WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
0005358743
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
7
Document Creation Date: 
June 23, 2015
Document Release Date: 
September 23, 2009
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
F-2009-00149
Publication Date: 
June 25, 1990
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PDF icon DOC_0005358743.pdf120.36 KB
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(b)(3) SE ET The Director of Central Intelligence Wuhin?ton, D.C. 2150.5 National Intelligence Council NIC 00694/90 25 June 1990 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence - THROUGH: Natielm 1 T 1 i cnr?e OffirPr fnr Warning FROM: Walter L. Barrows National Intelligence Officer for Africa SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa F At their monthly meeting on 19 June, Intelligence Community representatives agreed that: o Liberia's rebel leader Taylor will likely move against Monrovia soon, first attacking targets on the outskirts of the city. A bloodbath is very likely, and the crisis could drag on for some time. APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 14-Sep-2009 SEtET SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa Liberia: Next Steps. Led by CIA. Most analysts expect Charles Taylor and his NPFL rebels to move against Monrovia soon, resulting in a likely bloodbath that could drag on for some time. He needs to in Monrovia is likely to be chaos, with the citizenry caught in the middle. Chances are Doe will fight it out in Monrovia as we hold little hope for the peace talks, although his timely departure would probably avert a battle for the capital. Doe could also escape to his home intensifying rains will make operations more difficult, his forces are suffering from a variety of shortages, particularly food, and he faces serious command and control problems. We estimate 3,000 rebels would be required to attack Monrovia but Taylor has only about 1,500-2,000 presently available in the Monrovia area. The remainder will have to be redeployed from other rebel-controlled areas and could slow down his advance on the capital. We expect the rebels to attack intermediate targets on the city's outskirts (for instance, Camp Schiefflin, government and missionary radio stations) and avoid head-on confrontations with the Liberian army, hoping that morale will dissipate. But Doe's forces, particularly the 600 or so of his "best" troops, may acquit themselves better in and around Monrovia than they have elsewhere. A critical factor will be the loyalty of key military leaders, several of whom seem ready to defect. In any event, the result of fighting he has amassed some 2,500 Krahn troops--and conduct a bush war against whatever government succeeded him. His rebellion, however, would suffer supply problems, intra- Krahn feuding, and a general lack of outside support. Assuming he emerges on top, Taylor almost certainly would insist on heading a follow-on government. It would be dominated by NPFL members and perhaps include some prominent Liberians, but his most important need would be to find financial and administrative expertise, to raise revenues, and seek international assistance. In addition, Taylor would likely want to renegotiate with the US Government over rent for facilities and with foreign businessmen over terms of concessions and contracts. Collection Notes Analysts commend recent strides in collection on Taylor's group, but our information gaps are only beginning to be narrowed. What is the size of the NPFL and who are the commanders? What are their leadership capabilities? Also, the Liberian army has received SECT SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa several weapons shipments. Where have these weapons wound up? SE T SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa RET SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa