PERU: OUTLOOK FOR THE HOSTAGE CRISIS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005301013
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: June 22, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 14, 2009
• Case Number: F-2008-01718
• Publication Date: January 15, 1997

DOCID ?.Nc3394583
IC
"04V'
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
(b)(3)
SENSE OF THE COMMUNITY MEMORANDUM
15 January 1997
PERU: Outlook for the Hostage Crisis
Intelligence Community analysts believe that conditions are right for a peaceful resolution of the
hostage crisis at the Japanese embassy within the next several weeks unless frustration by Lima
or the hostage takers--the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)--boils over and leads
to the death of some of the hostages. Thus far, the terrorists have held back from violent actions.
Peruvian President Fujimori probably will continue to present a "business as usual" public
posture to deflect attention from the crisis. For example, he is hosting the first visit to Lima by a
sitting Ecuadorian president this week. Meanwhile, Japan, while pressing Fujimori for a peaceful
solution with no loss of life, has taken a back seat in offering strategies to resolve the crisis.
Fujimori probably will accept a face-saving compromise that includes the terrorists' safe
passage out of the country and possibly Tokyo's ransoming of its citizens. Fujimori typically
has a preference for direct action, but this impulse is tempered by the presence of hostages
from other nations--and by the realization that Japan is a key economic and cultural partner.
He is juggling his desire not to damage his domestic standing by appearing to concede to
MRTA demands with the need to reassure foreign countries and investors--particularly
Japan--that he can end the crisis with minimal or no loss of life.
? The terrorists may become more flexible as the crisis enters its second month because they
are anxious to refute claims that the MRTA is as violent as Sendero Luminoso and they want
to survive the crisis themselves. They could agree, for example, to a credible promise from
Fujimori to consider prison reform and safe passage to a third country.
? Japan has sought a limited role in the crisis because it did not want to complicate full
resolution of the crisis--and potentially share some blame for a negative outcome.
Nevertheless, it has offered subtle suggestions that Lima seriously consider granting safe
passage to a third country and accept offers of US assistance.
Despite the prospects for a peaceful resolution, a miscalculation could still produce a violent
outcome. Either the terrorists or Fujimori, frustrated as negotiations drag on, could take
precipitate action to end the stalemate. Fujimori probably would initiate a hostage rescue
mission if the MRTA begin killing hostages, and would consider a rescue if the number of
hostages were reduced substantially, or if all Japanese nationals were released.
This memorandum was prepared by the Deputy National Intelligence Officer f r Latin America. It was based on a
meeting with representatives from CIA, State/INR, DIA, (LSACOM, and USSOUTHCOM.
APPROVED FOR RELEASED
DATE: 08-31-2009