NORTH KOREA: LIKELY RESPONSE TO ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0005380437
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
6
Document Creation Date:
June 23, 2015
Document Release Date:
May 11, 2009
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
F-2009-00526
Publication Date:
December 10, 1991
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
DOC_0005380437.pdf | 188.56 KB |
Body:
National
Intelligence
Council
(b) (1)
(b) (3)
North Korea: Likely
Response to Economic
Sanctions
Information avaUable as of 10 December 1991
was used In the preparation of this Memorandum.
which was requested by the Acting Assistat>t
Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs It was prepared by the National
intelligence Officer for East Asia and
coordlnated with representatives of CIA. NSA.
the Department of State, DIA and the miitary
services. Comments can be directed to the
APPROVED FOR RELEASED
DATE: 06-May-2009
Key Judgments
The Intelligence Community believes that economic
sanctions per~e would not cause North Korea to abandon
its nuclear weapons program. If P'yongyang had not
already signed a safeguards agreement, it might respond to
sanctions by agreeing to fulfill some of its NPT
commitments, but only to split an international coalition
backing sanctions.
Foreign trade plays an important role in key sectors of
North Korea's economy. P'yongyan imports all of its
crude oil, coking coal, and advanced technology, and 25
percent of its needed food grains. It exports military
e i ment to a number of Middle Eastern countries.
A trade embargo-if fully respected and enforced-would
cause a significant falloff in production and impose severe
hardships on the North Korean populace. A curtailment of
crude oil shipments would be particularly troublesome and-
would lead to industrial shutdowns, restricted
transportation, and reduced agriculture and fishing.
Most of the North's trading partners would be reluctant to
impose, much less to enforce, economic sanctions. China's
role would be key, and we believe Beijing would
strenuously o se-and assist Pyongyang in evading-an
embargo.
With imposition of an embargo, at minimum the regime
would place its forces on alert, increase austerity measures,
and undertake efforts to subvert and evade the sanctions.
It might stage incidents along the Demilitarized Zone. It is
possible, though not likely, it could resort to a military
attack on the South, if P'yon rceived sanctions
threatened its basic survival.-_l
Discussion
In our view, the North Korean economy can
be hurt by economic sanctions- Years of
central planning have debilitated the North;
official South Korean estimates place North
Korea's per-capita GNP at $1,065 (see table
1), but we believe living standards have
deteriorated since the ctid-19800
? Economic performance in 1990 was
particularly bad. GNP declined by
almost four percent, and shortages of
food and fuel were widespread, due
largely to a meager harvest and the
breakdown of concessionary trade
arrangements with the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe.
? The North appears to be doing slightly
better this year, grain production is up,
and Pyongyang has had some success in
finding new suppliers of crude oil. But
shortages remain a fact of life for most
North Koreans, and industry continues to
The economy's vulnerability to economic -
sanctions reflects the importance of trade in
key sectors, although foreign purchases and
sales-including arms sales-account for only
about 20 percent of GNP. North Korea relies
on imports for several commodities, such as
crude oil, coking coal, and advanced
1A lack of official economic statistics
complicates any assessment of the North's
economic performance, but we believe South
Korean estimates are reasonable given the
pricing assumptions noted in table 1. given
technology. In addition, food grain has
become a critical import over the past few
years; last year North Korea was forced to
import roughly 25 percent of its grain
requirements. Its principal suppliers of
needed imports are the Soviet Union, China,
and Japan- (See table 2.)I
As relations between the USSR and
P'yongyang have cooled over the past few
years, Soviet trade as well as military and
technical assistance have diminished.
Military deliveries have declined steadily
since 1989, and many Soviet technicians have
returned home. These developments may
hinder the North's efforts to modernize its
military, as Pyongyang would probably not be
able to produce a modern tank or fighter
aircraft without Moscoww s help. Moscow still
provides some military materiel, as well as
coking coal, refined petroleum products,
building materials, machinery, and some
consumer goods to Pyongyang. Total
bilateral trade in 1991 is running far behind
hLt perhaps by as much as 50 percent.
China provides important military and
economic assistance to North Korea but has-
reduced its aid in recent years. The Chinese
have not supplied major weapons systems to
the North since the early 1980s. They still
provide technical assistance in defense
industries such as munitions production, and
may assist in maintaining some weapons such
as Silkworm antistup missiles. China was a
major source of crude oil-providing an
estimated 40 percent of l"yongyang's imports.
Beijing appears reluctant to increase
economic aid b6cause of its own domestic
economic problems, but still provides trade
credits and recently agreed to postpone a
planned switch from barter to hard currency
trade because of Pyongyang's economic
Japan is a major source of capita) goods,
dual-use vehicles, semi-finished
manufactures, and electronic components. In
addition to this legal trade, pro-Pyongyang
Korean residents in Japan provide the North
with COCOM-controlled equipment.
P'yongyang has a trade surplus with Japan,
and uses excess foreign exchange to purchase
needed goods from elsewhere.
Arms sales--principally to the Middle East-
also brought in nearly $200 million in needed
foreign currency in 1990 (see table 3). In the
last year, Pyongyang has established firm
partnerships to trade weapons for petroleum.
For example, the North purchased 600,000
tons of Iranian crude this year by drawing
against credits from the sale of Scud missiles
and equipment to Tehran 2
Impact of an Embargo
A trade embargo-if fully respected-=would
compound the problems plaguing the North
Korean economy and would impose severe
hardships on the North Korean populace.
