NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005301347
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2009
• Case Number: F-2007-00571
• Publication Date: July 6, 1990

APPROVED FOR RELEASED
DATE: 09-01-2009
-r ors t-
CPAS NID 90-156JX
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
 Albania: Tensions Still Bubbling
Liberia: Taylor Ready To Move
Moldavian Front Forges Toward Independence
Poland: Cabinet Changes Test Political Alignment
Bulgaria: Mladenov's Presidency in Jeopardy
Nicaragua: Government Handling Sandinista Strike
Special Analyses CFE: Racing the Clock
0'1' n 3eeret_
 Soviet Media on the Congress:
Little Coverage, Limited Impact
Soviet media have been slow to present details of the proceedings.
Although the opening sessions were televised live, only recorded
excerpts of subsequent sessions have been shown daily. Taped
versions of leaders' speeches have been broadcast, but lesser lights
have received only selective coverage. Pravda is supposed to carry full
versions of all speeches, minus administrative details, but its
coverage is lagging more than a day behind; as of yesterday, it had
published only the leadership speeches.
Alleging a proreform bias in the media, the delegates established a
committee of 13 members to work with the Soviet television service
to coordinate coverage of the congress and keep it acceptable to them.
Although coverage so far does not appear to be slanted, some of the
more dramatic moments-such as Defense Minister Yazov's reported
swoon when he addressed the congress on Tuesday or the
footstomping that halted Moscow party chief Prokofyev's speech on
Wednesday-were cut from the taped footage,
unlike the first session of the Congress
of People's Deputies last summer, which was covered in full and
commanded tremendous popular attention, coverage of the party
congress has met a lukewarm audience. Tapes of the congress have
appeared irregularly in late afternoon or close to midnight, and there
has been little advance notice of their appearance. Many Soviets
apparently prefer to watch the World Cup soccer matches and the
Tchaikovskiy piano competition.
 USSR: Congress Delegates Turn to Debate
In a move probably intended to diffuse criticism and allow disgruntled
delegates to let off steam, the CPSU Congress yesterday broke into
discussion sessions where delegates lambasted President Gorbachev's
foreign policy and Premier Ryzhkov's economic reforms.
Delegates chose which session they would attend, and, according to
TASS, the discussion of party reform claimed the most delegates:
more than 1,200; some 800 attended the session on economic reform.
Discussion was heated. Gorbachev's choice to head the session on
agricultural matters reportedly lost out to the party's hardline
agricultural czar, Yegor Ligachev.
At the meeting on international affairs, several delegates-including
a handful of senior military officers led by Major General Nikulin-
criticized Gorbachev's foreign policy. Although Presidential Council
member Primakov defended Gorbachev's record as "truly
triumphant," one delegate scoffed that its greatest success lay in the
"ability to give in.'
Delegates balked at naming the session on economic reform the
commission on the "transition to a market economy." According to
TASS, the delegates were nearly unanimous in criticizing the
Delegates who attended the session on nationalities agreed that a new
union treaty is needed to stabilize relations between Moscow and the
republics. At the session on the party's relations with the state, Soviet
Justice Minister Veniamin Yakovlev pointed to the danger of "losing
Comment: Traditionalists continue to dominate debate and have
prevailed on several organizational and procedural matters regarding
the sessions, but there has yet to be a vote on a key issue. The high
attendance at the sessions on party renewal and economic reform
supports other evidence that these are the most salient issues for the
traditionalists at the congress. They appear to stand a good chance of
gaining approval for adjustments to the party program and bylaws
that will emphasize the party's vanguard role, dilute support for
movement toward markets, and endorse the party's role in economic
policy making.
on-
6 July 1990
 Russian Legislators Showing Unexpected Cohesion
The republic's new legislative bodies have shown cohesion in the pursuit of greater republic
sovereignty under Yel'tsin's leadership, although the economic reform agenda ahead will
probably be contentious. The Russian Congress of People's Deputies completed its first
session on 22 June; its standing legislature, the republic Supreme Soviet, remains in session.
Both have made several assertions of republic autonomy, declaring the republic sovereign on
12 June and asserting the primacy of republic laws over union ones; staking out claims on
powers formerly controlled by the Kremlin, including the creation of a KGB and a central
bank; and prohibiting republic officials from holding high party and government posts
simultaneously.
The selections for elected posts-from chairman down-have brought out serious divisions
between Westernizing reformers and traditionalist deputies in both bodies. The concept of
greater republic sovereignty, however, has provided all with a common issue.
New Premier Silayev has outlined several economic goals that are likely to engender political
conflict with central authorities and other republics and that may pit his constituents against
one another. He asserted republic claims to productive assets, including those the Kremlin
controls; vowed to charge world prices for Russian goods in trade with other republics;
indicated he would permit higher retail prices while suggesting they would not hurt
consumers; and promised new emphasis on the rural economy.
Silayev appears to be signaling that the major parts of his agenda fit with Yel'tsin's goals. He
spoke positively of Yel'tsin's 500-day plan. Silayev's program will intensify debate on such
fundamental issues as the emerging clash of economic interests between the republics and the
center, as well as between consumers and producers and farmers and city people.
~T" r~-Sesset_
 -To-,_r"4_
Political maverick Boris Yel'tsin is getting good reviews in Moscow for
those dealing with selection for elected posts, and has managed in
Reform-minded politicians and ordinary citizens in Moscow are
praising Yel'tsin for his political skill and receptivity to new ideas. He
has maintained order in contentious legislative sessions, in particular
engineered the election
while traditionalist deputies are at the Soviet party congress
legislative process; e has had reform-minded
candidates selected tor legislative committee chairmen this week
he thought Silayev an intelligent, experienced leader with a realistic
reform program. He has also shown astuteness in manipulating the
moderate Ivan Silayev for premier, over a radical reformer, because
excessively optimistic.
team of advisers, including Moscow soviet chairman Gavriil Popov
and several other respected economists, on whom he relies heavily.
And Yel'tsin reportedly has secured the assistance of at least one
prominent Moscow economic research institute. Nonetheless, initial
outlines of his 500-day program for economic reform seem vague and
Since his election, Yel'tsin has tried to portray himself as
nonpartisan, withdrawing from the "Democratic Russia" bloc and
promising to suspend his party membership after the congress ends, a
point on which he vacillates. He appears to have assembled a capable
from him to the Russian and national party congresses. Yel'tsin's
composure will be tested when the legislature debates the nitty-gritty
Comment: The Russian president appears to be controlling his
propensity for erratic behavior. His political honeymoon is due in
part, however, to the fact that the attention and pressure have moved
abandoning them.
Yel'tsin appears to be broadening his power base to include moderate
Russian nationalists as well as radical reformers. He is likely to let
radical deputies take the lead on controversial issues, especially
economic ones, rather than personally taking radical positions; that
 O
Defense in the Soviet Budgetary System
In the Soviet financial system, the "state budget" consists of the
general revenues and expenditures of the central government plus
those of the republics and local jurisdictions. The "union budget"
consists of revenues and expenditures of the central government only.
For this year, the state budget is approximately 490 billion rubles,
and the union budget is approximately 244 billion rubles. Both are
subdivided into major groups, divisions for the ministries and
governmental agencies, and detailed expenditure types. The variety
of available budget accounts and the number of entities receiving
defense funds or undertaking military projects outside the Defense
Ministry mean that producing an accurate defense budget may
require a level of financial control and automation the Soviets do not
have.
o'I' a~`eereE-
 USSR: Hinting Defense Spending Higher Than Admitted
Recent Soviet statements indicate defense spending may be well above
the official figure and probably reflect efforts to develop a more accurate
version of the defense budget.
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, in a speech to the current party
congress to support his argument for defense cuts, said military
expenditures are a quarter of the Soviet budget, most likely meaning
the state budget. His remark implies that defense spending this year
will amount to more than 120 billion rubles. Shevardnadze's claim
generally agrees with statements earlier this year by President
Gorbachev and Politburo member Ligachev, who said defense
spending totaled 18 to 20 percent of national income, implying a
defense budget of 110 to 120 billion rubles. Other Soviets have
suggested the defense budget is even higher.
Valeriy Ochirov, deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet's Defense
and State Security Committee, told the Soviet press recently that his
committee plans to develop a new, e accurate estimate of the
defense budget but did not say when.
[According to some oviet
officials. including Albert Trifonov of the Military Industrial
Commission, the leadership in the past has not really known how
Comment: All of these statements imply defense expenditures well
above the official budget figure of 7 1 billion rubles for this year. It is
unlikely that Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, and Ligachev were oblivious
to the difference. Their statements support the claim a staffer on the
Defense and State Security Committee made in April that the
committee is computing a more inclusive, price-adjusted defense
spending estimate twice the official figure. Such a figure would be
consistent with the Intelligence Community's estimate that Soviet
defense spending was 130 to 160 billion rubles last year
The Soviets are probably having some difficulty developing a more
accurate defense figure because of poor accounting practices and a
complex budgetary system. Late last month, Vladimir Lopatin of the
Supreme Soviet's military reform subcommittee told the Soviet press
that this is in part because of inaccurate pricing, the distribution of
defense spending among the budgets of at least 10 different ministries,
and the lack of central accounting for military expenditures of
republics and enterprises. While taking the Soviets in the right
direction, therefore, these efforts may still not produce a defense
budget that can be accepted at face value.
 seekers have stalled amid signs of more antiregime activity.
Albanian police allowed a second wave of more than 100 asylum
seekers to enter several embassies yesterday, but Tirane denied West
German and Italian requests to fly in food and other necessities.
Western criticism of the situation yesterday, including EC concerns
over refugees' safety, induced the Albanian Government to deny
there had been deaths during Monday's demonstration. Tirane
maintains that all Albanians have a right to travel
their presence in the embassies is unnecessary.
The Albanian Communist Party's Central Committee met yesterday
and was expected to approve the emigration of those now awaiting
asylum. Press reports claim that leadership changes are being
considered and that additional demonstrations are planned.
defusing the situation to the foreign embassies providing sanctuary.
Tirane probably anticipates that allowing more refugees into the
embassies while denying food and other necessities will persuade the
Western governments to return them.
Further demonstrations almost certainly will exacerbate debate
within the leadership over the need for a crackdown. Civil
disobedience is likely to spread to other major cities, where the
regime may employ greater police repression out of view of Western
observers. If the situation deteriorates drastically, particularly in
Tirane, a power struggle between the hardliners and the moderates
under President Alia could ensue. In the event of a showdown,
hardliners have closer ties to security forces and would be more likely
to emerge on top.
 r.w
Ton .
 Rebel and government forces are preparing for the final batt"
Monrovia as public order in the capital deteriorates further.)
and the rebels hold most of Paynesville in the south.
Sporadic fighting continued yesterday in Monrovia's suburbs of
Paynesville and Elwa, but military positions have not changed
substantially. Government troops still control St. Paul River Bridge,
road leading to Sierra Leone near Brewerville
intends to take Monrovia within the next two days. The rebels
apparently have withdrawn from the Waterloo checkpoint on the
Rebel leader Charles Taylor
A large contingent of government soldiers was seen moving
Meanwhile, several hundred men under rival rebel leader Prince
Johnson reportedly left Bong Mines two days ago to engage Taylor's
forces outside Monrovia, possibly in an effort to get to Doe first.
Although the Johnson group has no heavy artillery or vehicles, they
are proficient, seasoned fi hters,
Gen. Moses Craig has fled the country, the fifth army general to
In the capital, undisciplined government soldiers continue to harass
residents and vandalize homes and businesses. At least five civilians
have been killed since Wednesday. Some soldiers reportedly are
providing cover for thieves in return for a share of the spoils. Brig.
encourage Doe's departure.
chance of an organized defense of the capital. Their flight may
Comment: The apparent abandonment of Camp Schieffelin indicates
government troops are consolidating in the capital to face the rebels'
advance, but many may take advantage of the escape route opened by
the rebels' withdrawal from the Sierra Leone road. As army leaders
flee, indiscipline among the troops will increase, jeopardizing any
 Lithuania After the Embargo
Moscow has restored the flow of oil and natural gas, ordered state
suppliers to resume delivery of other embargoed goods, and directed
the railroads to resume transport of all cargo destined for Lithuania.
The first deliveries included supplies of various kinds of fuel, which
will be allocated first to agriculture; other users will receive supplies
after the Mazeikiai refinery resumes operation and the republic's
internal fuel distribution network is reestablished.
The republic's economic recovery will take several weeks and may
be slowed further by the nationwide shortage of railcars, a shortage
of tank trucks caused by the removal of many such trucks from the
republic during the embargo, and the need to wait for the
replacement or return of workers lost to jobs in other republics
during the embargo.
 The Lithuanian legislature yesterday decided that it, not the
republic's Council of Ministers, will conduct independence
negotiations with Moscow; it also approved the formation of
a commission to prepare for them. Several Lithuanian officials
have said recently that negotiations could begin quickly, but in
a Lithuanian radio interview Tuesday President Landsbergis
Comment: Landsbergis and most legislators probably remain
wary of Soviet President Gorbachev's intentions and of their own
government's readiness to defend Lithuanian interests with sufficient
determination. Before beginning formal negotiations and activating
the moratorium on its independence declaration, the legislature
probably will insist on Moscow's assurances that the goal of
negotiations will be Lithuania's de facto independence and that they
will be conducted as between equal partners.
In an open letter, 47 reformers, including USA and Canada Institute
chief Arbatov, military reformer Major Lopatin, and sociologist
Zaslavskaya, have warned that the Russian party congress revealed an
emerging alliance between military officers and party traditionalists.
The letter, published Wednesday in Komsomolskaya Pravda, said this
collaboration could threaten the leadership, noting that "dictatorship
is knocking at the door." It pointedly asked, "If new collisions arise in
society," whose side will the generals be on? The letter called for
immediate, radical military reforms, a smaller professional army,
placement of the defense budget under the Supreme Soviet, and the
elimination of political officers in the military.
Comment: Although Westernizing reformers are no doubt alarmed by
the traditionalists' influence at the current Soviet party congress, the
letter appears primarily to reflect their efforts toward radical military
reform; they have lobbied recently for a ban on party activities in the
armed forces. In the weeks before the Soviet party congress, a new
spate of rumors in Moscow about the threat of a military coup were
fueled by sharp criticism of reform from several senior military
officers at the Russian party congress. The traditionalists' dominance
of that congress reduces the threat of a coup in the short term but
shows the long-term danger of their onnosition to democratization.
 F7/-l Territory claimed by Moldavian Front
for an Independent Romanian Republic
of Moldova
Territory annexed by the Ukrainian
Republic In 1940 (Northern Bukovlna
and southern districts of Bessarabia)
Territory claimed by McIdavlan Slavs to
form a Dnestr Autonomous Soviet
Socialist Republic
 The Moldavian People's Front Congress, held this week, adopted
a platform that calls for the creation of an independent Moldavia,
border changes, independence of the Moldavian church from the
Russian Orthodox church, and withdrawal of the military, the
Communist Party, and the KGB from the republic. Meanwhile, the
ethnic Russian majority in the city of Bendery has responded to
growing Moldavian separatism by voting overwhelmingly to join
other ethnic Russian cities in forming an autonomous republic linked
to the Russian Republic
Comment: The Front's platform is similar to the independence
movements in the Baltic and Georgian republics. It controls a third
of the legislature: its leader, first deputy chairman in the republic's
Supreme Soviet, is well placed to press for independence there.
Because the Front has yet to attain a majority in the legislature, it
is unlikely to push soon for secession. Its long-term goal, however,
POLAND: Cabinet Changes Test Political Alignment
Attempting to regain political momentum he has lost to Lech Walesa,
Prime Minister Mazowiecki today will announce a cabinet shakeup,
probably including the removal of holdover former Communist
ministers. Agriculture Minister Janicki-under fire from farmers-
resigned yesterday
Comment: Mazowiecki had avoided altering his cabinet, fearing such
a move might unravel the tenuous coalitions within Sol;darity and
between Solidarity and its Peasants' Party and Democratic Party
partners in the legislature. Finance Minister Balcerowicz almost
certainly will stay on, his departure would indicate the government
was junking its economic program. A new agriculture minister may
temporarily appease farmers, among the sharpest critics of economic
reform. The anticipated removal of former Communist ministers,
particularly General Kiszczak at Interior, will help counter criticism
that the government is shielding Communist holdovers but will give
encouragement to those seeking to replace President Jaruzelski with
Walesa. The cabinet changes require legislative approval, and there
is a slim chance the government could fall if enough of its partners
defect or if former Communists vote as a bloc for the first time.
MR-
p_
 Bulgaria
Mladenov's Authority Slipping
Petur Mladenov was appointed President and Communist
Party chief after Todor Zhivkov's ouster in November.
Criticism of his dual power later led him to resign the party
job. Mladenov will need all his skills as a seasoned party
infighter to preserve his remaining position. Even if the
current scandal does not force him from the presidency, it
will accelerate the shift of authority from the President to
Premier Lukanov, another Communist holdover.
 BULGARIA: Mladenov's Presidency in Jeopardy
Opposition leaders and student strikers are demanding that President
Mladenov resign now that he has publicly admitted authorizing the
use of force against antigovernment demonstrators last December.
Mladenov's statement was prompted by the recent release of a
videotape made during a demonstration in Sofia on 14 December
member of the Academy of Sciences.
has the votes in the legislature to block his reappointment as
president next week because a two-thirds majority is required.
Comment: Mladenov's resignation could come during next week's
meeting of the National Assembly. His departure might reduce the
rifts that have polarized Bulgaria since the Communists' electoral
victory last month. The presidency could be the sweetener needed to
bring the UDF into a coalition government as the Communists want.
The students almost certainly will continue their strikes to keep
pressure on Mladenov to resign. Even if he tries to hang on, the UDF
 OEM
Workers on Strike in Nicaragua, 5 July 1990
MANAGUA-
Foreign Ministry employees
City employees at mayor's office
Brewery workers
Bus workers
Health workers
Terchers and university students
Wu'er and sewage workers
With Pacific
Ocean
Nationwide
Telecommunications and postal workers
Metalworkers
Miners
Pharmaceutical workers
Textile workers
Nicaragua
2,000 unidentified workers
Maaaya
f_CO?; rL.
Drug store workers
Gas station workers
Caribbean
Sea
awaMry un?.nm.non n
Oa AI *Uhiy 1WLooUI,.
 NICARAGUA: Government Handling Sandinista Strike
The Chamorro government appears to be withstanding a Sandinista
attempt to paralyze the country through a nationwide strike. Pro-
Sandinista unionists ranging from farmhands to postal workers began
striking for higher wages and job security on Monday, The Sandinista
press had predicted 50,000 workers would participate, and former
President Daniel Ortega publicly endorsed the job action. Labor
Minister Rosales and democratic labor leaders have called the strike a
bust, and the Sandinista press now claims a turnout of only 28,000.
Police forces are securing access to public offices and preventing
violence. The government briefly detained seven labor leaders after
declaring the walkout illegal but yesterday agreed to begin
negotiations with the unions.
Comment: Sandinista leaders apparently hoped to duplicate a strike
in late May, in which public employees virtually shut down the
government. The relatively light turnout reflects both the Sandinistas'
diminishing control over labor and the government's advance
preparations. President Chamorro will have the upper hand in
negotiations but may make some concessions in the hove of heading
 To-
Middle East - Egyptian President Mubarak, Syrian President Asad meeting in
Cairo at midmonth ... relations restored last December ... likely
to discuss regional tensions, Arab-Israeli neace roc ss
breakdown of US-PLO dialogue.
- Press reports say USSR's Baltic republics will request formal ties
to EC's European Parliament ... citing membership in League of
Nations as precedent . . . showing West Europeans need to respond
alleged abuse of educational deferments.
- Yazov's report to Soviet party congress cited organized attempts to
disrupt spring conscription, noted callup ruined in Armenia ...
claimed armed forces 400,000 short-origin of number unclear ...
course to cover Russian, Soviet armies since 13th century.
-Soviet armed forces to experiment with officers' political
education ... Marxist-Leninist courses replaced by "practical
problems," including work with multinational units ... hist, ory
foreign criticism, spark further challenges.
political debate ... overreaction likely to fuel ethnic tensions,
- Recent arrests of several Kenyan politicians, human rights
advocates show President Moi determined to squelch budding
 West German CFE Manpower Proposal
Chancellor Kohl, Foreign Minister Genscher, and Defense Minister
Stolten6erg reportedly agreed among themselves Tuesday to back
what amounts to a 390,000-man ceiling for the armed forces of a
united Germany as part of a CFE agreement this fall. Under Bonn's
proposal, according to press reports, the CFE treaty would limit
national military manpower in each central European country to no
more than the combined ceilings on US and Soviet forces stationed in
the region, which the Ottawa Agreement in February set at 195,000
men each.
