(EST PUB DATE) LIBERIA: PEACE PROCESS UNRAVELING AS FIGHTING INTENSIFIES

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: LIBERIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001508385
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: June 22, 2015
• Document Release Date: March 11, 2009
• Case Number: F-2007-00542
• Publication Date: November 1, 1992

L12L -cog
Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Estimate
Liberia: Peace Process
Unraveling as Fighting
Intensifies
APPROVED FOR RELEASE -
CIA INFO DATE: 19-Jan-2009
This National Intelligence Estimate represents
the views of the Director of Central Intelligence
with the advice and assistance of the
US Intelligence community.
SCC
NIE 92.32
November 1992
Copy 4 5 0
 Director of
Central
Intelligence
NIE 92-32
Liberia: Peace Process
Unraveling;, as Fighting
Intensifies[
November 1992
 Selected Ethnic Groups of Liberia
Sierra
Leone
spryaaf?P+m
Airpo,?
Guinea
KPELLE
wu
(8.0)
KRAHN
Original ECOMOG
defensive perimeter
(20 kilometers)
H.tbd'i
Ethnic Composition
(perml of total poprlation)
(19.9)
Other
(30.4)
Robe,?:
Int:rnetian.l
Aipoit
Gto/
Ma
rro
(16.1)
 Key Judgments
Prospects for a peace settlement over the next six months are dim. The
Nigeria-dominated West African Cease-Fire Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG) has committed itself to a military offensive, and rebel
leader Charles Taylor remains intransigent. The Nigerian buildup of
ECOMOG may lead Taylor to renew talks, but we believe he has little
incentive to be flexible: /
? The'ECOMOG decision undermines the force's credibility as a
peace and increases the likelihood of broader ethnic warfare.
ECOMOG's chances of bringing Taylor to heel are decreasing, and
there is a better-than-even chance that after a round of intensified
fighting a military stalemate will develop. Splits among regional
leaders over strategy in Liberia continue to widen, and we believe
domestic concerns will undermine the willingness of key ECOMOG
participants to sustain their commitments beyond the end of the year: is The! 9,000-man ECOMOG force has .a military advantage over
Taylor and will inflict some defeats on him, but poor command and
control, logistic problems, and reluctance to sustain heavy casualties
undercut its edge.
Taylor has built up his arms stocks recently and is capable of fighting
an effective insurgency well beyond the six-month period of this
Estimate. Fear of ethnic retribution from anti-Taylor forces allied with
ECOMOG will help Taylor overcome dissension in his ranks and
motivate his troops.
West !African leaders and the warring factions all see potential benefits
from greater US and UN involvement, particularly in monitoring and
financial assistance. Heightened outside involvement wound give re-
gional leaders a face-saving way to reduce their commitment and shift
the burden to the international community.
iii -See
NIE 92-32
November 1992
 ECOWAS Peace Process
Economic Community of West African States (EGOWAS) has
been trying to find a peaceful solution to the Liberian crisis
since June,-1990 when local mediation failed. When it also
failed to arrange a cease-fire, ECOWAS deployed a peacekeep-
ingforce in August 1990 to protect West African citizens
stranded in Liberia and to prevent instability from spreading to
neighboring countries. ECOWAS continued its mediation ef-
forts throughout the next year and, after lengthy negotiations,
the Yamoussoukro IV accord was signed on 30 October 1991 by
key West .African leaders, the Liberian interim government in
Monrovia, and rebel leader Charles.Taylor.0
ECO WAS leaders still consider the accord to be a blueprint for
ending the fighting and creating an atmosphere in Liberia
conducive to 'holding national elections. The document calls for
ECOMOG to encamp and disarm the warring factions and
monitor all ports and airfields. It calls for an election commis-
sion to organize and hold elections within four months after
security considerations are resolved.F__-]
Implementation of the accord, however, has floundered from
the beginning as Taylor has failed to abide by its provisions. He
has interpreted implementation details to his own advantage,
failed to demobilize his forces, insisted on retaining control
over weapons, and circumscribed or imposed conditions on
expansion of ECOMOG monitoring operations into his territo-
ry. Taylor's reluctance to implement the accord stems from his
belief that anti-Taylor rebel groups, which did not sign the
accord, threaten his forces if he disarms. Moreover, Taylor
remains determined to assume the president of Liberia and
has viewed the accords as a hindrance.