The reduction of crude oil would be
particularly troublesome. Shortages of
gasoline, diesel fuel, and lubricants -
2'Me total value of arms deliveries in 1990
was far below the US $450 million in average
annual sales during 1981-89, when the Iran-
Iraq war increased demand for the low
technology arms Pyongyang produces. The
figure is expected to rise in 1991. F_~
are already chronic, slowing production and
tratransportation throughout the economy.
The cutoff of oil deliveries would probably
cause the regime to accelerate the shutdown
of even essential industries and move to
inefficient alternative forms of transportation-
-ox carts, bicycles, and charcoal-burning
vehicles. Fertilizer and pesticide production
would be cut, adversely affecting the
agricultural sector. Fuel shortages also would
hamper the fishing industry.
The reduction of grain imports eventually
would prove serious. Pyongyang has suffered
grain shortages for several years and has
coped by reducing rations and encouraging
citizens to eat only two meals a day, according
to travelers and defectors. Even with an
improved harvest this year, the North may
need to import as much as half a million tons
of.grain just to keep the already reduced
consumption levels from falling further.
North Korea reportedly stores large supplies
of food as military reserve st but we are
unable to quantify amounts.
If they had not already signed an IAEA
safeguards agreement, Pyongyang might try
to weaken-the international community's
resolve by agreeing to fulfill its NPT
commitments, albeit with conditions. The
IAEA safeguard procedures provide ample
opportunity--even after Pyongyang signs-to
delay implementation. We doubt an embargo
. would cause P'yongyan to abandon its
nuclear weapons program.
Harsher economic conditions caused by
sanctions would not necessarily threaten the
regime. Rather, past practice suggests the
North would portray the sanctions as a
warlike act and call for greater sacrifices to
defend the country. Such rhetoric could be
accompanied by moves to place forces on
alert, declare a state of emergency, and
initiate an intensive propaganda campaign.
In the short run at least, the result could
produce more popular support for the
leadership rather than an backlash or
pressure for change.
Diplomatically, Pyongyang would appeal to
China, the Soviet Union, and its Middle
Eastern friends to help either end or evade
the sanctions. P'yongyang almost certainly
would ask the Soviets and Chinese to
The North might resort to more hostile
actions, particularly if the embargo were to be
enforced militarily. The regime almost
certainly would encourage demonstrations in
South Korea. It could suspend the North-
South dialogue as a means of pressuring the
South; it also could carry out a terrorist
action against US or South Korean facilities
or personnel. F_~
The North could raise tensions by staging
military incidents along the Demilitarized
Zone, laying blame on the. United States and
South Korea. Although we believe the
probability is low, given the current attitudes
in P'yongyang--deeply suspicious of the West
and fundamentally concerned about survival-
the regime might sec an embargo as sufficient
provocation to launch an attack against the
South. F I
Although there is widespread international
interest in bringing North Korea's nuclear
program under IAEA safeguards, several key
countries would be reluctant to impose, much
less to enforce, economic sanctions.
We believe China.-which has publicly
opposed pressure tactics against the North-
would not support trade sanctions and would
veto UN action either to impose or militarily
enforce an embargo. At a minimum, we
believe Beijing would break the embargo by
expanding trade with North Korea in an
effort to preserve the Pyongyang regime. In
particular, China would probably provide
needed food and medical supplies, and could
also increase oil deliveries. A blockade could
lead Beijing to place its forces in northeast
China on alert and aggressively patrol its
territorial boundaries in the Yellow Sea-
raising the danger of an accidental dash. The
sharper anti-US environment that an
embargo would likely create in Beijing might
also prompt greater Chinese military
assistance to North Korea.
The Soviets support the goal of ending the
North Korean nuclear program, but would be
unenthusiastic about imposing international
sanctions on North Korea, which they believe
would strengthen P'yongyang's intransigence.
The Soviet leadership would probably argue
for food and medicine to be excluded from
any embargo and for a deadline that allows
Pyongyang time to implement safeguards
before sanctions would begin. We doubt they
would endorse a blockade, but probabl
would not attempt to break one.
Japan would probably go along with
economic sanctions--even though the
Japanese would prefer exhausting all
diplomatic options first. Japan would lose
some China trade through North Korean
ports, would probably face domestic disorder
from the pro-P'yongyang Korean residents,
and would see its efforts to normalize
relations with the North ruined. But the
evident concerns about North Korea's nuclear
program and a desire to remain in step with
Washington-factors already toughening
Tokyo's stance in normalization talks with
Pyongyang--would probabl lead Tokyo to
support an embargo. 77
We believe South Korea would be reluctant
to impose sanctions-particularly if food were
embargoed-for security and domestic
political reasons. South Koreans would worry
that sanctions could provoke a military
response from the North, particularly if the
UN called for a blockade to enforce the
measures. The certain termination of the
North-South dialogue and possibility of an
economic collapse in the North also would
weigh heavily. With national elections
scheduled in 1992, popular reaction would be
a critical factor. We believe Seoul would be
willing to support a limited embargo, but a
decision would involve difficult and
conflicting goals and probably come with
conditions attached.
Several Middle East nations that have close
military ties with F yon n~
probably would
attempt to evade the embargo. In East Asia,
ASEAN countries probably would support a
UN-sponsored embargo, but with
reservations about the possible use of
military force to advance what they view as
US interests. other countries with ongoing
would argue a ainst the imposition oL
sanctions.