NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0005301358
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
25
Document Creation Date:
June 23, 2015
Document Release Date:
September 9, 2009
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
F-2007-00571
Publication Date:
June 1, 1990
File:
Attachment | Size |
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DOC_0005301358.pdf | 471.58 KB |
Body:
? (b)(1)
(b)(3)
APPROVED FOR RELEASED
DATE: 09-01-2009
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1 June 1990
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Notes Liberia: Roberts Airfield Next Rebel Target 3
Latin America: OAS General Assembly Hesitant
Romania: Economy in Tailspin
Yugoslavia: Premier May Quit Communist Party
Special Analyses
USSR: Aid to Afghanistan a Manageable Cost 11
I June 1990
w'
TOTIvem-
LIBERIA: Roberts Airfield Next Rebel Target
Rebel leader Charles Taylor told the press Wednesday his forces were
poised to capture Roberts International Airfield. The rebels have
urged employees to evacuate the area to avoid injury. Some
commercial airlines have suspended service. The airport remains
open, but only 15 to 20 of some 100 employees reported for work
yesterday, includin only one air traffic controller and four ground
support personnel. the airfield is
lightly defended: only eight soldiers were seen there; another 30 to 40
Comment: The insurgents probably will attack the airport in the next
several days. They probably believe it is a soft target whose capture
will represent a psychological victory, virtually cutting Monrovia off
from the outside world. Although the rebels may capture the airport
fairly quickly, the army almost certainly will try to retake it.
Commercial airlines probably would be reluctant to resume flights if
the airport were shut down f v n a short time. r
side appears to be in control.
The OAS General Assembly will face several important regional
issues when it convenes on Sunday in Asuncion, Paraguay. There is
broad backing for sending observers to future Haitian elections but
considerable controversy over how far the OAS should go in
accommodating US urgings to promote democracy. Support for
continued assistance to Contra demobilization is widespread, but
few if any countries are likely to provide funds. Although Cuban
readmission to the OAS is not on the agenda, most member nations
favor it and probably will discuss the issue informally.
Comment: Many members fear that too strong a stand by the OAS
on promoting democracy could facilitate US intervention in the
future; several plan to oppose any weakening of the traditional OAS
anti-intervention stance. Some, notably the Mexicans, still harbor
anti-Panama sentiment, which could surface in minor ways. Because
the change of government in Nicaragua and Noriega's ouster in
Panama have removed major irritants, this Assembly is apt to be less
T'13's~
1 June 1990
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Romania's economy deteriorated sharply in the first quarter this year
because of rampant energy shortages, labor unrest, and government
efforts to buy political stability with increased consumer supplies.
Industrial production reportedly fell 20 percent from last year, while
hard currency exports plunged 40 percent and imports more than
doubled. Exports to CEMA member countries also dropped sharply.
Comment: To improve its standing for the recent national election,
the provisional government boosted living standards by increasing
imports and by diverting to consumers exportable food and industrial
energy supplies. Although continued deterioration makes this strategy
unsustainable, Bucharest will not quickly push the extensive
economic reforms necessary for economic recovery for fear of higher
prices and unemployment. The new government will be hard pressed
to deliver on its promise to improve the populace's economic well-
being, almost certainly generating renewed unrest.
Premier Ante Markovic is hinting he may leave the Communist party
and form a coalition of parties that support his reform program,
according to press reports this week. Markovic, an ethnic Croat,
already has sent a conciliatory greeting to the new non-Communist
nationalist government in Croatia. His comments about leaving the
party have sparked sharp attacks from the Belgrade press, controlled
by Serb strongman Slobodan Milosevic, against Markovic's economic
program and his personal credibility.
Comment: A recent nationwide poll shows Markovic remains the
most popular politician in the country; he also is the only federal
official respected by all Yugoslav ethnic groups. His reported
willingness to function outside the Communist party will accelerate
its disintegration. Although Markovic's comments will undercut Serb
support for his economic reform program. they will increase his
popularity in Croatia.
Twseffet-
'I'io 's'": -
In Bdef
Oa-
-Legislature of Soviet Moldavia yesterday recognized Lithuanian
independence ... strongest support so far by non-Baltic legislature
... Moldavian legislature not yet seeking independence, move
suggests proindependence sentiment growing.
- Albania hosted energy ministers from Bulgaria, Greece, Romania,
Turkey, Yugoslavia on Wednesday ... East Europeans probably
hope regional cooperation in using natural coal resources
will reduce dependence on USSR.
- EC urging France to lift ban on UK beef... ban disregards existing
EC safety measures against disease that has killed 13,000 British
cattle ... embargo would halve UK beef exports.
- East German Interior Minister under fire for appointing former
regime officials to key positions ... own party, coalition partners
demanding his ouster ... reflects growing concern about continued
influence of Communist secret police.
-Italy, France urging other EC states to normalize relations with
Vietnam... probably can persuade EC partners, sentiment
running against sanctions... Rome probably will push issue when
it assumes EC presidency next month.
JAPAN
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MICRONESIA
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Mlawly Islands'
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and
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Oceania -Marshall Islands President Kabua visits Washington I I June. . .
likely to raise claim of sovereignty over Wake Island ... though
claim rests n " ditional " Wake has no indiw-nnivq
inhabitants.
South Asia - Kashmiri leader Amanullah Khan back in Pakistan after seeking
political, financial support in US, Europe, press reports say. . .
heads most significant militant group ... Islamabad not likely to
curb his anti-Indian activities.
Tolrl&eFot
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omit-
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Special Analysis
USSR: Aid to Afghanistan a Manageable Cost
The Soviets continue to provide the Najibullah regime in Kabul with
generous amounts of military aid and economic assistance, though the
total value of the aid this year is unlikely to match the record level of last
nominal value of Moscow's military assistance to Afghanistan was
Cost of Soviet Military Aid to Afghanistan, 1988-90
The actual cost of this assistance in forgone hard currency was
substantially less because much of the equipment the Soviets have
currency, if at all, for far less than the contract value. Moscow
probably could have earned the following amounts in hard currency
by selling the items: about $570 million last year, $305 million in
1988, and $100-125 million in the first quarter this year. The
opportunity costs to the Soviet armed forces and the civil economy of
sending such material as trucks, spare parts, and some types of
ammunition and modern military equipment probably are negligible
as is the cash Moscow spends to pay for the Kabul re ime's large
tribal militias and intelligence operations.
Cost of Soviet Economic Aid to Afghanistan, 1988-90
Moscow's deliveries of economic assistance probably reached
$820 million last year, as compared with an estimated $180 million
in 1988. Soviet economic aid quadrupled last year as Moscow
attempted to prepare the Afghan economy for the withdrawal of
Soviet troops and civilian technicians. If Moscow's imports from
Afghanistan are offset against this aid, then net costs probably were
about $700 million. Of this figure, almost $400 million representcd
lost hard currency: Moscow provides oil products and foodstuffs that
could be sold for hard currency or, if kept at home, would help satisfy
short supply.
The Soviets probably assume that, unless there is a major
deterioration in the Kabul regime's political cohesion or military
situation, current military and economic aid levels will maintain the
Najibullah government. Soviet force reductions in Europe, Mongolia,
and along the Sino-Soviet border will give Moscow added surplus
equipment that could be sent to Afghanistan. The cost of Soviet
military aid to Afghanistan this year probably will be slightly lower
aid probably will drop by roughly half this year, as Soviet
1 June 1990