Given its historical role in Liberia, the United States will come under
further pressure to assume significant responsibilities, especially if a
humanitarian crisis develops. Further US military assistance to
ECOMOG would erode US credibility as an honest broker in Taylor's
eyes, however.F - - - ]
 Alternative Outcomes
Taylor Overruns Monrovia. There is a fair chance that he will succeed.
This scenario would be more likely if ECOMOG withdraws before a
peace` agreement is in place. Chaos and atrocities would be likely
initially, but Taylor probably would gradually pacify the country:'
? Taylor would want good relations with the United States, but other
external actors such as France would gain influence.F
Backsliding Into Chaos. There is some chance of this. Such a scenario
would be more likely if Taylor is ousted or killed and his National Pa-
triotic Front dissolved.. It;,could also happen if anti-Taylor forces go on
an ethnic rampage, or if,ECOMOG withdraws and Taylor is unable to
gain control of the capital from other warring factions.
A Workable`Peace Settlement: There is a slight chance that external
pressure; war weariness; ard' growing internal problems could lead to
this result. Prospects for this scenario would improve if credible
mediators, such as the United States or the UN, were involved.
 List of Acronyms
AFL-Armed Forces of Liberia
ECOMOG-West African Cease-Fire Monitoring Group
ECOWAS-Economic Community of West African States
IGNU-Interim Government of National Unity
NPFL-National Patriotic Front of Liberia
ULIMO-United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy
 Discussion'
Rebel leader Charles Taylor's intransigence
and the recent decision of the West African
Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)
to take military actions against Taylor fur-
ther dim prospects for a peace settlement,
undermine ECOMOG's credibility as a
peacekeeping force, and increase the risk of
broader ethnic warfare. The fragile cease-
fire in place since late 1990 was broken in
August when anti-Taylor forces of the Unit-
ed Liberation Movement of Liberia for De-
mocracy (ULIMO), with support from
ECOMOG, overran Taylor's forces in much
of northwestern Liberia. Taylor responded
with limited action against ULIMO that led
to clashes with ECOMOG soldiers. In recent
weeks, Taylor's forces have been increasing
pressure on ECOMOG's defensive perimeter
around Monrovia. The 9,000-man regional
force is reinforcing for an offensive amid
splits among key Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) players
over strategy in Liberia. The deteriorating
situation led to the evacuation in late Octo-
ber of nonessential US personnel and other
unofficial Americans.)
Shifting Dynamics Among Key Actors
Peacekeepers Become Belligerents. Increas-
ingly frustrated by Taylor's refusal to imple-
ment the Yamoussoukro peace accord and
his humiliation of peacekeeping troops,
ECOMOG is embarking on a military offen-
sive designed to force a weakened Taylor
back to the negotiating table by the end of
the year. Nigeria, the dominant force in
' This Estimate was requested by the Assistant Secretary of
State for African Afaiis. It assesses likely developments in
Nigeria-Taking The Lead in
ECOWAS
As founder of ECOWAS and the largest
state in West Africa, Nigeria probably
pressed for ECOWAS intervention in
Liberia to expand its:legdership role in
the region. Having invite consider.-
able money and prestige i p .the gfort, . , .
Abuja is unlikely to risk n, qpor al. errs-
barrassment by withdrawing under
pressure from Taylor, ,buts senior mili-
tary officials underestimate what would
be needed to quash Taylor. Nonethe-
less, growing domestic concerns, in-
creasing costs, and flagging support in
the military and among civilian offi-
cials are leading President Babangida
to attempt a quick resolution of the
crisis.
ECOMOG, has provided an additional 2,100
troops and probably is willing to send more
reinforcements. ECOMOG currently is try-
ing to drive rebels out of artillery range of
the capital, is conducting air and naval
strikes against rebel-held towns and resupply
routes, and is providing weapons, ammuni-
tion, and other support to several anti-Taylor
Liberian groups.
ECOMOG's limited military capabilities
and domestic political factors in member
states, however, are likely to keep it from
quashing Taylor. The regional force has a
military advantage over Taylor and appears
 capable of defending Monrovia against a
frontal assault. But, Taylor's ability to pene-
trate ECOMOG's perimeter around Monro-
via highlights ECOMOG's weaknesses.
These include and command
and control, logistic problems, difficulties
countering Taylor's small-unit tactics, and a
reluctance to sustain heavy casualties. These
weaknesses are likely to become more impor-
tant the longer the current round of fighting
lasts and the farther ECOMOG pushes out
from the capital. In addition, Nigeria, Sene-
gal, and Ghana-countries that provide the
bulk of ECOMOG forces-hold national
elections in the next few months, and domes=
tic concerns in member states coupled with
the financial burden of peacekeeping are
likely to weaken their cothmttment Senegal'
already is making contingency': plans to with-
draw its forces but has agreed to stay on for
now.F__1 * .
Widening splits within ECOWAS-the
regional group under whose auspices
ECOMOG was deployed in 1990-over
strategy in Liberia will further damage
ECOMOG's prospects. Countries with
troops in ECOMOG, including Nigeria, Sen-
egal, and Guinea, favor a hard line against
Taylor. Those without troops in ECOMOG,
particularly Ivory Coast and Burkina, oppose
such an obviously partisan role and Nigeria's
growing domination of ECOMOG. Indeed,
reporting indicates that Burkina-a longtime
patron of Taylor-maintains military sup-
port to him and threatens even the limited
consensus that has existed up to now. With-
out a regional consensus, an effective arms
embargo, international commercial sanc-
tions, and requests for UN involvement will
be difficult.)
Taylor Ready To Fight and Talk. Taylor,
who has long doubted ECOMOG's neutral-
ity, sees it as his principal enemy because of
Liberia's Wartime Economy
Liberia's economy is in shambles; the
country's GDP is probably only 25 per-
cent of the level achieved before the
war. Most businesses are operating at
significantly reduced levels and unem-
ployment and underemployment are
major social and economic problems.
Although the Interim Government has
been able to restore basic services in the
capital, its limited tax base has prevent-
ed it from doing more than the bare
minimum.
Meanwhile, Taylor's control over much :
of Liberia's exportable resources-in-
cluding minerals, rubber, and timber,
which accounted for about half of the
country's pre-civil war annual GDP-
has provided the NPFL with revenues
to sustain its activities. The NPFL has
resumed some commercial operations
formerly run by expatriates and has
negotiated with several foreign conces-
sion holders to resume operations.
Moreover, although much of the coun-
try's infrastructure has been destroyed,
the economically important rail line
from the northern mining center at
Yekepa to the port city of Buchanan
continues to function. An NPFL-run
front company operates the port, which
is the terminus for imports of food and
for commercial exports. F-
its military actions and rearming of predomi-
nantly Krahn anti-Taylor forces intent on
retribution against his National Patriotic
Front of Liberia (NPFL). ECOMOG's new
aggressiveness, including Nigerian airstrikes
 on rebel-held towns, its support for anti-
Taylor factions, and splits among key West
African leaders over strategy toward Taylor
have stiffened Taylor's resolve to resist.C
Taylor's strategy remains unclear, but he
probably realizes that a direct attack on
Monrovia would be unlikely to succeed. Con-
sequently, he probably will continue to rely
on small-unit guerrilla tactics to raise the
cost-both in lives and treasury-in hopes
that he can undermine ECOMOG and break
the morale of the "peacekeeping" force. Tay-
lor rejected the recent cease-fireultimatum
from ECOWAS but, fearing a Nigerian
buildup, he appears more amenable to re-
turning to negotiations."Ta'ylorprobably be-
lieves that, if he can outlast `ECOMOG by
dragging out peace talks, he can gain a peace
settlement on his terms or an outright mili-
tary victory.F_
In anticipation of extended fighting and an
arms embargo, Taylor has built up his arms
stocks substantially in recent months and is
capable of fighting an effective insurgency
for some time. Taylor has imported large
amounts of weapons and ammunition-in-
cluding antiaircraft artillery and vehicle-
mounted heavy weapons. Burkina reportedly
is providing at least a hundred soldiers, and
President Compaore is serving as a conduit
for money and arms. Taylor also employs
mercenaries from several neighboring coun-
tries. Libya provided assistance in the past,
and there is some evidence of continuing
support.)
