CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005339901
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2009
• Case Number: F-2008-01829
• Publication Date: May 12, 1960

III
.CENTRAL 1NT El.L1GENC E AGENCY
` I O FI E OF CURRENT iN~EWGENCE
tAGEN A3It-iaci 1~'.
APPROVED FOR
RELEASE^ DATE:
29-Jun-2009
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 12 May 1960
GROWING CRITICISM OF DIEM REGIME IN SOUTH VIETNAM
South Vietnamese President
Diem, beset with a serious chal-
lenge from resurgent Communist
guerrilla forces, also faces a
growing problem of dissatisfac-
tion among officials of his own
regime, as well as among the
public. Diem is taking urgent
steps--chiefly military--in an
effort to.redress the -internal
security situation, but shows
no inclination to liberalize
his'regime despite growing
criticism. This attitude
is consistent with his tough
mindedness. and with his belief
that the exigencies of the,
times require authoritarian
rule.
A number of important Viet-
namese figures, including high
government officials, labor or-
ganizers, members of the Nation-
al Assembly, and leaders of po-
litical parties, have privately
expressed discontent and frus-
tration with their "puppet"
roles. Their complaint is that
Diem's refusal to delegate au-
thority beyond a tight circle
of relatives and close associ-
ates has paralyzed effective.:
government, fostered favoritism
and corruption, alienated the
people, and facilitated Commu-
nist subversion.' Vice Presi-
dent Nguyen Ngoc Tho and other
cabinet members fear for the
government's stability unless
political reforms are undertaken
immediately.
A principal cause for wide-
spread resentment is the perva-
sive influence of the Can Lao,
a semicovert organization which
exercises the real Dower and
control in the government on
Diem's behalf. Under the di-
rection of Diem's brother and
chief political adviser, Ngo
Dinh Nhu, the Can Lao had gradu-
ally fashioned a commissar-like
network throughout the govern-
ment's political and military
substructure.
Diem thus far has refused
to acknowledge any serious short-
comings in his. entourage, and
brushes off critics of the regime
as either opportunists, crackpots, or
crypto-Communists. He has dismissed
as "inconsequential" the public peti-
tion for more democratic practices
issued in Saigon recently by a
group. of former Vietnamese gov-
ernment officials and civic
leaders. This unprecedented
attack on the Diem regime by a
cohesive, non-Communist group,
however,.could be the forerunner
of developments similar to
those in South Korea which re-
sulted in the overthrow of the
Rhee regime.. While this does
not seem an immediate likelihood,
Communist subversion--which has
already gained a toehold in cer-
tain.rural areas--is a particu-
larly dangerous factor in the
over-nll situation. S ET
US-JAPANESE SECURITY TREATY DIFFICULTIES.
Intensified attacks by the
Socialists and lack of coopera-
tion from intraparty opponents
of Prime Minister Kishi once
again may delay ratification of
the new US-Japanese security
treaty. Rivals within the Lib-
eral-Democratic party (LDP) are
procrastinating in order to
deny Kishi a political victory
which. would assure his re-elec-
tion as party president and con-
tinued tenure as prime. minister.
Kishi has been seeking to-
increase his prestige and
NOTES AND COMMENTS
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 CORY
NO
4445/'60
22 Septem a 1960
T a ., INTE'lLr ENCE A ENCY
~' j OFFICE F O CURRENT 1N1ELUGENCE
ABCHt VAL RECt RI?.
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 CURRENT 'INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SumMARy
The Diem government faces
a growing danger from the con-
tinued Communist guerrilla ac-
tivity in the countryside, wide-
spread peasant dissatisfaction,
and restiveness among articulate
groups in Saigon. After a slack-
ening with the advent of the
rainy reason, the Communists
again stepped up attacks in July,
frequently operating in larger
bands than previously. Possibly
because of Vietnamese Army pres-
sures in the delta provinces of
the south and west, Communist
activity increased north and r
east of Saigon. Main roads out-
side Saigon are insecure.
Recent reports that the
Communists may plan sabotage and
terrorism in the capital itself,
possibly including Americans as
targets, are being given greater
than usual credence by the Viet-
namese security service. It be-
lieves that special action groups
may have entered the city in con-
nection with the 15th' anniversary
on 23 September of the
beginning of anti-
French resistance, and
has advised Americans
against night travel
in the city at this
time.
President Diem
continues to oppose
the Communist threat
primarily through mil-
itary measures. In
addition to intensi-
fied antiguerrilla
training for the army,
be hopes to centralize
command and intelli-
gence functions and to
strengthen rural mili-
tias. At the same
time, he has taken
some steps to win
greater popular alle-
giance. He has visited
the countryside and,
PART II
in the face of peasant resist-
ance;, has announced a cutback
in the construction of "agro-
villes"--village regroupments
designed to provide greater eco-
nomic and physical security.
There is a possibility of
demonstrations in Saigon against
Diem's authoritarian rule. In
August, certain non-Communist
leaders in labor, refugee, and
student circles reportedly were
considering public protests; at
the same time,a number of sus-
pected agitators were arrested.
Communist infiltrators probably
would attempt to turn any demon-
strations into riots. Saigon
security officials reportedly
have plans to prevent any demon-
strations from gaining momentum.
They could seek army assistance
to quell disturbances, but it is
uncertain whether army troops
would remain loyal to Diem if
ordered to suppress non-Commu-
nist actions with force.
Areas of Main Communist Guerrilla Activity
III, de
Phu Qux
S OUT H
?P,~I1 Me
PA '.::' 111 PAtTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
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 There has been renewed em-
phasis from the Communist regime
in North Vietnam on the "strug-
gle against the US-Diem clique"
in the South. Speakers at the
regime's party congress in early
September indicated that North
Vietnam would support non-Com-
munist opponents of Diem looking
toward the formation of a coali-
tion government in Saigon.
North Vietnamese Premier Pham
Van Dong told the Indian chair-
man of the International Control
Commission in
early
August that
events in Laos
would
eventually
be
repeated in
South
Vietnam
and
Diem would
be overthrown, 11>
apparently by a coup d'etat
rather than by gueriilla action
alone, and replaced by a gov-
ernment which would negotiate
reunification with North Vietnam.
BELGIUM PLANS?TINDEPENDENCE FOR RUANDA-URUNDI IN 18 MONTHS
Belgium has announced a}ro-
gram of rapid political evolution
for Ruanda-Urundi, which it ad-
ministers as a UN trust territory.
Under this program, the govern-
mental structures which are be-
ing created in both Ruanda and
Urundi will be broadened after
the elections in the first part
of 1961, with the result that
each state will receive substan-
tial internal automony. Full
independence for the two is
scheduled for the first half of
1962, with a target date of I
April. After attaining independ-
ence, the two states will de-
cide whether to be separate or
to federate.
Belgium professes to hope
that by introducing natives into
all levels of government, it can
avoid the mistakes made in the
Congo. However, the low level of
political development, the prim-
itive nature of the territory's
economy, and continuing tribal
tension will probably lead to
trouble, in which the UN is 7
likely to become progressively
more deeply involved as a re-
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sult of its trusteeship respon-
sibility.
Both Ruanda and Urundi have
traditionally been ruled by the
Batutsi (Watutsi) tribal group.
Recently, however, the numerically
predominant Bahutu, probably
with Belgian support, have begun
to contest Tutsi rule; Tensions
between the two groups have re-
sulted in a year-long series of
riots, raids, and arson in the
northern state of Ruanda, where
the ethnic divisions are sharp-
est and the Tutsi are determined
to retain control. Order is being
maintained by three battalions
of Belgian paratroops; however,
the Belgian forces are scheduled
to leave the territory when it
receives independence, and it
is doubtful that the indigenous
security force now being trained
will be willing or able to in-
tervene effectively in future
outbreaks.
The problem of Ruanda-Urundi's
political backwardness can prob-
ably be lessened to some extent
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