IMPACT AND IMPLICATIONS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005406121
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 29, 2009
• Case Number: F-2009-01245
• Publication Date: April 1, 1988

APPROVED FOR RELEASED
DATE: 25-Sep-2009
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
 IRAN-IRAQ WAR
IMPACT AND IMPLICATIONS OF
CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE IN THE
Information available as of 20 March 1988 was used in
the preparation of this Memorandum, which was
approved for publication on 22 March 1988 by the
Acting Chairman of the National Intelligence Council.
 NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
 Iraqi use of chemical weapons to subdue the Kurdish
population inside Iraq, along the iriborder area with
Iran and Turkey, is qualitatively different from the use
of chemicals against another country. The Iraqis have
primarily used riot control agents and possibly, in some
cases, chemical weapons against the Kurds to minimize
the diversion of troops from more critical fronts and the
losses that might occur in inaccessible areas that favor
guerrilla forces. It is very difficult to determine the type
of agents and the exact circumstancesunder which any
of the agents may have been used.
Iraq used the riot control agent CS against the Kurds
during the civil war of 1974.75.
The campaign against the Kurds once again intensi-
fied in early 1987 as Iraq attempted to secure the
northern border areas with Turkey and Iran. Since
April 1987, a military campaign has been waged to
eradicate village bases of support for Kurdish guerrilla
8. Until 1986, release authority for chemical weap-
ons in Iraq was held at the highest levels of decision-
making, perhaps exclusively by President Husayn.
This was probably to ensure control of a limited
stockpile of chemical munitions and to guarantee that
sufficient supplies would be available to counter large
Iranian offensives. Baghdad may also have believed
that tight control of chemical weapons would make it
easier to deny that Iraqi forces had employed CW. In
1986, CW release authority was delegated to corps-
level commanders as the result of Iraqi losses during
the Al Faw and Mehron campaigns and after the
military apparently convinced President Husayn to
change release authority for chemical weapons to
permit better integration of CW into battle plans.
Chemical weapons now appear to be an important
adjunct for the achievement of tactical objectives.
9. In our judgment, the Iraqis perceive chemical
weapons to be an effective complement to their
conventional arsenal. Overall, we believe the frequen-
cy of chemical weapons use-probably constrained
groups. To minimize losses of men and materiel, Iraqi
troops have used riot control agents and Possibly chemi-
cal weapons repeatedly when conventional weapons
have not sufficed to subdue villagers before razing their
dwellings,
Saddam Husayn reportedly gave the direction of this
campaign to All Hassan al-Majid, director of internal
security and Saddatn's cousin, who devised a "scorched
earth" policy to eliminate dissident Kurdish activity in
northern Iraq. The policy, carried out between April
and July 1987, and apparently resumed in October
1987, has spurred the desertion of many loyalist Kurds
and private criticism from senior Iraqi Government and.
military figures. Even the figurehead vice president of
Iraq, a Kurd, has refused to support the policy-a
daring defiance of Saddam Husayn's authority.
The types and lethality of chemical weapons avail-
able to both sides have increased in recent months, and
the fighting in northeastern Iraq demonstrates that
neither has backed off from east I in them even
against Kurdish population centers
We do not believe the prospect of further
civilian casualties would dissuade either side from using
chemical weapons]
only by availability-has increased, and the effective-
ness of Baghdad's CW employment in major battles is
improving,
10. Constraints on Iraqi Use. By denying its use of
CW, Iraq has shown some concern for international
consequences. Baghdad's main concern has been that
any public outcry would further complicate its efforts
to obtain necessary conventional war materiels as well
as necessary CW materials. Although limited interna-
tional reaction has thus far not deterred Iraq's chemi-
cal employment, no political or religious constraints
seem to bear seriously on Husayn's decision to employ
CW. International and regional pressure-United
Nations condemnatory resolutions, demarches, and
export controls-have been ineffective in stopping the
development of the CW program or continued battle-
Iron
11. We believe that, as Iran's chemical weapons
stockpile increases and Iraqi chemical attacks contin-
ue, Tehran will selectively increase its use of chemicals
6
lop aecreT
 Table 2
Selected Chemical Weapon Employments
July 1982
Mandali and Ilasrah
CS type Few
August 1983
Haij Umran and Mt Kordeman
Mustard Less than 100
October-November 1983
Paniwtn
Mustard 3,000
February-March 1984
Majnoun Island
Mustard 2.500
March 1984
Al Basrah
Tabun 50 to 100
March 1985
Hawizah Marsh
Mustard/tab:n 3.000
February 1986
Al Faw
Mustard/tabor 8.000 to 10
000
December 1986
Umm ar Sasas
Mustard
khousands
April 1987
Al Sasrah
Mustard/taban 5.000
October 1987
Su./Mehra.
Mustard/nerve agent
March 1988
Iialabjah
Mustard/ner. a agent
mndreds
Iranian Use
April 1987
Al Borah
Phosgene/CK
October 1987
Sumar/Mehr
Mustard (possible)
in retaliation, and possibly as a preemptive weapon. In
April 1987, Iran clearly crossed the chemical barrier,
using chemical agents in a militarily sit nificant but
limited quantity in the Al Basrah area.
This apparent change in
policy seems confirmed by a mid-October 1987 Irani-
an mustard attack in retaliation for an Iraqi chemical
attack.
12. Constraints on Iranian Use. Due to Iraq's
much greater chemical capability, we assess that Iran
will remain cautious and selective in its use of chemi-
cals. We are confident, however, that the Iranians will
continue to use and probably increase their employ-
ment of chemical weapons to meet military require-
ments or to retaliate for Iraqi chemical attacks,
were probably militarily ineffective because of poor
employment techniques and unsuitable weather con-
ditions. In some cases, Iraqi pilots released chemical
munitions from too high altitudes and rarely delivered
enough agent at one time to be militarily effective, In
other cases, chemical bombs were released too low for
their fuzes to function. Iran thus obtained numerous '
Iraqi chemical weapons intact and scored a major
propaganda victory by publicizing this evidence (see
figure 2). Also, Iraq used chemical weapons in damp
conditions-particularly in the southern border area-
when the wind was blowing toward its own troops and
in daylight. In 1983, for example, Iraq used fighter-
bombers, artillery, and helicopters to deliver mustard
in an effort to dislodge Iranian forces around Mount
Kordeman in the northern border area. The chemical
attacks had little effect on Iranian troops; however, the
Iraqi forces were exposed when the wind shifted
toward Iraqi lines and the dense vapor flowed down-
hill-away from the Iranians.
Battlefield Effectiveness of Chemical Weapons
13. Faced with superior numbers of Iranian soldiers
in a war of attrition, Iraq elected in 1982 to use the
riot control agent CS in conjunction with conventional
weapons, hoping to solve its military dilemma. Iraq's
early uses of mustard and tabun in 1983 and 1984
14. The Intelligence Community believes that in
some cases during specific battles Iraqi chemical em-
ployments have been tactically effective. Whenever
the Iraqis used good delivery techniques, weather'
conditions and terrain were favorable, and the Irani-
ans were not adequately prepared or trained, the use
of chemical weapons has been effective. Iraqi mustard
7
I