While Taylor has had major problems with
dissension within NPFL ranks, the current
military threat is minimizing infighting and
motivating his troops to fight because of fear
of retribution from anti-Taylor forces. But
Where Do the French Stand?
French interest in the Liberian conflict
is driven by desire to increase its influ-
ence and commercial interests outside
Francophone Africa, to protect Franco-
phone allies against instability, and to
counter Nigerian hegemony. Paris be-
lieves a lasting settlement is impossible
without Taylor's support and has en-
couraged regional leaders to proceed
gradually to build confidence among all,
parties. French contact with. Taylor has;,,
increased markedly as: he solidified his,.,,,
control in the countryside Taylor's per
ception of continued French support
may be encouraging his Intransigence
Paris is likely to use its position as
Security Council chairman to stress
Taylor's concerns and probably would
oppose sanctions against him. France,
however, probably would support Tay-
lor's efforts to secure greater US and
UN involvement in Liberian negotia-
tions.)
indiscipline and ethnic tensions will continue
to bedevil his forces and may again put
Taylor at risk. Taylor, an Americo-Liberian,
has been at odds with his Gio and Mano
commanders--he narrowly avoided assassi-
nation in August-and has executed some
for disloyalty.)
Resurgence ofAnti-Taylor Groups. To in-
crease military pressure on Taylor,
ECOMOG is rearming anti-Taylor groups
dominated by ethnic Krahns, greatly increas-
ing the risk of another outbreak of ethnic
3 Secre
 warfare similar to that which occurred in
Monrovia in 1990. Despite protests to the
contrary, ULIMO and elements of former
President Doe's Army (AFL)-ECOMOG's
two principal allies in Liberia-almost cer-
tainly hope to regain Krahn supremacy in
Monrovia. Leadership squabbles, however,
have prevented the two groups from merg-
ing, and both remain dependent on
ECOMOG for military support. ECOMOG
hopes to control these groups for its own
purposes, but it is having discipline problems
with them, AFL soldiers
have set: up>c ec points -in -Monrovia and are
harassing:and detaining members of other
ethnic groups:
Liberia's -Interim Government of National
Unity (IGNU), established in mid-1990 un-
der ECOWAS' auspices, has created its own
small military force, contributing further to
ethnic tension in Monrovia. IGNU President
Sawyer hates Taylor and is urging
ECOMOG to be more aggressive against the
rebel leader. Sawyer has been trying to
broker an agreement between ULIMO and
the AFL, but he has little influence over
either group and almost certainly fears they
will eventually try to overthrow him.)
The Most Likely Scenario
Military Stalemate Likely To Develop...
ECOMOG is likely to go on the offensive
and probably will inflict some battlefield
defeats on Taylor, but after this round of
intensified fighting the odds are better than
even that a military stalemate will develop.
ECOMOG, with assistance from ULIMO
and the AFL forces, will first try to push
Taylor's forces out of artillery range of cen-
tral Monrovia.)
The regional force also is likely to continue
airstrikes in rebel-held territory and, once
planned reinforcements arrive, probably will
try to capture Roberts International Air-
port-a key entry point for goods and weap-
ons into Taylorland-and possibly other
nearby NPFL strongholds. ECOMOG,
however, is likely to stop short of major
operations deep into Taylorland because of
potential logistic problems and concern over
domestic reaction to heavy casualties.
