WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0005358743
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
7
Document Creation Date:
June 23, 2015
Document Release Date:
September 23, 2009
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
F-2009-00149
Publication Date:
June 25, 1990
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
DOC_0005358743.pdf | 120.36 KB |
Body:
(b)(3)
SE ET
The Director of Central Intelligence
Wuhin?ton, D.C. 2150.5
National Intelligence Council
NIC 00694/90
25 June 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
- THROUGH: Natielm 1 T 1 i cnr?e OffirPr fnr Warning
FROM: Walter L. Barrows
National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan
Africa F
At their monthly meeting on 19 June, Intelligence Community
representatives agreed that:
o Liberia's rebel leader Taylor will likely move against
Monrovia soon, first attacking targets on the outskirts of the
city. A bloodbath is very likely, and the crisis could drag
on for some time.
APPROVED FOR
RELEASE DATE:
14-Sep-2009
SEtET
SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa
Liberia: Next Steps. Led by
CIA.
Most analysts expect Charles
Taylor and his NPFL rebels to
move against Monrovia soon,
resulting in a likely
bloodbath that could drag on
for some time. He needs to
in Monrovia is likely to be
chaos, with the citizenry
caught in the middle.
Chances are Doe will fight it
out in Monrovia as we hold
little hope for the peace
talks, although his timely
departure would probably avert
a battle for the capital. Doe
could also escape to his home
intensifying rains will make
operations more difficult, his
forces are suffering from a
variety of shortages,
particularly food, and he
faces serious command and
control problems.
We estimate 3,000 rebels would
be required to attack Monrovia
but Taylor has only about
1,500-2,000 presently
available in the Monrovia
area. The remainder will have
to be redeployed from other
rebel-controlled areas and
could slow down his advance on
the capital.
We expect the rebels to attack
intermediate targets on the
city's outskirts (for
instance, Camp Schiefflin,
government and missionary
radio stations) and avoid
head-on confrontations with
the Liberian army, hoping that
morale will dissipate. But
Doe's forces, particularly the
600 or so of his "best"
troops, may acquit themselves
better in and around Monrovia
than they have elsewhere. A
critical factor will be the
loyalty of key military
leaders, several of whom seem
ready to defect. In any
event, the result of fighting
he has amassed some 2,500
Krahn troops--and conduct a
bush war against whatever
government succeeded him. His
rebellion, however, would
suffer supply problems, intra-
Krahn feuding, and a general
lack of outside support.
Assuming he emerges on top,
Taylor almost certainly would
insist on heading a follow-on
government. It would be
dominated by NPFL members and
perhaps include some prominent
Liberians, but his most
important need would be to
find financial and
administrative expertise, to
raise revenues, and seek
international assistance. In
addition, Taylor would likely
want to renegotiate with the
US Government over rent for
facilities and with foreign
businessmen over terms of
concessions and contracts.
Collection Notes Analysts
commend recent strides in
collection on Taylor's group,
but our information gaps are
only beginning to be narrowed.
What is the size of the NPFL
and who are the commanders?
What are their leadership
capabilities? Also, the
Liberian army has received
SECT
SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa
several weapons shipments.
Where have these weapons wound
up?
SE T
SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa
RET
SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa
SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa