GLOBAL HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES, 1995

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: LIBERIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001508390
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• Document Creation Date: June 22, 2015
• Document Release Date: March 11, 2009
• Case Number: F-2007-00542
• Publication Date: December 1, 1994

DCI
Director of
Central
Intelligence
^ (b) (1)
(b) (3)
National Intelligence Estimate
Global Humanitarian
Emergencies, 1995 (U)
Volume II: Country Estimates
This National Intelligence Estimate represents
the views of the Director of Central Intelligence
with the advice and assistance of the
US Intelligence Community.
APPROVED FOR
RELEASE DATE:
19-Jan-2009
sbr~
NIE 94-33/11
December 1994
Copy i 118
 DCI
Director of
Central
Intelligence
NIE 94-33/II
Global Humanitarian
Emergencies, 1995 (U)
Volume II: Country Estimates
Prepared under the auspices of Enid C. B. Schoettle,
National Intelligence Officer for Global and
Multilateral Issues. Inquiries may be directed to
Se~
December 1994
 Se et
NOF N-NOCONTRACT
Contents
Page
Discussion
1
Kenya
4
Ethiopia and Eritrea
Angola
Mozambique
7
Afghanistan
Pakistan
Europe
Bosnia and Herzegovina
9
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)
11
Central Asia and the Caucasus
11
Georgia
11
Azerbaijan
13
Tajikistan
13
14
14
Middle East-North Africa
16
Annex
International Humanitarian Agencies and the Red Cross Movement
19
 Se ret
NOF N-NOCONTRACT
Figure 1
Current Severe Humanitarian Emergenciesa
Country
Cause
Affected
Population
(millions)'
Ethiopia
Drought
4.3
Sudan
Conflict
4.3
Afghanistan
Conflict
4.2
Rwanda
Conflict
4
Angola
Conflict
3.7
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Conflict
2.5
Conflict and
state collapse
2.1
2
Government
policy
1.6
Eritrea
Drought
1.6
Sierra Leone
Conflict and
state collapse
1.5
Azerbaijan
Conflict
1+
Somalia
Conflict
1.1
Mozambique
Conflict
I
Tajikistan
Conflict
Nearly 1
___
Georgia
Conflict
Nearly 1
Judgment for 1995
In 1995, the country will continue to have a substantial food deficit
estimated at 500,000 metric tons.
The humanitarian crisis in the south is intensifying due to the civil war.
Owing to good harvests, the number at risk will be reduced to 3 mil-
lion.
The civil war has intensified. If Kabul and northern cities continue to
be cut off from supplies this winter, 3 million people in the country
could be in need of emergency humanitarian assistance.
The RPF is struggling to maintain security and to govern but faces the
threat of insurgency. Humanitarian needs will remain at high levels.
Refugees will contribute to instability in Zaire, Burundi, and Tanzania.
Emergency food needs have increased significantly. Despite the sign-
ing of the Lusaka Agreement and the implementation of the shaky
cease-fire, civilian suffering will continue.
The threat of large-scale deaths due to starvation remains low, but the
need for emergency assistance remains high for isolated safe areas.
During 1995, the situation will significantly worsen if UNPROFOR
withdraws, resulting in heavier fighting and decreased access for aid
delivery.
The failure of the warring factions to abide by the 1994 Akosombo
Agreement may lead in early 1995 to the drawdown of ECOMOG and
UN observers. An escalation of fighting will put the entire population
at risk.
Even if the multilateral UN force is able to maintain order, more than
I million Haitians will continue to depend on assistance in 1995.
The level of need will increase if intra-Kurdish fighting resumes or
"Operation Provide Comfort" is discontinued and Saddam Husayn
makes incursions into northern Iraq.
Despite expectations for a good harvest in 1995, dependence on donor
assistance will continue.
Growing prospects for violence in Freetown and ethnic conflict in the
interior risk a further deterioration of the humanitarian situation in the
coming months.
While both sides have generally been observing a cease-fire in place
since May 1994, the economy has slipped notably in the past year and
will continue to decline in 1995.
Factional fighting will increase after UN forces depart by March 1995.
Hunger and disease could reappear, although not at the 1992 level.
When ONUMOZ withdraws in January 1995, the peace settlement
between the MPLA and RENAMO will be severely tested. Renewed
conflict may cause refugees to flee into neighboring countries.
Tajikistan is embroiled in a third year of political and economic insta-
hilitwand.ciwiLkvarTP_oliticaL-reconciliation ic-unlikely- andits futs~re - _
humanitarian situation remains precarious.
The need for emergency assistance will remain at the current high
level whether or not a peace settlement is reached between Georgia
and Abkhaz.
'We define the "most severe" emergencies as those in which approximately I million
or more people are at risk.
hlncludes refugees from the named country, internally dis-
placed persons, and others in need.
 Sectt
NOF RN-NOCONTRACT
Mostly Likely Potential Emergencies
Country
Cause
Judgment
Burundi
Conflict
Political and economic conditions are similar to those in Rwanda in early 1994. Ethnic
clashes are rising, and the threat of widespread bloodshed is growing. The situation could
explode at any time. Conflict could spread to Rwanda, Zaire and Tanzania.
Croatia
Conflict
Unless there is progress on the diplomatic front, chances are greater than even that a mili-
tary offensive will occur to retake parts of Krajina, widening the Balkan war. Even a lim-
ited war could result in several hundred thousand refugees and internally displaced
persons.
 Discussion
(For information regarding potential new
crises, see Volume 1: Global Overview of the
Estimate.)
Africa
Africa's present emergency needs stem from
the regional impact of the Rwanda emergency;
drought, food shortages, and conflicts in the
Greater Horn; and conflicts and food shortages
elsewhere in Africa. (u)
Regional Impact of the Emergency in
Rwanda
Rwanda. Last year, we judged that the chances
of renewed conflict in Rwanda were high. The
humanitarian crisis now under way in Rwanda
is among the most difficult and complex the
world has faced in decades. (C NF)
Before the conflict that erupted 6 April, the
population of Rwanda was 7.7 million. The
ensuing ethnic slaughter has resulted in
500,000 to 1 million deaths. More than half the
surviving population currently is at risk. I
About 2 million people are internally displaced
and nearly 2 million Rwandans (mostly Hutus)
have taken refu e in Zaire, Tanzania, Burundi,
and Uganda
At the same time, 400,000 to 600,000 long-
term Tutsi refugees have moved back into
Rwanda from neighboring states, taking pos-
session of property abandoned by those who
--died oredfiffelwan an Patriotic ront
(RPF) is stretched thin trying to provide
' The population at risk includes refugees from the named
country, internally displaced persons, and others in need. (u)
security and govern, but Tutsi control of
Rwanda is not likely to be overturned in 1995.
Extremist Hutus who fled into exile will
attempt to move back into Rwanda by force. A
developing low-level Hutu insurgency threat-
ens to keep large portions of the country, espe-
cially in the former French security zone,
unstable. FI
The United Nations is encouraging Hutu refu-
gees to return to Rwanda, but many are reluc-
tant, fearing retribution from the former Hutu
army and militia members who dominate the
refugee camps, as well as from Tutsis who now
dominate the government and society in
Rwanda. Many undoubtedly fear prosecution
for their part in the genocide. It is unlikely that
the new Rwandan Government or the interna-
tional community will be able to entice large
numbers of refugees to return home soon. Hun-
dreds of thousands of Hutus are likely to
remain outside Rwanda indefinitely. The physi-
cal, social, and psychological devastation
wrought by the massacres and the civil war will
take years to overcome; some areas of the
countryside will probably remain in the grip of
violence or low-level insurgency.
The government is incapable of providing
assistance to its large internally displaced and
needy population. Expensive rehabilitation
projects and demining operations will be diffi-
cult to mount:
? As a result of the civil conflict that began in
9 0, hundreds of thousands of landmines
have been laid, mainly near the Ugandan
border.
 Sec#et
Meanwhile, most regions in Rwanda are expe-
riencing food shortages, and the cities lack
basic services. Humanitarian needs in Rwanda
will remain at high levels for the foreseeable
future. Fields are lying fallow, for example,
because many of the people who cul-
tivate them have left the country 7r
Current UN Consolidated Appeal
(April-December 1994): $598 million
Burundi. The murder of President Ndadaye, a
Hutu, in October 1993 by the Tutsi-controlled
military set off ethnic bloodletting that killed as
many as 50,000 Hutu and Tutsi Burundians,
displaced about half a million citizens within
Burundi, and drove at least 300,000 people into
Rwanda, Zaire, and Tanzania. In all, more than
15 percent of Burundians are in need of human-
itarian assistance. Burundi's transport system,
which serves the Rwandan relief efforts, as
well as its own needs, is being overwhelmed by
the immense amount of aid flowing into both
countries, as well as into Zaire:
? Following the Rwanda uprising in April
1994, nearly 250,000 Rwandan Hutu refu-
gees fled to northern Burundi. At the same
time, thousands of Burundian Hutu refugees
have returned from Rwanda. If many of the
refugees do not return to their farms to plant
crops by the end of February 1995, the food
shortfall could be significant. (u)
Ethnic tensions in Burundi are approaching the
levels witnessed in Rwanda before the April
1994 massacres began. Even a minor incident
could cause communal violence to erupt again
and the power-sharing coalition government
could fall before the end of 1995 with a Tutsi
walkout.
S cret
One of three scenarios could develop:
? Burundi military coup. Tensions and com-
munal violence could lead to a coup by the
Tutsi-based military against the Hutu major-
ity government. If one occurs, it would fuel
widespread communal violence and likely
will trigger a massive new influx of Hutu ref-
ugees into Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zaire. Tens
of thousands of Hutus and Tutsis could be
killed before civil order is restored.
? Communal violence. Violence from local-
ized incidents could spiral into a nationwide
calamity, resulting in massive deaths and a
flood of refugees. Violence would spread
quickly to Bujumbura where humanitarian
relief efforts for Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire
would be severely hindered.
? Tensions linger on. Burundi's
Tutsi-dominated military and civilian Tutsi
politicians could continue to maintain their
control over the Hutu government. Under
such a scenario, ethnic violence would con-
tinue at low levels with periodic attacks pro-
ducing population flows.
Most Recent UN Consolidated Appeal
(March-August 1994): $59 million
Zaire. Last year we reported that the collapse
of basic services, ethnic strife, looting, and vio-
lence had reduced the availability of food and
that malnutrition and disease were at high lev-
els. Since that time, the influx of more than 1
million refugees from Rwanda and Burundi has
 Secfet
aggravated local Zairian ethnic and political
tensions and has further strained the country's
deteriorating economic system:
? About 600,000 people are internally dis-
placed.
? Although agricultural potential is large, 1995
food production is estimated to be lower than
pre-1960 levels.
? Malnutrition continues at hi h levels, particu-
larly among urban children.
The new government of Prime Minister Kengo
is attempting to address these problems, but
President Mobutu is obstructing these efforts,
and the situation is not likely to improve signif-
icantly in 1995.
A major outbreak of ethnic violence or military
unrest is possible during 1995. Should violence
break out in the volatile eastern provinces, in
the southern province of Shaba, or elsewhere,
the international community would face major,
logistic difficulties delivering aid to large num-
bers of dislocated Zairians spread out over such
a vast geographic area. (u)
Most Recent UN Consolidated Appeal
(October 1993-June 1994): $76 million
Conflict and Drought in the Greater
Horn of Africa2
Sudan. The humanitarian crisis in southern
Sudan is continuing due to an ongoing civil war
that has gone on for over a decade. Last year
offensive against the rebels was hindering relief
efforts to 1.5 million southerners. Civil war and
natural disasters-including flooding-put
approximately 4.3 million Sudanese in need of
food, medical, and other aid in 1994, but large-
scale deaths were averted. We expect that a
resumption of fighting between government
and rebel forces, as well as intra-Sudan Peo-
ples' Liberation Army infighting, will disrupt
relief efforts in the south and cause more popu-
lation dislocations. More than 400,000
Sudanese have sought refuge in Uganda, Zaire,
Ethiopia, Kenva and the Central African
Republic.
Due to the good harvests, the number of people
in need will be reduced to approximately 3 mil-
lion in 1995. However, high levels of malnutri-
tion already are being reported by relief
workers in widespread locations throughout the
south. Elsewhere in Sudan, displaced southern-
ers and northerners need food, medicine, seeds,
and tools.
Funding and logistic problems, bureaucratic
delays in granting clearances for humanitarian
flights and permits for relief workers, and gov-
ernment and rebel obstruction of relief efforts
probably will interrupt deliveries of aid sup-
plies and exacerbate humanitarian problems. In
addition, relief efforts will be constrained by
the presence of 500,000 to 2 million landmines,
mostly in southern Sudan. Both sides in the
conflict are continuing to lay mines at a rapid
rate. F__1
Current UN Consolidated Appeal
(January-December 1994): $231 million
we-reported thatthe frttensifi. ed=.overnment__
PercentMet_56__
,_
2 USAID, June 1994, Breaking the Cycle of Despair: President
Clinton's Initiative on the Horn of Africa identified Burundi,
Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan,
Tanzania, and Uganda as the countries of the Greater Horn of
Africa. (U)
 Somalia. Last year we reported that wide-
spread hunger and disease could recur if inter-
national aid were halted. About 17 percent of
Somalis are at risk. More than 200,000 are ref-
ugees, 400,000 are internally displaced, and
approximately 500,000 are otherwise in need.
Because of a continuing effort by relief agen-
cies-combined with two years of relatively
good harvests-Somalia is not in imminent
danger of a food crisis. The World Food Pro-
gram (WFP) plans to augment donated food
with local purchases. (U)
Somalia's transport system-though rundown
in many parts of the country due to lack of
maintenance-is adequate to serve the country.
Landmines are present along the Ethiopian bor-
der, but major roads i d central Soma-
lia are relatively clear
Relief efforts are increasingly being hampered
by interclan fighting, banditry, and threats and
attacks against relief workers. Moreover, relief
organizations are being forced to negotiate with
whatever local faction controls an area. (U)
Somalia has no political or economic structure
in place at the current time, and pros ects for a
lasting political settlement are pool
Factional fighting will increase in Somalia after
UN forces depart by March 1995. Deteriorating
security has already prompted some relief
agencies to suspend operations. Intense fighting
would displace a large number of Somalis now
dependent on food aid and reduce the antici-
pated increases in agricultural output. Hunger
and disease could reappear, although not at the
1992 level. F__1
Kenya. The situation in Kenya is stable at the
current time, although ethnic tensions continue
to simmer and persistent drought afflicts the
S4.et
northern part of the country. About 170,000 of
Kenya's 28 million people are internally dis-
placed.
Kenya is a haven for more than 250,000 refu-
gees from Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia. Due
to continuing instability at home, refugees from
Somalia and Sudan currently in Kenya proba-
bly will not repatriate. Moreover, their numbers
may well increase, exacerbating Kenya's food
deficit.)
Current UN Consolidated Appeal
(January-December 1994): $96 million
Ethiopia and Eritrea. Early crop failures in
1994 put 8 million Ethiopians and Eritreans in
need of food aid, but large-scale deaths were
averted by timely international relief and
improved rains. Millions of people remain in
need of assistance, however, because of low
agricultural productivity, a chronic food deficit,
and weak distribution systems in the region that
will persist for the foreseeable future. Both
countries are resource-poor following 30 years
of war, and their capacity to cope is limited.
More than 1 million landmines are present
in both countries, primarily in the north.
(U)
In Ethiopia, sporadic rainfall has caused food
shortages. In addition, the spread of a pest
called army worms during the past several
months has added to the problem. Some 4.3
million people-about 8 percent of the popula-
tion-are refugees, internally displaced , or
otherwise in need. Almost 1 million metric tons
of- emergency food aitd were delivered in-1994.-
 If the more than 200,000 Ethiopian refugees in
Sudan, 7,500 in Djibouti, and 11,000 in Kenya
return home, aid will be needed to help reinte-
grate them. A large-scale repatriation to Eritrea
of its 400,000 refugees in Sudan is unlikely
because Eritrea's economic and social infra-
structure cannot absorb them. (u)
Figure 2. Food distribution at a Somali refugee
camp in Ethiopia. (C NF)
Despite the good harvest, the country will have
a food deficit of at least 500,000 metric tons in
1995:
? In the past decade, annual grain production in
Ethiopia-even in years with bumper
crops-has fallen below consumption
requirements. (u)
Eritrea is also facing a humanitarian emer-
gency. About 1.6 million Eritreans-or 46 per-
Elsewhere in Africa
Angola. Emergency food needs in Angola have
increased significantly since last year's Esti-
mate, largely because domestic food produc-
tion has fallen off due to intense and wide-
ranging civil conflict, which prevented planting
and harvesting in many areas of the country.
The UN estimates the number of Angolans
affected by civil unrest and drought at 3.7 mil-
lion-about 38 percent of the population.
During most of 1994, continued fighting endan-
gered aid deliveries throughout Angola, since
both the government and rebels used food as a
political weapon. Although UN agencies and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) pro-
viding relief assistance had improved access
early in 1994, beginning in June the govern-
ment and UNITA frequently denied authoriza-
tion for relief flights destined for the other's
territory:
? The United Nations believes the potential for
mass deaths due to starvation and malnutri-
tion-related illnesses to be much higher than
in Rwanda. (u)
cent of the country's 3.5 million people-are Even in areas without conflict, the delivery of
refugees, internally displaced, or otherwise in humanitarian aid is hindered by the country's
need. Even in good years, Eritrea's harvest poor transportation system. After almost 20
meets only about 60 percent of the population's years of civil war, most highways are in poor
-food _n ods__De~s zite~exnectat ons =for a o~d =? co d tion he w eetien"of=e ting- railsoad
harvest in 1995, dependence on donor assis- are virtually nonoperational. A railway
tance will continue. Some 90,000 metric tons accident in September 1994 in which some
of food aid likely will be needed in 1995, down 139 hitchhiking passengers died was attributed
from 270,000 metric tons in 1994. (U)
Se ret
 Se \ et
to faulty equipment and a poorly maintained
railbed. In addition to problems with pilferage
and corruption, Angola's three ports and
Luanda's airfield offer limited storage, and
cargo-handling equipment is scarce. Many vil-
lages, major cities, roads and bridges, and thou-
sands of hectares of farmland contain
landmines. (u)
Despite the signing of the Lusaka Agreement
and the implementation of a shaky cease-fire in
November 1994, civilian suffering will con-
tinue for some time. Angola will need substan-
tial food donations until the agricultural and
transportation sectors are rehabilitated. The
need for international food assistance will
increase if,
Current UN Consolidated Appeal
(February-December 1994): $188 million
Liberia. Last year we reported that the chances
of renewed conflict were high. Rival armed fac-
tions have increased their competition for terri-
torial control, and divisions among them will
intensify along ethnic lines. Liberia's political
and economic structures have disintegrated. In
all, nearly 75 percent of Liberians are at risk:
750,000 people are internally displaced; more
than 800,00 are refugees in Guinea, Cote d'Ivo-
ire, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria; and
another 600,000 are otherwise in need. The
population of the capital, Monrovia, has grown
from some 300,000 before the civil war to
nearly 1 million currently. (cam')
The conflict among numerous armed factions
in Liberia frequently makes it impossible for
international relief organizations to gain access
to most of the country. Consequently, humani-
tarian assistance for shifting populations-
probably several hundred thousand-trapped
between fighting factions in the interior of the
country is intermittent or nonexistent. Thou-
sands of landmines have recently been laid,
making humanitarian operations even more
precarious. ' . F)
The November 1994 Akosombo Agreement-
the latest attempt to end nearly five years of
civil war-failed and will do little to prevent a
further deterioration of the security situation.
The failure of the warring factions to abide by
the agreement may lead in early 1995 to a with-
drawal of the regional peacekeeping forces, the
Economic Community of West African States
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), and UN mili-
tary observers. This could, in turn, cause a fur-
ther escalation of t - fighting, putting the entire
population at risk. (S
Current UN Consolidated Appeal (November
1993-December 1994): $170 million
Sierra Leone. Last year we reported that the
government seemed to have the upper hand
against the rebels but that the end of the insur-
gency was far from certain. Today, Sierra
Leone does not have a fully functioning gov-
ernment. Food production has halted in major
farming areas, and the economic and social
infrastructure of about two-thirds of the coun-
try has been destroyed. About 30 percent of the
population is at risk. As many as 1.25 million
people are internally displaced due to con-
flict-particularly in the region bordering
Liberia; 30. 000 are refugees in Guinea and
Liberia. (C F)
 Sect
Deteriorating security conditions caused by
renegade soldiers, bandits, and rebels have dis-
rupted humanitarian aid efforts in much of the
countryside. Growing prospects for violence in
Freetown and ethnic conflict in the interior of
the country will lead to a deteriorating humani-
tarian situation in 1995. The Sierra Leonean
military, which lacks transport assets and
trained personnel, cannot give much assistance
to humanitarian efforts. (u)
Mozambique. Last year, we reported that, until
the former combatants are disarmed, a break-
down in security could lead to an acute human-
itarian crisis. Since then, demobilization in
August 1994 and the successful elections in
October have defused some of the threat to sta-
bility. However, the country is still awash in
uncollected arms, and the prospect of unem-
ployed, demobilized soldiers resorting to ban-
ditry remains a significant threat to security and
the efficient resettlement of refugees and the
displaced:
? Mozambique remains susceptible to
cyclones. Cyclone Nadia swept across
Mozambique in March 1994, lashing the
northern province of Nampula and devastat-
ing the country's principal northern port city
of Nacal . About 1.5 million people were
affected. (NF)
Since the elections, international attention has
shifted to restoring the country's torn social
fabric and destroyed infrastructure. The gov-
ernment and international agencies have begun
to resettle Mozambican refugees, and many
have self-repatriated. The total number of the
population at risk is 1 million-6 percent of the
___ _ ___, _ __?po_pu_lation _ as_c_ompared__to 43 ~_er_c_e~t_~e_yeral- -_
years ago. Only 200,000 refugees remain
in Malawi, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and
Tanzania; roughly 500,000 Mozambicans still
are internally displaced, and about 300,000
people are otherwise in need. (cvw)
The presence of as many as 2 million land-
mines has slowed economic reconstruction and
refugee repatriation. All major roads, all rail-
roads, many power pylons, and some farmlands
were mined during the war. (u)
By mid-1995, the population in need within
Mozambique is expected to rise from 800,000
to 1.5 million, including returning refugees,
demobilized soldiers, and internally displaced
persons. When the UN Operation in Mozam-
bique (ONUMOZ) withdraws in January 1995,
the peace settlement between the MPLA and
RENAMO will be severely tested. Widespread
civil or economic unrest-or resumption of
civil war-would make the country ungovern-
able and generate a new wave of refugees.
Current UN Consolidated Appeal
(May-December 1994): $195 million
South Asia
Afghanistan. There is no functioning govern-
ment in Afghanistan, and the civil war is taking
a heavy toll on the country's resident popula-
tion of 13 million. In addition, at least 3 million
Afghan refugees remain outside the country as
a result of the war that began in 1979. The civil
war will continue at least through 1995.
`According to the United Nations and other
:reJ -.encies,the..situatiion_in_Kabu-L-is one-.of
the worst humanitarian crises in the world. A
 blockade of the city has been in effect since last
winter, and civilians' stockpiles have been
depleted:
? Without emergency aid, more than half of
Kabul's approximately 800,000 residents will
be vulnerable to severe food shortages and
epidemics. (c r
Since January 1994, thousands of civilians
have been killed or injured, hundreds of thou-
sands have become homeless, and as many as 1
million have been internally displaced. The
civil war has halted repatriation efforts for the
refugees, most of whom currently are located in
Iran and Pakistan. The approximately 1.8 mil-
lion Afghan refugees in Iran are better off than
their counterparts in Pakistan, according to
Embassy reporting; most have been integrated
into Iranian society.
Delivering humanitarian aid in Afghanistan is
treacherous and difficult. Several relief workers
were murdered in 1992, causing the United
Nations to reassess its humanitarian relief pro-
gram, dramatically reduce its staff, and remove
expatriates from the country. The Soviet-
Afghan war left at least 9-10 million-and pos-
sibly as many as 35 million-landmines spread
throughout the country. While all provinces
have been affected, those on the Pakistani bor-
der and near Kabul have the most severe prob-
lems:
? The number of persons needing aid within
Afghanistan could be as high as 3 million if
fighting continues and Kabul and its environs
as well as northern cities continue to be cut
off from supplies this winter
Most Recent UN Consolidated Appeal:
(April-September 1994): $62 million
Figure 3. UN trucks at a camp near Peshawa Pakistan, used
to distribute f o o d and supplies t o Afghanistan. ( N ) ,
have fled to Pakistan since January 1994. (c
Pakistan. When fighting resumed in Afghani-
stan in January 1994, Pakistan closed its border
with Afghanistan to prevent a new influx of ref-
ugees. Pakistan will remain dependent on inter-
national assistance as long as it hosts a
significant number of Afghan refugees. Cur-
rently, more than 1.4 million Afghans are in
camps in Pakistan. More than 70,000 of these
According to a 1993 Department of State
report, Pakistan does not have a major problem
with landmines, although there are minefields
along its disputed border with Kashmir. (u)
Sri Lanka. The civil war in Sri Lanka between
the Sinhalese majority and Tamil separatists
continues to inflict hardships on the popula-
tions of the north and east, where most of the
fighting is occurring. Some 600,000 people,
mostly Tamils, have been internally displaced
by the conflict; more than 100,000 are refugees,
mostly in India. Transportation capabilities and
the country's infrastructure have largely been
neglected for the past decade. Landmines pose
a significant threat to the population and to
relief o~erations._They have been heavily used
on the Jaffna Peninsula and to a lesser degree in
other areas contested by government forces and
the insurgents. (u)
 Europe
At the same time, relief organizations still face
major obstacles in delivering food and supplies.
? The Bosnian Serbs periodically attack or
otherwise obstruct relief convoys and air-
craft, as well as cut off water and power sup-
plies. The Bosnian Government and Bosnian
Croats obstruct deliveries and distribution to
a lesser degree.
? Crime-much of it based. on black-marke-
teering of humanitarian goods-has become
endemic and will continue to be a major
problem in 1995.
? With an estimated 1.5 million landmines,
Bosnia and Herzegovina have the most
severe landmine problem in Europe. Mines
have been placed around the major cities, vil-
lages, along roads, and in religious buildings,
schools, and other places where refugees
might congregate. (u)
In addition, donor funding shortfalls have
begun to plague relief efforts:
? Overall contributions to the UN High Com-
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for the first
half of 1994 were 70 percent less than in the
same period in 1993. (u)
Relief officials attribute the decline to lack of
progress toward a peace settlement, competi-
tion from the Rwandan disaster, and sporadic
media coverage. Despite the funding shortfall,
relief agencies have pre-positioned food stocks
in sufficient amounts to cover basic needs
through winter 1995. (C NF)
andBihac-as well as to the displaced
Theabih Qf ntenationalaencies to_meet____
Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the threat of large-scale deaths
due to starvation and exposure currently
remains low, although the need for continued
humanitarian assistance remains high for iso-
lated safe areas and displaced and vulnerable
populations. Approximately 2.5 million
Bosnians are at risk. There are 1.1 million Bos-
nian refugees outside the former Yugoslavia
and in neighboring former republics and
1.4 million internally displaced persons and
others in need in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Over the last year, three trends have developed:
? More food is now available, and food prices
have fallen to near prewar levels in some
areas. Relief agencies delivered 247,000 met-
ric tons of food aid to Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina during the first eight months of 1994-as
compared to 172,000 metric tons delivered in
the first eight months of 1993.
? Health conditions have generally improved
due to increased food and medical supplies,
lower levels of fighting, and improved sanita-
tion. A WHO study in early spring 1994
found no severe or widespread malnutrition
in the country, despite delivery shortfalls over
the winter. Except in the Bihac enclave, war-
related casualties-the chief killer during the
conflict-also have declined.
rehabilitation efforts. However, aid deliveries
to people in the eastern enclaves, Sarajevo,
? Aid agencies have begun shifting resources to
the elderland other social cases-are
continuing. (
future humanitarian needs in Bosnia and
Herzegovina will depend on the level of
9 Sec'Nt
 S\ret
fighting and the outcome of negotiations to set-
tle the conflict. One of three scenarios could
develop:
? Continued fighting at present levels. If peri-
odic offensives and counteroffensives fail to
result in a decisive shift in the military situa-
tion, aid requirements for the isolated "safe"
areas-Sarajevo, Bihac, and the eastern
enclaves-generally will remain at 1994 lev-
els. Aid needs for the contiguous areas of the
Federation of Bosnia will continue to decline
if access into central Bosnia is not cut off for
an extended period of time.
? Fighting escalates. Should increasing hostili-
ties force UNPROFOR to withdraw, Bosnian
Serb forces, emboldened by the unlikelihood
of a lifting of the arms embargo, would esca-
late military operations in order to consoli-
date their territorial gains. They would
attempt to expand the northern corridor, cap-
ture the eastern enclaves, and tighten their
siege of Sarajevo. At the very least, Bosnian
Serb forces would cut aid access and utilities
to these areas. In addition, Bosnian Serbs
would probably interdict major road routes to
central Bosnia, cutting off aid deliveries.
? A political settlement. In the unlikely event
that a political settlement is reached, short-
term relief needs may increase as relief agen-
cies begin to resettle refugees and displaced
persons. Needs would then transition from
emergency relief to rehabilitation and recon-
struction as normal commerce resumed-(-c~
Croatia. The UN, European Community, and
other international relief organizations provide
aid to more than 180,000 Bosnian refugees-
mostly m re ugee camps-an support t e
Croatian Government's effort to assist about
200,000 displaced Croats, many of whom live
with friends and relatives. The Croatian econ-
omy revived substantially in 1994 although
political settlements of both the Bosnian and
Croatian conflicts will be necessary before nor-
mal commercial activity can be resumed and
large-scale repatriation and resettlement takes
place. Negotiations at the end of 1994 made
halting progress on economic confidence-
building measures between the Croatian Gov-
ernment and the Croatian Serbs, who control
approximately 27 percent of Croatian territory
in the Krajina and eastern Slavonia:
? If progress continues to be stalled on negotia-
tions to reestablish Zagreb's authority over
the UN Protected Areas and to resettle some
Croats to the Serb-controlled Krajina, an out-
break of fighting between Croatia and the
Krajina Serbs is likely.
? Chances are greater than even that Zagreb .
will initiate a military offensive to retake all
or parts of Krajina during the first half of
1995, widening the Balkan war and involving
troops and support from Serbia and Montene-
gro. An outbreak of fighting could affect hun-
dreds of thousands of Serbs in the "Republic
of Serb Krajina" and Croatians near the front-
lines, resulting in more internally displaced
e~ rsons and refugees from both communities.
(cc
Should a major war erupt in Croatia, UN
humanitarian- oiler-tions-in-Bosnia-would- also
be affected; relief assistance to more than 1
million Bosnians could be cut off.' ~
About a million landmines are present in the
former conflict areas-now UN Protected
Areas-and the number may be growing_in
areas where
ow-mtensi y con is con roues.
 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
(FYROM). Macedonia remains vulnerable to
economic, external, and interethnic pressures.
Its economy has suffered from the loss of tran-
sit trade due to UN sanctions against Serbia and
Montenegro, as well as from a trade embargo
by Greece (begun in February 1994), which
cuts off the country from its only outlet to the
south. Although unlikely during 1995, the
potential exists for the influx of as many as
300,000 ethnic Albanians from the neighboring
Serbian regions of Kosovo, should an ethnic
incident there lead the minority Serb authorities
to pursue a policy of ethnic cleansing. The
economy is already at the brink of collapse, and
the government is unable to care for its Bosnian
refugees. An influx of Kosovar Albanians
would overwhelm Macedonia's capacity, add to
tensions between Macedonians and minority
Albanians, and result in the ngbd for large-scale
humanitarian assistance. (c
Current UN Consolidated Appeal for all of the
former Yugoslavia (January-December 1994):
$721 million
Central Asia and the Caucasus
Georgia. Last year we reported that civil con-
flict in Georgia would continue, with full-
blown civil war a possibility. Although full-
blown civil war was avoided and is not likely to
break out over the time period of this Esti-
mate-largely due to the deployment of Rus-
sian peacekeepers in a security zone along the
Abkhaz-Georgian border-the country remains
fractured by unresolved ethnic conflicts. There
are more than 250,000 internally displaced per-
sons. Key transportation lines remain blocked,
most industries are operating at minimum
capacity, and a severe energy shortage has crip-
pled the economy. (u)
Nearly 1 million Georgians-about 17 percent
of the population-are in need of humanitarian
assistance, and most of the population relies on
Western grain for bread production. More than
200,000 of those in need are Georgians dis-
placed from Abkhazia:
? The 1994 grain harvest was only 229,000
metric tons, well below average, far less than
the 1993 harvest.
? FAO estimates Georgia will require more
than 1 million metric tons of grain from April
1994 to March 1995; as of November 1994,
750,000 metric tons had been donated,
pledged, or secured through credits and loans.
(U)
Delivering aid to Georgia is precarious.
T'bilisi's access routes north to Russia are con-
trolled by Abkhaz separatists, and those west to
Black Sea ports are frequently disrupted by
banditry and electricity shortages. Natural gas
shutoffs from Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan and
Russia will persist this winter because of Geor-
gian arrears. For the next year, the need for
humanitarian assistance in Georgia will remain
at the current high level whether or not a peace
settlement is reached between Georgia and
Abkhaz. Civil strife and localized crime and
violence are likely to continue to disr t com-
mercial activity and relief efforts. (c )
There are more than 70,000 landmines present
in Georgia, primarily in the Gumista River Val-
ley outside Sokhumi, the Kodori Valley, the
Och'anch'ire region, the Gali region, and along
the western portion of the Enguri River. (u)
Armenia. Last ear, we reprted_that Armenia
was all but cut off from the outside world
because of civil strife and the diversion of relief
 aid in Georgia, a blockade by Azerbaijan, and
Turkey's restriction of the delivery of supplies.
