is subject to conflict-
ing pressures from within his government. Some officials favor op-
posing the Soviets more strongly; others want to appease Moscow.
Zia and his advisers are worried about Moscow's
long-term objectives in the subcontinent and about the
serious problems Pakistan faces in the short term as the
Soviets try to pacify Afghanistan. Some advisers believe
that a continued influx of refugees could soon lead to
a serious breakdown of law and order along the frontier.
Diplomatic Tightrope
Islamabad has taken a strong diplomatic stand
against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, but it
is trying to avoid giving unnecessary offense to Moscow.
Zia rejected US aid primarily because he believed that
accepting it would increase tension with Moscow but would
not strengthen Pakistan's security to a corresponding
degree.
--continued
TA" Fftf_-rO+-
pAprii 1980
 Islamabad's desire to avoid confrontation with
Moscow is further reflected in its reluctance to back
publicly exile groups in Pakistan and its unwillingness
to give extensive help to Afghan insurgents. Pakistan
also has tended to avoid publicity on border incidents,
including Soviet overflights.
Zia and his advisers nevertheless are not seeking
an accommodation with Moscow. Pakistan's closest allies--
Saudi Arabia, Iran, and China--would have serious reser-
vations about any significant move toward Moscow. At
home, many Pakistanis--especially the conservatives sup-
porting Zia--would oppose abandoning fellow Muslims in
Afghanistan or any "sellout" to the USSR.
Pakistani policymakers doubt, moreover, that any
agreement with Moscow would bring more than temporary
benefits. There also is considerable sentiment in the
military--on which Zia ultimately depends--for a con-
tinued hardline on Afghanistan.
Pakistani leaders seem to agree on their sense of
isolation while facing the Soviets. This has led them
to an unprecedented interest in trying to improve re-
lations with India despite longstanding deep distrust
of India's intentions and of its relationship with
Domestic Politics
Although foreign developments and the extent of
foreign support will strongly influence Pakistani policy,
domestic politics could become an equally important
factor. The near automatic support that Zia received
after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan--even from
many of his political enemies--is beginning to dissipate.
14
19 April 1980
 Former Prime Minister Bhutto's widow has publicly
attacked Zia for failing to accept the Soviet-installed
Babrak government and for allowing insurgents to use
Pakistani territory. Many Islamabad officials, on the
other hand, believe that any attempt to placate the So-
viets could turn many in the Army against Zia.
19 April 1980