Soviet officials recently suggested a 200,000- to 250,000-man cap on
an all-German military and are not likely to be satisfied with Bonn's
much higher ceiling. In order to force it down, Moscow might be
willing to renegotiate the Ottawa Agreement and accept lower limits
on Soviet stationed forces. Only the Bundeswehr would be affected by
a 390,000-man ceiling on forces in central Europe. Bonn, which has
objected to such "singularized" treatment in the past, now apparently
sees the context of a broader geographic area as an acceptable device
to satisfy Soviet concerns about the size of the German military.
Some Allies are concerned that introducing new CFE proposals now
will complicate concluding a treaty by the fall, but an agreement on
manpower almost certainly would be a major shot in the arm to the
slow-moving negotiations.
 Special Analysis
The negotiations in Vienna on conventional arms reductions probably
cannot resolve the remaining issues without high-level political
intervention soon, and even with it a comprehensive treaty may not be
ready for signature at a CSCE summit this fall. As a last resort, most
NATO and Warsaw Pact members probably would still favor holding
a summit if a framework CFE agreement could be reached, in order
to ensure discussion of other pressing security issues, but delaying
signature of a full CFE treaty might postpone equipment reductions
and complicate plans for future arms control talks.
President Gorbachev almost certainly wants at least a preliminary
CFE accord this year if he cannot get a full agreement. Moscow views
a CFE agreement as essential to the further development of the CSCE
process, its chosen vehicle for establishing a new Pan-European
security system. The Soviets are reevaluating the military
implications of a CFE treaty in light of German unification and the
disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, however, and are likely to bargain
hard on the remaining issues, especially on the need to limit
Germany's future military strength and to retain a substantial portion
of the Pact's residual equipment allotment.
NATO members remain publicly committed to completing the CFE
treaty quickly; the Allies are exploring measures to ease Moscow's
concerns about a unified Germany and other security issues. Several
of them, in particular Paris and London, are nonetheless reluctant to
concede too much too soon and argue that, without hard bargaining,
Moscow will merely pocket concessions made prematurely.
Although last month's agreement on the key issue of defining and
limiting tanks and armored vehicles generated optimism. the two
Moscow's desire to reduce and cap a unified Germany's military
manpower remains the key obstacle. Most Allies would prefer to defer
the issue, in part to avoid complicating CFE. Moscow has sought to
achieve its goal in an initial CFE treaty by proposing a ceiling on
forces in Central Europe but probably would accept an alternate
formula in the current negotiations or a politically binding
commitment from NATO to address national manpower ceilings in
 follow-on talks. West German officials have recently said Bonn is
willing to propose measures effectively limiting German manpower
Moscow is likely to press hard to retain a greater share of the Pact's
military equipment than NATO's current proposal allows. The Allies
probably are prepared to meet the Soviets at least halfway on most
categories of equipment, but Paris and London argue such
compromises should be reserved until the eleventh hour to extract
The impasse on aircraft-especially land-based naval aviation-is so
intractable the issue may eventually be deferred to follow-on talks.
The Soviets are unlikely to drop their adamant opposition to capping
land-based naval aircraft unless NATO agrees to limit its carrier-
based aircraft. Although most Allies strongly want to include Soviet
aircraft in the current talks, they are likely to agree to defer the
subject if Moscow continues to reject limits on land-based naval
aircraft rather than risk delaying the initial CFE agreement further.
Less troublesome, but still unresolved, are fundamental differences
over the definitions and numbers of military sites to be inspected
under a CFE verification regime, as well as procedures for destroying
or converting treaty-limited equipment.
Most NATO Allies and Pact members, including the USSR, still
strongly favor achieving a full treaty this year, but they probably
would accept an interim framework accord. Most of them probably
would expect such an agreement to codify armor and artillery
ceilings, general destruction and verification principles, a ceiling on
US and Soviet stationed forces, and commitments to establish
national manpower ceilings and continue negotiations on aircraft.
With such a document in hand, European leaders almost certainly
would be willing to convene a CSCE summit this fall,
Such an interim solution, however, almost certainly would create new
problems. Neither alliance is likely to begin destroying equipment
until a full-blown CFE treaty, including a detailed verification and
destruction regime, is in place. Subsequent CFE negotiations would
face an especially short deadline because most Allies want to open
arms control negotiations to all 35 CSCE participants after the CSCE
Review Conference in Helsinki in 1992. Negotiations on short-range
nuclear forces are currently dependent on completion of a CFE
agreement and could also be delayed.
 7TorSeeret_
 op