The restrictions by Azerbaijan and Turkey con-
tinue. Minefields are present along Armenia's
borders with Turkey and Iran. The only over-
land supply route open for food and fuel deliv-
eries is the deteriorating and dangerous road and
rail system extending from Black Sea ports
through Georgian territory, which is rife with
banditry and subject to interdiction by ethnic
Azeris. The natural gas pipeline transits Geor-
gian territory near the Azerbaijan border, where
it is vulnerable to sabotage and cutoffs from
suppliers. Armenia's humanitarian needs have
been lessened by strong expatriate financial sup-
port, but widespread hunger will be avoided this
winter only if Georgian railroads function. (u)
The UN estimates that more than 250,000 refu-
gees from Armenia-ethnic Russians and eth-
nic Azeris-are in Russia and Azerbaijan.
Another 50,000 Armenians are internally dis-
placed. Government and NGO networks are
well established, but shelter programs fall well
short of meeting the needs of internally dis-
placed persons and refugees:
? The acreage planted for grain in 1994 was 13
percent lower than in 1993, winter wheat
plantings were down by 25 percent, and
cereal imports have decreased by a third of
their 1990-91 levels.
? FAO estimates a minimum grain import
requirement of 450,000 metric tons for July
1994 to June 1995. Donors are expected to
meet the grain shortfall needs in Armenia for
1995. (u)
Because it is unlikely that conditions along
rmema s ore- wi c ange su sta ttia y
during 1995, the need for emergency humani-
tarian assistance will continue at existing
S'et
levels. The absence of energy supplies is caus-
ing the Armenians to experience another cold,
dark winter. (u)
Azerbaijan. Last year, we reported that the war
in Azerbaijan over its ethnic Armenian-domi-
nated enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh had esca-
lated. We estimated that living conditions
would worsen as winter set in and food sup-
plies dwindled. While both sides have gener-
ally been observing a cease-fire in place since
May 1994, the Azerbaijan economy has slipped
notably in the past year and will continue to
decline in 1995. The Karabakh Armenians have
conquered one-fifth of the country, including
some of the best agricultural land, and have
control of a large cordon sanitaire into Arme-
nia. The resettlement of Azeris to Nagorno-
Karabakh or Armenian-occupied territory will
remain problematic as the various sides con-
tinue to jockey in the wake of the December
1994 Organization for Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe (OSCE) agreement:
? Civilians living near the frontlines of war
zones remain at risk from sporadic shelling.
There may be 50,000 or more landmines in
the Nagorno-Karabakh region. (u)
The affected population is estimated by the
United Nations to total more than 1 million
people-about 13 percent of the population.
Nearly 1 million refugees and internally dis-
placed people will continue to rely almost fully
on international relief. (u)
The country's worsening economic crisis has
placed an increasing number of the nonrefugee
population at risk, including nearly 200,000 in
the Nakhichevan enclave, where Armenian
blockades have e t an estimate percent o
 the population without wage income. Domestic
food shortages will become serious in 1995;
bread has already become more scarce on the
market due to grain shortages. The cutoff of the
rail line from Russia through Chechnya will
exacerbate shortages of basic food stocks.
Relief agencies are expanding efforts to pro-
vide aid to vulnerable populations throughout
the country, including 350,000 pensioners and
disabled. Baku has appealed to Iran, Turkey,
and Russia for food assistance, and in Novem-
ber 1994 Yel'tsin pleQged to deliver 300,000
metric tons of grain. (c
Current UN Consolidated Appeal for Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Georgia (April 1994 March
1995): $130 million
North Caucasus. Last year, we reported that
limited local warfare in Russia's North Cauca-
sus region was likely to result in some refugee
movements and hinder relief efforts to the
entire Caucasus. Conflict in Chechnya effec-
tively stopped pipeline and rail shipments south
into the Caucasus by late 1994, and by the end
of November full-scale conflict had broken out
between forces loyal to Chechen President
Dudayev and those of Russian-backed local
oppositionists. Moscow's recent direct inter-
vention may result in a protracted conflict that
could draw in sympathizers from neighboring
North Caucasus republics, creating refugees
and internally displaced persons.
Tajikistan. Last year, we reported that, despite
a successful UNHCR repatriation of as many as
400,000 displaced and refugee Tajiks, efforts to
assistance in 1994 helped to avert a humanitar-
ian crisis, and a Russian- and Uzbek-dominated
CIS peacekeeping force is guarding against the
resumption of civil war by insurgent Tajik
oppositionists operating out of Afghanistan.
Continued high levels of food assistance are
expected to forestall widespread hunger in
1995, but regional, clan-based violence could
break out following parliamentary elections in
February, leading to a collapse of the UN
cease-fire and isolating as many as 500,000
Tajiks, particularly in the Vodii Gharm (Garm
Valley), the Kulob region, and the Pamirs:
? The 1994 grain crop was 25 percent below
normal, and the Tajik Government lacks the
resources to procure much of the estimated
900,000 metric tons of grain, which are nor-
mally imported annually. By late 1994, grain
imports had shrunk to less than half of mini-
mum consumption needs, most cities had run
out of flour reserves, and armed bands were
tacking the food distribution system.
F)
Continued high levels of international assis-
tance will be required in 1995 to provide and
distribute food. Following the presidential elec-
tions in November 1994, which were widely
viewed as fraudulent, interested CIS donors,
primarily Russia and Kazakhstan, promised to
help make up for the grain shortfall of esti-
mated 300,000 metric tons in 1995. (C)
Although 80 percent of the refugees and dis-
placed people who fled during the 1992 fight-
ing have since returned, several hundred
thousand remain inadequately housed and fed
in the southern Kulob region. Security and pro-
reintegrate-man of-thosexeturmees ver=e4ai1ion fer--thesr-etu_r-n s s4nade-quaze d = - -,
ing, and the humanitarian situation would prob- their reintegration into Tajik society has been
ably worsen. Large amounts of international slow. Approximately 20,000 are living under
 Se ret
squalid conditions in camps in northern
Afghanistan. Nearly 100,000 are internally dis-
placed, many in the isolated Pamirs. The refu-
gees from Tajikistan who have fled to the
former Soviet Union number more than
300,000-including native Russians-and
most are not expected to return. (u)
Current UN Consolidated Appeal
(April-December 1994): $43 million
Latin America-Caribbean
Haiti. At present, Haiti is the only country in
the region in need of emergency humanitarian
assistance. Last year, we estimated that desper-
ate economic conditions in the country could
bring calls for emergency relief and stimulate
sudden and massive migration that would
necessitate direct US assistance. At least 2 mil-
lion Haitians currently are receiving emergency
health and water assistance; approximately 1
million are also receiving food from interna-
tional agencies:
? Lack of agricultural inputs, principally seeds
and fertilizers, have hindered vegetable pro-
duction, and industrial poultry production has
been largely abandoned due to lack of feed.
? Unemployment in rural areas, home to the
majority of Haitians, may be as high as 40
percent.
? In urban areas, declining production for
export has driven hundreds of firms out of
_busine d. cost -thousands _of workers the r_
jobs. (C F)
The international community's Energy Eco-
nomic Recovery Plan (EERP), if implemented,
should ease somewhat Haiti's most pressing
economic woes. The plan pledges some $650
million in the next 15 months, with $195 mil-
lion coming from the United States. (c
Still, Haiti remains a deeply divided society
and the new civilian government in Port-au-
Prince is not able to maintain order on its own.
If the United Nations Mission in Haiti
(UNMIH)-set to take over from the US-domi-
nated Multinational Force (MNF)3 early in
1995-is less effective than the MNF in main-
taining order, societal violence could increase
sharply. This, in turn, would pose a threat to the
distribution of international aid and could cre-
ate a renewed outflow of refugees. Even if
UNMIH is able to maintain order, more than 1
million Haitians probably will depend on inter-
national assistance in 1995 ' depend
Middle East-North Africa
Iraq. Iraq will require substantial emergency
humanitarian assistance in the coming year.
Relief efforts by the UN and other international
aid agencies are directed at approximately 1.3
million of Iraq's 20 million people. Last year,
we reported that the dependence of the Kurds
on international assistance had increased due to
Baghdad's embargo of the north. Relief offi-
cials estimate that approximately 750,000 peo-
ple in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq now
require assistance. }-,
The displacement of more than 30,000
Iraqi Kurds due to fighting in August and
September and an influx into northern Iraq
3 There will be 6,000 US troops and 2,000 troops from other
nations in Haiti by 15 December 1994. (u)
 of approximately 10,000 Kurds fleeing the
fighting in southeastern Turkey this summer are
adding to the pressure on relief efforts in the
region. A more critical situation could develop
if widespread intra-Kurdish fighting resumes or
if "Operation Provide Comfort" is discontinued
and Saddam Hussein makes incursions into
northern Iraq. Even if the oil embargo and the
sanctions regime were relaxed, the humanitar-
ian needs of the population at risk would
remain high.
On the surface, it appears that the humanitarian
program in northern Iraq is beginning to have
an impact. Irrigation projects-though still lim-
ited in scope-have transformed previously
barren valleys into productive lands. This
year's wheat yield was greater than last year's,
the Kurds are again growing their own rice,
livestock population has grown, new construc-
tion projects are under way, and villagers are
returning to their homes. But the improvements
in northern Iraq are fragile. The economy
remains stymied by the double sanctions, and
the fluctuating dollar-to-dinar rate reflects an
uncertain political situation. Iraqi shelling
along the border areas has escalated in recent
months as Saddam continues to look for new
ways to increase pressure on the Kurds. }
Planned food assistance from relief organiza-
tions should be adequate to meet the winter
needs in northern Iraq-which is traditionally a
surplus foodgrowing region. Approximately
100,000 metric tons will be needed from April
1994 to March 1995.4 This figure includes food
that relief organizations will purchase inside
Iraq. Lower resources for the UN program will
lead to a drawdown of personnel associated
with both security.arAd xelief, pro --ran bm_
? This number is a rough estimate only-the need for FY1995
has not yet been determined. (u)
United Nations already plans to cut its guard
force in Iraq to 100 personnel. The lack of
donor contributions to the food relief programs
will probably result in cutbacks for the World
Food Program and its implementing partners.
In central and southern Iraq, the United Nations
estimates that approximately 550,000 people
will require limited food assistance in 1995-
the same number as last year. One-hundred
thousand to 150,000
Iraq still denies the UN and other relief agen-
cies access to the southern marsh areas. The
regime has constructed causeways to divert
water away from the marsh areas, burned
marsh reeds, destroyed villages, and forced the
inhabitants to flee.
An estimated 5-10 million landmines are
present in Iraq. Minefields exist along the bor-
ders with Iran, Kuwait, and Turkey. Within
Iraq there are extensive minefields in Kurdis-
tan. (c, )
Current UN Consolidated Appeal
(April 1994-March 1995): $289 million
Percent Met: 25
 Yemen. The need for humanitarian assistance
in Yemen is growing and probably will
increase over the next year. Economic
conditions, already poor, were further weak-
ened by the civil war in 1994. According to US
diplomats and other Western observers:
? The fighting, which displaced 375,000 resi-
dents, caused an estimated 10,000 casualties
and has overwhelmed Yemen's health care
system.
? Unexploded ordnance and mines litter road-
sides and some hinterland areas, making
overland travel dangerous, particularly in the
Aden area. (c F)
Although relief organizations have operated in
Yemen for years, the lack of a strong central
government has placed relief workers at risk:
? Westerners are subject to threats and harass-
ment by local tribesmen; many of them use
hostages as bargaining chips to demand con-
cessions from the government.
? Islamic militants may view Christian relief
agencies as an affront. Members of the Sisters
of Charity, a humanitarian organization
founded by Mother Teresa, reportedly have
been harassed by Islamists in Aden since the
war ended. (,C.14)
Current UN Consolidated Appeal
pleted.
peacekeeping operation, less than 5 percent of
the population is at risk. Fewer than 100,000
Cambodians remain internally displaced; twice
that number are otherwise in need. The living
standards remain low throughout most of the
country. Sporadic fighting between government
troops and Khmer Rouge insurgents continues.
Cambodians are forced periodically to flee
from their homes. In May, for example, more
than 40,000 Khmer fled their villages in Bat-
dambang Province when local government
defenses collapsed and the Khmer Rouge razed
several villages. Last year, we reported that
more than 360,000 refugees who had recently
returned would need food assistance as UN
rationsJan out. The repatriation has been com-
International assistance to Cambodia has been
hampered by Phnom Penh's political infighting,
corruption, and a lack of qualified administra-
tors. Low-level fighting poses particular haz-
ards for donors distributing assistance outside
the capital. The Khmer Rouge and government
forces sometimes have harassed NGOs and
destroyed their facilities.
? The Cambodian Mine Action Center, a UN-
sponsored demining group, was forced to
temporarily suspend operations in May when
government troops damaged its headquarters
during a skirmish with Khmer Rouge troops.
(August 1994-February 1995): $22 million In no country in the world have uncleared land-
mines had such an enormous adverse impact as
in Cambodia, where one in every 236 people
has lost a limb to a landmine. The mines are
found mostly in the western and northwestern
parts of the country. New mines continue to be
laid. (u)
Cambodia. After more than 20 years of civil
war and internal unrest and an investment
of more than $2 billion in the 1991-93 UN
Se et 16
 Humanitarian assistance will be needed in
Cambodia during 1995 due to continuing war-
fare in the countryside, a dilapidated infrastruc-
ture, crop shortfalls, and the government's
serious budgetary limitations. UN food assis-
tance has ended, but UNHCR is helping some
50,000 returnees to find land, and UNDP is
providing development assistance. '(? Q
Burma. In Burma, a country with a total popu-
lation of 44 million people, counterinsurgency
operations, and repressive government policies
continue to dislocate and bring hardship to eth-
nic minorities. Half the 280,000 Muslim
Rohingyas who fled to Bangladesh in early
1992 remain there; the UNHCR now is repatri-
ating them at the rate of 5,000 per week in an
operation likely to be concluded by mid-1995.
(U)
More than 70,000 refugees-including political
dissidents and members of ethnic minorities
who have fled political persecution or attacks
by the Burma Army-have crossed the border
Figure 4. A Rohingya Muslim border camp in Bangladesh,
and live in camps in Thailand. Harsh govern-
ment policies and fighting between the Burma
Army and ethnic or narcotrafficking insurgent
groups may periodically increase the need for
humanitarian assistance as more people flee
their homes. )
Burma faces a serious problem with uncleared
landmines; all sides in the internal conflict have
used them over the past 40 years. (u)
 THIS PAGE WAS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 Annex
International Humanitarian
Agencies and the Red Cross
Movement
The UN Department of Humanitarian
Affairs (UNDHA)
The UNDHA was created in 1992 in an attempt
to improve UN coordination of humanitarian
relief. Its mandate includes providing assistance
to developing countries to prevent and warn
against disasters, as well as to mitigate their
effects; improving the UN's standby capacity
for dealing with emergencies; launching con-
solidated appeals; and improving the transition
from emergency relief to rehabilitation. Its
1993 expenditures were $72 million. (u)
The Office of the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR)
UNHCR, mandated to protect, repatriate, and
resettle refugees,' sometimes also coordinates
assistance programs for internally displaced
persons. Its budget has increased dramatically
from $400 million in 1984 to $1.3 billion in
1993. UNHCR, which is represented in more
than 100 countries, is financed almost entirely
by voluntary contributions from governments
and private contributors; a small amount comes
from the annual UN budget and may be used
only to defray administrative costs. (u)
The World Food Program (WFP)
WFP, the food aid arm of the United Nations
with offices in 85 developing countries,
provides both emergency aid and long-term
development assistance. Its 1994 expenditures
for emergency assistance and aid to internally
displaced persons are $1.2 billion. Funding
comes from voluntary contributions from gov-
ernments and other UN agencies in the form of
commodities, cash, and services. (U)
The UN Children's Fund (UNICEF)
UNICEF provides assistance, particularly
nutrition, health, and education, to children and
mothers in developing countries and to victims
of disasters. UNICEF has offices in 128 devel-
oping countries. Its total budget for 1993 was
$866 million, of which $138 million was
expended on humanitarian relief. Funding con-
sists of voluntary contributions from govern-
ments and from private donors. (u)
The World Health Organization (WHO)
WHO, which has a wide range of health-related
functions, furnishes technical assistance and
aid in humanitarian emergencies. Its 1993
expenditures for humanitarian relief were $48
million. Funding is provided by assessments on
UN member states, voluntary contributions
from governments, and contributions from
other UN agencies and private donors. (U)
The UN Development Programme (UNDP)
UNDP, the world's largest development ser-
vices network, operates as the United Nation's
-- _ n ng d ord nat-ing geneyy-oar
International law, as it has developed since 1945, defines "ref- technical cooperation. It maintains more than
ugees" as persons who are compelled to leave their country due
to fear of persecution, armed conflicts, or civil strife and whose 100 Resident Representatives in developing
lives or security would be endangered if they returned. (U)
 countries, many of whom serve as UN country
team coordinators in humanitarian emergen-
cies. Its total budget for 1993 was $1.4 billion,
of which a small but increasing portion was
expended on rehabilitation in humanitarian
emergencies. Funding comes from voluntary
contributions from governments at an annual
pledging conference called by the UN Secre-
tary-General. (u)
The European Emergency Humanitarian
Aid Office (ECHO)
ECHO, the emergency humanitarian assistance
organization of the European Union (EU),
manages and coordinates all EU relief efforts.
One of the largest contributors of humanitarian
relief, it allocated roughly $708 million for
humanitarian aid in 1993 and budgeted about
the same amount for 1994. Funds come from its
12 member states, many of whom also contrib-
ute bilaterally to humanitarian emergencies. (u)
The International Organization for
Migration (IOM)
IOM arranges resettlement and repatriation for
refugees and migrants. In 1993, its budget was
$263 million, of which a substantial portion
was for emergency assistance. Operational
funding comes from voluntary contributions
from governments, and administrative funding
comes from mandatory contributions from its
member governments. (u)
The International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC)
Established in 1863, the ICRC predates any
other agency in the international humanitarian
system and has unique attributes that set it apart
from both international organizations and
NGOs. Over the last century, it has been
assignee-important o cia response i hies set
forth in the Geneva Conventions and Additional
Secket
Protocols, including protection and assistance to
victims of international and internal civil con-
flict. A unique mandate of the ICRC is to moni-
tor treatment of prisoners of war, a humanitarian
responsibility not shared by any other relief
organization. When conflict situations stabilize,
ICRC turns over assistance operations to
National Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies and
other. NGOs. (u)
The ICRC's tradition of neutrality, impartiality,
and independence gives it credibility. Its com-
mitment to operating with the consent of war-
ring parties elicits belligerents' cooperation up
to a point but can impede its access to endan-
gered populations. ICRC adherence to its well-
established principles may also limit coordina-
tion with-other organizations that do not share
its tenets. (u)
The ICRC is a private, independent organiza-
tion composed largely of Swiss nationals and
supported primarily by Western governments.
Its 1993 expenditures for international disaster
relief were $519 million. (u)
The International Federation of Red Cross
and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)
IFRC is a federation of 161 National Red Cross
and Red Crescent Societies that provide assis-
tance to victims of natural disasters and armed
conflicts in their countries or in countries in
which they have a particular interest. The scale
and nature of the Federation's involvement in
emergency relief operations have grown dra-
matically in recent years. Its 1994 Emergency
Appeal seeks to assist 13 million persons in 46
countries. In 1993 its expenditures on interna-
tional relief were $273 million. (u)
 Warning Notice Intelligence Sources
or Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
National Security Unauthorized Disclosure
Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Information available as of 15 December 1993 was
used in the preparation of this National Intelligence
Estimate.
The following intelligence organizations participated
in the preparation of this Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
The Office of Intelligence Support,
Department of the Treasury
The Director of Intelligence,
Department of Energy
also participating:
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence,
Headquarters, Marine Corps
This Estimate was approved for publication by the
National Foreign Intelligence Board. '
Dissemination Control NOFORN (NF) Not releasable to foreign nationals
PROPIN (PR) Caution-proprietary information involved
ORCON (OC) Dissemination and extraction of information
controlled by originator
All material on this page
is Unclassified.
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