Taylor is unlikely to launch a directassault
on Monrovia but will use guerrilla :warfare
and long-range artillery to create havoc: be-
hind ECOMOG lines Tayldrr, has'shownv his
forces can penetrate the capital's defenses,
and, with covert supporters already iii Mon-
rovia, he will attempt to undermine the city's
security. Taylor probably cannot hold Rob-
erts International Airport against a deter-
mined ECOMOG attack, but he will make
such an operation costly and disrupt
ECOMOG's lines of communication. The
loss of the airfield would hurt Taylor logisti-
cally and psychologically, but he has alterna-
tive resupply routes. In addition, his troops,
spurred by ethnic hatred and fear of Krahn
retribution, probably would continue to
fight-F__1
Intensified fighting will spur ethnic tension
and increase the likelihood of atrocities. Pri-
marily concerned with Taylor, ECOMOG
will have trouble handling other unruly
armed factions, particularly if living condi-
tions in the capital deteriorate because of
food or water shortages, higher prices, and
an influx of refugees. Taylor also is likely to
provoke incidents in the capital to inflame
ethnic passions. F__]
 Military Balance of Forces
West African Cease-Fire Monitoring
Group (ECOMOG)` 9,000 troops from
seven West African countries deployed
primarily in Monrovia ... nine infantry
battalions, one artillery battalion, light
armored elements, seven Alpha jets, two
Super Puma helicopters, and eight naval
attack craft .. , adequately trained with
credible logistic base ... capable of secur-
ing strategic areas near capital, but logis-
tic problems conducting counterinsur-
gency opera~rons`in the interior are likely.
National Patriotic Front of Liberia
(NPFL) 10,000 to 15,000 troops deployed
throughout countryside capable ctfsus-
taining a long-term guerrilla campaign ...
dependent on 2,000-man core group of
battle-hardened Gio and Mano soldiers
and foreign mercenaries, as most troops
are undisciplined youths ... primarily
light infantry force with rudimentary
... But Time Is With Taylor ... Taylor's
concern over the Nigerian buildup probably
will make him open to renewed peace talks,
but he is unlikely to make significant conces-
sions. He probably believes he can outlast
ECOMOG, and he has more reason to drag
out talks than to negotiate seriously. Taylor
knows that ECOMOG member countries are
under growing pressure to withdraw or re-
duce their involvement, and he may suspect
that, beyond 1992, Nigeria may be the only
country willing.to stay in Liberia. Even
President Babangida will come under in-
creasing pressure, particularly as Nigerian
casualties mount.)
logistic base ... some heavy weaponry,
but few soldiers trained in their use. P
United Liberation Movement Qf Liberia
for Democracy (ULIMO)1,500 troops
deployed primarily in western Liberia
with 300 to 400 fighting in Monrovia ...
Krahn-dominated light infantry force with
few heavy weapons ... core group of 700
experienced in guerrilla tactics, but new
recruits untrained, ill disciplined... no
logistic base.
Former President Doe's Army (AFL)%In
terim Government of National vUnityz
(IGNU) Krahn-led AFL could field from
1.500 to 3,0001ighters, but most en-
camped near Monrovia since late 1990
with little training, discipline ... arms
and ammunition shortages, no logistic
base ... Interim Government has a 500-
man Guinean-trained security force ... no
logistic base.)
... As Regional Fallout Grows. Renewed
fighting has disrupted international relief
efforts throughout Liberia, and new refugees
are likely as fighting intensifies. Liberian
refugees in neighboring Guinea, Ivory Coast,
and Sierra Leone, which now number
650,000 after a high of 750,000 in 1990, are
likely to burgeon again and further strain
local and international resources.)
The Liberian conflict will further aggravate
ethnic and political tensions in neighboring
countries and spur the proliferation of weapons
 Key Leaders
Charles Taylor, Leader, National Pa-
triotic Front of Liberia (Since at Least
1989)
Motivated by desire for power, personal
gain ... skillful maneuverer ... intense-
ly preoccupied with physical safety ...
sacked from former President Doe's
government in 1983 for alleged embez-
zlemerit, coup plotting ... African
mother of unknown ethnicity, Americo-
Liberian (descendent offreed slaves)
father... age 44. F7
Amos Sawyer, President, Interim Gov-
e" ri
me nt i National Unity (Since 1990)
vision needed
to restore national unity ... isolated by
tight circle of hardline advisers ... self
exiled in United States in late 1980s .. .
mixed Americo-Liberian, Kru de-
scent ... age 47. F__]
Raleigh Seekie, Chairman, United Lib-
eration Movement of Liberia for De-
... probably aspires to high-
level offi ce but lacks political constitu-
ency, public support ... ol'Kru and
Bassa ethnicity, may be part Krahn ...
age 41. F__1
in the region. Failure to ensure a settlement
will cause regional leaders to reexamine
ECOWAS and its future. It almost certainly
will dampen enthusiasm for intervention in
the future, and differences in strategy
when to pull out and recriminations over
6
support for Taylor, for example-will exac-
erbate animosities among ECOWAS lead-
ers.
Alternative Outcomes
Taylor Overruns Monrovia. There is a fair
chance that Taylor could gain control of
Monrovia. Such an outcome would suggest
that Taylor had a larger core of better
trained fighters than previous evidence had
indicated. This scenario becomes more likely
if Senegal withdraws its force from
ECOMOG or if a military stalemate drags
on for some time, increasing prospects that
domestic developments in Nigeria will force
a withdrawal of its forces. Initial chaos and,
ethnic retribution would be likely, leading to:
heavy civilian casualties, refugees, and at- ~x
least a temporary disruption of international
relief efforts. Taylor, however, probably
would gradually pacify Monrovia and even-
tually the countryside.)
Backsliding Into Chaos. There is some
chance that the current round of fighting will
spread into a wider civil war. The conse-
quences would include heavy civilian casual-
ties, disruption of international relief efforts,
a large stream of Liberian refugees, and no
prospects for a peace agreement. The
likelihood of this scenario occurring in-
creases if:
? NPFL falls apart. ECOMOG military
pressure aggravates internal problems in
the NPFL and Taylor is killed, deposed, or
flees. Other NPFL leaders are unlikely to
hold the group together, and Gio and
Mano commanders probably would estab-
lish strongholds in their home areas. Atroc-
ities would significantly increase. The lack
of a unifying leader would handicap efforts
to reach a peace settlement.
 ? Anti-Taylor factions go on an ethnic ram-
page. ECOMOG loses all control over anti-
Taylor military factions and the Krahn-
dominated groups begin to exact revenge
against ethnic groups associated with the
NPFL. ULIMO and AFL units also move
into Taylorland to take on the NPFL.
? ECOMOG withdraws, Taylor fails to gain
control. ECOMOG's military efforts in-
flict damage on Taylor's forces but fail to
quash them and a military stalemate devel-
ops. Domestic pressures force ECOMOG
to withdraw before a peace agreement is in
place, leading tq a free-for-all between
resurgent Krahn forces and Taylor for
control over Monrovia. Widespread ethnJ
cally motivated retributions would be inev-
itable.
A Workable Peace Settlement. Chances are
slight that ECOMOG can pressure Taylor
into allowing ECOWAS to broker a work-
able peace agreement in the next six months.
The likelihood of serious negotiations would
improve, however, if credible mediators such
as the United States and the UN became
involved and provided the same type of lead-
ership and support they did in Angola. Even
with such assistance, talks probably would be
lengthy and arduous and odds of successful
implementation less than even. Issues that
would need to be resolved include: proce-
dures for encampment and disarmament,
authority over armed factions, composition
of a new peacekeeping/observer force, and
transitional and electoral procedures.F--]
Implications for ;the United States
Greater Pressure To Get Involved. The
United States has provided over $25 million
in support of ECOMOG operations and over
$200 million in humanitarian assistance.
Participating countries, particularly Senegal,
are asking for additional financial and mili-
tary assistance. Such appeals will grow
stronger as fighting intensifies and
ECOMOG members consider their commit-
ment beyond 1992.7-1
Although certain ECOWAS countries will
continue to provide arms to the warring
factions, regional leaders probably will ask
Washington to endorse its arms embargo and
may press the UN and United States to
support full sanctions. Despite ECOMOG's
current emphasis on military pressure, cer-
tain ECOWAS members are`already calling
for outside mediators. Once ECOMOG con-
cludes its military efforts, a regional consen-
sus to request UN involvement is likely to
emerge. If military action fails, ECOWAS
will be even more anxious for international
help in finding a solution.F_~
Given its historical role in Liberia, the Unit-
ed States will come under particular pressure
to play a major role, especially if a larger
humanitarian crisis develops. Washington al-
most certainly would be asked to boost its.
already massive humanitarian assistance by
increasing food and medical efforts and fi-
nancial support to private agencies operating
in Liberia, as well as neighboring Ivory
Coast and Guinea.)
Washington has limited influence with the
warring factions. To increase its leverage,
Washington would have to boost financial
and military assistance and-as in Angola-
become directly involved in the negotiation
and implementation of a peace settlement.
Taylor, Sawyer, and other factional leaders
are rarely swayed by US advice, but they
 continue to contact US officials and attach
importance to US support for their actions.
Taylor almost certainly will continue to ask
for UN observers-accompanied by a reduc-
tion in Nigerian and Senegalese troops-and
greater US participation in the peace pro-
cess, both of which he probably believes
would give him more maneuvering room in
negotiations.F__-]
The Downside of Involvement. ECOMOG is
no longer a peacekeeping force, and Taylor
would view new US assistance to it as a
hostile act, except US assistance to withdraw
ECOMOG troops from Liberia. US and UN
,support for sanctions might get Taylor to the
bargaining table, but it probably would com-
promise their chances as honest brokers in
negotiations. Greater UN and US involve-
ment also risks eclipsing ECOWAS and
giving it a way to unload the burden on
peacekeeping to the international com-
munity.F--]
UN observers in Liberia almost certainly
would help assuage Taylor's concerns about
ECOMOG's neutrality, but we believe a
presence as large as the 400- to 500-member
group sent to Angola might be needed to
ensure encampment and disarmament of the
warring factions. That force cost the UN
about $150 million, of which the United
States is obligated to pay 30 percent. The
United States also will be asked to shoulder
much of the financial costs of an election,
about $10-20 million.
What LI Taylor Overruns Monrovia. If Tay-
lor wins a military victory, he almost certain-
ly will: work to establish good: relations with
the United .States. He ,most. likely would.
immedi,at4ely:turn, to;Washington for hu-
i anitarian,,economic, and military assis
stance. Countries such as Burkina, Libya,
Ivory Coast, and France that have supported
Taylor's effort to varying degrees over the
years, however, are likely to gain influence at
US expense. Taylor, in an effort to secure
international aid and legitimacy, probably
would promise to hold elections, but they
would most likely be delayed and would not
be particularly free or fair. F_1
 Warning Notice Intelligence Sources
or Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
National Security Unauthorized Disclosure
Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Information available as of S November 1992 was used
in the preparation of this National Intelligence Estimate.
The following intelligence organizations participated
In the preparation of this Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
also participating:
The Deputy Chief ofStaffor intelligence,
Department of the A 1my
The Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence,
Headquarters, Marine Corps
This Estimate was approved for publication by the
National Foreign Intelligence Board.
Dissendnatlon Control NOFORN (NF) Not releasable to foreign nationals
Abbreviatloes NOCONTRACT (NC) Not releasable to contractors or contractor/consultants
PROPIN (PR) Caution-proprietary information involved
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